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Abstract
Teamwork, participation and the structure of representation are the core issues of this
thesis. The aim is to show how an industrial relations (IR) system shapes the introduction
of teamwork and defines the introduction of teamleaders and teamspeakers, and how these
teamleaders/teamspeakers affect the structure of representation. To evaluate this,
organisational behaviour theories of teamwork, leadership styles and industrial relations
models (unitarism, pluralism, adversarialism) are applied. Since the introduction of
teamwork into an existing manufacturing plant represents a transition from a worker-
supervisor system to a team-based system, a theory of democracy and collective bargaining
is used to evaluate the outcome of such a transition. In contrast to a worker-supervisor
system on the shopfloor, teamwork involves either a management-appointed teamleader or
an elected teamspeaker. Both cases have certain consequences for the structure of
representation on the shopfloor.
This research was designed to answer the question: To what extent and in what ways does
the institutional context affect the transition from a traditional system of representation to
teamwork and how does this affect the structure of representation? Two detailed case
studies have been conducted in the motor-car industry, using surveys and interviews. One
of the case studies was carried out at Vauxhall's Luton (UK) plant, the other at Adam Opel
AG in Germany. Both plants are subsidiaries of General Motors which introduced teamwork
as part of their Quality Network Production System in the early 1990s, modelled on MIT's
lean production. In one plant (Vauxhall) there was an adversarial IR system, resulting in an
appointment model: in the other there was a pluralist IR system which led to an election
model. The effects of an elected teamspeaker or an appointed teamleader on the structure
of representation have been examined.
The thesis argues that an existing IR system shapes the introduction of appointed
teamleaders or elected teamspeakers. The findings of the case studies and the survey
results indicate that appointed teamleaders tend to adopt an authoritarian leadership style
and are not seen as representatives by team-members (Vauxhall). In other words, the
outcome of a transition taking place in an adversarial IR system is adversarial;
management, teamleaders and team-members still view each other as us and them. In
contrast to this, a pluralist IR system tends to favour the election of teamspeakers, who are
seen as representatives. Consequently, the structure of representation in a pluralist IR
context supports pluralism as an outcome and strengthens its capacity for problem-solving;
while the structure of representation in the adversarial IR case increases the adversarial
nature of the system and further weakens its capability for problem-solving.
XII
1. Introduction
Industrial production incorporates technical production concepts which have shaped
the social organisation of work. Ford's development of a moving assembly line and the
standardisation of products and components had a strong impact on work in much the
same way as Taylor's division of labour forced workers to assemble only parts of a
product. In this system workers were separated from each other and closely moni-
tored by supervisors. Shopfloor relations were defined not only by a separation of
thinking, planning, and execution, etc. but also by a worker-supervisor structure.
Aware of the inhuman and impersonal aspects of assembly line work, many attempts
were made to humanise industrial assembly-based production concepts. One such at-
tempt was the introduction of teamwork, developed and studied by the British Tavis-
tock Institute in the 1950s. While in the 1970s teamwork became increasingly popular
with government supported Quality of Life projects in Germany. The failure of these
projects brought an end to teamwork, which has never been widely introduced as a
form of production organisation.
With the arrival of Japanese plants, the so-called transplants, in the USA and in Great
Britain, Western car manufacturers experienced not only competition because of im-
ported cars from Japan but also Japanese production in their home countries. Given
this threat, the motor-car industry ordered an intensive study of the Japanese produc-
tion system developed by Toyota. MIT's study resulted in a much cited book on the
car industry. 'Within one year no less than about 50 new management science books
carrying the title lean production were published in Germany and the IG Metall organ-
ised a conference on that subject" (Deutschmann 1995:97). The MIT research intro-
duced the term lean production to describe the organisation of workers in teams and
saw it as one of the crucial advantages of the Japanese. On the basis of increased
competition from Japanese manufacturers, plant closures and the MIT research find-
ings, Western motor-car companies started introducing teamwork. One of the early
and most intensive examples of the introduction of teamwork occurred at GM both in
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the USA and in Europe. Vauxhall in the UK and Opel in Germany which also intro-
duced a reorganisation of production away from the supervisor-worker system to a
teamwork system in the early 1990s.
As in other companies, GM's teams were headed by either an appointed teamleader or
an elected tearnspeaker. Whether or not teamleaders were appointed or elected did
not - it seems - depend on the free choice of management, but on the structure of the
existing lR system. Since European car plants exist in different IR systems within each
country and within each company, Europe displayed a patch-work of different IR
systems . and different teamwork approaches. Companies displayed a different ap-
proach to the selection of teamleaders not only in different countries, but also between
different plants in one country (GM-Opel in Riisselsheim differs from GM-Eisenach).
Apart from the rather rare example where a new plant in constructed at so-called
green-field sites like GM's German Eisenach plant (Mickler et al. 1994), in most
cases teamwork was introduced into an already existing plant (brown-field site). As
such, teamwork has been introduced into car plants where production and representa-
tion patterns were already organised long before teamwork arrived. One such example
was the existence of a supervisor system at Vauxhall and at Opel. Under the old sys-
tem, supervisors played a managerial role in controlling workers. In contrast to su-
pervisors, whose role was to oversee and monitor workers, teamleaders were required
to represent team-members. Whether elected by a team or appointed by management,
teamleaders or teamspeakers were conceived as having representative functions; this
created a new structure of representation additional to that of unions, works councils,
and workplace representatives.
The transition to a new model of this sort obviously affected industrial democracy on
the shopfloor in different ways. The concept of management-appointed teamleaders
differs widely from that of election by team-members. In the former case teamleaders'
loyalty will tend to be influenced by management because of their appointment, while
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the loyalty of an elected teamspeaker will tend to be with the team-members who
elect them; i.e. teamleaders and teamspeakers relate differently to their organisational
environment and to the structure of representation. It is the existence of these two
different organisational forms that lead to the research question: To what extent and
in what ways does the institutional context affect the transition from a traditional
system of representation to teamwork and how does this affect the general structure
of representation?
The two systems of elections and appointments have consequences for representation
structures; because of this one appointment case (Vauxhall) and one election case
(Opel) are part of the comparative case study. These two detailed case studies have
been supported by a short questionnaire investigating both the affects of teamwork on
representation and on the sort of change in social relations that the organisation un-
dergoes when teamwork is introduced. In order to compare apples (appointed team-
leaders) with pears (elected teamspeakers), a comparable framework (fruits) has to be
used. Since Vauxhall's IR systems and team-concept differs from Opel's IR systems
and team-concept, only a theory of industrial democracy and representation can com-
pare both. In other words, the fruits of the research must be a general theory of col-
lective bargaining and democracy. If it is the case that existing IR systems and struc-
tures of representation have defined the shape of Opel's and Vauxhall's team-concept,
a theory needs to be developed to predict outcomes on the basis of a study of the two
IR systems and the two structures of representation.
Moore's theory of transition (1966) has some implications here because it is based on
an examination of the social conditions which defme outcomes after a period of tran-
sition. He argues that in the case of nation states some reach modernity without de-
veloping a democratic system, while others develop a non-democratic systems. What
determines the outcome is not the transtion itself but the pre-existing conditions, i.e.
the existence or absence of feudalism. Walton and McKersie's theory of collective
bargaining negotiations (1965) is also useful in examining outcomes in an IR context.
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While Moore's theory was developed as a societal model, Walton and McKersie's
theory has its origins in IR and applies directly to collective bargaining negotiations,
i.e. examining the existing IR system and its affects outcomes: integrative bargaining,
distributive bargaining and collusion. It can equally be argued that a move from a
supervisor-worker system to a teamleader-member system leads to different outcomes
under different conditions. Along with the theory of democracy the IR concepts of
unitarism (collusion), pluralism (integrative bargaining), and adversarialism
(distributive bargaining) can be usefully used to examine the outcomeson. An IR
system of representation clearly must change with the introduction of teamwork. Both
a theory of transition and the triadic lR approach can be utilised by analysing the IR
system of at least one organisation which has had a non-democratic outcome and an
alternative system which resulted in a democratic outcome. The affect of teamleaders
on the structure of representation can be analysed and compared. For example, if an
IR system is based on a) pluralism (integrative bargaining), the possible outcome of
a transition to teamwork is likely to be an election of teamspeakers. As in the other
two cases: bl) non-democratic (adversarial), or b2) non-democratic (unitarism) the
outcome is likely to be non-democratic, this will mean a management appointed
teamleader.
If the IR system and the method of selecting teamleaders influence each other, the af-
fect of teamleaders and teamspeakers on the structure of representation can be ana-
lysed using organisational behaviour theories of groups, teams, and leadership styles.
The second problem to be addressed is whether or not teamleaders who are appointed
by management will tend to be loyal to management and are likely therefore to adopt
a different leadership style compared to elected teamspealcers whose loyalty will be
directed to their teams. Leadership styles will not only define a teamlcader's relation-
ship to team-members but will also influence the structure of representation itself. The
crucial question is therefore: who represents team-members best, is it the teamleader
or the teamspeaker, or the more traditional forms of representation, e.g. stewards,
workplace representatives, works councils members, etc.
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Chapter 2
Research Questions
Hypotheses &
Theory
2. Teamwork, Industrial Relations
& Industrial Democracy
The following chapter will examine teamwork in the light of a) organisational behav-
iour (the sociology of groups and teams and leadership theory and b) industrial rela-
tions (IR) and industrial democracy theory using the transitional and the triadic model.
In sociological definitions of teamwork, teams and groups are seen as different struc-
tures in an organisational arrangement. Teams therefore are not a synonym for
groups. However, both teams and groups have leaders. Since the present thesis is on
representation, the issue of teamleader or groupleader and whether or not they are
elected by team-members or appointed by management is crucial for exploring the
issue of representation and issues of industrial democracy.
The triadic approach to IR distinguishes three approaches: a) unitarism, b) pluralism,
and c) adversarialism. This model is used in the following ways: a) actors in the field
of IR use one of three approaches as a frame of reference (Fox 1973:205), b) an ap-
proach or a system of IR is used (Bean 1985:2) to describe existing characteristics,
elements or patterns and c) as an intellectual interpretation of reality is used (Clegg
1975, Hyman 1978, Poole 1982). The three approaches are applied in the thesis to the
introduction of tearnleaders/tearnspeakers into the workplace and to transitional is-
sues.
In order to examine the transition from a traditional system of representation to a'
team based system of representation, some theory of transition is necessary. There are
parallels-between the theory of transitions and the IR triadic model. While the IR
model uses unitarism and adversarialism for a non-democratic system and pluralism
for a democratic system, Moore similarly uses dictatorship and communism for a
non-democratic system, democracy for a democratic system. Both Moore and Walton
and McKersie's theory can be adapted to analyse the affect of teamwork and the role
of teamleaders/teamspeakers as it has developed in different IR systems.
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2.1. The Theory of Teams
& Industrial Democracy
In order to investigate the issue of teamleaders/teamspeakers, it will be necessary to
examine the difference between groups and teams, the nature of leadership styles and
how the selection procedure of teamleaders/teamspeakers (i.e. appointment/election).
affects the whole pattern of industrial democracy and IR.
2.1.1. Theories of Teams & Groups
Both teams and groups can be defmed as a "number of people who (a) interact with
each other, (b) are psychologically aware of each other, and (c) perceive themselves
to be a group" (Buchanan & Huczynski 1985:131). Both can also be described as
membership groups (Luthans 1985:362), because they consist of a defined and regu-
lated membership. The performance of tasks is also a crucial element for manufactur-
ing groups, because often, that is the reason for their existence: they are "formally de-
signed to work on a specific project or job. There interaction and structure are for-
mally designed to accomplish the task" (Luthans 1985:362). The manufacturing teams
studied in this thesis are primarily and necessarily task groups, because their existence
is based on the task of assembling cars.
While Kirsch argues that teamwork is working in a loose group or Arbeit im Raum-
verband (Kirsch 1993:19) many authors distinguish a difference between teams and
groups. Katzenbach & Smith (1993:60) state: "No group ever becomes a team until it
can hold itself accountable as a team". Their analysis differentiates between: work-
groups, real teams, and high-performance teams. High-pelformance teams are ex-
tremely rare in the motor-car industry. The important distinction then for this thesis is
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that between teams and groups. In a workgroup members share information, perspec-
tives, and insights however manufacturing teams on assembly lines usually do little
more than share information. Management, on the other hand, define these groups,
which have a very limited function, as teams. In many cases, attempts to shift respon-
sibility to the groups are made without giving them any degree of autonomy or train-
ing for autonomy. No attempt is made to define team coherence or accountability. In
contrast to workgroups, teams should share responsibility among team-members and
also perform a number of other functions as demonstrated clearly by Katzenbach &
Smith's table (1993: 214):
Table 2.1.: Work rou s and Teams
Workgroups Real Teams
Strong, clearly focused leader Shared leadership roles
Individual accountability Individual and mutual accountability
The group's and the broader purpose is the same Specific team purpose the team itself delivers
Individual work-products Collective work-products
Runs efficient meetings Encourages open discussion &
active problem-solving meetings
Measures its effectiveness indirectly
by its influence on others
Measures performance, directly by
assessing collective work-products
Discusses, decides, and delegates Discusses, decides, and does real work together
Katzenbach & Smith's definition of real teams argues that responisbility is distributed
throughout the team. Manufacturing workgroups in the motor-car industry on the
other hand generally have strong leaders who are expected to take overall responsi-
bility. Another important distinction between workgroups and teams has also been
used in terms of the work-product. While teams, as a result of their collective effort,
produce a complete product or a modular product (an engine, or a complete cockpit
for a car), workgroups always have a Tayloristic fragmentation tasks approach. In
short, no group can ever be a team, but all teams have surpassed the stage of being a
group. It seems, then, that the term workgroup is a more appropriate label for teams
in the car industry because such a group certainly never reaches the level of real
teams in terms of autonomy or coherence.
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2. 1.1. 1. Autonomy
Handy (1988:179) sees the necessity of being in control of decision-making proce-
dures as crucial to team autonomy and argues that the selection procedure itself will
affect the way decisions are made. Decisions he argues can be made in different ways:
"Decision by authority; decision by majority; decision by consensus; decision by mi-
nority; decision by no response". Decision by majority is the typical process in a team
when teamspeakers are elected, because their very existence is based on a majority
decision. Decisions by consensus are also likely to result in elected teamspeakers. A
distinction needs to be made between autonomous and semi-autonomous teams, the
former have total decision-making power; the latter have much less power to make
decisions (Versteeg 1990, Rubenowitz 1992, Schuring 1992). However, since no
group in IR organisations is totally autonomous, all manufacturing teams tend to be
conditional or semiautonomous. "There are, nevertheless, several dimensions and de-
grees of autonomy" (Trist 1981:32).
Gulowsen (1979) was particularly interested in the autonomy of teams as one of their
essential characteristics and developed the hypothesis that industrial democracy in-
creases with the degree of autonomy given to the team. On the basis of this assump-
tion, he developed a 9-item-scale as a measurement of autonomy which Berggren
(1992:96) applied to the motor-car industry. The following study will draw on his
scale of items which examines the following areas of their level of autonomy: 1. the
selection of the teamleader, 2. new members on the team, 3. distribution of work
within the team, 4. time flexibility, 5. acceptance of additional work, 6. representation
outside the team (i.e. teamleaders directly approach management without having to go
through supervisors), 7. methods of production, 8. production goals (output), 9. pro-
duction goals (quality):
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Table 2.2.: Levels of Participation
1 2 3 4
No participation
by a team
Team participates
in decisions
Co-decision-
making
Autonomous
team decision
is the total control of
management Man-
agement makes
decisions and teams
operate. Teams
have no power on
decision-making and
no participation. A
team-member re-
mains within a
'foreman-worker
structure.
Teams have some input
to their work and can
make suggestions, can
request and discuss is-
sues with management or
supervisors. The voice of
teams is heard, but teams
have no power for co-	 •
decision-making, which
remains in the hands of
management
is the stage which teams
can really influence issues
by co-decision-making,
Teams can reach deci-
sions with management as
an equal partner. The
decision-making power
given to teams by man-
agement can be seen as a
sign of trust leading to
"real teamwork" (Katz-
enbach & Smith 1993).
indicates managements
full trust in teams. They
can reach decisions
without management
Teams are autonomous
and accepted as full and
equal partners. The
closer the nine items on
Gulowsen's scale reach
level 4, the more a team
has achieved the status
of a real team.
2.1.1.2. Teams and Teamleaders
Not only the method of teamleader's selection, but also the relationship between
teamleaders and teams is pivotal. When the teamleader is elected by the team there are
particular reasons for this and these reasons will affect the relationship with the team.
They are often "elected by their peers, because they score highly in performing tasks
and the socio-emotional category" (Brown 1993:72). It seems that a teamleader is
usually a group member who possesses more status (and power) compared to most
other team-members (Brown 1993:51). A leader can be a task-specialist (Ribeaux
1978:280) or a socio-emotional specialist (Luthans 1985:484).
Whatever the reason for selection, the elected teamspeaker is less likely to experience
conflict with team norms than an appointed one but more likely to face conflict from
external pressures. The relationship between elected teamspeakers and their teams will
therefore tend to "fit well with a democratic culture, with representative systems"
(Handy 1988:183), and this will establish a model of democratic leadership, member
participation, and overall co-operation. Under democratic leadership there tends to be
personal and friendly relations among members, little scapegoating of individuals and
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a consistent work level; even when the leader is absent the group continues to pro-
duce good results.
White and Lippitt (1960) in a classic study of leadership in 1943, distinguish between
autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire leaders, but focus their study on democratic
leadership (Brown 1993:70, Smith et al. 1984:163). According to White and Lippitt, a
group's reaction to an autocratic leader might result in either an aggressive or an
apathetic outcome (Luthans 1985:476). Such leaders also tend not to interact openly.
Teams who have an autocratic leader are left with two options: a) to fight against
teamleaders or b) ignore them. In a democratic leadership style, both options are less
likely because conflicts are more likely to be solved within the team. Appointed
teamleaders do not necessarily need to be autocratic, but since they are not elected,
they are less likely to be answerable to a team and more likely to be loyal to manage-
ment. White and Lippitt also describe a laissez-faire leader, whose characteristics are
nowhere found in the motor-car industry.
A leader can be defined as a person who "influences others in the group more than
they themselves are influenced" (Brown 1993:67). To build a leader-follower relation-
ship between leaders and members, a leader must build credit with a group. This
credit is what gives them the subsequent legitimacy to exert influence over members.
Such legitimacy can be gained from various sources, it can come through appoint-
ment, or election, or through the support of followers in a less formal way. The basis
of a tearnleader's legitimacy varies and his/her relationship to team-members may also
vary according to the basis of this legitimacy. While the following have been defined
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as management styles (Smith et al. 1984:176) they are nevertheless also helpful in de-
fining the different roles of teamleaders and teamspeakers:
• Teamleaders tell: this is the most authoritarian style.
• Teamleaders sell: teamleaders still see themselves as the decision-maker and control-
ler, but instead of simply issuing instructions they will consider the best way to present
their wishes to the subordinate so as to get a reasonable and willing compliance.
• Teamleaders test in this style teamleaders will still define the situation and possible
course of action, and will then ask the subordinate(s) for comments and opinions. 	 •
• Teamleaders consults: here is the beginning of participation.
• The teamleader joins: this is a totally participative style. The teamleader and subordi-
nate(s) jointly review the situation and reach a decision on appropriate action.
A teamleader tells style would be most likely in the case of an appointed teamleader
who can draw on management's given authority; a democratic teamspeaker is less
likely to use the teamleader tells approach. A less authoritarian approach is the
teamleader sells style, which seeks compliance with the teamleader still in control. An
elected teamspeaker is less likely to use a sell or test style; consultation is the style of
democratic teamspeakers, who need the team's backing and legitimacy. Appointed
teamleaders on the other hand generally do not need to consult a team, because their
basis of legitimacy is external and they do not need the backing of the team. The
tearnleader joins style describes a mode of democratic leadership; s/he is part of a
team and her/his legitimacy is based on the team. For example teamleaders at Rover
who are selected by a mixed system of appointment and election, are not free to move
towards a style described as telling or selling, because they still depend on their team.
Even though Rover's teamleaders are assessed by management, they depend on their
teams, i.e. they tend to favour consultation or a joint leadership style.
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2.1.2. Conclusions
Teams are clearly, then, not the same as groups and according to all the accepted cri-
teria manufacturing teams are in fact groups. Unlike teams which share leadership re-
sponsibilities in a democratic style, groups often have a strong authoritarian leader.
This thesis will argue that what is called teamwork in the motor-car industry by either
sociological or IR criteria, does not represent genuine teamwork as defined by
• ICatzenbach & Smith. Given the conventional use of the term teamwork by industry,
the thesis will use the term teamwork, even though the term workgroup would be
more appropriate. However, teams in manufacturing do have a certain autonomy from
the organisation as investigations using Gulowsen's measure will demonstrate
(chapter 7), but they also show that the level of autonomy is low. Indeed, only 1/3rd
of all teams examined are able to select their teamleader and most teamleaders' legiti-
macy is derived from management. Given this basis to their legitimacy, research is
able to demonstrate that the motor-car industry is dominated by a particular leader-
ship style, which tends to be non-democratic. This has a number of implications for
the way that new representational forms have emerged from the introduction of
teamwork and also on how these new forms have affected traditional representational
structures.
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2.2. The Theory of Industrial Relations
The following section will examine the triadic approach to IR 1) unitarism, 2) plural-
ism and 3) adversarial by looking at each area in three ways: a) the orientation of
actors, b) the pattern of relationships, c) a theoretical assessment (Fox 1974:248f.).
This is followed by a consideration of the implications of unitarism, pluralism, and
adversarialism for industrial democracy. The place of teamwork in industrial democ-
racy and the implications for representation and participation are evaluated. Finally,
the theory of democratic and non-democratic systems is examined in relation to its
implications for 4) teamwork and industrial democracy, 5) Moore and Walton and
McKersie.
Cressy (1985), Salaman (1987:25) and others follow Fox (1966) with some varia-
tions. The latter initially specified two frames of reference: a) the unitary ideology, b)
the pluralist ideology, and then, through his critique of pluralism, added a further
radical perspective, i.e. the adversarial. Since one of the shortcomings of the triadic
approach is its restriction to three "boxes", Purcell & Ahlstrand (1994) have devel-
oped a more refmed version of the three approaches by developing sub-divisions. One
of their sub-divisions of Fox's pluralism is designated as sophisticated consultative,
yet another is the concept of a modern paternalism in which management "recognises
and values the relationship with trade unions and works council" (1994:197). Their
analysis of a sophisticated consultative framework is built on the idea of a complex
but constructive relationship with trade unions. In contrast to this, pure paternalism is
essentially unitarist because it not only attempts to avoid unions it also provides its
own system of benefits for employees and therefore expects loyalty in return. Another
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sub-division of Fox's unitarism is traditionalism, which is opposed to workers' or-
ganisations of representation. Purcell & Ahlstrand use the term bargained constitu-
tional as a sub-division of the adversarial system to illustrate how a long-established
union representation can be permitted by management and yet operate in an adversar-
ial relationship. Participation within the category bargained constitutional, is based on
highly specific collective bargaining arrangements which are clearly marked and are
controlled by management.
The triadic approach can provide a useful tool not only to understand and analyse ac-
tions in IR, but also to compare IR phenomena. By using the triadic approach, three
levels of analysis are important to differentiate: A) IR actors can use one of these
frames of reference as an ideology; this is the case when decisions and policies within
an IR system are based on an ideology which creates the frame of reference. This can
be seen as what Parsons (1968:758) calls "action frame of reference". Giddens
(1979:55) uses the terms action or agency which consits of several factors: the active
consciousness of the actro, a set of reasons, the motivational component of their ac-
tions and practice that are formed by intentions that influence human conduct, etc.
Classic cases are the model us and them to describe an adversarial frame of refer-
ence; we are all one big family to describe the attitude that prevails in a unitarist
frame of reference; and everything is manageable to describe a pluralist frame of ref-
erence. B) Giddens sees structuration as ways in which regular and repeated forms of
action generate systems of expectations and normal modes of behaviour, in turn
shaping actors' relations with each other. Then, for example, pluralist modes and ac-
tions can create pluralist structures. An action can build one element which together
with other elements can determine pattern of behaviour that result in institutionalised
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forms of IR. Structure can be "understood as referring to a pattern of social relation-
ships" (Giddens 1979:60). This is the second level of the triadic approach. C) The tri-
adic model can then also be fitted into a wider theoretical perspective which is then
used to analyse IR. This is the intellectual perspective or a set of social beliefs or ide-
ology. Unlike Parsons' action frame of reference, these are intellectual perspectives
based on social beliefs and not on action in a Parsonian sense. For example IR can be
understood using theoretical perspectives like Marx' theory of political economy or
using Walton and McKersie's theory of collective bargaining to examine the behav-
iour of parties in the process of negotiations.
As Purcell & Ahlstrand (1994) and others have shown, simply adapting the triadic ap-
proach involves the danger of possessing a model which has significant shortcomings.
Within collective bargaining negotiations, Walton and McKersie (1965) argue that a
feature of the pluralist approach expresses itself in integrative bargaining, while the
characteristics of Fox' adversarial approach are similar to their distributive bargain-
ing model. A sub-division of Walton and McKersie's attitudinal structuring model is
collusion (Purcell 1981:57) which has certain similarities with Fox' unitarist model.
Their integrative bargaining model can be linked to Purcell's concept of a high-trust
relationship (1981:61), while their distributive bargaining model indicates Purcell's
low-trust model. However, despite the shortcomings of the triadic model, it is useful
not only for an analysis of teamwork and representation, it can also help to set up a
frame of reference to compare different IR systems. The following section will de-
scribe the triadic approach (2.2.1. to 2.2.3.) divided into three sub-sections as it ap-
plies to: a) IR, b) industrial democracy and c) teamwork. The sub-sections will in-
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elude the use of unitarism, pluralism, and adversarialism as: a) a frame of reference,
b) a pattern of relationships, and c) an intellectual and theoretical perspective.
22.1. to 2.2.3. ' a) industrial relation* tii industrial democracy -c) teamwork
22.1. unitedSt 2,..
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- pattern of relationships
intellectual perspective
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2.1.1. Unitarism
Unitarist industrial relations as a frame of reference
The IR concept of a unitarist frame of reference (Fox 1974:249) uses the family as an
analogy, i.e. the ideal unitarist vision compares IR to a family. It sees family as a
synonym for relations in industry with the guiding paternal hand of management as the
hierarchical head. As in a family, each actor in the industrial organisation has a given
place with a set role in an accepted hierarchy; collective bargaining either has a dimin-
ished role or does not occur at all. Management and workers' representatives have an
attitude towards co-operation, as in Walton and McKersie's attitudinal structuring
model they collude to avoid collective bargaining. Both parties go beyond the ques-
tion of recognising the legitimacy of the other's ends and means"; interests merge and
both "form a coalition in which they pursue common ends" (Walton and McKersie
1965:188).
Just as in a family, the concept of loyalty is important in this model, so is the concept
of mutual understanding and commitment in this model (Storey & Sisson 1991:168).
This sort of loyalty can be expressed in manufacturing industry as an esprit de corps
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or as the Japanese feudalist concept of oyabun-kobun or again as Fox's Master and
Servant relationship (1974:250), i.e. a mutual dependency with a top-down structure.
Each position within this framework is determined and actors have to play their role.
As in a family, a unitarist frame of reference demands loyalty from each member and
trust in leadership from the top. This model sees managers as strong father figures,
invites all the IR actors to identify with the organisation and fulfil their role in his/her
place in the hierarchy. A managerial unitarist frame of reference seeks a good pater-
nalistic relationship with senior stewards and unions (if they exist at all), on the basis
that "we're in the same business for the same purpose" (Rose 1992:265), i.e. it identi-
fies management and worker's goals.
Unitarist industrial relations as an approach
The unitarist pattern of a relationship is basically conflict free because it starts from
the assumption that industrial organisations are characterised by shared interests and
values. Unitarism as a pattern of a relationship assumes that there is a family or a
team striving towards a common goal (Purcell & Sisson 1984). IR is therefore struc-
tured in a way which avoids conflict, because the main function of IR is to support the
process of production. This is HRM's function. Marchington (1992:8) says of HRM:
"At its most basic level, HRM has come into vogue as a new, more fashionable name
for personnel management". However, Storey (1992) makes a distinction between
personnel management, IR and FIRM; he views the nature of this relation as unitarist
(1992:35). In a unitarist approach industrial democracy is seen as the communicating
of management's decisions; these briefings take on the status of employee involvement
(Marchington & Armstrong 1981). Charismatic leadership appeals to a unity of inter-
ests and uses a hierarchical structure of established procedures for common agree-
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ments. In its most logical and constant form it operates like a determinist machine
(Cressey 1985:129).
Unitarist industrial relations: an intellectual perspective
Unitarism as an intellectual perspective starts with the assumption that there is an
identity of interests between capital and labour. It argues that an independent organi-
sation of representation via stewards and unions is not needed, because workers' and
management's interests are the same (Marchington & Armstrong 1981). Unitarism as
an intellectual perspective does not investigate or even recognise power as central to
social and industrial life. "It's existence is taken for granted and, hence, it's effects
have been left largely uninvestigated" (Poole 1978:12).
Unitarism as an intellectual perspective views trade unions in three ways (Fox
1973:190); a) as historical anachronisms brought into existence originally by an un-
enlightened and short-sighted political movement to achieve so-called humane treat-
ment by employers for employees; b) as a result of greed to increase the welfare of a
particular group; c) more extremely it sees trade unions as a vehicle serving those who
seek to subvert the existing social order, i.e. having a political purpose extraneous to
the effective functioning of industry.
Unitarist industrial democracy as a frame of reference
--A unitarist frame of reference rejects any form of industrial democracy. Industrial
democracy as a system of representation for different interest groups does not exist as
a force within a unitarist frame of reference. It always seeks to perpetuate the idea of
a conflict free zone where mutual understanding is achievable between management
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and workers aiming for a common goal. Conflicts are not seen as inherent to the
whole system, but as individual conflicts which need to be resolved on an individual
level.
Marchington's concept of employee involvement (El) can be seen as being part of a
unitarist frame of reference on industrial democracy, because "El differs from col-
lective bargaining and industrial democracy, both of which are explicit forms of power
sharing between management and employees - via their representatives" (Marchington
1992:18). Basically, employee involvement only operates on the level of granting em-
ployees more information, or in some cases a limited influence on the shopfloor.
Again, to what extent autonomy is given, is at the discretion of management and
therefore is non-democratic and essentially non-participatory.
Unitarist industrial democracy as an approach
A unitarist approach to industrial democracy features FIRM. For Ackers et al. HRM
strategies includes participation as a model to by-pass unions. In their model of union
by-passing, the "likely circumstances are an historically strong, workplace trade union
organisation, facing a looser external labour market and unfavourable political advan-
tage" (Ackers et al. 1992:277). Ackers et al. conclude that short of trying to destroy
unions completely this HRM strategy is geared towards a domestication of unions.
This is exactly what happened in the 1980s in some well-unionised larger manufactur-
ing companies and led to a non-union model. This "is a union avoidance model
championed by US companies like IBM and Hewlett Packard" (Ackers et al.
1992:277). They also quote examples where trade union organisation pose an obsta-
cle to management's control of its human resource management techniques.
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A unitarist approach to industrial democracy is demonstrated in Japanese IR in
workplaces in Britain, such as Sony and Nissan, etc. The principle of a no-strike or
lock-out agreement is achieved through the setting up of a "participative" mechanism
- the company employees' board. Not industrial democracy, but employee involve-
ment via consultation is introduced. This type of consultation involves no more than
explaining the commercial objectives of the company. In contrast to a pluralist ap-
proach, which seeks to create institutions for participation, a unitarist approach to
industrial democracy sees individual consultation as more important than group con-
sultation, preferring to deal with workers as isolated units rather than with groups of
workers. This does not constitute anything like real industrial democracy. In a uni-
tarist approach, industrial democracy or participation is reduced to production-related
issues like quality etc. and does not reach the realm of workers' involvement at any
other level. Therefore, shopfloor workers participate exclusively, but directly in qual-
ity control circles and in group-oriented problem solving efforts but not in any other
type of decision making.
A unitarist approach to industrial democracy as a coflict-solving mechanism defines
industrial conflict in a narrow individualistic way; "the doctrine of common purpose
and harmony of interests implies that an apparent conflict is either (a) merely fric-
tional, e.g. due to incompatible personalities or things going wrong, or (b) caused by
faulty communication, e.g. misunderstandings about aims or methods, or (c) the result
of stupidity in the form of a failure to grasp the communality of interests, or (d) the
work of agitators inciting the supine majority who would otherwise be content" (Fox
1966:12).
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Unitarist industrial democracy: an intellectual perspective
The intellectual tool to analyse industrial democracy in a unitarist IR system is not co-
decision-making or participation, but a very weak version of participation; i.e. em-
ployee involvement. For the advocates of employee involvement (unitarism),
"industrial democracy - as an aspect of practical IR - was buried with the Bullock
Committee fifteen years ago; and employee participation is its replacement;
"employee involvement is silent on power but noisy on getting work done more effi-
ciently" (Towers 1992:1).
Unitarists have not developed an intellectual perspective on industrial democracy, be-
cause both are mutually exclusive. In short, from an intellectual view point, demor-
cracy can exist in the area of politics, but not as an aspect of IR.
Unitarist teamwork as a frame of reference
Given the unitarist frame of reference a team is seen as a family within a larger family,
the company, with a teamleaders as a father figure. A teamleader in this system does
not belong to either side of a social or industrial organisation and there is no need for
any kind of election process to balance an inherent conflict between different power
interests, because:
Were are no oppoilitiVoups tirialons: arid therefore niTiiiiarfiadirs
[within the team; Its members owe allegiance to their own leader but to no
others. If the members have an obligation of loyalty towards the leader, the
obligation is 'certainly reciprocated, for it is the duty of the leader to act in
I such a way as to inspire the loyalty he demands. Morale and success areA
LciPselYSMAgetan.„ctrost heavilY19011,Pe.ActnAlselali,Qnshim (F9k1966:3)4
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Given that a hierarchical concept of loyalty is the central frame of reference, teams are
expected to be loyal to the company and team-members are expected to be loyal to
their teamleaders.
Unitarist teamwork as an approach
The unitarist team-concept approach focuses on authority and on loyalty. Teams are
not regarded as independent units in a plant which are allowed to act on their own
behalf. Nor are they seen as an independent force representing one interest among
other interest groups. Teams are seen as part of an organic structure functioning as a
natural part of the company to enhance the goals of management. Direct and individ-
ual involvement in production related issues on the shopfloor is often carried out in
production teams, i.e. involvement on the lowest level as part of HRM strategies.
As much as teams are encouraged to involve themselves directly on the shopfloor,
they are not believed to need any participative role in the selection of a teamleader;
this is defined as part of the right to manage. This view can be located in a strong
authoritarian practice. In the unitarist team-concept, "teamleaders have the opportu-
nity to become more involved" (1Cinnie 1989:142), while in Kinnie's definition the
teamleader is part of the involvement process, the team itself is not.
Unitarist teamwork: an intellectual perspective
Teams are organised in a so-called natural way and management selects teamleaders
in the interest of teams. Teams are part of a hierarchical system at the bottom of the
organisation, serving production and are themselves hierarchical; the tearnleader be-
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comes, in turn, a father figure imposing his will on the team and regards himself as the
trustee of their true interests (cf. Endo 1994). The intellectual perspective of unita-
rism, as far as teamwork is concerned, can be summarised in the words of a Nissan
manager Mithunaga (1992) at the Kyushu plant:
rC5iir team system is orgatifie—ci tikirifirWiuza (61:1afiantiairinafia) in a topl
UnwamaxaO thatAhelop can controltabpttotn,lbe head can controphetand„4
In sharp contrast to the adversarial or pluralistic view of teamwork, unitarism does
not view teams as an additional group with rights to participate, nor as an additional
actor representing either side: management or workers.
2.2.2. Pluralism
Pluralist industrial relations as a frame of reference
Walton and McKersie's (1965:5) integrative bargaining model shares some of the
characteristics of the pluralist framework; i.e. both sides negotiate in a joint decision-
making process, which "requires open communication which in turn depends on trust"
(Purcell 1981:51). Therefore a positive attitude towards trust plays a central role in
integrative bargaining. In the words of Walton and McKersie (1965:356): "problem
solving succeeds with frankness" between the two groups. The pluralist frame of ref-
erence or the pluralist standpoint (Fox 1974:258) argues that different groups have
different interests and that institutions are needed to bring about the accommodation
of these different interests. Management and workers do not all sit in one boat. This
difference of interest is recognised as part of the pluralist frame of reference; it is not
ignored or denied.
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The essential aspect of this frame of reference is that the actors believe that conflicts
between management and workers are inherent to the system and that they can be
regulated on a micro level. There is also a strong belief in institutions and their capac-
ity to manage IR problems.
Pluralist industrial relations as an approach
The pluralist approach to JR recognises permanent conflict as part of the industrial
system (Clegg 1975:312); it focuses on procedures which Fox (1974:264) calls: basic
procedural consensus. As a pattern of behaviour for conflict-solving, Walton and
McKersie (1965:4) focus on the use of integrative bargaining to find common inter-
ests and solve the problems confronting both parties. Both methods have the underly-
ing assumption that joint-decision-making processes are necessary (1965:5). Conse-
quently, "industrial relations pluralists have generally combined a sense of the inevi-
tability of conflict in industrial life, with a balanced awareness of the grounds for co-
operation and compromise" (Ackers et al. 1992:269). The pluralist approach allows
the existence of independent trade unions, but sees them as part of an institutional
framework and needing to operate within a defmed framework. Industrial democracy,
then, is an instrument to forge corporatism.
In Cressey's words (1985:117): "the participation approach is oriented towards im-
proving industrial relations practices, changing workforce attitudes and possibly sig-
nificantly reordering the authority relations between the workforce and their managers
and supervisors". Essential for the pluralist approach is the existence of industrial
democracy and participation within institutionalised forms of IR.
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Pluralist industrial relations: an intellectual perspective
Pluralism as a political concept was one of the main philosophical outcomes of the
Age of Enlightenment which assumed that justice could be established through intel-
lectual competition (Quesel 1992:227). Pluralism as an intellectual perspective pri-
marely "emerged as a criticism of the political doctrine of sovereignity" (Clegg
1975:309), i.e. it accepted the existance of two forces and the need to find a model
for compromise. It can be translated into industrial relations, because there are simi-
larities between the process of collective bargaining in IR and the political processes
of compromise and concession (Clegg 1975:311) in other systems.
Ackers et al. (1992) argue that the ideal philosophical participation is located within
the pluralist approach. Indeed, its original source is primarily ideological or philo-
sophical whether on the part of the state, a political party or an employer. Essential to
pluralism is the idea of distribution of power. Power "must be distributed in some ac-
ceptable fashion among individuals, organised groups and the state" (Kerr 1955:3).
Contemporary examples of this are the German works council system, the Bullock
proposals and, the European Union (EU) social charter all of which embody participa-
tory ideals whose explicit aims are harmonisation.
Pluralist industrial democracy as a frame of reference
Unlike adversarialism and unitarism, the pluralist frame of reference in industrial
democracy is based on the concept of groups negotiating with each other (Fox
1973:192). Actors within a pluralist frame of reference, then, see themselves as one
group in a group-based system inside the company. Actors view the accommodation
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of different interests as an attempt to reach some state of parity; i.e. actors believe
that a balance of power is possible between competing interest groups and that this is
oriented towards improving industrial relations practices (Cressey 1985:117). There is
an assumption among IR actors about the existance of different interests and that this
can be negotiated within an agreed common framework of industrial democracy, i.e.
an institutionalised form of interest management. Unlike a unitarist frame of reference
which puts emphasise on the guiding hand of management to serve workers' interests,
actors within the pluralist frame of reference assume that both sides can work to-
gether. Unlike an adversarial or a unitarist frame of reference, the pluralist frame of
reference draws strongly on democratic ideals.
Pluralist industrial democracy as an approach
Pluralism particularly emphasises participation and integrative bargaining within es-
tablished institutions; participation through collective bargaining, then, is part of the
pluralist approach (Mason 1982:188). In the context of German IR, for example, the
pluralist approach locates distributive bargaining via independent unions outside the
arena of workplace collective bargaining to keep strikes, etc. away from company
based industrial democracy. While inside the workplace, the German normative-
pluralist sytem has created a forum for integrative bargaining via works council and
joint-negotiation committees. In short, the German system has divided integrative
from distributive bargaining by allocating integrative bargaining to the company
level and distributive bargaining to the regional and sectorial level (chapter 5.2.2.).
The pluralist approach to industrial democracy recognises problem-solving as a set of
structural arrangements or institutionalised procedures to solve conflicts between
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different groups within the company (Purcell & Sisson 1984:113). A pluralist ap-
proach to lR needs such institutionalised forms for problem-solving, while micro-level
conflicts are inevitable but they are not unsolvable. Problems become negotiable once
they are transferred to the proper institution. They are resolved through "structural
arrangements which link organisational decisions to the interests of employees and
employers" (Marchington 1992:23).
Pluralist industrial democracy: an intellectual perspective
Most pluralists accept the basic premise that management should manage, but also
stress the value of participation (cf. Blumberg 1968:131) through institutionalised
forms to contain management's power to manage. This is the essence of an intellec-
tual perspective of a pluralist system. A pluralist perspective on industrial democracy
"is based on the belief that it anticipates the creation of a new more democratic, and
more egalitarian society" (Greenberg 1986:14). In contrast to the loyalty theme, the
pluralist approach views industrial democracy as an instrument which can influence
industrial societies, i.e. through the collaboration and co-operation of workers and
employers the quality of workers' lives can be improved and the goals of employers
(i.e. profits) can be simultaneously achieved.
Clegg emphasises that interaction between political and industrial democracy, i.e. just
as the political democracy needs a system of opposition so there is case for a "strong
and independent oppositional body to management within industry (i.e. the trade un-
ions)" (Poole 1978:31). One problem that can arise from pluralist views on industrial
democracy is that workers learn to take their right to political suffrage for granted but
because of the real nature of power relations within capitalism they are prevented
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from participating in a full and democratic way and therefore become frustrated
(Coates & Topham 1972:217); i.e. any assumption that is based on an asymmetric
distribution of power is an illusion (Purcell 1979:27) and therefore pluralism can seem
to offer democracy and participation without the equal distribution of power which
makes the former possible.
Pluralist teamwork as a frame of reference
In terms of pluralism, industrial democracy and teamwork belong in the democratic
frame of reference. The internal structure of the team is organised along democratic
lines and team-members are given the opportunity to influence teamwork and can be
elected as teamspeaker. In a democratic IR system, the democratic ethos is transferred
into teams not only because the teamspeaker is elected, but because of the degree of
participation by the team in internal team affairs. In addition, such teams should not be
restricted to issues solely related to production but their remit should be wider in the
sense that they can negotiate with management and resolve IR issues.
A pluralist frame of reference sees the importance of democratic institutions for the
system to be successful. Institutions act as a mode of mediation and negotiation in or-
der to smooth the path for changes ranging from workers mobility, setting up new
production lines, locating of production processes, etc. When faced with IR issues like
that of the introduction of teamwork, the pluralist frame of reference creates institu-
tions for monitoring the transition. Thus a pluralist frame of reference tends to result
in a more democratic version of teamwork, because it also uses a democratic method
of implementation.
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Pluralist teamwork as an approach
Teamwork is not contradictory to a pluralist approach to IR. Given the levels of par-
ticipation in such a system, teams provide an additional level of representation.
Poole's (1978) pluralist approach demonstrates that teams are restricted to the shop-
floor which sets boundaries to their participation. However, this can have positive ad-
vantages; Goodrich (1920:119) sees the regulative power of a team as an essential
factor for industrial democracy, because it models democratic forms of participation
on the shopfloor and demonstrates the value of democracy. Although teams might be
democratic in style and structure, however their ability to influence decisions of any
importance is limited.
For the pluralist approach to work, the creation of teamspeakers is again accepted as
in the interest of both workers and management. They are seen as actors who can
provide direct input on IR on the shopfloor and at managerial level to solve problems
before they reach the stage of conflict and the usual forms of traditional representa-
tion, i.e. workplace representatives, works councils, and shop stewards. In such a
system, teamspeakers are not seen as a system of representation that competes with
the traditional structure of representation but one that supplements it to create greater
democracy throughout the system. Teamwork provides an option for the type of ne-
gotiations described by Walton and McKersie's integrative bargaining, because this
type of bargaining refers to the rights and obligations of both sides and not merely to
strictly economic situations (distributive bargaining).
30
Pluralist teamwork: an intellectual perspective
For theorists of democracy, teamwork provides one organisational form of democracy
in which decisions can be reached by open discussion and voting. Lippitt and White
(1960) in a classic study of leadership argue that democratic leadership is essential to
pluralism. Sociologists who study groups and political scientists focus on the value of
teamwork as a pluralist form which can bring about a democratic resolution to work
organisation and IR conflicts (Trist 1981). While sociologists of democratic theory
tend to focus on internal team structures, political scientists focus more on the selec-
tion process of leaders.
Schumpeter (1976) represents, a pragmatic pluralist view when he argues that democ-
racy is less a political goal than an institutional arrangement, i.e. a pragmatic method
of mediation between the two classes, workers and management and acts as a form of
convenient arrangement between the two. Schumpeter therefore supports the concept
of elected leadership on the basis that democracy is a type of market place which of-
fers constructive solutions. For Schumpeter, it is the competitive struggle for leader-
ship that is the distinctive feature of democracy's value for IR (cf. Pateman 1970:4).
In other words, teamwork can be seen as a form of democracy, because with team-
work, workers can compete for leadership within their teams, i.e. the position of
team-speaker. Even if teams have no other function besides the election of team-
speakers, this is still a vbery important form of democracy.
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2.2.3. Adversarialism
Adversarial industrial relations as a frame of reference
An adversarial frame of reference can be described as fundamentally advocating a
dualist approach with workers on the one side and management on the other. IR is
seen as the meeting point of two classes: labour and capital. Actors of IR within this
frame of reference see the two sides as us and them, workers and management. Class
conflict is seen as inherent and inevitable and both sides operate with an attitude of
low-trust and high militancy (Walton and McKersie 1965:122).
This is an overtly conflictual model of distrust with both sides operating defensively
because "they do not trust each other" (Purcell .1981:50). There is also a "desire to
preserve an arm's length relationship (Walton and McKersie 1965:18) because of this
basic distrust in the other side. Both camps envision themselves in a state of trench
warfare and therefore actors within this frame of reference see the IR system as ad-
versarial. For management and workers who operate within this adversarial model
distrust and hostility towards the other side is endemic. An us and them frame of ref-
erence often means the exclusion of unions and their representatives from participa-
tion; for workers' representatives this means the constant need to protect their own
interests-. Management continuously seeks to increase the rate of exploitation and
therefore their control while workers' organisations owe their existence to the need to
oppose management and employers desire to exclude them (Blumberg 1968:40).
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Adversarial industrial relations as an approach
The permanent conflict of interests between capital and labour thus pervades all as-
pects of this employment relationship. Management constantly attempts to increase
the rate of exploitation; workers constantly defend their conditions (Burawoy 1979).
The very nature of the capitalist economy may drive management to increase the rate
of workers exploitation in the search for profit and result in an attempt to diminish the
power of the other side. Within such a model no accommodation between employees
and employers is possible, because "the interests of the two parties are diametrically
opposed" (Walton and McKersie 1965:127).
Such adversarial patterns are described by Walton and McKersie's (1965:11) dis-
tributive bargaining; i.e.conflict on interest between management and unions occurs
in situations in which one party wins what the other party loses. In such a win-lose
situation, the adversarial approach to lR is not based on participation and discussion,
but on the fear of incorporation and non-participation. For workers, then, any partici-
pation within this framework is seen as a betrayal of their interests. Essential to this
adversarial approach is the existence of independent workers' organisations, because
they alone are seen to be able to defend workers against management's interests.
Adversarial industrial relations as an intellectual perspective
The labour process approach has its intellectual and philosophical base in Marx' Cri-
tique on Political Economy. Labour process theory essentially states that capital
owns the means of production and hires labour to produce the goods it wishes to sell
at a profit. "The labour process has developed three basic structural features: a) the
division of intellectual and manual labour, b) hierarchical control, c) fragmentation or
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deskilling of labour" (Brighton Labour Process Group 1977:16). Central to the adver-
sarial intellectual approach to IR is the issue of power and control i.e. who controls
teams for example becomes pivotal in the introduction of teamwork. Control in indus-
trial relations (Purcell 1977) can take different forms (R. Edwards 1979): a) simple
control by an authoritarian boss, b) technological control (control through Fordist
and Taylorist manufacturing techniques), c) bureaucratic control as analysed by Max
Weber, and d) concertive control (Barker 1993:409; cf. Garrahan & Stewart 1992;
Sewell & Wilkinson 1992; Stephenson 1994; McKinlay & Taylor 1994). In summary,
teams are not a democratic attempt to distribute power, but rather they are a mecha-
nism of control in the hands of management.
Adversarial industrial democracy as a frame of reference
Given the adversarial frame of reference, i.e. us and them, IR actors tend not to par-
ticipate in industrial democracy and to see it partly as a fraud or a manipulative game
to weaken the other side. Employees argue that management controls information or
deliberately miscommunicates in order to mislead workers' representatives. There is a
substantial lack of trust (Walton and McKersie 1965:142) on both sides. From this
perspective workers view industrial democracy as an illusion and little more than an
attempt to incorporate their representatives into management's agenda (Purcell
1981:235) and therefore they often refusing a participatory approach.
--
Since workers fear incorporation into a management agenda, the adversarial frame of
reference can also be described as anti-incorporatist. Management on the other hand,
see workers' democracy as a threat to their status quo and as a strategy of usurping
their power and control. The basic philosophical frame of reference can be seen as:
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external capitalist forces determine both management's need for control and workers'
resistance to the capitalist mode of production (Friedman 1977:56).
Adversarial industrial democracy as an approach
Ramsay (1977) argues this adverserial position when he states that industrial democ-
racy and participation are merely instruments to secure labour's compliance to man-
agement and that this can be accomplished in several different ways. In Ramsay's suc-
cess category, participative forms are established and are successful but this very suc-
cess lead to an acceptance of the status quo and this is used by the system against
workers' interests. The second category is triviality under which participation is re-
duced to a very minor participative role, i.e. tea towel issues. In the third category he
argues that participation leads to instability. It is because workers understand that
participation is a management technique to gain compliance that they reject industrial
democracy. On the other hand management prefers a unitary frame of reference refus-
ing "de facto recognition of unions and bargaining" (Ramsay 1977:482) in order to
maintain stability. Ramsay calls this last category committee status; real conflicts are
shelved by moving them to institutionalised form such as committees. In the adversar-
ial model institutions are not seen as accommodating workers' interests but as a
means of management control. In summary, management's interest in participation and
industrial democracy is viewed as a lip-service to the democratic ideal with the ulti-
mate aim of incorporating workers into management's strategies.
The adversarial or anti-incorporative approach is summarised by Blumberg
(1968:142): "If the trade unions were to participate in management, they would inevi-
tably be drawn into an organisational role conflict, with workers as the ultimate los-
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ers". For managers too participative forms can be seen as problematic with workers
attempting to usurp management powers without an appropriate understanding of the
economic situation or market forces. For both workers and management participation
in industrial democracy is a contradiction to the idea of distributive bargaining, be-
cause distributive bargaining assumes a conflict of interest and is in its very nature a
self-interested process" (Walton and McKersie 1965:357), i.e. management wants to
follow their own interests in the same way as unions do. Participation, according to
this model, can only be designed to make workers believe that relationships of power
have been resolved (Eberwein et al. 1982:232) resulting in an illusion of power shar-
ing and common interest.
Adversarial industrial democracy: an intellectual perspective
In terms of the adversarial analysis democracy is impossible in the world of industry
which is an arena in which two economic classes battle. Indeed unlike political democ-
racy, "most industrial and commercial management is selected in a very different man-
ner from democratic governments" (Clegg 1975:311), i.e. no management is elected
by workers. Although Clegg can be seen as a pluralist, his critique on industrial de-
mocracy focuses on the core element of democracy in industy. In order to label an
institution democratic certain characteristics must be present, all the participants must
have equal rights to candidacy for positions of power, to choosing their officers, and
to having a say in major decisions and policies via their representatives (Lammers
1992:586). This is not the case in management-union relationships. Therefore Lam-
mers argues, the concept of industrial democracy is a contradiction in itself; industry
is, by definition, a place where one side governs and controls the other; any form of
democratic election is controlled and manipulated in the interests of the most power-
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nil group. The adverserial position believes that "the organisation and objectives of
capitalist industry are structured against the realisation of workers' interests" (Hyman
1975a:XXIV).
Adversarial teamwork as a frame of reference
Given the us and them nature of IR within this frame of reference teamwork in an ad-
versarial system is seen primarily as management's teamwork. Teamwork can either
serve the interests of the workers or the interests of management but is most likely to
serve the latter given the power relationship between the two. Therefore given the
frame of reference based on non-participation, workers' representatives tend neither
to want to introduce teamwork, nor to select teamleaders as the team itself is seen as
an instrument of management control. In the manufacturing industry therefore it is
management who introduces teamwork for their own purpose, i.e. the greater exploi-
tation of labour and therefore influences the way it is set up in their own interests.
The introduction of teamleaders by management, however, can create a dilemma for
workers' representatives. Actors with an adversarial frame of reference see them-
selves in a way that does not allow them to participate in the selection of teamleaders,
and they have an attitude of exclusion towards teamleaders, because they see team-
leaders as agents of management. As teamleaders have a representative function,
which overlaps the representative functions of worker's representatives, it is impossi-
ble for workers to ignore these new IR players. Actors with an adversarial frame of
reference demand an independent trade union body to represent workers, teamleaders
are excluded from the selection because teamwork is seen as a management strategy
for control.
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Adversarial teamwork as an approach
Workers' representatives, in an adversarial IR system, tend to either try to avoid the
introduction of teamwork or try to minimise the damage caused by teamwork. Given
the prime objective of workers to create independent workers organisations, team-
work is seen as a tool in the hands of management which can damage worker's repre-
sentation by setting up independent channels and undermining the traditional represen-
tatives forms set up by workers themselves.
Such a system gives workers the illusion of having an additional level of representa-
tion. Ironically, in an adversarial system, trade unions will argue for appointed team-
leaders to avoid confusion over the issue of representation among workers, i.e. they
are agents of management and this must be clearly seen to be the case. The power of
the teamleader must be diminished in order not to challenge the workers' own system
of representation. On the other hand, management is also determined to appoint
teamleaders to ensure that their own teamleaders are in control and are prepared to
augment management's power.
Adversarial teamwork: an intellectual perspective
A Marxist class conflict model informs the dynamics of the adversarial model; capital
against labour, management against worker. Actors within this framework are set
against each other, locked in a continuous battle to maintain power and control. For
management this control extends to every area of the work arena so teamwork can
have the advantage for them of greater control by-passing traditional worker power
and using methods to create an illusion of democracy. For workers teamwork within
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this adversarial frame, is a further device of management to erode their conditions
and to remove their power from their organisation.
Nevertheless management accepts the idea of teamwork if it can be used to seek
greater compliance from workers (Ramsey 1977) but for the workers within this
framework it is always imposed from above (Parker & Slaughter 1988). There is also
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that while workers co-operate initially to set up
teamwork in the hope of greater participation, they are soon disillusioned (Babson
1993, Stephenson 1994) and see it as a device to get more work from them
(Robertson 1992).
2.2.4. Teamwork
& Industrial Democracy
The introduction of teamwork in the European motor-car industry, then, did not take
place in a vacuum, it happened within a particular IR system with particular ideologies
and attitudes to industrial democracy. It was in the context of a particular IR frame-
work, (unitarism, pluralism, adversarialism) that teamwork developed. A prime ex-
ample of how these positions influenced teamwork is apparent in examining the issue
of teamleaders. When teamwork was introduced into the motor-car industry the team
was usually headed by a tearnleadetheamspeaker who took the position for a period
of at least 6 months; Volvo's rotating teamspeakers at its Uddevalla plant are excep-
tions to this rule; until the closure of Uddevalla in the late 1980s, they were the only
teamspeakers in the motor-car industry that rotated. The present-day motor-car indus-
try has introduced teamwork overall, including teamleaders; the question of the selec-
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tion process for teamleaders remains important; as a "method of selecting decision
makers" (Mason 1982:46). In general, management, unions and works councils are
faced with two choices when introducing a teamleader: a) election by the team-
members or b) the appointment of the teamleader by management. In the case of a)
and even more in the case of b), various kinds of assessments, test, screening or in-
terviews for the teamleader may be applied to recruit a capable person for the posi-
tion; "on the basis of suitability and qualifications for the position" (Jaguar 1991). In
contrast to elections, the appointment and assessment model gives management total
control over the appointment of teamleaders. Management expects certain functions
from teamleaders, and therefore, demands an assessment. The appointment and as-
sessment model is the classic model for all Japanese plants both outside and inside Ja-
pan. Within the pure appointment model, management does not see the need for an
assessment.
A typical version of using a pure appointment method is Ford (FRG and UK) and
Vauxhall (UK), where former utility-leaders or charge-hands are appointed as team-
leaders. Such utility leaders have had previous experience in leading a group (not a
team) of workers. The pure appointment model may indicate that management does
not expect teamleaders to perform a different function from their previous work, i.e.
they are merely renamed. However, the latter case is less likely because in most cases
in the pure appointment model, management is able to draw on experienced charge-
hands whose loyalty has already been tested within the system, i.e. they are promoted
or appointed from those whose attitudes and style suit management. Management
prefers, then, an appointment system with the need to assess the skills of teamleaders,
i.e. a skill gap model issued because it gives them complete control. However, if the
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teamspeaker is elected management seeks to demote their value, i.e. they have no as-
sessed skills.
The method of selection reflects on management's attitude towards teamwork, its
status, value and role. In an election model, based on the high slcill level of most team-
members, tasks can rotate within a team. Functional expectations of management to-
wards teamspeakers however are consequently low, because a team can cover all the
necessary functions and does not need to have a strong teamleader to operate. With
the appointment model management expects elected teamspeakers to perform like
leaders and to have different functions. Management does not assume that all team-
members have the necessary skills to perform a leader's function, therefore, manage-
ment argues the need for individual assessment. It thus argues for a skills gap model
which does not expect to fmd teamleader-skills among team-members. With simple
appointment system, management views the skills of charge-hands as somewhat
similar to teamleaders' skills, therefore former charge-hands can be appointed to
teamleaders.
This leads to the question of why companies have introduced different models, and
why there are elections (GM West-Germany) and appointments (Vauxhall and GM-
Eisenach), i.e. different systems within the same company (General Motors Europe).
Common to all GM plants was the transition from a worker-supervisor to a team-
leader-team system in the early 1990s. Although the time period and content of the
transition was the same, the outcomes have, in fact, been very different. Sometimes a
model has emerged leading towards democratic elections; at others an authoritarian
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appointment system has been implemented. It is the other factors in the IR system that
have influenced there divergent models that are of interest to this thesis.
2.2.5. Application:
Walton & McKersie and Moore
In order to apply Walton and McKersie's and Moore' s theory to IR and to the central
question of teamwork, the following section will a) describe Walton and McKersie's
theory of collective bargaining and Moore's theory of transition, b) examine a demo-
cratic and a non-democratic outcome of collective bargaining, c) apply their theories
to teamwork, d) apply Walton and McKersie's model of collective bargaining and
categories of transition to the triadic approach, e) apply these to IR, and 0 analyse
teamwork by using the theory of democratic and non-democratic outcomes and the
theory of bargaining behaviour.
a) Walton and McKersie: collective bargaining
Moore: transition
Walton and McKersie (1965) have developed four theoretical models to analyse pat-
tern of behaviour in a situation of collective bargaining. The most common form of
collective bargaining takes place in their a) distributive bargaining model, which in-
volves strictly economic values. In their new book Strategic Negotiations (Walton et
al. 199444) this is called: "dividing the pie". While b) integrative bargaining issues
are more likely to contain "items referring to rights and obligations" for which they
use the term "expanding the pie" (1994:45). c) Their attitudinal structuring model is
social-psychological in orientation (1965:184) and can be summarised in the following
attitudinal dimensions: adversarial, i.e. conflict and the containment of aggression;
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pluralist, i.e. accommodation and cooperation, and unitarist, i.e. collusion. Their
fourth model d) is directed towards interorganisational bargaining and analyses the
internal dynamics of the organisations behind negotiators in collective bargaining
situations, i.e. management and union organia4tion.
Moore has developed a theory which describes the transition from one societal system
(feudalism) to another system (modernity). Unlike the USA which he argues is the
first new nation (Lipset 1964) without feudalism, his examples are of societies where
systems went through a transition; not a transformation, in the sense that Habermas
(1992) defines it, because for Habermas the transformation towards modernity is still
incomplete. Such transitions can have a non-democratic (adversarial and unitarist) or
a democratic outcome (pluralist).
b) Teamwork, Transition and Collective Bargaining
Like the societal transitions described by Moore, in the realm of IR a transition can
take place from an old system (worker-supervisor system) to a new system
(teamwork). This in fact occurred in the car industry in the early 1990s. If it is the
preceding structure that largely determines the outcome of such a transition, the pre-
transitional existence of a certain IR system may well have defined the mode of selec-
tion for teamspeakers/teamleaders and the nature of the teams itself.
The transition from a worker-supervisor system to a teamwork system takes place
with negotiations between management and unions/works councils. Such negotiations
can take place either through integrative or distributive bargaining, (Walton and
McKersie). Whether integrative bargaining or distributive bargaining determine the
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outcome of negotiations, but again will be another factor in influencing collective bar-
gaining outcomes.
c) Categories of Transition and Collective Bargaining
The theory of transitions can provide an analytical framework not only to forecast
different outcomes, but also to examine possible paths which lead to such outcomes.
The theory is essentially concerned with the non-democratic and the democratic out-
come of a transitional period. The democratic outcome occurs when neither side wins
and the transition involves a compromise without authoritarianism. In this version,
neither side is strong enough to win and the outcome is an arrangement between the
two classes. Such a mediation or such an arrangement between two classes is com-
monly described as democratic. Moore again examines the routes to a) a democratic
outcome: a successful revolution (French Revolution, the English Puritan Revolution
and the American Civil War); and b) to a non-democratic outcome: I) a non-
revolutionary outcome (fascism in Italy and Germay) or II) a revolutionary outcome
(communism in Russia and China).
Walton and McKersie's model on the other hand is developed from the study of
American collective bargaining negotiations and their pattern of behaviour. They use
four systems of activities, each with its own function for the interacting parties. As in
the case of the transitional model, Walton and McKersie's model is based on the un-
derstanding of two sides, i.e. management and unions. Their position to each other in
a collective bargaining situations determines whether negotiations take place in an in-
tegrative or in a distributive model and the nature of the style chosen will itself influ-
ence outcomes.
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d) The Industrial Relations Context
While it is obviously impossible to transfer Moore's analysis of the historical devel-
opment of nation-states wholesale to the study of IR, there are nevertheless striking
parallels with the IR theories discussed above. His theory of transitions has useful
implications for a study of industrial democracy and IR and is largely based on the
study of two classes. The present thesis can similarly be seen as the interaction of a
study of the two classes within IR, i.e. workers' representatives and management,
teamleaders/teamspeakers. Moore can be applied because management and organised
labour do constitute two classes whose interaction within the world of industry cre-
ates transitional forms through the conflict of interests of both sides. As in the model
for a non-democratic society, one side wins over the other side. Any imbalance of
power as in Walton and McKersie's analysis of distributive bargaining can create a
non-pluralist outcome, because one side wins. Only when neither workers nor man-
agement win and both negotiate towards a common or complementary interest
(Walton and McKersie 1965:4), can a democratic balance of power (pluralism or in-
tegrative bargaining) be established and both sides "accept the rules of the game"
(Purcell 1981:57).
For Walton and McKersie and for Purcell (1981), the concept of trust is an important
factor in labour negotiations. Walton and McKersie (1965:122) write that distributive
bargaining is "characterised by low trust and high militancy". For Purcell (1981:53)
such a bargaining relationship is defined by a "distrustful relationship in industrial re-
lations with the parties essentially denying each other's legitimacy". By contrast, inte-
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grative bargaining trust is linked to a supportive climate. This is "marked by encour-
agement and freedom to behave spontaneously without fear of sanctions" Walton and
McKersie' s (1965:141).
While Moore's transition theory and Walton and McKersie's bargaining theory func-
tion well to assist them to describe transitions and bargaining behaviour, no system
ever conforms entirely to these categories. Certainly within IR the models overlap and
often share elements of both non-democratic and democratic models and of integra-
tive bargaining and distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965:161). In fact
within IR the situation is never static, and the modes change constantly depending on
the balance of shifting power relationships while always tends to move towards some
sort of pragmatic accommodation:
e) Democratic and Non-Democratic Teamwork
Given a pre-transitional IR structure, three outcomes that affect teamwork can be
detected: a) One outcome of a transition towards a team-teamleader system is non-
democratic authoritarianism; management holds the power and colludes with the un-
ion (if there is one) and there is no election of teamspealcers (unitarist). d) The out-
come of a high-trust and integrative bargaining relationship in negotiations for the
selection of teamleaders/teamspeakers is democracy, teaznspeakers are elected
(pluralist). c) A third and non-democratic outcome occurs in an adversarial relation-
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ship with an distributive bargaining system. This does not leave room for the election
of teamspeakers, because such a relationship is based on low-trust.
Where a democratic outcome has occurred the teamspeaker is elected in fair and
democratic elections without management's intervention. It seems that an IR system
showing patterns of industrial democracy (Turner & Auer 1994:55-56) before the
transition, are likely to introduce elections for teamspeakers. In other words, the exis-
tence of previous institutional arrangements is crucial. "Institutions of codetermination
facilitate proactive union strategies which result in negotiated work reorganisation"
(Turner & Auer 1994:56). In a democratic framework, the two social classes are seen
as, an enlightened and modern management on the one hand, and a strong union or-
ganisation on the other. Both sides agree that the conflict over selection can be re-
solved in negotiations as a subject to compromise (Walton and McKersie 1965:133).
Management does not see organised labour as a threat, but employers and wage earn-
ers recognise each other "as interacting agents of the enterprise" (FOrstenberg
1992:787) thus creating a social partnership. In the non-democratic outcome a) man-
agement dictates who the teamleader is (unitarism) or b) the adversarial model oper-
ates and management still appoints teamleaders.
As a result of the application of Fox' triadic model, Walton and McKersie's collective
bargaining theory and Moore's theory of transition the following hypotheses can be
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formed: a) Whether or not a teamleader is elected or appointed, a teamleader will be a
new player within industrial democracy on the shopfloor. b) Whether or not a team-
leader is appointed or elected, as a team and working area representative, s/he may
get into conflict with an elected steward and/or an elected works council on the issue
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of: who represents? c) A teamspeakers who is elected is more likely to solely repre-
sent a team, because a teamleader can be voted out. A teamleader who is appointed
by the company, represents the team's interest and the company's interest at the same
time. d) If an elected teamspeaker represents a team, a teamleader may be a represen-
tative against the company in the case of a conflict. On the other hand, if a tearnleader
is appointed by the company, s/he may be used against the workers in the case of
conflict. e) If a teamleader is appointed, a new form of workers control on the shop-
floor may result. f) Whether or not a teamleader is appointed or elected, the area of
conflict may shift more towards the shopfloor level.
2.2.6. Conclusions
It is possible then to draw on the general triadic models of Fox, Walton and McKersie
and Moore to establish a framework of concepts to describe the transition from one
form of IR on the shopfloor to another. Applied to the issue of teamwork on the
shopfloor and the election or appointment of teamleaders, what is revealed is that, the
forms such changes take are dependent on pre-transitional IR (unitarism, pluralism,
adversarial). Such forms are: a) democracy (pluralism or integrative bargaining); in
this case the drive for accommodation leads to a greater tendency to compromise on
the nature of the team's role and there are elected teamspeakers, b) non-democracy
(unitarist and collusion or adversarial and distributive bargaining), which leads to
the acceptance of teamwork on management terms, by patterns of obedience
(unitarist) or teamwork is imposed from above against workers' representatives
(adversarial). If these three theoretical concepts are linked, an analytical tool can be
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developed to examine the effects of teamwork on the structure of representation. If all
three approaches are shown in a matrix, then the following can be stated:
Table 2.4.: Three theoretical Approaches 
I Fox, etc A I	 Walton & McKersie	 I	 Transition	 I
I Unitarism I	 Collusion in Attitudinal Structuring 	 I	 non-democratic	 1
Pluralism ,* 	Integrative Bargaining	 I -0	 democracy
I Adversarial 1	 Distributive Bargaining 	 non-democratic - 
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2.3. Conclusions
Teams can create a new system of representation within a plant and can potentially be
actively involved in decision-making on the shopfloor. Teamleaders therefore repre-
sent a new player in IR and this raises issues for the traditional system of representa-
tion. Industrial relations writers have identified three models to analyse IR, which can
be used to analyse the outcome from a traditional worker-supervisor system to a
team-teamleader system.
The triadic approach needs however to be supported by more sophisticated levels to
deal with the problem. The triadic model already explain not only the framework
within which IR actors proceed (unitarism, pluralism, adversarialism), they help to
analyse the institutional patterns that dominate particular IR situations. They also es-
tablish the intellectual assumptions from which systems develop. By analysing each
one of these approaches, not only does their underlying structure came to light, but
also their ideological location.
Besides the three approaches and an analysis on three levels (frame of reference, pat-
tern, and intellectual perspective), each approach has been analysed in terms of a) IR,
b) industrial democracy, and c) teamwork. It is clear that only the pluralist approach
with its-pluralist frame of reference and its integrative bargaining is most likely to be
able to lead to a democratic version of teamwork. While other IR approaches
(unitarism and adversarial) have a strong tendency to lead to a non-democratic ver-
sion of teamwork.
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The theory of transition and Walton and McKersie's theory of collective bargaining
have thus provided a useful tool to examine particular influences on the formation of
team-concepts. Different lR systems were faced with the decision of whether a team-
leader/teamspeaker should be elected or appointed; such a decision it seems did not
depend on the will of IR actors, but on their existing IR system. On the basis of stud-
ies of transitions and collective bargaining behaviour, the most likely outcome of
teamleader's or teamspeaker's selection can be predicted. In other words, the pre-
teamwork IR system can lead to a certain team-concept. This can be shown in the
following table:
Table 2.5.: IR Annroaches
IR System unitarism pluralism adversarial
frame of reference - family problme-solving trench war
IR approach ,.,,,,,, , right to manage &
weak or no unions
enlightened management
strong unions
conflict oriented
Intellectual perspective authoritarian democracy inherent class conflict
, Industrial democracy no institutions
only consuttation
co-determination
Institutionalised IA
no institutions deci-
sion-makinq by conflict
non-democratictransition non-democratic democratic
attitudinal dimensions collusion accommodation & cooperation conflict & aggression
hate & anta	 nm isn
distrust
of friendliness_twee intimacy & sweetheart friendliness & neutralism
level of trust trust & blackmail limited or extended trust
teamwork non-democratic democratic non-democratic
, leaders/speaker , ..>„, appointed elected by teams appointed
The following thesis analyses two IR systems, a democratic and a non-democratic
case study in order to examine the process involved in electing teamspeakers and ap-
pointing teamleaders and their role in the structure of representation. In the study of
these two IR systems, two levels of analysis are important: a) the frame of reference
and b) the actual pattern in which an IR system works. Preference will be given to b)
the pattern or approach of an IR system. In other words, the thesis examines the
"reproduced relations between actors or collectives, organised as regular social prac-
tices" (Giddens 1979:66). The frame of reference plays an additional role. The thesis
will also examine how a particular frame of reference is used by actors in IR to ex-
plain their action and positions.
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Chapter
Methodology
3. Research Methods
In order to explore the core research problem teamwork and the structure of repre-
sentation at two GM plants Vauxhall Ltd. (GB) and Adam Opel AG (FRG) have to be
investigated. The following chapter will develop a methodology and provide the re-
search design for this. Applied methods and design are linked in this thesis so that it
articulates the objectives and questions of the study. A connection has been estab-
lished throughout the thesis between the subject matter and the relevant techniques
for analysing the evidence. The methodology blends the theoretical framework
(chapter 2) with the case studies (chapter 4-6) and enables the generalisation of the
research findings (chapter 7). On the other hand the thesis avoids story telling (a let's
collect data) approach (Galtung 1992) and aims to develop causal propositions sup-
ported by data and logic (Bryman 1988a:30). Research methods are important for the
following thesis, however an "overconcern with methodology is like packing your
bags for a journey and never making it" (Brown 1993).
3.1. Methodology &
Comparative Enquiry
In the preceding chapter, the theoretical problems affecting teams, groups, teamwork,
industrial democracy, and IR systems have been addressed. The theory of transitions
provided a useful framework for an analysis of a particular transition from a worker-
supervisor system to a team based system. The theory also has predicative value for
the outcomes of such a transition (cf. democratic, non-democratic). Out of a theoreti-
cal analysis of transitions a core research question has been developed: To what extent
and in what ways does the institutional context affect the transition from a tradi-
tional system of representation to teamwork and how does this affect the general
structure of representation?
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The theory of transitions has acted to provide a theoretical framework in the absence
of a clear relationship between theory and practice in IR (Hyman 1994a:167). Hy-
man's recognition of the lack of a theoretical foundation in IR investigations and the
tenuous natuie of Fox's model as a basis to explore industrial phenomena, results in
the need to draw upon extraneous theory to develop the research problem.
Socio-interaction theory for example claims that a "good theory should never leave us
with the idea that the world is made once and for all. A good theory will always have
some empty boxes for the reality not yet there, for the potential as opposed to empiri-
cal reality" (Galtung 1992:102). Even when theory is defmed as an "unambiguous set
or systems of laws, integrated on the basis of a common unifying principle" (Oyen
1992:8), laws and lawlike generalisations must be open-ended. A suitable theory
should not only have the power to predict outcomes, but also "should include a meta-
theory reflecting on the social function of that theory as ideology" (Galtung 1992:99).
Moore's work facilitates the creation of a meta-theory to examine the ideological as-
pects of the present research problems, while Walton and McKersie facilitate the
creation of an emancipatory theory. In the thinking of the contemporary German criti-
cal theorist Jiirgen Habermas, theory is considered according to its ability to diagnose
the ills of society and then to form part of a process of political action for their rem-
edy (May 1993:28). Habermas demands that a theory should be part of a process of
political action to deal with practice. In the words of Marx, it is not a question of in-
terpreting the world, but of changing it. In the tradition of the Frankfurt School,
Habermas insists on the necessary emancipatory character of a theory. Moore and
Walton and McKersie are similarly to Habermas concerned with the emancipatory
possibilities of theory. These theories used in the present research "reject the stand-
point of the observer, which characterises positive epistemology, as a valid vantage
point for understanding human activities" (Burrell & Morgan 1979:5).
The theory of transitions and democracy in the area of IR and industrial democracy,
demands a certain methodological approach. Transferred to IR, they demand a de-
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tailed study of the social and economic conditions that affect change. Just as Moore
made a detailed analysis of several class relations the present study examines the four
main players in the area of IR: a) management, b) workers' representation (shop
stewards, works councils, workplace representatives), c) teamleaders, d) teamspeak-
ers.
Galtung's request for an assessment of the ideology behind a theory is important. To
predict outcomes, Moore analyses the change from feudalism to capitalism, while
Walton and McKersie analyse collective bargaining. While Moore's theory analyses
democracy, communism and fascism, a theory focusing exclusively on capitalism
(Parson) would not be able to compare the three different developments. His study is
above all then a comparative study, he compares social and economic conditions not
only in a single society, but in several societies before and after the transition from
feudalism to modernity (cf. Øyen 1992:10). Walton and McKersie focus on capitalism
when comparing collective bargaining hehaviour in the USA. Unlike Walton and
McKersie's US based study, Moore's comparative observations (May 1993:156) ac-
cept the importance of cross-national research. One of the key questions for com-
parative research is: "Does this require a different practice from other forms of re-
search?" The purist theory argues that comparative work is no different from any
other research. An ethnocentric approach "simply adds on their findings to existing
ways of understanding and explaining" (May 1993:156). The totalist approach is on
the other hand, aware of cross-national research and its methodological and theoreti-
cal pitfalls, and the comparativists believe that cross-national research is an important
topic. As a result, they undertake this work in a different manner and frame their re-
search questions accordingly. This description of comparative research can be applied
to this research. The formulation of hypotheses was affected by the fact that the pres-
ent study is a comparative study. In a study of teamwork and industrial democracy, a
comparative research aims for cross-national comparisons and alters hypotheses when
necessary to suit each case. Moore needed to examine a significant range of societies
in order to develop his theory and thus he escapes the danger of mono-causality and
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singularity. His research method is useful in its application to IR studies, because only
a comparative analysis of different IR systems enables the thesis to show different
outcomes.
In short, the present research follows Moore's comparative methodology using case
study research to analyse the main players in ER and their relationship to each other.
Further, the research compares different IR systems in order to analyse the role of
teamleaders and teamspeakers. The advantages of a comparative study is that multiple
case research "strengthens results by replicating the pattern-matching and yielding
greater confidence on the robustness of the theory" (Yin 1993:79). The research data
then will be based on field studies in England and Germany, with the main focus on
GM's German plant and British plant. These plants are investigated using qualitative
semi-structured interviews (appendix A and B), structured questionnaires (appendix C
and D); the use of primary and secondary sources.
For such a comparative research project to be successful it is important to recognise
the following aspects of social research: a) "place: A concentration on this dimension
enables the researcher to consider the influence of physical settings upon actors, b)
language: the more familiar researchers are with the language of a social setting the
more accurate are their interpretations, c) intimacy: the greater the personal involve-
ment with the group and its members, the more the researcher is able to understand
the meanings and actions they undertake, d) social consensus: this is the extent to
which the observer is able to indicate how the meanings within the culture are em-
ployed and shared among people (May 1993:123). Places in this research are re-
stricted-to two GM plants; language differences need to be taken into account be-
cause the German and English contexts create differences; for example, stewards
(GB) and workplace representatives (Germany) cannot be seen as synonymous; both
mean different things within different IR systems. Intimacy has be established by
spending time in each plant, taking part in team-meeting, workplace representatives
meetings, works council meetings, shop stewards meetings, living with shop stewards,
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etc. Social Consensus has been achieved through having held office as a works
council-member in the motor-car industry myself several years ago, taking part in the
1984 strike in Germany, researching Ford's engine plant in Bridgend, etc. It seems as
if May's claim for intimacy and social consensus are somehow connected and both
have been achieved through my own experience, internships and contacts to union
representatives in Germany and England.
"To allow for the possibility of diversity and similarity, comparative analysis considers
both endogenous and exogenous factors. The former are those which are peculiar to
the country which is being studied, while the latter are those elements, such as inter-
national capital, gender and race relations, which while influencing that country's po-
litical relations, are not simply peculiar to it" (May 1993:158). The endogenous factor
in the present study in terms of IR is the individual country's system, while the exoge-
nous factor is the world wide introduction of teamwork in the motor-car industry
(chapter 1).
Maitland (1983:19) in his study of British and German companies points out that an
important consequence of his research design was, that "the two factories do not rep-
resent modal instances of the universe of British and German factories; nor are they
intended to do so". In contrast to this, the case studies of this research are intended to
contribute to overall statements about IR in both countries (chapter 7). A comparative
study of two similar GM plants, in two different countries, with different types of
teamwork are introduced and also the different affects on industrial relations in each
plant. Since both plants were seeking agreements with their rank-and-file representa-
tives they have an impact on the design of teamwork. Both plants are so-called brown
field sites.
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3.2. Defining the Research Problem
The collection of evidence to examine the research problem of teamwork and indus-
trial democracy has focused on the car industry. With the arrival of lean production in
Europe, teamwork has been introduced in a number of motor-car plants. The motor-
car industry was selected for a study of teamwork and industrial democracy in par-
ticular, because of it's advances in the area of teamwork. Since GM was able to gain
experience from the arrival of transplants in the 1980s, this experience is now being
transferred to Europe. Consequently, GM is not only the most advanced example of
the plant wide introduction of teamwork, it also provides the best study of the most
advanced team-concept in Britain and Germany. Within the structure of GME, the
two selected plants are the major GM operations in England and Germany; the Luton
and the Rtisselsheim plant. The key research question has been developed through
these studies.
Comparative study involves an awareness that German IR differs significantly from IR
in England; Vauxhall's and Opel's teamwork have been introduced into two different
IR contexts and, it is the teamleader/teamspeaker's role that is the main focus of
study. However, to compare one system of teamwork with another system of team-
work, both cannot be identical; comparative research is aware of the issue of compar-
ing like with like. This issue is addressed in terms of appropriateness and equiva-
lence. The purpose of appropriateness concerns the methods employed and the con-
ceptualisation of issues when undertaking comparative research. Researchers cannot
assume that what is appropriate for one culture will necessarily be appropriate for
another-Equivalence is concerned with the differences between cultures, and is aware
that meanings vary from culture to culture, which raises the question of language. The
response to the classical objection to comparing apples and oranges is simple: they
are fruits. Similarly, teamleader and teamspeaker can be compared by using a higher
level of abstraction for a comparison; i.e. theories of teams and leadership. The advan-
tage of such a comparative approach is, that fmdings in one country can be better un-
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derstood when compared to findings from another country. A moving back and forth
between two different systems of teamwork during the research enables a comparative
researcher to assess both systems in a more comprehensive way. The arrival of team-
leaders/teamspeakers as new players within the lR structure in the plants has affected
the traditional methods of plant based problem-solving and industrial democracy. The
company and union representatives basically had two choices regarding teamleaders:
a) teamspeakers can be elected by the members for the team or b) teamleaders can be
appointed exclusively by the management. In both cases the choices are discussed
during the early phase of negotiations for a teamwork agreement. In each plant repre-
sentatives went in different directions; Opel's agreement includes the election of team-
speakers, which obviously can be taken as a sign of democracy in an industry; on the
other hand, Luton's appointed tearnleaders are excluded from industrial democracy. In
the future, Luton's elected stewards will have to negotiate with teamleaders.
Hypotheses regarding the role of teamleadershearnspeakers as part of industrial de-
mocracy can be drawn. Various hypothesis are tested using a cause and effect model
and are subject to empirical testing. The hypotheses of the present study are: a)
Whether or not a teamleader is elected or appointed, a teamleader will be a new
player within participation (industrial democracy) on the shopfloor. b) Whether or not
a teamleader is appointed or elected, s/he will be a team and working area representa-
tive. Therefore an elected or appointed teamleader may get into conflict with an
elected steward and/or an elected works council on the issue of: who represents? c) A
teamspealcer who is elected, is more likely to solely represent a team, because a
teamleader can be voted out. A teamleader who is appointed by the company, repre-
sents the team's interest and the company's interest at the same time. d) Whether or
not an elected teamspealcer represents a team, a teamspealcer may be a representative
against the company in the case of a conflict. On the other hand, if a teamleader is ap-
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pointed by the company, s/he may be used against the workers in the case of conflict.
e) Whether or not a teamleader is appointed, a new form of workers control on the
shopfloor may result. f) Whether or not a teamleader is appointed or elected, the area
of conflict may shift more towards the shopfloor level.
To answer the research question about the effects of teamleaders/teamspeakers on
industrial democracy in the two plants, appropriate evidence has been collected. As an
overview the hypotheses can be placed into a matrix:
Table 3.1.: Hvrotheses and Teamwork at Ovel and Vauxhall
Opal Vauxhall
Industrial Democracy: democratic election authoritarian appointment
a) Teamleader
and representation:
In conflict with steward and BR to
a smaller extent
In conflict with steward and union
b) Who represents: less clear option clear option
C) Teamleader: represents solely team-member's
Interest
has to represent company and team-
member's Interest
d) Basis of legitimacy: legitimacy from workers legitimacy from company
e) Control: minor control, elected by team high control, appointed by management
I) Conflict shift away stewards and man-
aqement towards shopfloor
shift away stewards and management
towards shopfloor
3.3. Research Methods
For the hypotheses (a to f), plant based case studies have been used to supply suffi-
cient data for the research. The first method used was interviews with works council-
members, stewards, union officials, workplace representatives, i.e. Vertrauensperson
(VP), plant managers, personal managers, supervisors, area managers, etc. (appendix
0). For these interviews, a semi-structured questionnaire (appendix A & B) was de-
signed and successfully used in both plants. The research method of qualitative inter-
views was supported by primary literature (appendix H to M) from other sources. To
answer the key research question, documents as primary sources needed to be used as
well. Both agreements between unions/works councils and management have been
analysed; these documents lay out the formal structure of both team-concepts. Addi-
tional company, union, and works council documents were also used. Whereas, union
literature often analyses teamwork's role within industrial democracy; neither secon-
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dary nor primary literature are "neutral artefacts that independently report social real-
ity (positivism)" (May 1993:139). Both primary sources and secondary sources have
had to be critically viewed. As part of this quantitative research, supporting data was
also delivered from questionnaires (appendix C & D). D. Hyman et al. argue for the
"adoption of an integrated approach combining interviews, analysis of documents, at-
tendance at meetings and informal discussions". Katz (1985:7) also suggests a mixing
of methodological approaches that would provide an understanding of what might be
missed by using only one methodological technique". Quantitative and qualitative re-
search methods are the core element of the case study research project. After both
methods have been applied, the collected data has been examined according to a the-
ory of industrial democracy. Without this transfer into theory, the research question
cannot be answered and a fmal and subsequent analysis of teamwork cannot be made.
A synthesis of methods has been used as part of the two-plant-comparison. As the
role of an elected teamleader differs from the role of an appointed one in regards to
industrial democracy both have been examined. Since both GM plants operated differ-
ent concepts of teamwork, Luton and Riisselsheim are the ideal research objects for a
comparison to provide sufficient evidence to develop the research hypotheses.
The questionnaires used were originally designed by the Canadian Autoworker's Un-
ion (CAW) and were successfully used at GM's Canadian CAMI plant (see appendix
C and D) and adjusted and translated to be used at Opel and Vauxhall. This data has
been sufficient to provide additional support for the case study research as well as the
hypotheses (b - f). Since questionnaires are not the main tool of the present research.
Questionnaires have the shortcoming that they are sent out to respondents, the re-
searcher- then has no understanding of the considerations which people make in an-
swering the questions. The present research accepts this shortcoming. Another short-
coming of the survey method is that the answers of team-members only reflect their
attitude towards teamwork at the time of the questionnaire. In order to evaluate
changing attitudes towards teamwork, several surveys over a certain research period
would have been needed. In contrast to interviews, a questionnaire also enforces nar-
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row boundaries on team-members, so that team-members are not free to express their
ideas. Given the shortcomings of the questionnaire and its strength which lies in its
comparability, the two surveys supported the research findings made in the case stud-
ies.
As the key research question can hardly be answered by an exclusive use of question-
naires and quantitative research methods alone, questionnaires like interviews, are
used primarily to verify statements by respondents. The theory behind the interview
method is that "each person is asked questions in the same way so that any differences
between . the answers are then assumed to be real ones and not the result of the inter-
view situation itself. This method is said to permit comparability between responses"
(May 1993:92). Semi-structured interviews were carried out during 1992 and 1995
and were supplemented with an analysis of the records of managerial, union, and joint
meetings. Attention was focused on the manual workforce, teamleaders, team-
members, and especially stewards/workplace representatives. In all cases the analyti-
cal focus of the research was the plant. Semi-structured interviews were used for
managers, stewards, teamleaders, and team-members.
3.4. Qualitative &
Quantitative Research
May (1993:114) suggests, that "qualitative and quantitative methodology are not
mutually exclusive. Differences between the approaches are located in the overall
form, focus, and emphasis of study". The basic differences between qualitative and
quantitative research is that qualitative research can use participant observation
techniques and unstructured, in-depth interviewing; while quantitative research tends
to use more quantitative survey methods. Surveys can be used in the following ways:
"a) factual, b) attitudinal, c) social psychological and d) explanatory" (May 1993:67).
The questionnaires used in the present study have been specifically attitudinal in order
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to ascertain the view of team-members and teamleaders/teamspeakers towards team-
work. Therefore, the purpose of questionnaires is to assess the opinion of the lR ac-
tors and to create supporting data. The same questionnaires were used throughout the
comparative study.
In contrast to quantitative research, qualitative research tend to espouse an approach
in which theory and empirical investigation is supposed to be interwoven. Bryman
(1988a:3) summarises this difference as "inquiry from the outside and inquiry from the
inside". Since the research question needs to be answered from the inside, a qualita-
tive research method is the primary method used in this study, but quantitative re-
search has also been important as part of the empirical investigation. Qualitative re-
search has also helped in terms of comparative study. To help generalise results, a
qualitative researcher may study more than one case. The principle of appropriateness
in answering particular research questions with either quantitative or qualitative ma-
terial has been applied. The present research is not concerned with questions like
worker's attitude towards teamwork, but is concerned with teamleaders/teamspeakers
and established representational forms.
Bryman's (1988a:18) analysis has been applied to the present research "quantitative
research is often conceptualised by it's practitioners as having a logical structure in
which theories determine the problem to which researchers address themselves in the
form of hypothesis derived from general theories". The thesis is concerned with the
testing of hypotheses driven by a general theory of democracy, transition and collec-
tive bargaining behaviour. It then seeks to apply the result of this particular investiga-
tion. As-one of the shortcomings of quantitative research is it's empirical emphasis on
individual or group dynamics, the individual or group is not the central focus of the
present study. Essential for the present study is a continuous link between micro and
the macro levels; without macro analysis, micro accounts tend to become exercises in
empiricism and risk piling up facts in arbitrary heaps (Ramsay 1993:78). To avoid the
pitfalls of empiricism, the method used in the present research is observation of teams
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and unions, etc. "In carrying out empirical research, the case study, especially the
company case study, is the 'model' that characterises German industrial sociological
research methods, in contrast to the survey or interview methods widely used in
American sociology" (Altmann 1992:1). To same degree the present research follows
the German methodological understanding of industrial sociology but also uses the
American; questionnaires support the case studies, not the reverse.
As in most intensive case study research, there are necessarily contacts between re-
searcher and participants. A central part of the research consideration is to be aware
of the relations between investigators and research participants; it can be either that
of: "the complete participant (engaging fully in the activities of the group) and the
participant observer (this person adapts an overt role and makes her or his presence
and intentions known to the group)" (May 1993:119). The present research follows
the participant observer model because the researcher does not fully participate in the
activities of the teams; team-members were informed about the presence and inten-
tions of the research.
May's three processes have been utilised (1993:125): "The first of the stages toward
this aim is the selection and definition of problems, concepts and indices. The second
stage is a check on the frequency and distribution of phenomena. Thirdly, the con-
struction of system models as the fmal stage of analysis in the field consists of incor-
porating individual findings into a generalised model of the social system or organisa-
tion under study or some part of that organisation". At the beginning of the research,
contacts with teams and stewards helped to defme the research problem; a further
stage checked that teamwork took a variety of forms; in the final stage, the research
findings from both case studies were generalised. This research draws on socio-
interaction theory (Yin 1993:19), because researcher and participants are not sepa-
rated from each other, but in a constant dialogue about the research and the changes
involved in teamwork and it's affects on the research.
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Another qualitative method used in the present research is semi-structured interview-
ing in which the researcher provides some guidance and allows interviewees to give
their impressions. Research is also guided by: a) examining the social industrial set-
ting, and b) by describing events and situations that took place (May 1993:121). As
well as using semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews to build the sub-
stance of the research, both methods in the present study enable the researcher to
analyse social relationships in terms of the IR actor's own interpretation of his in-
volvement in teamwork. Therefore, semi-structured and unstructured interviews are
an important element for the type of data collection used here and demand further ex-
amination as an acceptable research method.
3.5. The Administration of the Survey
a) The use of questionnaires
The purpose of the questionnaire was to supplement the central case studies, which
were based on semi-structured and un-structured interviews (appendix 0). There are
four main reasons for the use of questionnaires (Hague 1993:11):
a) Accurate Information: To draw accurate information from the respondents,
i.e. to ask the right question of the right person. This was accomplished by se-
lecting workers for questions about teamwork who had been working with
teamwork for a substantial period of time in each plant. The selected workers
were working in an area of production which is the most labour intensive part
of can manufacturing, i.e. final assembly at Opel and Vauxhall's door-section
(cf. sampling). Teamwork was introduced in both plants in 1992 and the sur-
vey was carried out in the Autumn of 1994.
65
b) Exact Question: Team-members were asked the same questions in both
plants. This involved a direct translation of the English questionnaire into
German (cf. appendix C and D). However, given the different IR system in
both plants, some language adaptations were necessary in order to meet the
criteria established by May (chapter 3.1.).
c) Standard Format: The purpose of the questionnaire was to deliver standard-
ised information about the attitudes of team-members to teamwork.
d) Data Processing: Unlike semi-structured interviews, the use of questionnaires
also facilitated data processing.
b) The type, design and pilot-study of the questionnaire
While Easterby-Smith et al. (1993:119) distinguish between two types of question-
naire (fact and opinion), Hague (1993:29) suggests three types: a) behavioural, b)
attitudinal, and c) classificatory. Since the main purpose of the present use of ques-
tionnaires is "what do people think of something?" and "what is their image and rating
of those things", the present questionnaire is an attitudinal survey, i.e. it asks about
attitudes as aspects of opinions which are real to the individual who holds them
(Oppenheim 1982). In other words, to address the main research question (chapter
3.2.) the questionnaire seeks to deliver additional information, but is in itself not able
to provide sufficient data to answer the main research question. The attitudinal survey
supports the case study, not the reverse. According to Oppenheim (1982:120) an
"attitude scale consists of from half-a-dozen to two dozen or more attitudinal state-
ments, with which the respondent is asked to agree or disagree". In the present ques-
tionnaire, respondents were asked 24 questions in which they were offered the option
of agreement or disagreement. The attitudinal questionnaire used here addresses the
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following questions (Hague 1993:31): "what do you think of...?" (question 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 31); "do you agree or disagree...?" (8, 9, 15, 24, 27, 30); "how do
you rate...?" (13, 16); "what is the likelihood of...?" (28, 29, 30).
Literature on research methods defmes open and closed questions (McNeill 1990:26).
The present questionnaire contains open-ended questions (1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 14, 22) and
closed questions (3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31). The number of open-ended questions used in the present ques-
tionnaire is limited because the research is primarily based on two detailed case stud-
ies with interviews that contain open-ended questions (appendix A and B). The use of
closed questions was the prime objective in the application of the survey given that
closed questions allow for coding (Hague 1993:47). Both closed and open-ended
questions enable subject flow. This is achieved by positioning general questions about
teamwork (question 8 to 15) at the beginning of the questionnaire, followed by a se-
ries of questions (question 16 to 22) about team-members' attitudes towards team-
leaders (Vauxhall) and team-speakers (Opel). The survey concludes with questions
(question 23 to 31) about what team-members see as the relationship between team-
leaders and shop stewards (Vauxhall) and team-speakers and works council mem-
bers/workplace representatives (Opel), i.e. the prime research interest.
The present questionnaire was piloted originally as part of a questionnaire to evaluate
workers' attitude towards Japanese management techniques. From a questionnaire of
over 110 questions on Kaizen, Quality, etc. questions on teamwork were extracted
and adapted for the two case studies of motor-car plants in Germany and Britain. That
is, before the questionnaire was used at Vauxhall and Opel, it had been applied in an
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earlier study in a Canadian motor-car plant (CAMI) as part of a two-year project
asking workers every half year about her/his attitude towards Japanese management
techniques (Robertson 1992). As the research team at CAMI were addressing a simi-
lar research question in the motor-car industry to the present, this provided a useful
pilot questionnaire for the present study.
c) Validity
The way that the validity of the survey was tested was to use the following principles
(Wiseman 1979:119): 1) "no one is lying", this principle was tested by checking the
answers within each questionnaire for contradictions and by comparing these answers
to the results of the interviews with Meisters, teamleaders, team-speakers, supervi-
sors, team-members, etc. at the same section of production. The answers in the ques-
tionnaire were checked against the "official story" (cf. the agreement, appendix I, no.
2) Where there were discrepancies, details were double checked. 3) Virtually none of
the answers given in the questionnaire "did not make sense". In other words, most
responses in the questionnaire matched the responses in the interviews. 4) It was also
assumed that respondents did "the best they could" to fill in the questionnaire, which
was cross-referenced with other questions. 5) None of the survey results was re-
garded as "truly irrelevant to the study", because questions from the survey were di-
rectly directly to the research question and to the hypotheses (cf. chapter 7.5. a-f).
Therefore answers from the questionnaires were considered relevant to the research.
6. While the research was guided by the principle that "there is no such thing as abso-
lute truth", by comparing the survey results with the interview results and the com-
pany's documents, the research can claim to have satisfied the above criteria of valid-
ity.
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In addition three other criteria to establish validity were applied: a) Face validity; this
was achieved by using the questionnaire and its application in the research, i.e. as an
additional source of information. b) Convergent validity; this was done by comparing
the survey results with the results produced by using other research methods
(interviews, documentation, literature, etc.). c) Validation by known groups. Al-
though this principle demands the application of a questionnaire to groups that differ
from the groups researched (i.e. workers with no experience of teamwork), the survey
results were compared with information gathered by interviewing (appendix a and b)
respondents with no experience of teamwork (appendix 0). This interviews took
place during the complete period of the thesis, because neither Opel nor Vauxhall had
introduced the team-concept by mid-1995. These interviews were conduced in Opel's
warehouse, paint-shop and stamping-plant and at Vauxhall's paint-shop and soft and
hard trim (cf. chapter 4.1.4.) where Vauxhall had selected teamleaders but had not
introduced teamwork by the time of the research.
Easterby-Smith et al. (1993:41) focus on two theoretical differences in the issue of
validity. The present research satisfies both criteria: a) According to positivist criteria
the questionnaire used did what it was supposed to do; the survey delivered additional
information to answer the research question. b) By asking questions to team-members
who had worked with teamwork for a considerable time on the assembly line in both
plants, full access was gained to the knowledge and meaning of the informants
(phenomenological approach).
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d) Sampling
The questionnaire uses a sample of team-members in both plants in order "to obtain
information from, or about, a defined set of people, or population" (Easterby-Smith et
al. 1993:122). The target population (Moser and Kalton 1989:53) were the team-
members on the assembly lines in both Vauxhall and Opel. As a survey population,
team-members working with teamwork for the longest period of time were selected.
In the case of Vauxhall, the production area with the most experience of teamwork
was the Door-Module-Section (a sub-section of final assembly). At the time of the
survey, Vauxhall's final assembly had selected teamleaders and had began to set up
team-meetings. In short, teamwork on Vauxhall's final assembly line was not ad-
vanced enough for the application of an attitudinal survey focusing on questions about
a team-members' relationship to her/his teamleader, etc. In the case of Opel fmal as-
sembly on the Omega-line was chosen, where teamwork was introduced at the same
time as at Vauxhall's door-section. a) No random sampling was done (Moser and
Kalton 1989:63).
b) Stratified samples, i.e. the distribution of questionnaires to a small sample group.
This was done at Vauxhall: 70 to 80 per shift, i.e. 140 to 160 team-members were
targeted as the population and shop stewards distributed the questionnaires to team-
members on both shifts. At Opel: 29 teams with seven members on average (i.e. 203
team-members in one shift, one works council member per shift) were chosen as the
population. In both populations (Vauxhall: —150 team-members and Opel: —203 team-
members) 100 questionnaires were distributed and collected through the works
council in Germany and through shop stewards in Vauxhall. In other words, between
71.4 % and 62.5 % of all team-members in Vauxhall's sample group were asked to fill
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in the questionnaire. At Opel, 49.3 % of all team-members were asked the same ques-
tions. The questionnaire (at Opel) was distributed (September 1994), collected
(September to October) and processed (end of October). At Vauxhall, the question-
naire was distributed (November 1994), collected (November) and processed in No-
vember. In both plants (Vauxhall's door-section and Opel's final assembly Omega-
line) union-membership is above 97 %. Consequently, questions relating to union or
non-union membership had no relevance. In both cases, the works council and shop
stewards were asked to return 50+ questionnaires, because this number seems to be
sufficient to a) cover enough team-members at Vauxhall's door-section and Opel's
final assembly and b) provide a satisfactory basis to assisst the main research question
and the hypothese (chapter 3.2.). The distribution resulted in 53 returned question-
naires at Vauxhall and 57 at Opel. The response rate (above 50 %) seems acceptable
(McNeill 1990:40). The results were analysed (value, frequency, percentage, validity
percentage, etc.) using the statistical software SPSS/PC+ (cf. Foster 1992).
The two remaining forms of sampling are c) quota sampling (for example the first 20
who enter the station at 8:00 am) and d) cluster sampling (asking all members of a
unit) were not used.
3.6. Access
Access is a key issue, if there is no access, there is no case study research, as many
methodologists have postulated (0yen 1992:1; Beynon 1988:26; Lawrence 1988:100;
Buchanan et al. 1988:56). Access to Opel was based on a long term relationship be-
tween the researcher and works council which was first established during the 1984
strike for a 35-hour-week. On the basis of this contact, access was not a question of
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negotiation, but of a short discussion prior to the start of the research. In this re-
search, personnel managers were interviewed; but union representatives, work coun-
sel members, and teamleader were the primary sources. Since the case studies are
concerned with teamwork and industrial democracy and teamwork that in both cases
were introduced by management the research relied also on interviews with personnel
managers. One problem of access was that union representation and works councils
were sometimes reluctant to participate and concerned about confidentiality. Access
for the British case study was arranged through a union contact established during an
internship in FORD in 1989. Contacts with the TGWU (FORD) made the contact
with the TGWU (Vauxhall) possible. TGWU as well as works council access enabled
research visits to several motor-car plants (see: Chronology of Research). Once inside
Vauxhall, even access to production managers was possible, although not necessary
for this research. However, interviewing people not functionally connected with
teamwork often provided interesting insights into teamwork.
Another important aspect of comparative research was participation in meetings and
observing managers on a daily basis. Access to meetings at Opel's bi-weekly works
councils-management meetings was given. In the case of Vauxhall, meetings between
management and union representation took place very rarely and not at the time of my
visits. In the case of these meetings, interviews with Vauxhall's personnel manager
and union representation during other visits to the plant provided the necessary infor-
mation. There were also meetings where access to researchers were denied, especially
those on the future developments of teamwork. The fmal question with regard to ac-
cess was the question of the timing of withdrawal from a research site. A departure
from the research site cannot be too early as important developments like the reduc-
tion of team size in parts of the German plant (by mid-1994) would be missed. How-
ever, as a deadline, the end of 1994 seemed an appropriate time for withdrawal from
the research sites, but since developments on the issue of teamwork were still taking
place during the spring of 1995, research contacts to both sites was maintained.
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3.7. Chronology of Research
Information on the motor-car industry was collected from various research, plant vis-
its, internships, and from the UAW/Detroit and TGWU at Ford-Bridgend. Since this
research gained from that experience, a chronology of the research follows:
Table 3.2.: Research Chronolo
1988 USA UAW-Research Dept., Detroit: Five months internship
Oct. 1988 USA Chrysler-Kenosha: Discussion with UAW convenor, stewards, etc.
Nov. 1988 USA FORD River Rouge and various GM plants
Jan. 1989 Japan Honda plant in Kyushu: Tour by management.
Mar. 1989 GB FORD-englne-plant/Bridgend: One month internship, research: Stewards & TGWU
Mar. 1989 GB FORD-Halewood: Discussion with TGWU convenor and stewards.
May 1992 GB Visit at Warwick University to discuss research proposal for PhD
June 1992 FRG Opel Discussion of research proposal with BR-members
Sept. 1992 Japan Nissan plant in Kyushu, discussion with management
Oct. 1992 GB Start of research at the School of Industrial and Business Studies, Warwick University
December
1992
GB Vauxhall: interviews with TGWU, visit door section, interview with manager on door-section, phone
discussion with GM's ONPS' representative for teamwork, interview with Personnel Manager, attended
stewards meeting, interview with MSF and AEEU convenor.
Dec. 1992 FRG Opel: Interview with BR-members and personnel manager teamwork.
Jan. 1993 FRG Opel: Interview with BR, interview with BR, member delegated to the issue of teamwork, interview with
manager for teamwork, visit at door-section, attended VP meeting (final assembly, Omega-line), dis-
cussion with consulting firm on teamwork, video presentation about teamwork and discussions
January
1993
GB Vauxhall: Interview with manager of ONPS, TGWU-convenor, personnel manager, MSF represents-
five, visit door-section in the plant, interviews with TGWU-steward at the door-section, manager, team-
members at the door-section
Feb. 1993 GB IBC-Luton: Tour by management, interview with production manager.
Mar. 1993 GB Jaguar-Birmingham: Tour by TGWU convenor and discussion.
Mar. 1993 GB Land Rover (Coventry): Discussion with TGWU-convenor and stewards.
July-
August
1993
FRG Opel: Internship at Opel's BR for two months: Visit door-section, interview with BR-member, manager,
attended joint management-BR committee on teamwork (Lenkungsausschuss), interview with BR-
member delegate to union, I.e. VP, spend several days with BR-members (four) at final assembly area,
attended VP meetings at final assembly, interview with BR-member delegated to the issue of teamwork
and BR-members at final assembly (Omega and Vectra), attended joint management-BR committee on
teamwork (LenkungsausschuB) in parts shop, attended VP-meeting in press shop, interview with BR-
member at press shop attended VP-meeting in body shop, interview with BR-member for body shop
attend BR-meeting concerning teamwork, attended joint teamspeaker training by management and BR,
attended joint management-BR committee on teamwork (Lenkungsausschuss) for the ROsselsheim
plant, interview with manager of teamwork and manager for organisational development,
9. July 94 FRG Attended One Day Teamspeaker Training at GM's Training Centre/ROsselsheim
15. July 94 FRG Attended Opel's plant wide works meeting
August
1993
FRG IGM's head-office/Frankfurt: Interview with union representative for teamwork and works councils in the
German car industry.
August
1993
FRG Opel-Eisenach: Tour and interview by BR-member, discussion with TGWU delegates from the Vaux-
hall-Luton plant during their visit in Eisenach,
August
1993
Austria GM-Aspem (engine & gearboxes): Plant tour by BR interview with BR convenor, discussion with BR-
members.
September
1993
FRG Mercedes-Benz: Plant tour by BR, interview with BR-member for teamwork, discussion with BR-
members,
Jan. 1994 Japan Toyota, Kyushu: Plant tour by union representative, interview with union representatives.
January
1994
Japan Toyota, Tsutsumi-Plant in Toyota City: Tour by management, discussion with Union in the plant, visit
union headquarters and Toyota's company headquarters, discussion with management.
February
1994
GB Rover, Cowley Plant in Oxford: Tour by management, discussion with management, discussion with
AEEU representative.
March
1994
GB Rolls Royce in Crewe: Tour by teamleader, discussion with convenor and stewards from AEEU, MSF
and TGWU
April
1994
GB Peugeot (Coventry): Interview with personnel manager, tour & interview with TGWU-convenor, dis-
cussion with AEEU and TGWU-stewards.
May 1994 FRG Opel: Interview with teamwork manager, discussion with BR-member for teamwork.
July 1994 GB Toyota Motors In Derbyshire: Tour by management, discussion with management.
Sep. 1994 FRG Opel: Interview with manager (0B) and BR on the changes of teamwork.
November
1994
GB One week visit at Vauxhall, interviews with TGWU-convenor, stewards, AEEU convenor, personnel
manager, personnel development manager, visit at door-section, visit at IBC, interview with TGWU-
convenor
November
1994
GB Discussions on Teamwork with stewards at TGWU seminar New Working Practices within the Corn-
ponents Industry, National Exhibition Centre, Birmingham
January 95 FRG Opel: discussion on development of teamwork with representative of Organisational Development and
works council.
March 95 FRG Official plant tour at Opel and discussion with representative of personnel department and BR on
wages and teamwork
Sep. 1995 GB End of Research
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Chapter
The Introduction
of Teamwork
4. Teamwork at General Motors
GM has, over time, accumulated significant experience in teamwork. In the late
1980s, GM had over twenty plants operating teamwork with some 30,000 employees
in the USA. In Europe, the engine plant in Austria, which opened in 1982 was chosen,
to serve as the pioneer plant in Europe to introduce teamwork. According to Eisen-
ach's works council-member BOckel (1993), it was a pilgrimage location for visitors
until Opel-Eisenach was built. GM's central policy has been to introduce teamwork
into all European plants, however it is clear that different IR systems and different
union responses have varied widely and have affected the adaption of the system.
For GM-Austria, Alfons Wiirzel (Automobil 1992:26) noted, "teamwork reduces
production costs, increases quality and suggestions compared to non-teamwork
plants". GM-Austria was set up before the Japanese challenge arrived in Europe and
GM and Isuzu jointly own IBC (Isuzu-Bedford-Commercial Vehicles), adjacent to
Vauxhall-Luton. Although Vauxhall and IBC belong to the same company, there are
limited contacts between them. IBC's teamwork was introduced in 1986 which influ-
enced Vauxhall's agreement between management and the unions (AEU, ASTMS,
EETPU, TASS and the TGWU) with the Van Operation New Employee Agreement.
In all European GM plants, responsibilities were transferred to teams, but even at its
best, the new system can only be described as creating partial autonomy which is
controlled by rigid time standards and is increasingly subject to electronic monitoring.
Despite all the discussions about teamwork, the old structure of management hierar-
chy was maintained (FR 1994). In Europe and the USA, a GM employee involvement
programme was installed using workgroup problem-solving techniques (Scarbrough
1992:66). GM held extensive discussions whether or not to adapt a Swedish style of
teamwork (Berggren 1992:179), or a Toyota style. Teamwork as an organisational
behavioural issue should not affect the old patterns of production. GM's intention for
the introduction of teamwork was strongly influenced by it's experience in the USA,
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IBC's teamwork on the other hand is shaped by ISUZU and Opel-Eisenach's team-
work is modelled on GM's NUMMI and CAME plants. In both cases, GM was able to
install a new version of teamwork independent from Vauxhall's management and un-
ions and from Opel's management and works council/trade union. However, Opel-
Riisselsheim and Vauxhall-Luton are typical examples of how teamwork was intro-
duced into GM plants in Europe.
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4.1. Teamwork at Vauxhall
Since the arrival of lean production and the setting up of Nissan's UK factory, most
major car manufacturers have introduced lean production methods (IRS1534 1993:5),
of which teamwork is a central feature. Drawing directly from lean production, Vaux-
hall's management sees teamwork "as an important part of the new manufacturing
system that will allow the company to be a producer of World Class Quality products"
(Vauxhall 1990:13). In the 1980s, Ellesmere Port and IBC introduced teamwork be-
fore Luton by reaching their own separate agreements. Teamwork outlined in the
Ellesmere's V6 agreement called The New Employee Agreement, resembles IBC's
teamwork agreement introduced in 1987 which obviously influenced the arrangements
at the Luton factory. (Vauxhall 1992).
The Ellesmere V6 teamwork agreement is by far the most important for Luton's
Working Together to Win document. According to Vauxhall's personnel director
Warman (1993): "IBC introduced teamwork before Vauxhall and initially provided a
model for us". However, the teamwork at IBC was not successful in the 80s' and
Ellesmere's V6 agreement was chosen as a successful model which was introduced at
the same time as the new V6 engine. As an incentive for worker's acceptance for
Ellesmere's V6, Luton's management offered a wage increase; workers at Ellesmere
Port received a 5 % wage increase, workers at Luton received the same.
Besides the general statement in the Ellesmere V6 agreement that "teamwork will
bring competitive costs, secure customer satisfaction, and contribute to the long term
viability of the company and long term job security for it's Employees". (Vauxhall
1990:13), the document included fundamental principles which Vauxhall saw as im-
portant principles of teamwork (Vauxhall 1990:14): "All team-members (5-15) share
the responsibility for work performance by the team, rotating jobs within the team,
continually striving for improvement in operations cost, quality and productivity". The
teamleader as a member of the team would share these responsibilities. Teamwork at
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GM's aftersale warehouse demonstrated the way that tearnleaders would be selected;
there also was also a clear definition of the different roles of teamleaders and supervi-
sors. For example, a teamleader's responsibility is "when necessary, to assist with
employee reviews, disciplinary hearings, etc.", whereas supervisors can "conduct ap-
praisals of employees in line with procedure" (Aftersale 1992:87).
4.1.1. The Introduction of Teamwork
After the abandonment of teamwork at IBC and its successful introduction at Elles-
mere, Luton's agreement was modelled on Ellesmere's V6. According to Vauxhall's
personnel director Warman (1993) Luton's teamwork is in fact an improved version of
the Ellesmere agreement. During the introduction of teamwork at Vauxhall, GME
refused to be involved directly on the basis of allowing different sites to manage their
own IR. Although all European personnel managers meet on a regular basis and visits
from GME are on a frequent basis, they argue that "GME leaves industrial relations
and personnel to local GM plants and does not give detailed guidelines for that"
(Warman 1993). According to Vauxhall's teamwork-manager Eglington (1992),
GME did not have a time schedule or a detailed and structured plan for teamwork;
GME however did develop a guiding booklet called Teamwork, which is part of a se-
ries on lean production or QNPS. QNPS's predecessor The Quality Network had ex-
pressed management intentions to introduce teamwork to the unions in 1988. In
March 1990, QNPS were introduced and a set of goals were laid down: increase
quality, eliminate waste, create continuous improvement (Kaizen); improved internal
communication, workplace organisation, and problem-solving, and introduce team-
work. While all these were related to production, attention was directed to teamwork
as an issue of central importance.
Before introducing teamwork, companies often conducted attitudinal surveys to as-
sess the mood of the plant and the degree of willingness to accept teamwork. Vaux-
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hall employed the Neil Gardner Employee Communication as advisors on teamwork
in the summer of 1991 (27. June to 12. July) to conduct an Internal Communication
Survey asking each worker to complete a questionnaire containing 31 questions. Be-
fore introducing teamwork, Vauxhall's employees were aware of the following: the
experience of the IBC agreement, the experience of the Ellesmere Port V6 agreement,
i.e. The New Employee Agreement, the profit sharing scheme, the Quality Network,
the QNPS, and the Internal Communication Survey.
Management itself was divided over the introduction of teamwork, some arguing for
teamwork and a 5 % wage increase; others arguing that productivity could be in-
creased without teamwork. Since Ellesmere had offered a pay rise, Luton had to offer
the same to introduce teamwork. Even though workers received a 5 % wage increase
as an incentive to accept the system, the wage structure at Luton remained unaffected
by teamwork because all assembly line workers remained in the same wage level(CP =
6,39 pounds/hour). So did the electrical skills section, the mechanical skills section,
etc. In the first year of teamwork, there were no mixed skilled teams and this has not
changed; the skilled trades (AEEU) remained in the same wage group.
Negotiations to introduce teamwork took six months at Ellesmere and teamwork was
officially introduced on the 7th September 1992 after agreement was reached between
management and AEEU, MSF, and TGWU. A ballot for teamwork was taken on the
1st and 2nd September 1992 and the result was announced on the 4th September.
Each union voted separately. Together with Luton's Working together to win (7.
September 1992) and Vauxhall's Luton aftersale warehouse agreement (28. Septem-
ber 1992), all of the British GM locations introduced teamwork. By the end of 1992
Luton's teamwork system, with company appointed tearnleaders, was installed.
79
4.1.2. The Teamwork Agreement
The agreement to operate teamwork at Vauxhall is defined by an agreement signed by
all the participating unions. In the introduction the role of the union is clarified: "The
trade unions, as the representatives of employees have an integral part to play in this
agreement" (Vauxhall 1992). Vauxhall expresses high hopes that: teamwork "will al-
low the company to be a producer of World Class Quality products at a competitive
price, contributing to long term job security for its employees" (Vauxhall 1992). In
this optimistic eulogy in the introduction to the agreement, employee involvement is
presented as having the ability to "impact the success of the business through decision
making" (Vauxhall 1992). While Vauxhall in this document clearly expressed the de-
sire to involve its workers at a higher level; in reality this involvement was controlled
by the company's own management plan.
In describing employees as the "most important investment and resource and a critical
part of the operational process", Vauxhall was seeking what a German unionist Kohl-
bacher (1993) had identified as: the gold in worker's brain; to harvest this gold more
efficiently, the traditionally individualised workers were placed in teams. According to
Vauxhall's employee service manager Knapman (1994), teams which are comprised
of 5 and 15 members and have 8 members on average sharing responsibilities for
(Vauxhall 1992):
• Work performed by the team, subject to any work measurement
system in operation at the time.
• Rotating jobs within the team and, where necessary, between
teams within job classification.
• Ensuring quality of team output.
• Maintaining a safe, clean and tidy work area
Teams are described as groups of employees working as natural workgroups. Each
team-member is made responsible for production related issues; s/he is employed pri-
marily to carry out production tasks, such as material handling, etc. In moving away
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from Taylor's division of hand and brain and the complete segregation of labour func-
tions, teamwork seemed to set up more general responsibilities for workers.
For example, workers are made responsible for their own efficiency through identify-
ing any wasted time, unnecessary walks to material boxes, wasted materials, etc. This
process was intended to get team-members themselves to abolish any non-value-
added-labour, i.e. to do their own time and motion study. Non-value-added-motions
are distinguished in management's definition from value-added-motions; value-added-
motions are identified as direct operations on the car; non-value-added-motions are
operations which do not add any direct value to the car, i.e. unnecessary walks to
material-boxes, waiting time, etc. By reducing non-value-added-motions, production
it is argued, becomes more efficient, i.e. more time is spend directly on the product. In
other words, each small break, each small step aside, each minute of recreation on the
assembly line must be identified and abolished. By reducing such waste, production
would not only be more efficient, but work will be more intense. This is seen by man-
agement as developing efficient work methods in conjunction with a system of sug-
gestions and methods which are displayed on the team board; Standard Operations
Sheets (SOS) analyse all motions on the assembly line to eliminate waste. This is done
in team-meetings during working hours, but voluntary meetings may also be held off
work time if necessary. After having analysed one complete operation, teams discuss
the task of a particular worker and try to improve the task. Team-members also carry
out product-inspection, repair, and minor maintenance. The extension of the workers'
role from a task-oriented one such as a machine operator on an assembly line to that
described above involves an increased "demand for job knowledge" to "fulfil all jobs
within the team" and is asking the workers to monitor and manage themselves, i.e. a
complete redefinition of worker's role.
Vauxhall's teamwork-manager Eglington (1993), uses the football-metaphor to de-
scribe the role of teamleaders. "The teamleader is an integral part of the team and has
a full and active role within that team" (Vauxhall 1992); i.e. the captain plays on the
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field with the team; teamleaders are not the coaches of teams but the captains. While
teamleaders could play the part of coach it is likely then that they would be seen as a
non-productive new supervisor rather than if they are actively working as part of a
team.
For management to justify the existence of a teamleader, their duties have to be pre-
cisely defined. Their role is clearly defined. They must be able to: perform all opera-
tions within the team; to support and represent teams; to work with other teamlead-
ers, supervisors, and other employees; to encourage individuals to meet their respon-
sibilities with regard to quality, cost, productivity, metal-scrap reduction, training, job
rotation, performance, to maintaining schedules, and safety. Teamleader's responsi-
bilities are thus expanded into the responsibilities of the traditional supervisor.
Teamleaders are also asked to regulate internal matters, e.g. disputes. As teamwork
involves this element of IR, all aspects of how teams and teamleaders is of great of
interest to the Trade Unions (Vauxhall 1992). Consequently they argue that all the
usual representational procedures must still apply after the introduction of teamwork,
i.e. shop stewards theoretically retain there powers as described in the teamwork
agreement (Vauxhall 1992):
• Problem-solving in the areas of employee job related problems.
• Obtaining and co-originating necessary supplies, required main-
tenance and technical support to ensure continuous efficient op-
erations.
• Accepting responsibility for the working operation of the team.
• Accommodating employee absences where appropriate.
• Communicating job related information to team-members.
• The Unions accept that the Company will establish through
agreement a selection criterion for teamleaders. The selection of
teamleaders will be on the basis of these agreed criteria. Appli-
cations will be sought and all applicants will be interviewed.
Vauxhall's agreement explicitly deals with the role of union representation under
teamwork. Teams and especially teamleaders can carry out responsibilities related to
union representation; shop stewards have to deal with teamleaders and supervisors
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after the transition to teamwork; previously stewards had only to deal with supervi-
sors. With teamwork, teamleaders and supervisors will share management's respon-
sibilities, thus the stewards must negotiate with supervisors and teamleaders.
With this formal teamwork structure, supervisors as a hierarchical layer do not com-
pletely disappear, even though their number is reduced. Often supervisors are given
the overall responsibility of managing a small number of teams. While teams are rep-
resented by teamleaders, supervisors maintain their responsibility for disciplinary ac-
tions, control of performance standards, corrective action, personnel issues, selecting
new team-members, engineering change, administration of salary/wage changes, etc.
Even though teamwork shifts many responsibilities to teams and especially to team-
leaders, crucial issues such as reviewing employee's performance for the purpose of
personal development and wage progression remain in the sphere of the supervisors;
the power to hire and fire remains with them, too, through their control of appoint-
ment and disciplinary procedures.
4.1.3. Teamwork in Practice
Although the agreement lays out the formal structure of teamwork, it differs widely
from teamwork in practice. One fundamental change away from the control mecha-
nisms of Taylorism has been the abolition of the system of clocking-on. In March
1993 teamleaders were made responsible for absence control. It is important to note
that the movement towards a tearnleaders' control of absenteeism did not in fact affect
the rate of absenteeism because absentee rates remained the same (i.e. 5 %) after the
abolition of the clocking-on (1992). This was, according to Vauxhall's teamwork-
manager Eglington (1992), "expected to decline after the introduction of teamwork,
because of the use of pressure on the workers from the teamleader". However, in
1993 there was no major change.
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Within this teamwork system management did not decide to introduce mixed-skilled
teams, thus job classification remains unchanged. "flexibility and mobility calls for
employees to carry out functions other than their normal duties both inside and out-
side their classification" (Vauxhall 1992:10). This was not intended to change job
classifications, but to soften it. In practice, the traditional hierarchy was maintained
and so were the segregated roles of union members; TGWU production workers were
not mixed into teams with AEEU skilled workers. Rotation of team-members, how-
ever, within the team, was introduced in Vauxhall's agreement (p. 18), IBC's agree-
ment (p. 28), and Ellesmere's agreement (p. 14). Even though Luton's agreement de-
mands rotation, in practice team-members did not rotate in 1992. Rotation again has
been seen as a positive practice by management in terms of ensuring that workers are
like interchangeable parts of an efficient machine.
Teams did not have team-meetings in the first year of the Vauxhall agreement. The
management position on this is stated by the QNPS manager Hart (1993): "team-
meetings are not necessary for the existence of the team, because the team-members
can see each other all the time". This reveals management's reluctance to increase the
power of the teams or strengthen it's internal dynamics as a unit of representation.
Vauxhall's personnel manager acknowledged early union resistance to teamwork (cf.
Wood 1991:592), which was initially on the grounds of insufficient numbers to carry
out the scheme in 1993.
Even though teamwork was set up, Vauxhall did not explicitly acknowledge the need
for further training for the system to succeed, Vauxhall's teamwork-manager Egling-
ton (1993) did introduce a training scheme during the reduction of working hours due
to the recession of 1993 to "improve the team building process"; i.e. when there was
unpaid time available. This team training was not installed as vocational training, but
was part of management's plan to increase co-operation ideals (Warman 1993); hence
the training was oriented towards selling a corporate identity.
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After the first year of teamwork, then, teams were partly made responsible for ab-
sence control and a whole range of minor self-management issues to increase effi-
ciency, but workers still held clear traditional job classifications and their wage struc-
ture had not altered. There was no team rotation and there were no team-meetings. In
short, Vauxhall's teamwork basically converted former group, utility-leaders or
charge-hands to teamleaders and previous work units into teams; the only difference
was an extension of worker's role for greater production efficiency.
4. 1.3. 1. Teamwork
in Practice at the Door-Section
Vauxhall's most advanced developments on teamwork were initiated at the door-
section where a pilot-scheme for teamwork took place in (May 1992). The section
operated with a standard two shift pattern. The main function of this department is
removing doors from the cars and assembling them separately; the door-section as-
sembles doors on a parallel running assembly line. In the initial planning stage only
previously selected teamleaders, managers, and supervisors were included in the ex-
periment and shop stewards were completely excluded from the project. This planning
agreed:
• the parameters of the new production system,
• the required labour,
• that training of man power occurring on the line,
• the organisation of teams,
• the layout of the line production.
During the initial stage, the supervisor faced two problems. On the one hand, some of
the top and middle management opposed the new production methods including
teamwork. According to the supervisor on the door-section Lalji (1992), supervisors
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became aware that they were dealing with a new structure of IR which would affect
their own position.
The original planning agreement added two supervisors to the 80 existing workers per
shift who were supplied by the internal labour market. Workers were selected from all
over the plant and none had any previous experience of teamwork. This on-the-job
experience was used as the main training method. Team discussions about work tasks
was held, problems were solved and a suggestion scheme introduced, which resulted
in many improvements, for example: material delivery to the line, position of the de-
livered material, height of the doors, the existence of team-meeting rooms, etc. At this
initial planning stage, stewards were not present at team discussions. Without partici-
pation by stewards, Vauxhall was able to set up a new production process on their
own, while stewards as the traditional workers' representative, who could normally
have controlled or monitored these processes and questioned management's inten-
tions were excluded.
The official start of teamwork on the assembly line was on the 14th of July 1992.
Productivity by the end of 1992 had reached sixty doors per hours, compared with
forty-seven doors per hour on a similar line without teamwork. According to the
original agreement, the teams were required to rotate members. The door-section was
for a long time the only place where workers actually rotated. In some teams, team-
members refused to be rotated, because workers wanted to keep their existing jobs.
According to TGWU-steward Russell (1993), they were afraid that "quality would fall
because operators do not know how to do each other's job". Vauxhall's door-section
supervisor Lalji (1993) claimed that supervisors needed to fulfil the requirements of
the agreement and ordered rotation. Lalji (1993) agreed that management used heavy
pressure to enforce rotation: "if a team-member rejects rotation, I transfer him to a
heavy job until s/he agrees to rotate". Team-members had no power to organise rota-
tion themselves, this power remained firmly in the hands of the supervisors who inter-
vened in teams issue, i.e. top-down management control.
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After the initial phase, Vauxhall planned to make reductions in the workforce. Be-
tween the 12th of July and 25th of December 1992 the workforce was reduced by 12
workers. On one team, the reduction of team-members was discussed among the team
themselves; the team discussed their assigned task in relation to its members and
asked for a reduction of team size. The teams were encouraged to do this with finan-
cial incentives from management. During discussions, the team decided to remove
two team-members and reduce it from nine to seven members. The expected rewards
would be equally distributed amongst all nine members. This suggestion was pre-
sented to and accepted by management. After the team was reduced to seven mem-
bers, the team then reached the decision to distribute the reward of £ 700 among the
remaining members; the two team-members who had to leave joined other teams but
did not receive a share in the fmancial reward for the original suggestion. Stewards
were of course not able to influence this process because management could argue
that the team decided on the reduction and the reward sharing method. Team-
meetings were held weekly (5 to 20 minutes) during breaks, hence management used
recreation time to utilise work related discussions of benefit to itself.
Under the agreement, teamleaders had to be appointed for the door-section, but this
process resulted in a dysfunctional link between teams and tearnleaders. For example,
in one case, "the team started with a co-ordinator and got into a routine, but later a
teamleader was added from outside to the team and we had to show him what to do"
(interview: Russell 1993). This type of teamwork started with the disadvantage of not
having a teamleader who naturally emerges from the team. This resulted in the often
expressed view that teamleaders were assigned to control and monitor teams. In the
words of the team-member Russell (1933): "We are the team and someone is watch-
ing us, i.e. the teamleader". Teamleaders were seen as an outsider whose loyalty was
to management.
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The tearnleader's job was also often not established in accordance with the original
agreement, and tearnleaders tend to adapt the role of the coach and not the role of the
captain. One task of the teamleader, which was regulated in the agreement, was to
cover for absent workers. If more than one team-member was absent, another team-
leader from another team had to cover. As far as absentee-coverage was concerned,
teamwork did meet with the requirements as outlined in the agreement. Besides filling
in for absent operators teamleaders also "organised the material flow to the line and
control quality" (interview: Russell 1993). One of the incentives for workers to be
teamleaders is not to work directly on the assembly line. Nevertheless, according to
Russell (1993), "if a teamleader does not work on the line, he struggles because he is
no longer an integral part of the team". Since in most cases teamleaders do not work
on the line, team-members often feel that teamleaders do not contribute enough"
(interview: Russell 1993). Further in a "company appointed teamleader regime" teams
can never meet without the external control of a teamleader. In addition to the exter-
nal control, TGWU-steward Russell (1993) noted, the team "cannot remove the
tearnleader", because s/he is appointed.
The teamleader is one of the central features of teamwork and the manner of his/her
selection is vital to the success of teamwork. On Gulowsen's (1979) scale (chapter
2.1.1.1) no participation by the team in selecting the teamleader means total control
by management. Research applying this scale to 19 motor-car factories (Murakami
1995) shows Vauxhall ranks very low in terms of participation and democracy in
terms of new members, distribution of work, time flexibility, acceptance of additional
work, representation, methods of production, output, and quality, Vauxhall's teams
tend to rank below average (see appendix N4). In summary, teams on the door-
section are given less autonomy compared to other plants. For tearn/eader selection,
the average level of autonomy ranges between participation (2) and co-decision-
making (3), but Vauxhall's teams are subject to management's decision (1).
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A survey (appendix A & B) to ascertain the stability of teams asked (question: 4): Has
the number of people on your team changed since your last meeting? Only 30 % said
yes, 56 % said that the number of people on their team had not changed. Since the
teams were newly composed by selecting workers from all over the plant and organis-
ing them into teams and Kaizen-activities often demanded changes among teams, sta-
ble teams had still not been achieved by the time the questionnaire was completed.
During the introduction of teamwork, when team-meetings were scheduled. 28 % of
the workers said they had been required to attend such meetings and 61 % said they
were not required to attend (question: 8). The agreement clearly states that team-
meetings can be scheduled outside of work time, but that attendance is on a voluntary
basis. Most of the time, team-meetings are held after work and only 24 % of team-
members attend; 54 % said that they do not always attend.
Workers were also asked (question: 11) what was their theoretical position on team-
work, i.e. about the idea of working in a team (How much do you like the idea of
working as part of a team?) 14.8 % of Vauxhall's workers said very much, most
workers said somewhat (44.4%) and around 40 % said either not much (20.4 %) or
not at all (18.5 %). The results of question (12): how much do you like being a mem-
ber of your team? are similar. 27.8 % of the workers said very much, 35 % said
somewhat, 22.2 % said not much and only 11.1 % said not at all. In short, over 60 %
of Vauxhall's workers like the idea of working in a team or being a member of a team
very much or somewhat, while only 30 % like the idea not much or not at all.
When asked: is there a pressing issue that your team was dealing with now? 17 % said
yes there is a pressing issue (question: 10), 72 % said no. Since Vauxhall operates
team-meetings largely outside work time, this may explaine why workers' attendance
is low and most workers do not feel that they have to attend meetings, do not have a
pressing issue to take to meetings. This strategy has not only affected the amount of
involvement by workers but the tendency not to identify or be involved in issues that
affect the workplace.
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When asked (question: 13): How often have there been serious disagreements be-
tween members of your team? 35 % said either sometimes or not much and 61 % said
either once in a while or not at all. Since production work on the line does not give
workers room for working together as a team and team-meetings are not well at-
tended there are few occasions when their affairs are really discussed, this again may
explain why there are few serious agreements or disagreements.
When the relatively newly composed teams were asked (question: 17): Do you think
there should be a teamleader? 40.7 % said yes there should be a teamleader but more
than half (51.9 %) disagreed. Not surprisingly given this answer team-members do not
want to be teamleaders, because to question (18): Would you like to become a team-
leader? only 7.4 % said yes and 85.2 % said no. However, the position on the mode
of appointment of teamleaders was very clear; 75.9 % said they thought teamleaders
should be elected from the workforce (question: 19); while only 13 % disagreed with
the election of teamleaders. In addition (question: 20), 44.4 % rejected the notion of
team-member rotation (Do you think that teamleaders should be rotated? Do you
think that everyone should get a chance at being the teamleader?), but 38.9 % fa-
voured this idea (question: 20). It seems as if workers were unsure in the first place
about the value of a teamleader, but they do not want themselves to be teamleaders
either because they identify it as a management role or they do not want greater re-
sponsibility, but if there are teamleaders they clearly want them to be elected.
Additional questions about the selection process of teamleaders asked (question: 21):
Do you think that the current system for selecting teamleaders is a fair one? 68.5 %
of them said: no and 16.7 answered yes (no response 14.8 %). In summary, team-
members not only disagreed with the institution of teamleaders, but also with the ex-
isting mode of appointment. Since the relationship between team-members and team-
leaders seems to be problematic, the following questions focused more specifically on
this relationship:
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Table 4.1.: Teamleaders and Team-Members at Vauxhall (in %)
Question (16):
How often..,
all the
time often
once in
a while never
a) do you get along with your teamleader? 24.1 29.6 35.2 3.7
b) does your teamleader help you with your job? 3.7 20 50 16.7
C) does your teamleader co-operate with you? 9.3 27.8 42.6 7.4
d) do you get the sense your teamleader respects you? 16.7 14.8 22.2 37
e) does your teamleader pressure you to submit suggestions? o 13 72.2 9.3
f) does your teamleader listen to your ideas about
making the job easier and safer? 9.3 18.5 38.9 25.9
q) does your teamleader put pressure on you to do your job? 14.8 16.7 16.7 40.7
h) does your teamleader think more like management than one of you? 42.6 22.2 16.7 11.1
The answers to these questions domonstrate that while most team-members get along
well with their teamleaders, they did not view them as specially helpful with their jobs.
,Equally teamleaders do not seem to pressure their members for suggestions, nor do
they put pressure on team-members to do their jobs better. The result from this survey
(appendix C) demonstrates that workers more often than not identify teamleaders
with management (42.6 %); i.e. team-members view teamleaders as management's
teamleaders. The results indicate also that there is a gulf between tearnleaders and
team-members. Question (13) which asked about the relationship among team-
members themselves was: How often has there been serious disagreements between
members of your team? 61.1 % said either not much or never. It seems that while
team-members express their problems to teamleaders team-members operate more
closely together. While internal conflicts within the teams are low, the relationship
between teamleader and team-members is more open to conflict. Again access to
teamleaders is restricted a) if they are on the line or b) the workers do not attend
meetings. In addition, questions were also asked about their general attitude to team-
work:
Table 4.2.: Team-Members and Teamwork
Question (15): agree
30.2 %
disagree
69.8 %a) Helps me do my lob better.
b) Gives me a chance to get to know people. 49.1 % 50.9 %
C) Is a waste of time. 36.0 % 64.0 %
d) Gives me a chance to raise my concerns. 32.1 % 67.9 %
e) Helps me feel I'm part of Vauxhall. 16.3 % 83.7 %
f) Is a way to get us to work harder. 83.7% 16.3%
g) Helps me see how my job fits In the overall scheme. 25.5 % 74.5%
h) Gets us all pressuring one another. 64.0 `Ye 36.0 °A,
I) Gives me a say over how my job Is done. 23.5 % 76.7 %
j) Helps Vauxhall but not me. 79.6 % 20.4%
k) Allows team-members to act together to express complaints. 50.0 % 50.0 %
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A clear picture emerges from this survey of dissatisfaction with the implementation of
teamwork. 79.6 % of workers clearly identify the purpose of the introduction of
teamwork as suiting management before their own interests; 64 % see it as used by
management to get workers pressuring other workers; 76.7 % feel they have no
greater say or control through team structures; 83.7 % do not identify in any way with
the company and 64 % see the whole project as a waste of time in terms of their own
interests. Where teamwork however seems to suit workers more is in it's socialising
aspect although it is also seen positively as a way of marshalling and expressing corn-
plains.To conclude, even though there are some positive aspects for the workforce,
the negative aspects are more strongly expressed.
4.1.4. Teamwork and Teamleaders
A significant section of the teamwork agreement regulates teamleaders' role because
of their influence over the internal structure of the team and their position in the inter-
nal hierarchy. Even though teamleaders were instituted in 1992, a similar position in
the plant existed for many years. Therefore an extra layer between workers and su-
pervisors was nothing new at Vauxhall. As early as 1941, charge-hands were ap-
pointed by management; they received a pay increase of 26 pence more than the aver-
age wage in 1992. A charge-hand was, then, an assistant supervisor or a deputy su-
pervisor who worked between supervisors and workers. Their task was mainly tool
distribution and maintenance, but on occasions charge-hands also stood in for absen-
tees. Similarly, charge-hands also existed at IBC because by the time charge-hands
were introduced both plants had a similar internal structure. Although IBC and Vaux-
hall are located adjacent to one another, today their IR differs widely as Vauxhall is
solely GM managed while IBC has a Japanese-British management. At the IBC plant
"the new teamleader's role continues many of the functions performed by group-
leaders (charge-hands) in the old company" (IBC 1988:2). In comparison to the old
charge-hands, new teamleaders at 1BC have increased authority. Like the charge-
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hand/teamleader relationship at IBC, "there have been expectations that the former
group leader would be the future teamleader" (interview: Hart 1993) at Vauxhall.
Even though these expectations existed, new teamleaders were "appointed by the
company on the basis of agreed published criteria with equal opportunity for all em-
ployees" (Vauxhall 1990:16). For management, the appointment of the teamleader
was a necessity because teamwork began with the teamleaders role which was even
more important than the formation of the teams themselves. Approximately 1100
employees applied, i.e. 25 % of the total workforce. All applicants were interviewed
(May 1992) and selected candidates were subsequently tested in mathematics, english,
and communication skills. Vauxhall's teamwork-manager Eglington (1992) did not
want the supervisors to nominate future teamleaders, because he argued of the fear of
nepotism. Management also felt that the selection process should remain independent
to increase the level of objectivity. Out of the 1100 candidates, 403 teamleader were
chosen by the company. All 403 teamleaders were trained. Significantly of these 403
teamleaders 80 % were former charge-hands.
Vauxhall did not want teamleaders to be elected by teams, because it feared that if
stewards were voted in it would increase their power. Although management knew
that NUMMI's teamleaders were elected, Vauxhall followed the Ellesmere Port model
and appointed them. Vauxhall's QNPS representative Hart (1993) labelled NUMMI as
an ideal world, where "the teamleader could be elected and does not need to be ap-
pointed". Vauxhall's management stated that it would opt for an appointment system
for four main reasons: a) a fear of increasing the number of stewards, b) a policy of
appointing former charge-hands as teamleaders, c) the difficulty of introducing team-
work without creating teams, d) the preference by the unions for appointment as op-
posed to elections.
With the introduction of teamleaders the areas covered by one supervisor became
wider. Vauxhall initiated the following number of teamleaders:
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Table 4.3.: The Vauxhall Plant
Plant-Number Name Number of teamleaders
LA 01 Body Shop 60
LA 02 Paint Shop 46
LA 03 Final Assembly 78
LA 04 Soft Trim Shop 44
LA 05 Hard Trim Shop 134
Total (1992) All shops 363
By 1994 the number of teamleaders had reached its final level of 543, and their distri-
bution between different parts of the plant remained unchanged. All 543 teamleaders
"will be within the same occupational classification as their team-members but will
receive a teamleader supplement, which on appointment will be 6 % of their basic
rates followed by a further 3 % upon satisfactory completion of a qualifying period of
six months" (Vauxhall 1992:67). In concrete terms this amounted to approximately £
28 per week. Even though the wage system did not open a new level of payment for
teamleaders, they received an extra payment on top of their normal pay; this wage in-
crease acted as an incentive for people to became teamleaders. Although a 9 % pay
rise was not the only incentive to become a teamleader, it was enough to keep the
resignation rate below 2 % in 1994. The other reason for this low rate of resignation
was that 80 % of teamleaders were former charge-hands. Since teamwork was not
fully installed during the first year, the role of the new teamleaders differed only
slightly from the role of the old charge-hand.
The change from charge-hand to teamleader did not alter their position within the
hierarchy, because teamleaders like charge-hands have always been positioned be-
tween team-members and supervisors. On the other hand, teamleaders also have to
function in what could be called a triangle: a) the rank and file, b) supervisors and c)
stewards. Within such a triangle, the most important issue, i.e. the power to discipline
remained firmly in the hand of the supervisor. The agreement specifies that formal
disciplinary action will always be taken by the supervisor. Even though the agreement
was clear on the issue of disciplinary action and who could take it, alterations that
were discussed did, during the first year of teamwork, demonstrate that the system
was not static and showed some flexibility on this point.
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Table 4.3.: The Vauxhall Plant
Plant-Number Name Number of teamleaders
LA 01 Body Shop 60
LA 02 Paint Shop 46
LA 03 Final Assembly 78
LA 04 Soft Trim Shop 44
LA 05 Hard Trim Shop 134
Total (1992) ._	 All shops 363
By 1994 the number of tearnleaders had reached its final level of 543, and their distri-
bution between different parts of the plant remained unchanged. All 543 teamleaders
"will be within the same occupational classification as their team-members but will
receive a teamleader supplement, which on appointment will be 6 % of their basic
rates followed by a further 3 % upon satisfactory completion of a qualifying period of
six months" (Vauxhall 1992:67). In concrete terms this amounted to approximately £
28 per week. Even though the wage system did not open a new level of payment for
teamleaders, they received an extra payment on top of their normal pay; this wage in-
crease acted as an incentive for people to became teamleaders. Although a 9 % pay
rise was not the only incentive to become a teamleader, it was enough to keep the
resignation rate below 2 % in 1994. The other reason for this low rate of resignation
was that 80 % of teamleaders were former charge-hands. Since teamwork was not
fully installed during the first year, the role of the new teamleaders differed only
slightly from the role of the old charge-hand.
The change from charge-hand to teamleader did not alter their position within the
hierarchy, because teamleaders like charge-hands have always been positioned be-
tween team-members and supervisors. On the other hand, teamleaders also have to
function in what could be called a triangle: a) the rank and file, b) supervisors and c)
stewards. Within such a triangle, the most important issue, i.e. the power to discipline
remained firmly in the hand of the supervisor. The agreement specifies that formal
disciplinary action will always be taken by the supervisor. Even though the agreement
was clear on the issue of disciplinary action and who could take it, alterations that
were discussed did, during the first year of teamwork, demonstrate that the system
was not static and showed some flexibility on this point.
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The first attempt by management to alter the role of the teamleader was carried out
within one year of its introduction. In February 1993, management issued a paper on
the teamleader's roles which increased the teamleader's responsibilities. After the op-
position of TGWU's convenor John Jack, the paper was withdrawn because its con-
tents exceeded the regulations of the original teamwork agreement. For example, in
contrast to the old agreement, the new regulation would have allowed the teamleader
to publish an absentee list on team notice boards. According to the original agree-
ment, the teamleader role was merely to "accommodate absent employees" (Vauxhall
1922:22). Furthermore, the paper would have given teamleaders the power to "liaise
with the supervisor for the purpose of assessing team-members performance". The
original agreement did not contain such a provision. Consequently, an attempt by the
company to break the agreement was stopped by the unions.
4.1.5. Conclusions
At the beginning of the 1990s motivated by increased competition and recession,
Vauxhall saw the opportunity to increase productivity and profit and to create a better
manufacturing system. Teamwork was considered to have a significant advantage
over the old production models. IBC's teamwork was successful in the late '80s when
Japanese management took partial control and improved their methods. Besides IBC,
Ellesmere Port had also introduced teamwork. Ellesmere's teamwork was a success
and influenced Luton's willingness to adapt teamwork.
During the process of the introduction of teamwork, GME did not directly interfere at
Vauxhall, apart from giving guidelines and advice to local management. Differences in
national contexts or even between plants were accepted by GME. However, GME
insisted on the introduction of QNPS and teamwork in all European operations in the
early 90s. Teamwork models differ between countries and even between GM plants
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inside the same country. Teamwork also incorporated the issue of plant based indus-
trial democracy, i.e. representation in the form of stewards in Vauxhall's agreement
includes the unions and employee representatives as an integral part of the represen-
tative system. Besides this it also requires employee involvement.
While teamwork demanded more from team-members and teamleaders, it did not
change traditional job classifications. Nevertheless, some of these factors were af-
fected by the introduction of teamwork at the door-section. Vauxhall's agreement
recognised the unions as an integral part of the representative process and yet stew-
ards were excluded from the planning stage at the door-section. The reduction of the
workforce was accomplished through a suggestion scheme which again stewards
could not influence or oppose particularly as this decision was not a management one
but a team or worker led decision.
Another example demonstrates the conflict that can occur between teamleaders and
team-members. Although greater productivity was achieved through the introduction
of teamwork on the door-section, management decided not to use this surplus time
for team-meetings. Team-members were not able to change their teamleader because
all team-meetings are attended by teamleaders who draw up an agenda and chair the
meeting. As a result of this, a team is unable to meet in work without a tearnleader
being present and in control of the agenda. The teamleader is in some cases regarded
as an external representative with a management controlled function which has sur-
veillance control functions A further lack of democracy is that teams cannot remove
the teamleader because s/he is appointed by the company.
Since team-members cannot change teamleaders, management is able to constantly
monitor and control teams. As a consequence, teamleaders are the crucial representa-
tive figures because s/he sets the agenda and has the power to co-opt external people,
for example stewards. Given the teamleaders' position in their role over and above a
team, team-members often do not see them as necessary. Half of the team-members
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rejected their role; We do not need them; 85 % said they did not want to be teamlead-
ers because they feared they would be identified with management puppets. Despite
management's and union's decision to appoint tearnleaders most workers would prefer
to elect them and 68.5 % of the workforce think the current system of selection of
teamleaders is unfair. Team-members do not only reject the appointment of teamlead-
ers, the results of the survey clearly express the conflict between teamleaders and
teams. Team-members tend to disregard the whole team system when the relation
between team-members and teamleaders is bad. In short, Vauxhall's team-concept in-
dicates problems not only between teamleaders and team-members, but for the whole
concept of teamwork.
The door-section was considered to be the pilot model to test the effectiveness of
teamwork which was then to be transferred to the whole plant. Teamleaders have
much in common with their predecessors, the charge-hands. Because of the process
of selecting teamleaders; 80 % of the new teamleaders were in fact former charge-
hands. Vauxhall's management strategy in appointing teamleaders was to avoid a
further growth in the number of stewards who were seen as hostile representatives of
the workforce in comparison to teamleaders who were seen to function much more
effectively and in favour of the company's industrial goals.
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Chapter
Teamwork
at Opel
4.2. Teamwork at Opel
In 1925, the assembly line at Opel was one of the first assembly line factories in Ger-
many (Gottschall 1992:56). According to Door-Module manager Vogel (1993), pro-
duction was partly organised in cells between 1986 and 1994, but all other parts of the
plant were constructed around the assembly line. One of the reasons for introducing
teamwork was the co-called Kaizen or KVP. Works council-member Seib (1993) at
final assembly regards ICaizen as an option which is used to improve the "quality of
working life". Since management uses K'VP as a measure for the success of team-
work, supervisors are forced to work according to it's guidelines.
Since GM-Aspern was one of the pilot scheme for teamwork, Opel's works council
and management carefully watched the development of the production teams at As-
pem during the eighties. In the nineties on the other hand the focus shifted towards
GM-Eisenach. In contrast to Opel's team-concept which is examined in this study; the
Eisenach teams had to present at least three suggestions per month to avoid wage re-
ductions. According to Opel-Bochum's works council-member Schaumberg (1993),
GM's management demands team-meetings to be scheduled off work time at Eisen-
ach. Increasingly KVPs are forced on teams as a measurement of success. To high-
light the importance of KVPs and their link to an increase in productivity, "Walter
Schlotfeld, the personnel director at Riisselsheim expects an increase in productivity
through the introduction of teamwork" (Main Spitze 11.4.91) and through the use of
KVPs. Management quite openly expects an increase in productivity from teamwork
and an improvement in work standards.
As Gulowsen shows (chapter 2.1.1.1), it is possible that teams are able to autono-
mously redistribute their work to a high degree. However, at Opel when teams were
allowed to redesign their own work to increase efficiency, supervisors often used this
information to cut the team's membership and increase the work load of individual
team-members. Closely linked to redistributing work was the rotation of team-
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members, which enabled team-members to do their neighbour's job (Wolf 1991:30).
This was fostered by management and works council in order not only to distribute
the work load within teams, but also because the works council argued that it was a
step towards the humanisation of work; workers would no longer be inhumanely and
monotonously performing one assembly line function.
Productivity increases, rotation of jobs, internal distribution of work and KVPs are all
indicators that allowed Opel's management to evaluate the teamwork experiment and
to measure it's successful implementation for the company. The QNPS which include
teamwork, were geared to approach a broad-scale transformation to a second indus-
trial revolution (Mailer 1992:198). Original plans for teamwork started with 3,000
workers in 1992 but were scheduled to affect all employees by 1993; all production
work would then take place in teams. To achieve this goal, management and the
works council agreed to introduce a "committee on the introduction of teamwork"
(Lenkungsausschuft Gruppenarbeit). By 1993, production workers were placed in
teams on the Omega and Vectra/Calibra line. During a meeting of the Lenkung-
sausschufi Gruppenarbeit (25. January 1993), reports which were presented by Opel's
warehouse demonstrated resistance by supervisors to the introduction of teamwork.
According to works council-member Franz (1993), "supervisors are the key to the
success of teamwork, hence the works council demanded a better training for them".
It was agreed that the economic recession in Germany, i.e. particularly the falling de-
mands for cars, endangered teamwork. On the other hand, the "lay-offs in weekly
work time could be used to train teamspeakers and supervisors". Supervisors and
highly skilled workers were the focus point for the introduction of teamwork. How-
ever teamwork included a mixing of production and quality control; teams at the final
assembly line were established without merging production and quality; at final as-
sembly there were 29 teams in production and four teams in quality control. In other
words, the goal of merging quality control with production was not reached in 1993,
but was finally accomplished in 1995.
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The teamwork which started in the early 1990s had made considerable progress by the
mid-1990s compared to other motor-car producers in Germany. Although important
issues such as KVPs, rotation, and work distribution were still in an introductory
phase, Opel managed to introduce teamwork as a plant wide concept of organising
production workers on the assembly line. A small questionnaire-survey (appendix B)
was conducted in final assembly. In answer to the central question (12): How much do
you like being a member of your team? 24 % answered very much, 58 % somewhat,
12 % not much, and 6 % not at all. As fmal assembly was the first area in which
teamwork was introduced team-members in the majority seemed to favour teamwork,
even after having worked for over a year in teams. More than 80 % either enjoyed
working in a team or at least liked it to some extent. On the basis of this results work-
ers tended to accept the introduction of teamwork in final assembly.
4.2.1. The Introduction of Teamwork
With the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s, attempts were made to ease it's negative ef-
fects by trying to implement teamwork. However, "the teamwork project in the 70's
failed because of the resistance of management, union and the works councils"
(Endres 1993:635). Management, unions and the works council rejected teamwork;
management saw it as a loss of control and unions/works council feared the impact of
teamspeakers on representation.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, these views changed considerably not only within
management, but also within unions and the works councils. In the 1980s and 1990s,
competition from Japanese producers forced GM to look at its production concepts in
the USA and in Europe. The 1980s also proved to be less favourable for unions in
Germany, so that when at the end of 1988 Opel's management approached the works
council about teamwork the works council agreed under the provision of a new wages
structure. The works council and management agreed on setting up a committee to
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change the wage structure and also to introduce teamwork. The committee worked
on a draft for an agreement between the end of 1989 and mid 1991. This negotiation
resulted in the reduction of wages grades (42 to 10) and the introduction of team-
work. GM began the introduction of teamwork without having a structured plan and
schedule; each GM plant, it was decided, should adjust teamwork according to the
structure of it's existing IR and production system. In contrast to green field sites like
CAMI or Eisenach where it was possible to create new structures, teamwork, at a
brown field site, had to fit into an existing structure.
Since introducing teamwork into an existing brown-field site demanded more time and
a different approach, Opel estimated in 1991 the time needed was two to three years
as an introductory period. In 1993, management declared that: "Although teamwork
started with 12 teams in June 1990, it will take more than five years until teamwork
will be fully developed" (interview: Hildrnan 1993). Teamwork was first introduced in
final assembly ( interview: Schischke 1993).
Before the introduction of teamwork in 1990, an external consultant (IFAO) was
hired by Opel's management. IFAO assisted and gave advice to management and to
some degree to the works council during this period. Already in 1990, IFAO were
distributing leaflets on management's behalf about the advantages of teamwork and
was using attitudinal surveys in some parts of the plant to assess employees receptiv-
ity to this change.
In a survey at Opel where question (11) about being a member of a team was asked:
How much do you like the idea of working as part of a team? 23.5 % said very much,
51.0 % somewhat, 15.7 % not much, and 7.8 % not at all. These findings seemed to
support management's impression, that the bulk of the workers, i.e. almost 75 %
would support teamwork. IFAO was used by management to provide advise and to
collect appropriate data to enable management to handle all the issues connected with
a successful introduction of the system.
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Teamwork is not just one element of QNPS, but is regarded as an essential aspect,
because teams after all is at the forefront of production. Under this new system,
teams, would have between eight to fifteen workers elected group-speakers (Network
1992:44). Even though teams elected their teamspeakers, QNPS aimed to introduce a
customer-relationships. A team, for example which installs a gear-box into a car is the
customer of a team that builds the gear-box. Under QNPS and the customer-supplier-
relation, Opel's management tried to introduce competition between the different sec-
tions of production and different production teams. This customer-supplier-relations
model between teams is not yet fully implemented, but is scheduled to be implemented
once teamwork is fully operating. Management needed to set up fully functioning
teams before they were able to fully introduce the customer-supplier-relations model.
GM's Opel management was very clear on the objectives of teamwork. To inform
their employees concerning the introduction of QNPS, Opel arranged five company-
wide meetings with 5,000 workers attending in August and September 1991, 14,000
workers present at the Bochum plant-meeting in August 1991, and 45 training classes
for teamwork were organised for 5,800 workers at the Kaiserslautern plant in 1991
and 1992 (Network 1992:3). In large workshops workers met to receive information
about teamwork. To gain workers acceptance and support for teamwork, workers at
all Opel operations were given continuous information by management at an early
stage; information about teamwork was given after the works council had agreed to
implement teamwork in all GM plants. Before the company agreement
(Betriebsvereinbarung, BV) with number 179 (BV 179) was signed, works council-
members agreed to install project teams for the introduction of teamwork at Opel's
research and development department. After this process of consultation with the
works council, teamwork commenced with six teams. The experience gained from the
project teams was then used in the draft of BY 179. At the components shop team-
work started in 1990 prior to BV 179 with works council's approval. Pilot
schemeswere launched starting with the gear-box production line because the compo-
103
nents shop was not directly part of the production flow. Team-meetings were held
approximately once a week, although in 1992 the number of team-meetings fell be-
cause of labour shortages. According to works council-member Wink (1993) and
Sigges (1993), the introduction of teamwork at the component's shop was too fast
and done without consulting supervisors and without appropriate training for team-
speakers. Works council-member Wink's concern reflects the more general concern
about the problems that occurred during the introduction of teamwork at the compo-
nents shop. Based on feedback to this early experiment, Opel reached an agreement
with the works council to introduce teamwork at the company's domestic plants,
(1RS/519. 1992:3) in April 1991. Because of the German system of IR, the works
council enjoyed considerable co-determination power over personnel affairs
(Markovits 1986) therefore management was forced to seek works council's approval
for any change in personnel relations. On the basis of the works constitution
(BetrVG), Opel's management invited the works council for a discussion on team-
work. In addition to the pilot-studies, a company agreement between management
and the works council was reached including provisions for team-members and team-
speakers (Frackmann 1993:65). Even before the agreement was officially signed, a
steering committee (Lenkungsausschuss) had been set up to implement the agreement
(ThOnnes 1993:188). The steering committee met fortnightly, monitored and dis-
cussed developments, problems, and any necessary changes to teamwork.
4.2.2. The Teamwork Agreement
By the mid-1970s workers were increasingly disillusioned with Opel's old and conser-
vative works council and voted for a more progressive works council. Since this pro-
gressive works council was elected in spring 1975, Opel has signed more than 250
BVs, demonstrating the importance of documented agreement through institutional-
ised means, in this system. Given the importance of teamwork, it was then regulated
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through a legally binding contract between management and the works council, i.e. a
company agreement (Betriebsvereinbarung, BV).
On the 4th of April 1991, Opel's management and the works council reached an
agreement on teamwork. The agreement (no. 179) applied to all German GM opera-
tions, (Riisselsheim, Bochum, and Kaiserslautern, and Dudenhofen), but not to the
Opel-Eisenach GmbH factory, which is a separate company not linked to Opel
(West). Management's reason for BV 179 was to meet the challenge of competition.
The works council's interest was to increase workers individual self-development
within the frame of production. To be able to achieve both goals, they agreed to in-
troduce teamwork. Management saw one aim of teamwork of Kaizen as an increase in
flexibility and motivation. To ease the effect on workers, the works council demanded
that if productivity increases and team sizes are reduced team-members who are re-
moved from teams have to be employed at a better or similar position within the
company (BV 1991:2), thus introducing a strong element of workers' protection. Ac-
cording to Opel's management, team size or team areas are to be organised in a way
that each team can accomplish its production tasks without shifting workers between
different teams on a short-time basis. Teams should be stable in size and location.
According to BY 179, teams have the following responsibilities (BV 1991:3):
• distribution of work among its members, regulation of rest time, team-meetings, health and
safety improvements, job rotation, holiday planning,
• increase of motivation and satisfaction,
• production tasks and quality demands have to be met,
• adaptation of production variations,
• meet cost requirements of production,
• production and tool efficiency compensated by minor maintenance and machine fitting,
• Kalzen (continuos improvement) for production,
• developing standardised work charts,
• installation of improved tools or production methods within the working area of the team
• ensure the Information tows within the team to the supervisor,
• training of new team-members,
• integration of disabled workers,
• maintaining a clean and tidy work area,
• support creativity, innovations and independence of team-members,
• participation on work tasks, conditions, production organisation, and working environment'.
To avoid disadvantages for workers as a result of accepting teamwork, the works
council included a provision that if suggestions result in personnel alterations, they
need to be approved by the works council (BY 1991:4). The BV also negotiated pro-
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visions stopping team-members and teamspeakers from being subject to personnel
assessment methods like the Japanese Satei (Endo 1994) which could be used to
threaten workers. According to BV 179 (1991:4), "teams can neither test or examine
team-members, nor are job evaluation and efficiency measures the responsibilities of
the team".
Team-meetings, as set up by management, are seen as work related discussions for up
to one hour and should be on a weekly basis. Teamspeakers set up meetings to dis-
cuss production; these are held in normal working hours. It was agreed that off-work
time meetings were paid as overtime. Teams have the freedom to determine their own
agenda and can consult all necessary specialists, supervisors, works council-members,
etc. They can also introduce special issues in meetings (BV 1991:4), but access to
team-meetings for any outsider is very restricted because they are only allowed to
participate if co-opted. However, the decision who to invite must be made by the
team and not by the teamspeaker alone.
The wages structure of team-members, as set up in BY 180, is different according to
their working tasks (BV 1991:4). With teamwork, the number of wage grades were
reduced from 42 grades to 10. However, one way to increase an individual wage was
to move from one wage grade to another; this was linked to skill and work tasks and
could be achieved by acquiring additional skills through rotation. In short, although
wages grades were reduced, with teamwork, workers could move to a higher grade
more easily. The team cannot hinder any member from self improvement (BV
1991:4); this gave team-members the option to rotate, resulting in the acquisition of
additional skills, which then enabled team-members to move to a higher wage grade.
As a consequence of this agreement, works council was able to ensure additional
wage claims for its members. GM's management was aware of this implication but
accepted it.
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Teamspeaker
Management and works council agreed at an early stage that teamspeakers should not
be called teamleaders to avoid the German word Fiihrer or GruppenfiThrer. Even
more important, both sides wanted to ensure a democratic election and a strong link
between the team and teamspeaker. While teams were headed by either a manage-
ment-appointed leader or by a team elected speaker, teamspeakers represented
team-members inside and outside of teams and acted on behalf of the team. They had
no disciplinary or supervisory powers, Opel's teamspeakers were seen as mediators,
communicators and moderators.
BV 179 demands secret elections (majority voting) for a teamspeaker. These elec-
tions were to be held among team-members on a six monthly (first election) basis and
later on an annual basis. The usual case in elections were that teams decide who the
teamspeaker will be before the election. Voting is often done by a show of hands.
Prior to the election, teams were informed about teamspeakers' duties, rights and
tasks. Teamspeakers' positions are not a lifetime position because a term can end at
any time through majority voting in a secret ballot. Deputy teamspeakers are elected
who deputise for a teamspeaker during his absences; BY 179 also included a small
financial incentive for the teamspeaker; 30 pc/hour. Teamspeakers and team-members
were seen as performing different functions. Teamspeakers had the following respon-
sibilities: team motivating, moderating at team-meetings, consulting on information
flow, reaching team goals, and supporting supervisors; s/he is provided with the nec-
essary time for her/his duties. The crucial factor of disciplinary action is also regulated
in BY 179, which states, that teamspeakers do not have the authority to discipline
people (Wolf 1991:30), this remains firmly in the hand of supervisors.
Even though it is not specifically addressed in the agreement, there is a link between
supervisors and teamwork; these changes in teamwork meant that the work of super-
visors changed as well. Since German supervisors' function has traditionally been a
production related role, and some of these functions were now delegated to teams,
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the Meister's (supervisory) function shifted more towards a social function, i.e. a
working together with teams, supporting teams to ensure the accomplishment of their
tasks, developing communication and co-ordination among teams and sections, assist-
ing the problem-solving processes, supporting the skill-development of team-members
and the assignment of personnel to production tasks. Supervisors are also responsible
for exchanging team-members among teams, i.e. they fulfilled their traditional role as
technical advisors. As teamwork moved some of these supervisory functions to teams,
training was seen as important. Teamspeakers, deputy teamspeakers, and supervisors
received additional communications training; together with the works council, man-
agement developed training methods to create new qualifications; the works council
had the power to approve such training schemes which were then designed and car-
ried out by management.
Management and works council altered the role of the teamspeaker in spring 1994. As
with the first amendment to BV 179, an additional amendment (BV-AB 1994) regu-
lated the selection, nomination, assessment, training and removal of teamspeakers. In
contrast to the previous regulation, teamspeakers, for example, must be able to speak
German. Previous experience throughout the initial period showed that teamspeakers
often lacked the necessary communication skills to moderate meetings, discuss and
negotiate with supervisors, etc. GM's management demanded a re-assessment of the
teamspeaker's role. Works council agreed to an alteration concerning the language
requirement which of course excluded many non-German speakers from applying for
the tearnspeaker role. The works council was not able to push management to initiate
more and better training courses, even in language skills, but in fact accepted the re-
quest to exclude certain workers from a potential application. In contrast to previous
regulations, a potential candidate must also be able to perform the highest level of
flexibility within a team. The changes then were linked to the level of skills or the level
of operations s/he is able to carry out. Another significant modification of BV 179
was that, not only a team can nominate a candidate for teamspeaker, but also supervi-
sors; this clause was previously strongly resisted by works council-members, and it
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was one which introduced a much less democratic system. This change marked a step
backwards to the old IR: to the worker-supervisor system. After a candidate for
teamspeaker is nominated, an assessment is used by management to appraise the
teamspeakers qualifications with regard to problem-solving, communication, modera-
tion, logical thinking, and mathematics.
To conclude management not only excluded parts of the workforce from application,
it also failed to provide the necessary training for potential teamspeakers e.g. lan-
guage. In addition, management demanded of teamspeakers a high level of skills, and
because of the consequent introduction of assessment criteria management changed
from a more democratic model (team elects) to a more authoritarian model
(management assessment and team elects). In contrast, elections of teamspeakers by
teams showed that team-members elect teamspeakers on the basis of production and
operational skills. Because of these modifications to the old agreement, management
had significantly narrowed the range of potential applicants and made the whole sys-
tem less democratic.
Teamwork and Participation
BV 179 includes explicit provisions to address the relationship between teamwork and
the works council:
To ensure the works council's ability of co-determination, it has to be in-
formed about planed measures within a reasonable period of time. The
rights of the works council are based on collective and company agree-
ments, laws, and other regulations remains untouched.
Since the power of the works council is based on the works constitution and a BV can
neither by-pass nor ignore the works constitution, the works council needed to be part
of any new form of representation that teamwork involved. As the role of the new
teams were representative and entered the arena of representation assigned to the
works council by law, the works councils had to be informed about any changes and
planned measures on the issue of teamwork. The introduction of teamwork, then, be-
came an issue both for management and the works council, any local adjustments
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within ROsselsheim, Bochum, or Kaiserslautern needed to be agreed with the works
council. To ensure their constant input and participation a joint committee of equal
numbers of works council-members and management was installed to deal with all
necessary negotiations concerning this agreement.
With BV 179, all previous agreements (the Bochum agreement of 22nd December
1988 and the Kaiserslautern agreement of 18th September 1989) were discontinued.
With BY 179 an amendment was reached distributing the rank and file into non-mixed
teams. In contrast to lean production in modem plants, Opel still kept maintenance
and production teams separate from each other. As Lane put it, "the old division be-
tween production and skilled trades departments has not been abolished" (Lane
1988:149).
4.2.3. Teamwork in Practice
Teamwork in the 1990s is according to workplace representative Casu (1992,1993)
not primarily intended to overcome traditional work practices and job demarcations; it
is the consequence of an attempt by management to move into the direction of lean
production under market pressure. Skilled and unskilled workers are still separated
from each other; the relatively small degree of training concentrates largely on com-
munication and presentation skills. Any attempt to upgrade skills for previously un-
skilled workers cannot be found at Opel. Even though teams are not mixed, the team
size, between 8 and 15 (13,3 on average), remains stable. In this survey (appendix C
and D),..80. 4 % said no to the question (4): Has the number of people on your team
changed since your lost meeting? Only 17.6 % answered Yes.
As teamwork was introduced at Opel, jobs were increasingly broadly defined and their
boundaries became more fluid; teams had the responsibility of distributing work
among team-members. However, in many cases the Meister still distributed work
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within teams, according to works council-member Franz (1993a). Despite the claim of
the agreement to protect less capable or older team-members, increasingly team-
members were defmed as incapable and pushed out of existing teams by their fellow
team-members. One of the elements in the agreement to which the works council paid
special interest was the integration of disabled workers. A works council-member rep-
resented the disabled workers and was occupied allocating disabled workers around
the plant as these workers enjoyed special protection by law from dismissal. Moved to
non-assembly line jobs however the introduction of teamwork was to have major af-
fects on the security of these workers.
Team-members were instructed at Opel to hold meetings at least once a week for up
to one hour per week. The agreement did not mention whether attendance should be
voluntary or compulsory. However, to the question (8): Are you required to attend
team-meetings? 55 % said yes and 45 % no. More crucial was the team-members' at-
tendance; to the question (9) do you always attend 74.5 % said yes. 23.5 % said no.
Even though BY 179 does not require attendance at team-meetings, half of the team-
members are requested to attend, and almost 75 % attend team-meetings all the time.
However, at Opel, in reality, such team-meetings are held much less than once a week
and often do not even occur on a monthly basis. In January 1993, team-meetings were
often cancelled on the production line for the Omega-car because of insufficient re-
placement workers. Some of the team-members on the Omega B-shift reported that
meetings were only held every six months. Here, some meetings were organised off
work time, but voluntary attendance was around 50 %. During a meeting of the
Lenkungsausschufl, the personnel manager Schischke (1993) reported that there were
not enough meetings and because of different languages spoken on the assembly line,
communication between team-members was a real problem. Since team-meetings are
often denied by supervisors, works councils demanded the instalment of a stand in
team or a so-called fire brigade to take over a team's task when necessary. Although
this brigade was installed for a while in some areas it was subsequently abolished.
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Workers were also asked (question: 11) about the idea of working in a team (How
much do you like the idea of working as part of a team?) 23.5 % of Opel's workers
said very much, most workers said somewhat (51 %) and only around 20 % said ei-
ther not much (15.7 %) or not at all (7.8 %). The results of the question (12): how
much do you like being a member of your team? are similar. 24 % of the workers said
very much, 58 % said somewhat, 12 % said not much and only 6 % said not at all. In
short, over 70 % of Opel's workers like the idea of working in a team or being a
member of a team very much or somewhat, while only 20 % like the idea not much or
not at all.
Originally management was afraid that meetings would be used by works councils and
workplace representatives to discuss union issues. However, discussions at meetings
have ranged from rotation, to absenteeism, to flexibility, material handling, production
flow or holiday planning. When the workforce was asked the question (10): Is there a
pressing issue that your team is dealing with now? 51.0 % said yes, there is and 45.1
% answered no, there isn't (no response: 7.8 %). It seems as if almost half of the
team-members do not think there is a pressing issue which needs to be discussed in
meetings. Issues discussed in meetings can also lead to conflict, thus the question (13)
was asked: How often have there been serious disagreements between members of
your team? 8.2 % answered all the time, 58 % answered often, 12 % said once in a
while and only 6 % said never.
In terms of Opel's agreement, job rotation seemed to be a measure which not only
increases flexibility, but also enables team-members to share the burden of harder jobs
within teams by rotating jobs. However, rotation has also had negative side effects;
every worker was expected to function on each job of the team's operation. However,
team-members who were not able to keep up in specific jobs were often asked to
leave the team. This particularly affected the female, disabled and older members of
teams. Although holiday planning was allocated to the teams, the main allocation of
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holidays is done by management. Opel closes for three weeks during the summer and
during the Christmas holidays; these holidays again are fixed by management. Even
though in both cases the works council participates in the decision, teams themselves
have no input. However, the remaining holidays can be distributed by teams and this
seems can work in favour of team-members.
Even though the Opel agreement states that production tasks and quality demands
have to be met, monitoring functions remain the supervisors' responsibility. The same
applied to the cost efficient design of production; this is still the responsibility of su-
pervisors. Since teamspeakers and team-members are not sufficiently trained, func-
tions like giving assistance to production-engineering remains part of the supervisory
role. Supervisors are also still in charge of maintenance, production, and tool mainte-
nance and machine fitting; there tasks are not handed over to teams because of their
lack of training. Continuous improvement suggestions (ICVP) have a top-down char-
acter; middle-management imposes ICVPs on teams and tries to convince the top-
management that teamwork functions well.
The clause which demands the maintenance of clean and tidy work areas has already
created friction between teams; one team on A-shift at final assembly made a sugges-
tion to the management that a disabled cleaner should not be replaced after he retired.
The team's suggestion or KVP was accepted and the worker was not replaced, which
meant not only that a disabled worker did not get a job, but that the team on B-shift
had to clean their working area without participating in either the decision, or in the
reward which management paid to the team on A-shift. Such friction happens increas-
ingly because workers in certain sections are broken up into teams, and teams in dif-
ferent shifts are encouraged to submit KVPs to gain financial rewards. While there
suggestions do not exclusively affect their own "lean management" - they can affect
other teams as well.
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The sort of autonomy of teams established by management at Opel seems to lead to
the danger of having workers act against each other and against traditional concepts
of worker's organisations. Many teams also seem to believe they have significant lev-
els of autonomy to make their own decisions. Often teams in manufacturing are ac-
tually not autonomous but are semi-autonomous. On Gulowsen's scale (chapter
2.1.1.1.) Opel's teams reach an average level of autonomy (appendix N). The excep-
tion to this level of autonomy is item 7 (methods of production), because it is almost
completely defmed by the assembly line. Opel seems to give it's teams a greater
autonomy in the area of methods of production, but the degree of autonomy is de-
termined narrowly because of the mode of Fordist and Taylorist production. In gen-
eral, Opel's teams seem to reflect the level of autonomy of other car plants (appendix
N).
In a survey on the attitude of team-members to teamspeakers 66.7 % of the team-
members at Opel's fmal assembly (appendix D) responded favourably to question
(17): Do you think there should be teamspeaker? Only approximately 20 % said there
should be no teamspeaker (no response: 11.8 %). According to the survey, speakers
seemed to be widely accepted by team-members. 60.8 % of the team-members, how-
ever, said no to question (18): Would you like to become a teamspeaker? Only 23.5
% of the team-members wanted to be teamspeakers (no response: 15.7 %). One rea-
son for the rejection of this position is that their role is seen as that of a middle-man
between management (supervisors) and workers (team-members). The choice of be-
coming such a link between workers and management is not attractive, it seems, given
the marginal pay increase of a few pence per hour. In contrast to Eisenach and Toy-
ota, the-position of teamleader at Opel is not a step upward in a clear career structure.
At Toyota and Eisenach, a tearnleader's position is not only a move away from the
constraints of the assembly line, it is also a move in the direction of becoming a su-
pervisor (Toyota) or an area-engineer (Eisenach). To become a supervisor or Meister
at Opel, however, an additional training in a Meister-Schule is required. Without a
Meister-Certificate a tearnspeaker cannot graduate up to that level; i.e. to move from
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teamspeaker to supervisor without any kind of additional training is almost impossi-
ble. Therefore, the incentive of a career-move is basically non-existent at Opel. In
most cases, pressure is put on team-members to become teamspeakers; i.e. the posi-
tion generally is not attractive to the workforce.
A further survey question (20) asked workers at Opel: Do you think that teamspeak-
ers should be rotated? 52 % said no and 36% said yes (no response: 12 %). It seems
that most team-members accept the mode of selection, but the majority did not want
to rotate the position. Therefore, almost 90 % of team-members agreed with the exist-
ing system of election, because 86.3 % said yes to the question (21): Do you think
that the current system for selecting teamspeakers is a fair one? Only 5.9 % said no
(no response: 7.8 %). Team-members at final assembly agreed with the method of se-
lection; i.e. most teams were satisfied to have been able to find a team-member who
was willing to take the position. Nevertheless, about 30 % of all tearnspeakers re-
signed by the end of the first term (1/2 year).
Since the teamspeaker's position is exposed to conflict and difficulties and the team-
teamspeaker relations are important for teamwork, one of the questions in the survey
tried to evaluate team-members' relation to teamspeakers. Team-members were asked
to respond to the following set of questions:
Table 4.4.: Teams eakers and Team-Members at 	 1
Question (16): all the
time often
once in
a while never
a) How often do you get along with your teamspeaker? 32 ao 26 2
b) How often does your teamspeaker help you with your job? 22 36 34 8
C) How often does your teamspeaker co-operate with you? 38 34 24 4
d) How often do you get the sense your teamspeaker respects you? 41,7 22,9 167 18,8
e) How often does your teamspeaker pressure you to submit suggestions? 2,0 6,1 36,7 55,1
I) How often does your teamspeaker listen to your ideas about making the lob easier and safer? 58 20 20 2
g) How often does your teamspeaker put pressure on you to do your job? 4,2 8,3 45,8 41,7
52,2h) How often does your teamspeaker think more like management than one of you? 8,7 21,7 17,4
72 % of the team-members said they had a good relationship with their speaker either
all the time or often; only 2 % see their relationship as never good. It can be assumed,
that the relationship of the majority of the team-members to teamspeakers is good
perhaps because they are elected and this generates a certain degree of trust. Since
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teamspeakers are just one of the workers in the team, an election does not change in-
ternal team relations to a significant degree. Half of the team-members, because that
teamspeakers never think like management. However, there were cases where work-
ers saw this new position as the same as the supervisory role and behaved accord-
ingly. In most teams such a development led to two possible reactions: either a team-
speaker lost the position very soon, or works councils, or workplace representatives,
or Meisters advised them about the role and the nature of their position. In most cases
teamspeakers grasped the nature of their role. Despite the fact, that team-members
have a good relationship with them, they are in general not considered to be helpful
on production related issues. In contrast to the Eisenach model, where teamleaders
received special training, at Opel they did not. In addition, the largest single reason for
being elected to the role of teamspeaker was a knowledge of production. Workers
who do get elected as teamspeakers definitely do not have the power or status and are
nto seen to have the power of the German Meister. For 40 % of the team-members,
teamspeakers either helped them only once in a while or never. The results of the sur-
vey showed that workers did not expect teamspeakers to carry out different functions
on the assembly line, a task seen as the responsibility of Meisters. Opel's management
also did not create this position to compete with the supervisory functions of Meister.
Teamspeakers, in this model, function more as a first among equals (Eyer 1993:17).
The so-called football-metaphor (interview: Eglington 1993) can be applied to Opel's
teamspeakers. Both, Opel' management and the works council wanted teamspeakers
to be like captains, i.e. unlike Toyota, Opel's speakers participate fully on the assem-
bly lines thus maintaining their captain-like role.
Teamspeakers at Opel do better on the question of co-operation in work related mat-
ters. The answer to question d) in the above table indicates that team-members believe
that their teamspeakers respect them. However, almost 20 % of the team-members
feel that they are showed no respect at all. The data (question: g) also seems to sup-
port team-members' claim that KVP is often introduced from outside; whereas Eisen-
ach forces teams to submit KVPs, Opel's teamspeaker do not pressure team-members
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to do their job or to make suggestions. Since their legitimacy and their position de-
pends directly on their relationship to team-members, they are not in a position to put
pressure on workers to a significant degree. The results tend to support Kern's (1991)
assessment that teams can protect individual workers from the interference of the
Meister. In contrast to Eisenach, Opel's teams are setup as a cohesive group of work-
ers who are not exposed to management' control via supervisors. Work pressure can-
not be transferred onto teams by using teamleaders; this is demonstrated by Parker &
Slaughter's study of Management by Stress (1988) and The Dark Side of Teamwork
(1993).
The answers once in a while (17,4 %) and never (52,2 %) were given to the question
to assess workers attitude to their teamspeakers' allegiance. Were they more loyal to
management or to team-members? Because of the election system teamspeakers not
only depend directly on teams, but also earn their legitimacy from them, therefore,
most of the workforce tended to think that they were more like teams ( approximately
70 %) then management (approximately 30 %). Since a career move is basically not
an option, they are not bought or tempted to behave like new supervisors and addi-
tionally they continue to work on the assembly line and experience all its pressures
and problems first hand. They may have a title or a different position, but essentially
teamspeakers see themselves as workers on the line. With teamwork, this did not
change, nor has their status which remains that of blue collar workers.
In a teamspeaker election, at least two candidates need to stand and the election is by
majority vote. In some incidences, supervisors tried to influence elections. Neverthe-
less the-predominant qualification for electing a candidate is the level of their per-
formance in production and technical skills (ThOnnes 1993:191). In mixed nationality
teams, nationality at times created factions particularly when representatives of certain
nations were nominated. Pressures on teamspeakers were high because while officially
they are allowed one hour off per day for teamwork, this time is often denied by su-
pervisors because of labour shortages.
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After elections were conducted at final assembly, supervisors and speakers received a
3 to 4 day external training. Although Opel's management wanted works council's
participation, the training sessions were held without their participation because
works council-members had other priorities or were disinterested. Commenting on
union training in relationship to teamwork, works council-member Wink (1993) sug-
gested that instead of the present system of separate and external union training for
speakers, training for teamspeakers should be combined and jointly held by manage-
ment and union. Under such training schemes, the conflict of interests between man-
agement and workers would be made clear. However, Wink did not find enough sup-
port within the works council assembly (40 members) for his plan, because the major-
ity of the works council preferred the traditional union education approach, i.e. exter-
nal one week seminars. As of January 1993 approximately 150 teamspeakers and oth-
ers had participated in IGM's teamwork training. However, there has been widespread
criticism of the union (IGM) for not implementing enough union training. Considering
that Opel employs 2,000 teamspeakers out of which 150 received some union training
only a very small number of teamspeakers were involved in this type of scheme. The
training by IGM is intended to train teamspeakers in union affairs, however only 7.5
% of the teamspeakers were able to participate; certainly in 1993 and 1994 the IGM
unions did not conduct training schemes on a large enough scale to satisfy training
needs.
Management organised its training differently and on a wider scale. The in-plant
training approach was based on the snow ball system, whereby speakers receive a
three to-four day training, which, in theory, is then transferred to the teams during
team-meetings. Since the training is very short and line workers usually do not have
any recent experience with education, management's education affected team-
members only to a very limited extent. According to Opel's teamwork-manager Hild-
mann (1993), the organiser of such training expected to improve the social climate.
Respondents were asked (question: 13): How often have there been serious disa-
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greements between members of your team? 8.2 % said, that serious disagreements
had occured all the time. 58 % agreed that serious disagreements were often the case,
12 % said once in a while, only 6 % gave the answer never. It seems that team-
members' responses and the intention of management towards teamwork differ from
each other. While management initially hoped to improve the social climate on the
shopfloor in an attempt to increase job satisfaction, a high proportion of team-
members mention serious disagreements between team-members. Teamwork, then,
did not create a more harmonious working relationship as is commonly believed to be
the case.
To evaluate the process of teamwork, management organised monthly feed-back
meetings with supervisors. According to Opel's teamwork-manager Hildmann (1993),
feed-back from management's training sessions showed roughly the following:
• 40 % of teamspeakers agree with the introduction of teamwork &
support the idea,
• 40 % agree to the concept, but have concerns about the success
of teamwork, and
• 20 % reject the idea of teamwork.
Riisselsheim sets itself the goal of convincing at least 50 % of the workforce to sup-
port teamwork. Hildmann himself was appointed by Opel's management to supervise
the introduction of teamwork; his plan was to gain enough support so that teamwork
could be put in place and succeed.
One of the basic characteristics of world class manufacturing (Schonberger 1982) in
lean production seems to be that "whole layers of management are eliminated" (Storey
1994:2). However, at Opel, an additional layer (teamspeakers) was introduced. Since
the layer of teamspeaker overlapped with the layer of supervisor, management needed
to alter the latter's role. In contrast to standard teamwork literature and even to
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GME's own publication, teamwork did not reduce the levels of management; man-
agement, however, did put three to four teams under one supervisor, (25 to 40 work-
ers).
Opel's teamwork-manager Hildmann (1993) claims to have reduced hierarchical
structures by replacing the former groupleader (Kolonnenfiihrer, i.e. charge-hand). In
some areas this has been done merely y re-naming them; the overall hierarchy how-
ever remains largely unaffected. Instead of decreasing the hierarchy, the supervisors
gained importance. Especially for production issues, the role of the teamspeaker is
extremely limited and their training is insufficient. To protect their position, supervi-
sors who regard meetings as unimportant and often cancel them and thwart their
whole process. This itself can obstructed the smooth functioning of teamwork. GM-
Aspern's solution was the merger of a traditional supervisor and a position above
them to create the position of production co-ordinator (Murakami 1993b) and Eisen-
ach's solution was the creation of an area-engineer (Murakami 1994a). Opel' man-
agement "admits, that we did not address the future role of Meister during the intro-
duction of teamwork" (ThOnnes 1993:194). In a significant number of cases, works
council-members demanded from management, on the ground of BV 179 (sec. 2),
that team-meetings must take place. Cancellations of meetings by supervisors is seen
by the works council as one of the reasons for worker's dissatisfaction with team-
work.
To evaluate the overall attitude of team-members to teamwork, the following ques-
tions were asked: Workers were ased to please read the following list of statements
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and mark wherever you agree or disagree. All things considered, working in a
team...
Table 4.5.: Team-Members and Teamwork at 0 el
Question (15): agree
58.0%
disagree
42.0%a) Helps me do my Job better.
b) Gives me a chance to get to know people. 44.9% 55.1%
C) Is a waste of time. 28.6 % 71.4%
d) Gives me a chance to raise my concerns. 89.6% 10.4%
e) Helps me feel I'm part of Adam Opel. 33.3 % 66.7%
f) Is a way to get us to work harder. 42.0 °A3 58.0 %
g) Helps me see how my job fits in the overall scheme. 55.1 % 44.9%
h) Gets us all pressuring one another. 46.0 % 54.0%
I) Gives me a say over how my fob is done. 62.0 % 38,0%
47.9 %j) Helps Opel but not me. 52.1 %
k) Mows team-members to act together to express complaints. 94.0 % 6.0 %
According to these responses team-members seem to be divided over the question of
whether or not teamwork helps workers. The same applies to the question b) about
meeting people. Teams are composed of workers from similar working areas who
have worked together for years. The new team-members therefore knew each other
long before teamwork was introduced and teamwork consequently made little differ-
ence to he social cohesion of the groups. When introducing teamwork, Opel did not
employ new workers and no new team-members were assigned to final assembly, so
in the development of teams at Opel social interaction was already established and not
facilitated by the existence of teams.
71.4 % of the workers believed that teamwork was not a waste of time, obviously,
teamwork has resulted in a positive change for workers on the assembly line and the
reality of teamwork has in this sense matched up to management expectations. In
contrast to this, the CAM1 study (Robertson 1992) reveals, that when management
decides _to introduce teamwork, workers expectations are high because of the prom-
ises made by management (Murakaini 1993). Often, as the situation at CAME demon-
strates, workers expectations disappear even after a short period (Berggren 1991).
Unlike CAMI, however Opel's workers began to realise the advantages of teamwork
after two to three years. After this period of time, the original drive towards team-
work was not exhausted and management's original promises were partially fulfilled.
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Hence, workers even after a long period of time had lapsed did not see teamwork as a
waste of time.
In contrast to the supervisor-worker-system, almost 90 % of team-members view
teamwork as an option to raise their concerns. Workers see themselves in this sense as
part of a collective force and view teamwork as enabling them to talk to management
collectively. In 1993, Opel experienced a small scale un-official and un-documented
industrial action which in practice only lasted a few hours. This occurred in an area
which had teamwork. Given all the negative effect of teamwork on union representa-
tion, Opel's works council-members observed this industrial action with great interest.
Works council-members viewed the attendance rate on the strike as an indication of
management's success in using teams to influence union representation. The turnout
of the strike contradicted the works council's expectation, which was that the collec-
tive action of workers would diminish because of the influence of team-
work(interview: Wink 1993a). On the contrary, works council-member Hasenauer
(1993) described attendance at the strike as even higher then before teamwork. How-
ever, teamwork is still seen by the unions as a device for a participative approach used
by management and therefore it has not translated into a higher commitment to the
company (corporate identity). Only 1/3rd of workers see themselves as being part of
Opel, while for 2/3rds of the workers, teamwork did not help them identify with the
company at all.
One of the most critical questions for the success of teamwork has been: Working
harder or working smarter? (Murakami 1993). 42 % of the workforce believe that
teamwork makes work harder. Teamwork also does not seem to help team-members
to understand their work in the context of the whole organisation. Only 50 % see
teamwork as a means to improve their understanding of their position within Opel. In
addition, about 50 % hold the view that teamwork results in workers pressuring each
other. Team-members on the other hand did not see their teamspeaker as a source of
imposing work on them; they agree that with teamwork competition increases
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amongst workers themselves, but it seems that more team-members were afraid that
such competition would happen than actually took place (interview: Seib 1993). In
the survey 60 % believe that they have some influence on their direct working prac-
tice, which is another indicator of a degree of direct involvement with teamwork.
Team-members also commonly believe that teamwork brings individual workers to-
gether in order to express their collective views. To summarise, team-members view
teamwork with mixed feelings. On the one hand they see teamwork as an option
which increases direct participation, on the other hand, workers also feel the need to
act together to make their opinion recognised. In other words, teamwork has not in-
creased the degree of legitimacy of management, but the results show that workers'
have mixed feelings towards the use of teamwork.
4.2.4. Conclusions
Since teamwork relates directly to personnel affairs, and works council-member's par-
ticipative power in the area of personnel matters is quite strong, Opel's management
needed an agreement with the works council to implement teamwork and this, in turn,
has had a major affect on the type of agreement, particularly in terms of humanising
work. The Lenkungsausschufi was an important institution in implementing team-
work. While works councils and unions saw the possible advantages of teamwork,
management used KVP criterion as a measure of success, i.e. ICVPs are one of the
elements of QNPS to introduce lean production at Opel.
A survey among team-members at final assembly resulted in findings which show that
most team-members either enjoy working in a team or at least like it to some extent.
Even after about three years of working in teams, workers still seem to prefer the idea
of being a member of a team rather than a mere number in a production section. In
order to ensure an effective teamwork system, Opel's BY requires that meetings are
held up to one hour on a weekly basis, but these do not always take place in reality.
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Access to team-meetings is also limited because only teams and teamspeakers can
invite outsiders (supervisors, engineers, managers, works council-members, etc.) to
team-meetings. In other words, since access is restricted, meetings are more or less
restrict direct participation by works council-members or workplace representatives
(VP) unless s/he a is member of the team. In some rare cases teamspeakers and
workplace representatives are identical, but in most cases a team may not have a
workplace representative as a team-member.
Teamspeakers are elected in secret elections (majority voting) and therefore, Opel's
teamwork ranks higher on Gulowsen's scale of autonomy than other plants. An addi-
tional amendment (BV-AB 1994), however, now regulates the selection, nomination,
assessment, training and removal of teamspeakers and therefore decreases not only
the autonomy of the system but also its democracy. Management has successfully im-
plemented regulations narrowing team-members' autonomous decision-maldng power.
Nevertheless (despite management's interference), teams are still in a position to select
their teamspeaker autonomously. The existence of teamspeakers is not seriously
questioned by team-members (only 20 % reject the idea of having teamspeakers). It is
important to note that the elective process enjoys a high degree of legitimacy in this
system, because team-members favour the election of teamspeakers. Similarly, most
team-members believed that teamwork is not a waste of time. This can be seen as a
strong indicator that teamwork has partially fulfilled workers' expectation which were
raised by management's promises during it's introduction. Approximately half of the
workers however express the believe that teamwork helps management more then it
helps them. Teamwork also seems to function successfully as a forum for open dis-
cussion --without the attendance or interference of supervisors and management.
Teamwork has consequently enabled workers to discuss their work; teamwork par-
ticularly created a forum in which the effects of Fordism and Taylorism can be dis-
cussed for the first time, despite the fact that teams have very limited power to alter
the effects of these systems.
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One of the crucial points about teamwork has been training; an area in which neither
Opel's management nor the unions have done enough. This has also added to the
workers' sense of grievance that teamwork did not bring the training workers were
promised initially in management brochures in the teamwork agreement (cf. appendix
I, no.5) and at mass meetings between management and workers. Equally, as far as
the unions' training for teamwork is concerned it has not been a priority; IGM has not
managed to educate Opel's teamspeakers sufficiently in terms of performing this role.
In other words, IGM has failed to train teamspeakers to provide them with the appro-
priate union education so that the position of teamspeakers can also be that of a
workplace representative.
To conclude, for Opel's management teamwork was successfully implemented plant-
wide. Based on the experience of the 1970s in GM-Aspem, and Opel's pilot team, the
works council was able to convince management to allow team-members to elect their
teamspeakers autonomously. Teams and teamspeakers can to a certain limited degree
protect individual workers from the power of supervisors. With the election of team-
speakers, Opel's management created a teamwork system with a degree of legitimacy.
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4.3. Comparative Conclusions
Both Vauxhall and Opel were influenced by the publication of MIT's book on the in-
troduction of lean production/teamwork into the motor-car industry; GME initiated
the policy, but did not interfere directly with the introduction of teamwork leaving
different IR systems to some degree to find their own models. While Vauxhall began
by introducing teamwork in the door-section department, Opel started at fmal assem-
bly. Given these pilot experiences, both Open and Vauxhall went ahead and began to
introduce their own version of teamwork. Teams were clearly defmed in terms of
tasks and roles and a number of supervisory responsibilities were shifted to teams.
The results, using Gulowsen's measurement, on Vauxhall and Opel can be compared.
The degree of autonomy is about the same in most areas of implementation, except in
the election or appointment system for teamleaders; Vauxhall is lower on the Gu-
lowsen scaleand higher at Opel (see appendix N3). Vauxhall's teams have no decision-
making power, because management decides who will be the teamleader. Opel's teams
on the other hand are given a certain amount of autonomy when compared to a num-
ber of motor-car plants (see appendix N4). These factors also mean that Vauxhall's
teams have less input in their daily work situation compared to the teams at Opel.
While Vauxhall's management keeps teams controlled through their teamleaders,
Opel's teams not only elect teamspeakers, but they also have more autonomy. Opel's
election model clearly shows a higher degree of acceptance by the workforce; Opel's
management not only relies on teams to elect a suitable teamspeaker, but also on their
ability to self-regulate, while Vauxhall's management has maintained the old supervi-
sor structure. In contrast to Vauxhall, however Opel's teamspeakers are less exposed
to management control and disapproval because they speak on behalf of a team. Opel
therefore relies on decisions made by teams, whereas Vauxhall' management depends
on decisions made by tearnleaders. Therefore, the daily work situation at Opel is much
more influenced by the existing teamwork, than at Vauxhall, where the tearnleader not
the team makes the decisions.
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Consequently, while Vauxhall's management has stuck much more to the classic ad-
verserial IR approach, Opel's management has moved more directly in the direction of
workers' participation, i.e. towards a more pluralist frame of reference. It seems as if
the German IR-system, and Opel's internal 1R-system, as embodied in German law,
means that management can give slightly more autonomy to its teams compared to
Vauxhall. It seems the existing system of IR operating in both plants not only defines
the level of autonomy, but also influences the way in which teamwork has been intro-
duced and operated.
In Britain and in Germany, GME did not attempt to influence or change the IR sys-
tems, they merely used or adapted it, attempting to avoid conflicts with traditional
workers' representatives. Teamwork was in both cases introduced into existing plants
where a specific tradition of IR and a clear structure of representation already existed.
However, in both cases GME's QNPS provided the guiding principles for the intro-
duction of teamwork but this was adapted to different systems of worker's represen-
tation on the shopfloor. While Vauxhall's agreement specifically mentions the need to
recognise union representation, Opel's system of representation is primarily based on
law. In both Germany and in Britain, management had to seek an agreement with un-
ion representation/works council, for different reasons; in Germany it was a legal re-
quirement and at Vauxhall management had to recognise existing union power. This
resulted in independent agreements. The key feature of both team-concepts however
was the teamleader; in one case (Opel) s/he is elected, on the other, Vauxhall, s/he is
appointed. Teamwork resulted in approximately 400 teamleaders at Vauxhall and ap-
proximately 2,000 teamspeakers at Opel. When teamwork and teamlead-
ers/teamspeaker are compared by using the same questionnaire in assigned areas
(Opel's final assembly, Vauxhall's door-section), the following table shows the differ-
ent responses:
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Table 4.6.: Teamleaders and Team-Members at Vauxhall and Opel in %
QueatIon(16): all the time	 r often once • Wale never
GM Plant Location: GB FRG GB FRG GB FRG GB FRG
a) How often do you get
along with your team leader?
24.1 32 29.6 40 352 26 3.7 2
b) How often does your
teamleader help you with your lob?
3.7 22 20 36 50 34 16.7 8
c) How often does your
teamleader co-operate with yOu?
9.3 38 27.8 34 42.6 24 7.4 4
d) How often do you get the sense
Your teamleader respects you?
16.7 41,7 14.8 22,9 22.2 16,7 37 18,8
e) How often does your teamleader pressure you to
submit suogestions?
0 2,0 13 6,1 72.2 36,7 9.3 55,1
f) How often does your teamieader
listen to your ideas about
making the lob easier and safer? 9.3 58 18.5 20.0 38.9 20 25.9 2
p) How often does your teamleader put pressure on
you to do your lob?
14.8 4,2 16.7 8,3 16.7 45,8 40.7 41,7
h) How often does your teamleader think more like
management than one of you?
42.6 8,7 222 21,7 16.7 17,4 11.1 52,2
While results to question a) are quite similar, it seems as if Opel's teamspeakers are
more willing to help team-members compared to Vauxhall's teamleaders (question b).
More significantly Opel's teamspeakers co-operate with team-members much more
than Vauxhall's teamleaders. Since Opel's teamspeakers are elected, they pay much
more attention to the views of their team-members and the reverse is also true. How-
ever, teamleaders in both cases do not seem to pressure their team-members for Kai-
zen. One of the more interesting contrasts between the two sides is over issues like
making jobs easier and safer. While only 9.3 % of Vauxhall's teatnleaders listen to
team-members' ideas about making a job easier and safer all the time; 58 % of Opel's
teamspeakers felt that the teamleader was crucial to this. Vauxhall's teamleaders, it
seems, are also more likely to pressure their team-members compared to Opel's team-
speakers.
The survey also demonstrated the independence of teamleaders and teamspeakers in
workers' perspective. While according to the survey 42.6 % of Vauxhall's workers
believe that teatnleaders think all the time like management rather than like team-
members, only 8.7 % seem to do so at Opel. In fact, while Vauxhall's teamleaders de-
pend on management appointment, Opel's teamspeakers clearly depend on their team.
As an overall result therefore, the relationship between Opel's teamspeakers and team-
members is much better than in Vauxhall. While Vauxhall's team-members see their
teamleader more as someone "outside the team", Opel's team-members see a team-
speaker as part of the team. Therefore, according to the survey Opel's teamspeakers
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operate more closely with the team compared to Vauxhall's tearnleaders and Opel's
teamspeakers agree with management far less compared to Vauxhall's teamleaders.
Not surprisingly, 66.7 % of Opel's team-members think there should be teamspeakers,
while only 40 % of Vauxhall's team-members agree. Again, Opel's team-members
want to be teamspeakers slightly more than Vauxhall's want to be teamleaders.
Table 4.7.: Team-Members and Teamleaders at Vauxhall and 0 el in %
Question (17, 18, 20, 19): YES YES NO NO
GM Plant Location: GB FRG GB FRG
Do you think there should be a teamleader? 40.7 66.7 51.9 19,6_
60.8Would you like to become teamleader?
_
7.4 23.5 85.2
Do you think that the current system
for selecting teamleaders Is a fair one? 16.7 86.3 68.5 11.8
Do you think teamleaders should be elected? 75.9 862 13.0 5.9
One of the most obvious reasons fro the difference in these results is that 86.3 % of
Opel's team-members agree with the current election method for teamspeakers, while
68.5 % of the Vauxhall team-members disagree with their own system of appoint-
ment. This is reflected in a general support for an election system (Vauxhall: 75.9 %,
Opel: 86.2 %). It seems that whether or not teamspeakers are elected crucial affects
not only internal team relations, but also the team-members' general attitudes to
teamwork. To compare views at Vauxhall and Opel, the results from both surveys are
shown in the following table:
Table 4.8.: Team-Members and Teamwork at Vauxhall and 0 el
Question (15):
GB
aEree
FRG GB
disagree
FRGGM Plant Location:
a) Helps me do my job better. 30.2 % 58.0 % 69.8 % 42.0 °A
b) Gives me a chance to get to know people. 49.1 ')/0 44.9 % 50.9 % 55.1 %
c) Is a waste of time. 36.0 % 28.6 % 64.0 ')/0 71.4 %
d) Gives me a chance to raise my concerns. 32.1 % 89.6 % 67.9 % 10.4 %
e) Helps me feel I'm part of the company. 16.3 % 33.3 '% 83.7% 66.7 %
f) Is a way to get us to work harder. 83.7 % 42.0 % 16.3 % 58.0 %
g) Helps me see how my job
fits in the overall scheme. 25.5 % 55.1 % 74.5 % 44.9 %
h) Gets us all pressuring one another. 64.0 '2/0 46.0 % 36.0 % 54.0 %
i) Gives me a say over how my job is done. 23.5 % 62.0 % 76.7 % 38.0 %
0 Helps the company but not me. 79.6 % 52.1 % 20.4 % 47.9 %
k) Allows team-members to act
together to express complaints.
50.0 % 94.0 % 50.0 °/0 6.0 %
Teamwork is viewed by Opel's team-members more positively than Vauxhall's team-
members; while almost 60 % of Opel's team-members think teamwork helps, only 30
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% of Vauxhall's team-members agree with this. A significant number of Opel's (71.4
%) and Vauxhall's team-members (64 %) also believe that teamwork is not a waste of
time. 83.7 % of Vauxhall's team-members think that teamwork makes them work
harder, while only 42 % at Opel agree to that proposition. Most surprisingly 94 % of
Opel's team-members think that they can participate successfully; only 50 % agree
with this at Vauxhall. Given all these factors, teamwork it seems, is much less attrac-
tive to Vauxhall's workers than to Opel's. Opel's version of teamwork is more likely
not only to survive, but also to be more successful for both management and workers
than Vauxhall's system, primarily because workers are more committed to working in
teams, participation is higher and team-teamspeaker relations are better.
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Chapter 5
Representation
5. The Structure of Representation
All capitalist societies have developed structures for workers' representation: national,
industrial, corporation/company, plant and workplace. However this representative
system is structured and a functional relationships exists between them; they depend
on each other and cannot escape this structurally defined dependency whether at
company or at plant level (Schmidt & Trinczek 1991:169).
The British and German industrial system both have systems for worker's representa-
tion that have developed in different ways for particular historical reasons and have
different underlying concepts of industrial democracy. The strength of British unions,
for example, has been traditionally the plant, where unions have no legal rights un-
derpinning employee representation (Terry 1993:30). British unions have been struc-
tured, organised and resourced around unpaid voluntary activists with trade unions
based firmly within plants. Their social and legislative basis has generally been estab-
lished by voluntary agreement, collective bargaining and through state intervention
(Fox 1985:373). British unions, then, can be characterised by two structural factors,
one is voluntarism and the other is their base in the workplace. German representa-
tional structures, on the other hand, are defmed by the absolute dominance of indus-
trial unionism and a legal and dualist pattern of representation with works councils
inside companies and unions based outside. Because of their legal status works
councils were able to maintain their existence largely unaffected throughout the 1980s
(Schmidt & Trinczek 1991:177) and to maintain their role for conflict resolution
(Jacobi et al. 1992:218). For both, British and German workers' organisations work-
place representation is crucial and conflict resolution on the shopfloor is central to
their existence (Bean 1985:4). Comparing the British with the German IR system,
Miiller-Jentsch (1986:44) notes: "Two basic forms of industrial democracy can be
distinguished: a) Participation based on co-operation by representatives independent
from unions (for example works councils); this is found in Germany, Sweden, and
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Austria; b) a conflict oriented model of workers control based on union representation
in companies, which can be found in GB, France, and Italy".
The German system belongs to the former model and is part of a pluralist frame of
reference, while the British us and them has the characteristics of a conflict oriented
adversarial system. Participation in the German system can be direct, i.e. individuals
or small production groups at shopfloor level, or indirect through unions or other rep-
resentatives (Monat 1992:942). Participation in this sense can be seen as a method of
decision-making "with the aim of bringing one's own interests into play" (KiBler
1994). The shopfloor is one of the key locations for this both in Britain and Germany.
The existence of stewards, workplace representatives, and/or works councils as forms
of indirect representation, and work-teams as a form of direct representation leads to
the question that in a situation where both representative systems exist side by side,
who will represent the interest of workers.
With lean production, management has attempted to develop a policy of using
worker's drive for participation to increase productivity. British and German unions
for a variety of reasons have agreed to management's request. There has been two
union approaches to management's demands: a) the rejection of management's inten-
tion (anti-incorporatism), or b) the use of management's intention for participation
(the pluralist frame of reference). IGM in Germany, therefore has detailed approaches
and strategies to deal with management decisions in a pluralist fashion. AEEU and
TGWU on the other hand have not responded in the same strategic way, because un-
like IGM both unions are more decentralised and therefore leave responses to the
shopfloor. Whereas IGM's head office can issue central guidelines on teamwork,
AEEU's and TGWU's central offices have not given central guidelines on teamwork,
largely because their stewards organisation is relatively independent from their central
office. There is also some difference between the two unions at Vauxhall in terms of
their approach to teamwork and, in fact, they often have opposing policies and
strategies; the AEEU approach seems to be more pluralist while the TGWU's ap-
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proach seems to be more adversarial and tend to oppose any management changes
(i.e. teamwork) on the grounds that they are not good for workers.
5.1. Structure of Representation
in GB & at Vauxhall Ltd.
One of the essential elements of voluntarism at Vauxhall has been the strategic use of
free collective bargaining, (cf. Flanders 1974); sometimes both terms are used as a
synonym. The idea of voluntarism in Great Britain has also meant that there are more
options for the development of all three responses: (cf. unitarist, pluralist, adversar-
ial), because it leaves unions and management the autonomy to adapt diverse ap-
proaches. Unlike Germany, British IR is not bound to a system of legal regulations
forcing German lR towards the adaption of a pluralist frame of reference.
5.1.1. Shop Stewards in Britain
To understand the British IR system it is necessary to comprehend the central role of
the shop steward. This has been examined in the following three stages: a) a descrip-
tion of a shop steward's role to show how the formal structure of stewards is por-
trayed in union rule books, b) the actual role, i.e. the reality of steward's representa-
tion on the shopfloor, and c) an evaluation is used to assess the role of stewards from
a theoretical perspective.
a) Formal Description
Stewards are union representatives for a group of union members at shopfloor level.
One of the earliest functions of stewards was recruitment and the collection of union
dues The steward's function is to be a union representative, but also to be able to
mediate management decisions by participating in decision-making and representing
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the views of union members. Stewards are therefore dynamic in terms of recruiting
new members, representing members in individual and group grievance situations,
bargaining over wages and conditions at plant level and sometimes company level,
and representing union policy within the plant. Their representative powers are
therefore wide and allows them to participate in IR at every level including wage bar-
gaining. They represent the power of collective labour and the demands of their un-
ions.
According to Coates and Topham (1988), most union rulebooks are silent on the is-
sue of a steward's function and, indeed, the TGWU rulebook only states that they
should represent their members in a defined work area and give the fullest support and
protection to members (TGWU 1992:29); thus stewards are able to develop their
function unaffected by specific directions from their union and to define and develop
their role in their daily working relationship with their members and with manage-
ment. This lack of precise definition is again another indication of their power in terms
of it's flexibility.
Because they are able to establish networks, stewards spend a considerable amount of
time interacting with foremen. "The average time taken up by a steward's duties is
over two hours per day" (Partridge 1977:34). "The role of lay union representation
inevitably takes up a certain amount of employee time that would otherwise be spent
working, exactly how much time is spent on these duties will depend on a variety of
factors, such as the number of members and the number of other representatives in the
establishment. Some levels of activity may well take place without the knowledge of
management. However, in most cases workers' representatives have some form of
agreement or understanding with management covering their union duties and activi-
ties" (Millward et al. 1992:122). An important factor for stewards' mobility is time off
(cf. Coates and Topham 1988:159). Consequently, the actual working situation of
stewards defines to a certain extent their ability to represent. The hypothesis could
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then be: the less stewards are engaged in work, which demands a constant presence at
a certain point of production, the better is their ability to represent the workforce.
13) Actual Pattern
Although elections seems to be the most common way of selecting shop stewards,
most unions do not demand a specific method for stewards' election. The TGWU (the
union which organises production workers in the car industry) prescribes that, they,
unlike teamleaders "should be elected by the membership" (TGWU 1992:29) and that
these elections take place at least once every two years. The most common method
for the election of stewards is a simple show of hands (Millward et al. 1992:136); less
often, they may be elected at a union branch meeting (Coates and Topham 1988:154).
Workplace elections undoubtedly strengthen the relationship between a workgroup
and steward; in this way the section also becomes an important decision-making unit
and a meaningful entity. A democratic election of this sort by the workgroup certainly
fosters collectivism and, in part, it does this because stewards are so important to the
lives of its members (Batstone et al. 1977:136).
Since stewards are union representatives, they can often use their knowledge to co-
ordinate and prevent workers pursuing individualistic and sectional interests;, they,
unlike teamleaders, have usually developed a network on the shopfloor which pro-
vides not only an affirmation of the norms and values of steward leadership but also is
able to disperse detailed information to facilitate stewards' independent actions in re-
lation to problems that arise.
As with-the relationship between the union and the stewards, so is the relationship
with senior stewards; both relationships are based on independence and autonomy. it
is expected that a steward will deal with problems and give senior stewards or the
convenor strength from the shopfloor. It is essentially the stewards' network at the
workplace which allows stewards' independent action in relation to work problems. In
a relationship between stewards and a convenor, Batstone et al. (1977) stress that
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stewards are able to handle the great bulk of issues by themselves. This not only keeps
the convenor's time free to deal with management, but also strengthens the steward's
position at the workplace. Purcell & Sisson (1984:106) argue that, in the long run,
management itself is the most important influence shaping the behaviour of its stew-
ards.
c) An Assessment
One of the methods used to evaluate the functions of stewards are the categories de-
veloped by Coates and Topham (1988:157) and Partridge (1977:32): Stewards en-
gage in the following activities: (1) spokesman for the workgroup, (2) disseminator of
information between the organisation and the group, (3) bargaining over minor griev-
ances, (4) monitoring of information, (5) liaison with other groups and with managers,
(6) exercising leadership to strengthen the cohesion, and therefore the bargaining
power of the group, (7) decision-making, (8) formal negotiation with senior manage-
ment.
A steward organisation has been seen as evidence of a democratic form of decision-
making and of a decentralisation of decision-making (Batstone et al. 1977:2). It could
be argued that stewards are by definition a participative institution. However, while
the way stewards are selected may indicate the existence of participation and democ-
racy, their relationship with management can take different forms These have been
categorised by Batstone et al. (1977:35) as:
The leader is a steward who is able to play a representative role in rela-
tion to his members, as s/he attempts to implement union principles.
S/he not merely demonstrates a commitment to such goals but is gert-'
wally able to achieve them.'
The nascent leader is often sponsored by a leader; s/he is committed to
union principles, but without the support of other stewards s/he is unable
to maintain the necessary representative role. f;„ I
The cowboy,' by contrast, is able to play a representative role at least in/
the short-term, but is not committed to union principles as we have de-
"fined them. S/he is typically concerned with maximising the short-run
earnings of her/his own particular group of members,
*, k Finally, the populist lacks a commitment to' union principles and the abil-
ity or desire to be a representative; s/he acts as a delegate. Accordingly,
her/his activities are generally much more determined by the expressed
wishes of her/his members. ---- 	 r
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Whatever factors determine the basis for stewards elections, they do have a constitu-
ency and they are "closely identified with the workgroup they represent" (Terry
1984:71); this builds a grass roots base to many of the larger unions. Not only is the
steward in the workplace the backbone of unions, but the stewards' main area of ac-
tivity and even their identity is inextricably linked to the work area or workgroup. The
relationship between stewards and groups is not only one of representation it is also
one of protecting workers' interests. In the words of Terry (1993:13): "To the mem-
bership, the steward is the union" and yet they are at the very bottom of the union; it
is, in fact, their bottom-up representative position that encourages the confidence of
workers in their representative powers.
5.1.2. Stewards at Vauxhall
According to MSF's convenor Payne (1992), the attitude of Vauxhall's stewards to-
wards management differs from union to union. Management's relationship to stew-
ards varies depending on which union they are dealing with (MSF, AEEU, TGWU).
Vauxhall' s management regards the TGWU as the most important union because in
terms of membership numbers, it is the most powerful union. Management claims that
they wish to have good relations with the TGWU but undoubtedly, Vauxhall's per-
sonnel manager views the TGWU in the same way as the TGWU views management.
Both see each other as "us and them ". TGWU's convenor Jack (1993) is not alone in
viewing management as an agent of capitalism; the general perception held among
TGWU-stewards is that, whatever scheme management puts forward, it will represent
management interests and will constitute an indirect or direct attack on worker's rep-
resentational structures. Vauxhall's stewards frequently quote the personnel director's
hostile statement: burn the union as an indicator of how adversarial management's
attitudes are at Vauxhall. Despite this adversarial frame of reference, i.e. the state of
trench-war between the plant's personnel director and the TGWU, both unions and
management are continuously involved in negotiations and bargaining. To make in-
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dustrial relations work in Vauxhall, the TGWU basically by-passes the personnel di-
rector by negotiating with another senior manager in personnel. In contrast to the
TGWU, management-MSF relations are considered by management to be easier and
more pluralist. Because of their small membership at Vauxhall MSF is not seen as a
strong force and therefore has little weight with management despite its compromis-
ing approach. AEEU-management relations are less adversarial than the TGWU-
management relations and MSF-management relations. In some cases the AEEU sides
with management and has acted divisively against the TGWU, e.g. over teamwork;
and in other cases they co-operate with the TGWU against management.
Informal meetings between the TGWU convenor and one of the senior personnel
managers are important and seem to constitute the real grounds upon which most
conflicts are resolved. The issue of teamwork, in fact, was first put to the TGWU in
brief face-to-face informal discussions. Such discussions were used by management to
assess the TGWU's opinion, while the TGWU used them to work out management's
intentions. For many years these informal relationship between TGWU-stewards and a
particular personnel manager have been developed in a piecemeal way. It is a curious
aspect of the adversarial frame of reference that when neither side trusts the other in
direct negotiations, deals and settlements are often made initially informally and se-
cretly.
One of the important features of the system of shop stewards is that they are directly
elected; the workgroup not only elects them and gives them legitimacy in form of di-
rect democracy, they also speak on behalf of the group at the workplace. Vauxhall's
stewards thus make overtime arrangements etc., with middle-management. Often they
move into areas of responsibility that normally belong to supervisors. However far
from being an assistant-supervisor, Vauxhall's stewards also deal with grievances and
small scale bargaining. Since Vauxhall's stewards are an important link between their
workgroup and management, they can usually decide how, when, and where etc., in-
formation is given to the shopfloor. They also link their group to others by talking to
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other stewards as well as to other supervisors. By using their ability to communicate
with other stewards and other groups, they are, at least in most areas, able to set up
an internal communication structure that benefits the workforce. This creates the
ground for a favourable bargaining position with management.
Because of the nature of their representative powers it would have been possible for
Vauxhall's stewards to block the introduction of teamwork; certainly in areas repre-
sented by the TGWU votes by the workforce on the agreement came close to rejec-
tion. The decision on teamwork at Vauxhall depended on TGWU-stewards who were
almost powerful enough to convince their members to vote for a rejection despite
management's offer of a pay increase. Vauxhall's TGWU-stewards had the bargaining
basis for negotiations with senior management; had the union decided, for example,
not to accept teamwork, management would not have been able to by-pass the
TGWU-stewards.
However on the whole, most stewards get the results of union agreements with man-
agement through their union convenors, so some decisions are made at the top and
passed down and this was so in the case of teamwork. Members on the shopfloor ex-
pect their stewards to lead, to be committed to their workgroup and not to get too
close to management. Stewards who become foremen for example are the subject of a
good deal of criticism (cf. Batstone et al. 1977:33), because workers regard supervi-
sors as being on the other side. Again however the shop stewards attitudes varied de-
pending on their union's attitude. Unlike TGWU-stewards, many AEEU-stewards be-
lieved that their role included that of liaison with management over the maintenance
of production (cf. Coates & Topham 1988:157). Given the craft orientation and the
task of maintenance of AEEU members and stewards, Coates & Topham's general
analysis applies to Vauxhall's AEEU-stewards because these groups of workers often
act and think like Coates & Topham have described. Despite this, overall, a TGWU or
AEEU shop steward is clearly seen by workers as representing their interests and are
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elected to do this. Trust for AEEU and TGWU shop stewards then is central and is
far greater than for the local trade union representatives.
5.1.3. Union Recognition
Like most other foreign owned enterprises in Britain (cf. Purcell et al. 1987:136),
Vauxhall, because of the historical struggle of workers, recognises the existance of
unions. Stewards' have been traditionally strong in the male-dominated manufacturing
industries. Not surprisingly, the motor-car industry in the post-war period was able to
benefit from general economic developments, and stewards in that industry became
prominent and influential because they could secure increased earnings for their mem-
bers (Terry 1984:72). North American-owned companies (Ford and Vauxhall) have
long established stewards organisations. At Vauxhall particularly there was the plant
had almost a closed shop system as almost all workers were in one of the three unions
at Vauxhall. A small group of TGWU-stewards tend to lead opinion on the shopfloor.
In addition to this, the motor-car industry was regarded as a sector in which stewards
have normally been militant. However, this view changed during the 1980s. By the
time teamwork was discussed with management, stewards were in a powerful bargain-
ing position, and management realised that they needed the support of the TGWU
shopfloor to introduce teamwork in production. Vauxhall has the typical steward
system for the car industry (TGWU, AEEU, MSF). AEEU-members elected 72 stew-
ards (47 %), TGWU: 71(46 %), and MSF: 11(7 %). Over 97 % of manual workers
are in one or the other union.
Management's perception is that the TGWU is more inflexible and hostile than the
AEEU, and relations between management and the TGWU have been continuesly un-
easy (Carr 1994:200). Even though the AEEU has slightly more stewards, the TGWU
not only has more members, it is also more powerful. This is not only because the
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AEEU has largely craft workers and skilled workers, but also because the TGWU is
better organised; their network is stronger, and they organise production.
Management accepts that unions can support their members and represent them
therefore Vauxhall's management does not directly try to by-pass them. The adversar-
ial frame of reference is expressed in the teamwork agreement because on the one
hand, "The Unions recognise the responsibilities of management to plan, organise and
manage" (Vauxhall 1992:11). On the other hand, management recognises the right of
the unions to represent the interests of, and communicate with, their members: "The
company recognises the right of its employees to belong to a union and will encour-
age the employees to be members of the appropriate union" (Vauxhall 1992:11).
While both sides agree on each other's responsibility, there is no mechanism for par-
ticipation and negotiations are always conducted within an adversarial framework.
5.1.4. Inter-Union Relations
Relations between the unions at Vauxhall have been problematic for historical rea-
sons. One source of division had been the AEU's Nissan deal (late 1980s) when the
AEU not only excluded the TGWU by making a single union deal with Nissan's man-
agement, but also capitulated to the company; this has resulted in their marginalisa-
tion (Independent 15.6.92:4).The AEU-Nissan deal was not only widely discussed in
Britain, but also deplored by the TGWU who tried to represent workers' interests at
Nissan. The TGWU had also excluded the EETPU from meetings in the plant after
their collusion with management at Wapping and their exclusion from the TUC. As
the TGWTJ is net only the strongest union at Vauxhall, but tends to express the opin-
ions of the workforce, it was able to convince MSF and AEU (before the merger with
the EETPU), to exclude EETPU from meetings in the plant (after Wapping and the
exclusion of the EETPU from the TUC). When EETPU merged with the AEU to
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create the AEEU; TGWU-AEEU inter-union relations continued to be poor at Vaux-
hall.
As is common for the car industry, unions at Vauxhall have more or less clear areas of
organisation, recruitment and responsibilities with a few overlapping areas. In general
the following unions represent the following areas of production:
Table 5.1.: Unions and Areas at Vauxhall
Union: Area of organisation within the plant:
AEEU Craft and some production workers
TGWU Most production workers
MSF Staff or white collar workers (supervisor etc.)
TGWU and AEEU have their offices and their members on the shopfloor in order to
be close to their members. Trade union membership follows the following pattern:
AEEU 1,524 (36 %), TGWU 2,349 (55 %), and MSF 380 (9 %). Since the TGWU
has more than 50 % of all union members and organises the most important part of
the car plant (assembly line), it is in a strong bargaining position compared to the
AEEU and MSF. In most cases, where decision-making by the unions is required, the
TGWU is the leading force.
Both unions have their meeting base at the plant; unions see these facilities as the re-
sult of prolonged struggle with the employer, who, at the first opportunity, they feel
would be glad to remove this facilities (cf. Coates and Topham 1988:147). Both un-
ions have offices in the plant, where stewards and convenor meet daily or weekly on
an informal and individual basis. TGWU-stewards fmance their own office utilities
which are supplied by a monthly lottery. With the agreement on teamwork, both
(AEEU and TGWU) were offered desks in the personnel department, but rejected the
offer in order to maintain immediate and direct communication with the shopfloor.
Thus, the AEEU and the TGWU maintained separate offices with one convenor and
staff for each union. Only the part-time MSF senior steward took a desk in the per-
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sonnel department. To facilitate the representation of union members, Vauxhall rec-
ognised these facilities enabling the unions to operate as a representative.
Table 5.2.: Unions and Re resentatives
AEEU 3 full-time senior representatives (Engineering)
1 part-time senior representative (EETPU)
MSF 1 part-time In-plant senior representative
TGWU 3 full-time In-plant senior representatives
In the event of full-time representatives being absent because of sickness or company
approved union activities, Vauxhall allows stewards to replace them. In most cases
this is done by the deputy convenor or equivalent steward. Any change to the number,
or geographical distribution of representatives within the plant, are matters for joint
discussion. The agreement on teamwork did not alter the number of stewards, there-
fore, the power relation between the unions did not change with the introduction of
teamwork; the number of representatives and areas of representation remained the
same. According to Jack (1994), since all three unions were concerned with team-
work management, a committee was set up comprising all three unions.
According to the teamwork agreement, convenor, deputy convenor, and secretary are
free of work assignments and are able to devote their time to union affairs. Although
both the TGWU and the AEEU fought together on the issue of maintaining their own
headquarters on the factory floor, this did not bridge other more fundamental differ-
ences in their approach to IR. However, both unions feared incorporation into man-
agement's agenda and did not want to move too close to the personnel department
which would mean separating from their members and the work of the stewards.
AEEU and TGWU maintain their position as being us and not the them. This consti-
tutes a strong rejection of either an unitarist frame of reference or even a pluralist
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one, i.e. direct and daily contact with the personnel department was avoided because
this could be seen as a process of compromise and absorption into management's
schedule.
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5.1.5. Committees
The present inter-union relation at Vauxhall differs from other workplaces. Some
workplaces have a Joint Shop Steward Committee (JSSC) at both plant and company
level. At Vauxhall, each union has monthly meetings of stewards which are held sepa-
rately. These are granted by management, but such meetings have to take place on
separate days/dates each month. According to the agreement, stewards' meetings can-
not exceed one and half hours in duration and stewards who attend these meetings
outside their normal staff hours will be paid one and half hours at the applicable over-
time rate; this applies to meetings that are held between an early shift and a late shift.
Vauxhall's JSSC has been held in the past but these meetings only took place in con-
nection with wage negotiations.
At Vauxhall, the small degree of success of organised participation shows neither un-
ions, management or stewards favour a pluralist approach. Vauxhall's stewards prefer
to use collective bargaining as a means of confronting management rather then par-
ticipating in management lead institutions. Given the unions view of committees for
example, Vauxhall's unions were not very interested in a committee to introduce
teamwork. "According to the agreement, the Luton management wanted to have a
Joint Plant Committee (JPC) to improve IR in the plant. According to Jack (1993),
this committee was composed of 17 members in total, the meetings were held once a
month, the JPC was composed of 7 company members and 10 union representatives.
The seven company members were appointed by management, including the JPC
chairman and secretary who had an administrative support function; the 10 union
members were: 4 AEEU representatives from the engineering section, 1 from EETPU
section, 1 from MSF, who was the part-time senior representative, and 4 TGWU rep-
resentatives. The unions elected one of their JPC members as chairman, the convenor
of the TGWU, John Jack.
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The agreement demanded that the unions were totally committed to the principle of
working together and that the union chairman would endeavour to speak with one
voice for all unions and would act collectively in the interests of all the employees and
the unions at Vauxhall. Given the difficult relationship between the unions, manage-
ment attempted to get all unions together to avoid inter-union conflicts and to be able
to reach a uniform agreement with the whole workforce. In practice, however, this
did not work; inter-union disputes broke out immediately and the AEEU complained
about the chairman from the TGWU. The agreement (Vauxhall 1992:24-33) states:
JPO meetings will normally be held monthly, but special.meetingsl
may be arranged. Formal minutes Will be prepared by the secretary i
-and agreed by the Jpe chair and will be shown to the union chair prior
.,„tof"pUblication'The:JPQ maw following discussion, establish sub-
committees to deal with specific issues. The terms of reference and
E composition of such sub-committees will be determined by the JPC-
L(within the broad general terms of reference): , All such subcommittees
I will be required to report findings and recommendations to the full
?PC as requested.-	 Ow- or, 
Two other issues here are important, it could be argued that: a) by forcing unions to-
gether management produced inter-union conflict and in effect weakened the more
adversarial position of the TGWU to teamwork and, b) by setting up a sub-
committee system on specific issues (cf. Ramsay 1977:482) that are undefined, man-
agement could avoid the central committee and control the whole process. However
with the introduction of a committee to discuss teamwork and other issues of IR,
management not only tried to move the unions from an adversarial frame of reference
to a pluralist one, but it also tried to get the unions to speak with one voice. The
minutes of the JPC, from the beginning show that, the JPC was used by management
and, in a sense, was doomed to fail not only because of direct management attempts
to control it but because it was quickly obvious that unions and management had ma-
jor disagreements. However, the unions demanded that the JPC should not just be
used for management presentations on teamwork (JPC 12.1.1993) but that unions
should be given time to raise their concerns; management accepted this demand.
146
Since GM's practice is to set different plants in competition with each other, the union
demanded information on the future production of the 2900 car series (Cavalier). In a
letter to the JPC, the union demanded that unless management placed this on "the
agenda for the next JPC then we should give serious consideration to the future of the
JPC" (TGWU 10.11.1993). The TGWU threatened to leave the JPC unless the issue
was discussed. In a joint letter from the AEEU, TGWU, and MSF, the union side of
the JPC demanded, "that the JPC should not, under any circumstances, become an-
other Joint-Consultative Committee (JCC)" (JPC-Union: 15.11.1993). The unions
successfully stopped the JPC from becoming another JCC; the JCC had been seen by
the unions as a management committee which did not give unions a voice and a forum
in which management did not allow unions to raise their own issues. Management-
union relations in the JPC remained tense; letters and arguments instead of discus-
sions, ensued between unions and management. Conflicts over a range of issues con-
tinuously created disagreement and a breakdown of discussions. An examples of this
from the JPC minutes reads: The trade union chairman reported that the company's
proposal on work measurement was not acceptable (IPC 21.12.1993). Not only did
the union attack management and threaten to leave the JPC on several occasions,
management also attacked the union consistently refusing them a voice on several is-
sues that they felt were crucial.
During a JPC meeting on the 21st of December 1993, "the personnel manager showed
a chart indicating the number of supervisors and the corresponding number of agreed
stewards (August 1990) the numbers showed 24 more stewards than supervisors"
(JPC 21.12.1993:5). Because of the agreement on teamwork, management has been
able to reduce the number of supervisors because some of their functions were moved
to tearnleaders in ratio to the number of supervisors. Management then moved to try
to reduce the number of stewards; this was felt to be a direct attack on union repre-
sentation. During this meeting, the union side of the JPC strongly rejected the link
between the number of supervisors and the number of stewards. During the following
meeting (January 1994), management again stated its "concern about the imbalance
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between the number of stewards and supervisors" (JPC 18.1.1994:2); again unions
rejected this argument and stated that the central issue was on the recognition of
stewards and argued for maintaining their numbers. They also discussed the option of
de-recognising supervisors and recognising teamleaders. Management replied that the
issue would be "put on ice until a meeting could be convened on the subject" (JPC
18.1.1994). During the following meeting (February 1994) further conflicts took
place, the "Trade Union Chairman said that the Japanese philosophy of the company
was not the same as the one that operated in Japan where the employees had jobs for
life. Rover in the UK also had a jobs for life agreement" (JPC 15.2.1994:4). Manage-
ment replied that redundancies were made voluntarily and according to the Early
Separation Programme. A further damaging conflict arose over the issue of out-
sourcing of the soft-trim. Unions demanded that "consultation should have occurred
at an earlier stage" (JPC 15.2.1994). The unions clearly indicated during the meeting
that despite the ostensible purpose of the JPC, i.e. communication and negotiation,
management still had a hidden agenda and did not discuss its policies and decisions
with the unions. The issue of outsourcing particularly created the most frustration
among the unions at the JPC and among union members. The unions declared that
"GME would not be allowed to get its own way on this issue" (JPC 15.2.1994). Man-
agement saw this as union interference in a management issue and was afraid that the
unions would strike and hoped this was not "a statement indicating action" (JPC
15.2.1994). One of the first actions taken by JPC's TGWU-chairman was to opt-out
of the meeting and the other unions followed. This marked the end of the JPC ex-
periment with management and unions forced back into their traditional adversarial
frame of reference with no institutionalised structure to discuss 1R issues.
There were no further JPC meetings after the 21st of June 1994. According to the
TGWU-convenor, Jack (1994), the TGWU and other unions left, because "the JPC
was a waste of time and they (management) gave us (unions) only the information
that they choose". Jack (1994) also states that, the JPC was not there to solve prob-
lems; "sometimes we found out something, then we would challenge them and all they
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would say was, we did not want to tell you the bad news". In summary, the JPC was,
for the unions, another JCC, and a clear split divided it along the lines of them
(management) and us (unions). The committee never established itself as a forum for
discussions on IR or teamwork and it never achieved any decision-making power. The
meeting did not serve as an organised forum for participation; management's attempt
to provide a forum of institutionalised lR (IPC) as a pluralist institution did not suc-
ceed because the form itself was ineffective; management tended to lead it in its own
favour and the unions saw no possibility of real discussions or decision-making on
issues that affected their membership.
5.1.6. Convenors and Stewards
Of the TGWU-stewards at Vauxhall, a small group of eight to ten senior stewards and
the convenor from the core group, are the opinion-leaders (Batstone et al. 1977:100),
in the sense that they lead and represent opinions from the shopfloor; i.e. not that they
create opinions. This group is able to deal with all aspects of the work situation
(production), because they have developed a particularly strong network of contacts
on the shopfloor. Most of the stewards (AEEU and TGWU) trust and respect them
because they have achieved major successes in negotiations, and because they have
established strong contacts with other influential stewards, union members, and with
management, i.e. this is the basis of their legitimacy.
Compared with other unions like the AEEU, and to a greater extent MSF, the TGWU
was able to maintain a high degree of independence in terms of its relationship to
management. Most of the TGWU-stewards do not fall into the category of populist
stewards (Batstone et al. 1977:59), because they co-operate closely with other shop
stewards in the handling of issues. In contrast to a populist steward most TGWU-
stewards are leaders, able to handle problems themselves, and the core group of sen-
ior stewards expects them to do so.
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Batstone et al. (1977:45) have labelled a core-group of stewards as quasi-elite; this
core-group "consists of experienced stewards who are in close contact with the con-
venors and upon whom the convenors rely. They play a major role in decision-
making". This can be said about the core-group of shop stewards at Vauxhall; i.e.
TGWU-stewards do form a core-group; while the AEEU-stewards do not. Other
stewards, outside the core-group, lack comparable influence and have to work
through the opinion-leaders. Members of the core-group are often better able to deal
with management because of their greater resources and skills. The forum to influence
stewards outside the core-group meets at the monthly stewards meeting, where the
convenor and the core-group not only reaffirm the norms of steward leadership (cf.
Batstone et al. 1977:78) but also discuss union and management policy. In addition,
Vauxhall's TGWU core-group issues its policy statements during these meetings.
There is, however, also a small group of radical stewards outside the core-group who
are strong enough at times to challenge the core-group of senior stewards and the
convenor. This radical-group, which is strongly committed to union principles, is
made up of approximately five to seven young TGWU-stewards who are able to exert
influence on the majority of stewards on certain issues. As in the case of teamwork,
often the core-group invites members of this radical-group to informal discussions in
order to get their policy accepted by the stewards assembly as a whole.
5.1.7. Stewards' External Relations
Stewards at Vauxhall have good relationships with their workgroups, yet the negative
side of Vauxhall's strong plant based organisation is often the weak link in the external
union organisation. Often the decentralisation of such a structure of representation is
reflected in their distant relationship with the formal union structure, i.e. to each par-
ticular unions' employed full-time official (Terry 1993:12). Both major unions differ in
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their relationship to their external union representative. Since the present AEEU full-
time official was a former employee of Vauxhall, the AEEU has good relations with
its full-time official and works closely with him (cf. Boraston 1975:16). In contrast is
the negative relationship of TGWU-stewards to their local TGWU full-time official;
he has been in office for seven years, but there is not much contact between him and
the stewards who consider him unsupportive of their representative work (Boraston
1975:41). Contacts with TGWU-stewards and the convenor at IBC (Luton) are bet-
ter; they attended the pre-teamwork meetings with Vauxhall's TGWU-stewards and
TGWU-members to discuss the new agreement on five Saturdays before the fmal vote
was taken in 1992. TGWU-stewards also had contacts with TGWU-stewards at Ford-
Dagenham and Ford/IVECO on these issues.
TGWU-stewards of the core-group whose legitimacy is strong with the workforce
also have international contacts to other GM plants and with other stewards from the
European and American car industry. These international meetings are not held on a
regular basis. There is no European works council for GM and the only contact that
has been established on an international basis was a meeting of European GM plants
in Belgium in 1987 and one in 1994. The other contact was a company-organised visit
of the TGWU convenor to NUMMI in 1986, which lasted three weeks. Besides this,
TGWU-stewards attended the TGWU-Seminar on the European Motor-Car Industry
at Eastbourne in December 1992; this seminar was attended by union representatives
from all major European member states.
Every two months a Combined Committee meeting of British GM plants is held,
where the core-group of each plant meets. These meetings are attended by stewards
from AEEU and TGWU, but not by officials from either of the unions. Both unions
also have Joint National Committees which meets every two months and include
stewards and union officials. Under the agreement, management allows stewards rea-
sonable paid time off for union duties relevant to the company. However, where the
representative is taking part in:
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• branch, area or regional meetings of the Union where the
business of the union is under discussion
• meetings of official policy making bodies such
as the executive committee or annual conference
such time off granted by the company is normally on an unpaid basis.
5.1.8. Stewards and Workgroups
Crucial for effective representation to take place is the stewards' link to the workplace
because if any of the unions are to bargain effectively stewards need the backing of
their members; workgroup support becomes the crucial element in this structure of
representation. Each workgroup elects stewards every two years. In most cases, ap-
proximately 25 to 35 members elect one steward in a secret ballot. Such a constitu-
ency is small enough to represent workers within one production area, though it may
vary in size from area to area depending on the actual working environment. There is
also a dependency of stewards' activity on their workplace because whatever working
situation they are in, they are able to take time off for union representation. However,
the actual size of stewards' constituencies vary between 4 and 60 for TGWU-stewards
at Vauxhall. The average size of a typical steward's constituency is 32 members in one
workgroup (appendix P5); this is significantly smaller than shown in surveys of British
IR.
With Vauxhall's agreement, management committed itself to work with the unions in
relation to the issue of time off for union duties. The guiding principle of this was the
_
ACAS Code of Practice No. 3 "Time Off for Union Duties and Activities" (1991) or
any subsequent Code of Practice that supersedes this. Each steward is granted facili-
ties to deal with issues arising in the area to which they are assigned. The steward
must notify a supervisor when s/he leaves the area and the supervisor will make the
necessary arrangements within a reasonable period of time. According to the new
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agreement, management allows stewards to take time off for their work as union rep-
resentatives. In addition, management "recognises the exclusive right of each union to
communicate with its own members" (Vauxhall 1992:11); management recognises
that stewards need to be given sufficient time off to enable them to represent their
members. Under teamwork conditions, which includes work distribution among a
team, any absent team-member has to be covered by a teamleader. Teamleaders not
only put pressure on each team-member to attend, but also on stewards who are
team-members not to leave the team, otherwise teamleaders have to work on the line
themselves. Time off for stewards who are part of a team is always a potential area of
conflict between teamleaders and stewards.
In the teamwork agreement at Vauxhall (1992), management views on the issue of
conflict are explicitly stated, i.e. management does not want conflict, it wants compli-
ance through agreements; "management recognises the need to foster and maintain
the best possible relationships with its employees based on a spirit of care, unity,
teamwork, mutual trust and co-operation". Here, management contrasts its section on
"time off for stewards" with a description of teamwork and states that the relationship
should be one of unity and mutual trust. On the one hand management recognises
union's right to solve conflicts (pluralism) while on the other hand management ne-
glects the existence of conflicts by stating the ideal of a relationship based on unity
(unitarism). Despite the overall tendency of Vauxhall's IR towards an adversarial
frame of reference, both sections of the agreement show the difference between man-
agement's view and the view held by the unions. Unions are interested primarily in
maintaining their representative role which clearly adversarial, while management
disguise their own adversarial attitude with terms such as unity, trust and teamwork.
Even within the agreement adversarial attitudes between management and unions can
be clearly detected. The role of the stewards is clearly in conflict with their role as
team-members; on the other hand, the agreement allows teamleaders to have repre-
sentatives functions that overlap those of shop stewards. Management desire for shop
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stewards and teamleaders to work as team-members in the spirit of trust and unity is
often belied by the actual practice of management and the team structure set up by
management with their tendency to undermine the position of the shop stewards.
5.1.9. Conclusions
As a shop steward's power is based on her/his ability to organise independently of
state regulation, they exercise leadership in the work area where they are elected, and
they are therefore committed to a process of networking which is based on union
shopfloor organisation. This gives them not only power but a certain degree of resil-
ience. TGWU-stewards are more or less leaders in their work area; the leader figure
is in fact more likely to be found in an IR system based on this sort of adversarial
frame of reference. Given the power of all three unions, management has been forced
to recognise the importance of union agreement. The TGWU is the opinion leader
and is the strongest union at Vauxhall.
Given management's relationship to unions and the TGWU's relation to management,
attempts to create a more pluralist framework have not been successful. TGWU con-
venors and stewards lead in the direction of an adversarial frame of reference, i.e.
become the nature of their role. The decision for example about office space in the
personnel department demonstrates that the general relationship of management and
union can be described as us and them; it is one characterised by suspicion and sepa-
ration. While the teamwork agreement shows that management was not able to by-
pass or-de-recognise the unions; even if it wanted this; it shows that an IR system
based on a unitarist frame of reference does not exist. Attempts by management to
get the unions to believe that a pluralist frame of reference could work failed;
TGWU's opinion leaders continue to regard committees and lR institutions negatively
as they fear incorporation into management's agenda. Since the unitarist frame of ref-
erence option was closed for management and they also failed to move IR more to-
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wards a pluralist frame of reference, management-union relations remained in what
can only be called a continuing adversarial frame of reference.
To summarise, the strength of the TGWU lies in its ability to organise important parts
of the plant, which is still, in effect, an informal closed shop. Management needed the
TGWU's approval to introduce teamwork and therefore was not able to by-pass un-
ions or de-recognise them (unitarist frame of reference). IR at Vauxhall can still be
described as an example of an IR framework of adversarialism because stewards have
maintained their independence from management. Their strength is based on their
close links to their constituency or workgroup and most stewards still view manage-
ment as the enemy. During the period of the introduction of teamwork, TGWU and
AEEU-stewards were able to maintain the number of stewards and to negotiate time
off for representation. Management has accepted their role and function.
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Chapter
The Structure of
Representation
in Germany
and at Opel
5.2. The Structure of Representation
in Germany and at Opel
Workplace organisation in Germany and at Opel is characterised by a dual structure
of legally prescribed works councils and union workplace representatives. The con-
cept of a , pluralistic IR has resulted in a constitutional factory (Mfiller-Jentsch
1986:42). Part of the 19th century strategy by the German bourgeoisie to undermine
workers attraction to socialism introduced consultation and participation schemes for
workers. Miiller-Jentsch (1986:41) argues that the German dualist system with its
pluralist frame of reference has its origins in a strategy to avoid a workers' take-over
of industry by offering them some degree of participation and power. As a result of
this, there is collective bargaining on one level and participation on other levels.
Usually collective bargaining in the German IR system takes place at a regional or na-
tional and sectorial level. For example, negotiations on wages, work time, etc. take
place between an employer's federation representing, for example, all employers in the
metal industry (i.e. sectorial) in a geographical area (for example the state Hesse is a
collective bargaining region) and the trade union in that sector (metal industry, i.e.
IGM) and region.
The works councils' role is defmed by law, i.e. in the Works Constitution Act
(BetrVG). Union lay representatives or workplace representatives (Vertrauensperson,
VPs), on the other hand, have no formal recognition within existing workplace legis-
lation and act essentially as an information link between unions and membership.
German labour law regulates the proceedings of institutions like the works council,
but does not dictate the outcome of negotiations between management and works
councils. In short, the law directs, arranges, and controls institutionalised LR, but does
not determine outcomes.
In order to evaluate the structure of representation in the German IR system and at
Opel, the following sections will: examine a) the Works Constitution Act (Betriebs-
157
vetfassungsgesetz) and the works council (Betriebsrat), b) industrial unionism and
trade unions, c) the role of the workplace representatives (Vertrauensperson, VP),
and d) how the preceding three aspects (a-c) work at Opel.
5.2.1. Works Constitution Act
and Works Councils
To explore the important role of the Works Constitution Act and the works councils
in German IR, the following section will examine: a) the legal prescription of the
works councils, which largely defmes the way in which they operate, b) the actual
practice of IR at the works council-management level, and c) give an assessment of
the function of the works councils.
a) The Legal Prescription of Works Councils
German IR can be characterised as a "separation of unions and plant-level representa-
tion through the works councils, and the restriction of unionised collective bargaining
to regional wage bargaining" (Herding 1972:1). Streeck (1988), and Lane (1988)
have emphasised three distinctive features:
(a) The rigidity of employment relations imposed by the BetrVG.
(b) The works council, not the union, is the representative body,
competent to negotiate technical rationalisation. works councils
tend to be dominated by skilled workers who have less to fear
from change. They see their main role as managing transitions
and concentrating on achieving gains.
(c) Pluralism makes it likely that greater workers' responsibility for
production, implied by the new production concepts, is not mis-
used.
At company level, the "German system of codetermination is usually considered to be
the most highly developed example of employee participation" (Hall 1993:1). How-
ever, there are considerable variations between different industries, unions, firms, and
even within single plants. Company-based codetennination can be summarised as
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having the following features: a) business affairs are not directly affected by codeter-
mination, b) a spirit of mutual trust between management and works councils exists,
c) works councils are not a union organisation in companies, d) collective bargaining
does not override company codetermination, but strives to improve it.
Given the long existence of legalised and institutionalised forms of participation.
German IR can be characterised as having a pluralist frame of reference in which un-
ions have a very limited representative function inside companies and no legal recog-
nition. The BetrVG (1950s) "affects 15 million workers out of 21 million" (Briefs
1992:104) and 90 % of all German private companies that have 5 or more workers
(Maitland 1983:41). The BetrVG regulates the ratio between works council-members
and workers (Kittner 1991). With an increase of workers, the number of works
council-members also increases, but the correlation is regressive, in terms of a pro-
portion of works council-members to the workforce. Small companies have more
works council-members than larger companies (appendix P7). As . the number of
workers increase, the number of works council-members increases at a lower rate.
However, the legal power of the works council remains unchanged. Sec. 2 BetrVG
demands that works councils and management work in a spirit of mutual trust. It
seems as if the law recognises management's right to manage, but allows works
councils to counteract the worst effects of management, i.e. management is not free to
adapt a macho-management style as disruption or disturbance of works councils
constitute a criminal offence (sec. 119 BetrVG). The aim is to ensure continuous pro-
duction with as few management/worker conflicts disrupting production as little as
possible.
-
Companies without works councils have virtually no trade union organisation
(Schmidt & Trinczek 1991:181). In companies with works councils, elections take
place through a list of candidates nominated by unions or any group of workers.
IGM's workplace representatives are a recruiting ground for works council-members
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(Shire 1991:14). In 80 % of all works council's elections they are elected from a union
list (Purcell 1993:7). Composing such a list for the election of a works council is a
complicated manoeuvre negotiated between different interest groups. Originally a
works council-term of office was one year, under the BetrVG of 1920, two years in
1952, three years in 1972, and it finally reached four years in 1988 (Keller 1993:64).
Hanau & Adomait (1986:122) noted two different participation rights for works
councils:
a) consultation and access to advice sec. 90, 92, 96 97, and 102 BetrVG
b) right of information sec. 80, 89, 90, and 99 BetrVG, including the right b
view management documents (sec. 80 and 83 BetrVG)
The amendment to BetrVG in 1972 grants works council the right to extensive infor-
mation before rationalisation measures are introduced (cf. new work organisation like
teamwork). Works councils also have rights to co-decision-making (sec. 80, 90).
Works councils also have a duty to reject any re-organisation of work if it is not in
accordance with the principle of humanisation of work. Any new form of work which
disadvantages workers, more than traditional work practices, can be rejected. Any
work reorganisation (cf. teamwork) requires considerable discussion and negotiation
with works councils. Although management is legally free, after consultation with the
works council, to go ahead with new production plans, it must negotiate the terms of
change; otherwise works councils can ask a labour court to force management to con-
sult with them. The level of influence increases or decreases depending on the subject
area; these are categorised in terms of: a) social affairs, b) personnel affairs, and c)
business affairs (Miiller-Jentsch 1986:223):
Table 5.3: Partici ation under the BetrVG
Item Social Affairs: Personnel Affairs: Business Affairs:
Co-
Deter-
mlnation:
Sec. 87: Work time,
Holiday, Wages, Bonus,
Sec. 91: Human Work
Sec. 94: Questionnaires,
Sec. 95: Assessment,
Sec. 98: Training
Sec. 112: Social Plan (Redundancies,
Closures of Production, etc.)
Veto:
Sec. 99: Employment, Job
Descriptions, Transfers
Sec. 102: Dismissal
information
and
Consultation:
Sec. 89:
Health and Safety
Sec. 92:
Personnel Planning,
Sec. 102: Dismissal
Sec. 90: Construction, Technology,
Production Process, Workplace, Sec.
106: Business Committee, Sec. 111:
Relocation of Production
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Management and works councils do not agree on everything. However it only rarely
occurs that an issue is submitted to arbitration (Keller 1993:66). Establishment-level
arbitration committees are composed of an equal number of management and works
council representatives headed by an independent (usually a retired) labour judge. The
next stage is a special courts system called labour courts; at a labour court both sides
can present their views and opinions.
Opel's works council is entitled to considerable resources, including the option for the
works council to use consultants, which reflects the level of professionalism of the
works council. Opel's works council also has permanent advisors and is even large
enough to have a Referent, i.e. a graduate advisor. Besides secretarial support for
Opel's works council, the advisor plays an important role in supporting it by making
links with other plants. According to Opel's advisor Herber (1994) "so far, there has
been no industry-wide meeting of advisors in the German car industry", but there is a
network for information exchange between all the advisors. Whenever advisors of
works councils do not have direct contact to other advisors, they have contacts to
works council-members.
b) The Actual Practice of Industrial Relations
Codetennination is an important factor, but not at the workgroup level, rather at a
level above the group (Keller 1993:61). Codetermination enables works councils to
participate in management decisions and prevents managers acting directly against
works councils (Turner 1991:165). The stringent legal regulations (Hall 1993:5) that
control this has led to a "high degree of juridification of German industrial relations"
(Jacobi et al. 1992:227).
c) An Assessment
It is largely because of the legal basis of works councils that IR in Germany tends to-
wards greater agreement rather than opposition and conflict (Keller 1993:63). Works
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councils cannot refuse to participate and operate in an adversarial manner with man-
agement, as all forms of industrial action, particularly strikes are outlawed. Works
councils also cannot fit into a unitarist frame of reference, i.e. total compliance to
management, because legal requirements almost force them to participate and repre-
sent the worker's view. They cannot in a sense neglect their own rights by non-
participation; they are made to feel that they are an integral part of a system that at
least listens to their voice. The rights of the works councils can be assessed on a
strong-medium-weak matrix:
Table 5.4.: Legal Rights according to BetrVG
Intensity: Social Personnel Business
Co-Determination: STRONG ' MEDIUM
1
WEAK
Right to Veto: MEDIUM STRONG WEAK
Info. & Consult: - STRONG STRONG STRONG
This matrix shows the strength of participation in different areas; works councils have
the strongest influence over social issues, and the more the issue relates to business
affairs the weaker their voice or legal rights become.
German unions are often viewed as a mixture of Ordnungsfaktor (guarantor of stabil-
ity) and Gegenmacht (counteracting power). While the concept of Ordnungsfaktor
has strong implications for a unitarist frame of reference, Gegenmacht operates in an
adversarial frame of reference (cf. Schmidt 1971), i.e. worker's power counteracts
the worst excesses of management control.
5.2.2. Industrial Unionism
and Trade Unions
Trade unions and works councils are the central pillars (Schmidt and Trinczek
1991:167) of German IR. However, both are not separated from each other and they
do not operate in different arenas of IR. The dual system is, as Thelen (1991:19) cor-
rectly assessed, "mutually reinforcing". Unions supply works councils with informa-
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lion and expertise, through educational courses, or advise them through their full-time
officials; while works councils sustain union organisation by recruiting members and
functioning as an arm of the union at the workplace. Unions, like IGM, are organised
on an industrial base (Industrieverbandsprinzip). In the 1990s, "IGM held on to its
high membership levels and density" (Turner 1991:104). IGM is one of 16 unions in
the DGB, the German Trade Union Federation. Each of the unions covers one or
more industries and there is very little competition among unions. Outside plants, re-
gional collective bargaining on wages, work time, etc. is put in the legal framework of
the Tarifvertragsgesetz which together with section 9.3 of the German constitution
sets the boundaries of IR.
Works councils and unions "are mutually dependent, having a close and stable divi-
sion of labour, and are reliable partners within a network of stable cooperation"
(Jacobi et al. 1992:218). Within this dual system unions and employers' associations
are responsible for collective bargaining at regional and sectorial level. Issues for col-
lective bargaining which relate to the whole industry or to the region are their concern
(cf. wages, work time, holidays, etc.), but not plant-specific issues (cf. teamwork).
Despite the fact that teamwork is not a regional or industry-specific issue, IGM did
make recommendations on the introduction of teamwork, however they did not issue
a common and standardised format for company agreements. IGM did not negotiate
with the employer federation on the issue of teamwork; IGM had two strategies on
this front: firstly, defend the workforce against the possible negative effects of team-
work; secondly, develop and promote an independent union vision and strategy for
the shape and content of teamwork. Typically, union policy strongly influenced the
works councils. In the 1980s, IGM demanded that works councils should reject over-
time; Opel's works council met IGM's demand, even though Opel's works council had
no legal obligations to follow union policy it nevertheless did so in this typical case.
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5.2.3. Workplace Representatives
German style union-stewards are workplace representatives or Vertrauenspersonen
(VPs); i.e. they are a voluntary system of representation. Only union members of at
least one year's standing can be nominated. Elections of workplace representatives
take place in their assigned work areas; this is generally a small group of union mem-
bers at the workplace. Elections for workplace representatives take place every three
years (works council: every four years). Workplace representatives are elected by
union members only. According to the IGM (1980) rule book workplace representa-
tives have the following duties which tend to be defined rather passively, i.e. they in-
form, collect, pass on, encourage, distribute, etc.:
• inform union members concerning union policies,
• inform union members about collective agreements, company agree-
ments etc.,
• inform union members about resolutions of union committees,
• encourage union members to discuss union issues,
• participate in union meetings and union education,
encourage union members to discuss, organise, participate, & carry
out industrial action,
• keep union membership records and inform the union office about
new members, transfer of union members etc.,
• distribute union newspapers, etc. to their members.
• maintain communication between union members and union organi-
sation,
• develop union membership throughout the company,
• encourage union members to participate in union education,
• advise works council before it signs company agreements with man-
agement,
• inform union members about resolutions of works council meetings,
• work towards improvements of working conditions,
maintain contact with local and regional union offices (Koopmann
1984).
The recruitment of new members is one of the crucial links between IGM and Opel's
works council because unions need works councils for membership recruitment to
secure their existence. Brock et al. (1969:86) suggest such a division of representation
between workplace representatives and works councils has made representation more
effective because workplace representatives depend largely on information given by
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the works councils (Brock et al. 1969:75). Works councils on the other hand equally
depend on workplace representatives, because they inform them of shopfloor issues.
5.2.4. Industrial Relations at Opel
80 % of all blue-collar workers are IGM members, even though the closed shop is
illegal in Germany (Miller 1978:340). According to works council-member Franz
(1993) "the IGM membership in staff areas is between 25 and 30 %". The staff union
DAG (Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft), has one works council-member at Opel
and mainly organises white collar workers. Opel's smallest union is the Christian
Metalworkers Association (CMV, Christlicher Metallarbeiter Verein). According to
Streeck (1984:9), CMV and DAG have small pockets of membership in the plant, but
numerically and politically they are insignificant.
a) Opel's works councils
Opel's works council holds significant powers and Streeck (1992:180) has noted that
the situation is well described by a GM manager who after a period at Opel con-
cluded: "Without the works council, nothing happens, with the works council, every-
thing happens". Most of the day-to-day business is conducted through committee
meetings with managerial counterparts. The nature of teamwork at Opel demonstrates
the significance of Opel's works council because it has a voice at various levels in
management decision-making, and engages in a daily process of negotiation regarding
the allocation of workers. The legal status given to works councils gives them the
power to delay and obstruct managerial decisions by excessive insistence on legal
formalities. Because of this, Opel's management is interested in collaborating with the
works council (pluralist frame of reference), especially on issues of work organisation
(teamwork). Works councils are useful in that they share the responsibilities of deci-
sion making and help to make management policies more acceptable to workers.
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very issue is considered very carefully by the works council because workers hold
works council-members responsible for decisions made with management.
A number of significant IR issues are regulated in the form of Betriebsvereinbarungen
or company agreements (BVs). Details are regulated in sec. 77 of the works constitu-
tion (BetrVG). Company agreements are used as an indicator of the success of par-
ticipation. Opel's high number of company agreements is considered a sign of an ef-
fective works council (cf. Keller 1993:67). According to BR-convenor Milner (1993)
"we have achieved over 250 agreements". These company agreements have a direct
and compulsory effect on individual employees (sec. 77); they regulate all matters re-
lating to the establishment. Company agreements that contradict collective agree-
ments are however legally void (Streeck 1984:24). A typical example of a company
agreement (BV) regulates that "all works council-member are full-time representa-
tives" (interview: Wink 1993), despite the fact that the works constitution gives them
only limited time off. Another company agreement now regulates teamwork and ap-
plies to all workers. How work is organised is then, not an issue of regional collective
bargaining and therefore it is not regulated by the IGM.
Legal requirements prevent works council-members from moving in the direction of
an adversarial model (cf. Fiirstenberg 1992:789) because conflicts between labour
and capital are moved to the arena of regional collective bargaining. On the one hand,
it enables unions to act reasonably freely on Opel's plant level, on the other hand,
works councils' influence on work reorganisation restricts management from moving
towards a macho-management policy.
Opel's workplace representatives, as members of the IGM, put forward lists for the
election of the works council. According to works council-member Ziegler (1993) the
first priority of Opel's IGM-workplace representatives has been to balance white-
collar and blue-collar workers' interest. A balance between German and foreign
workers is important also, because if there are not enough foreign workers on the list,
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an independent Turkish list would attract many votes; different production areas
would not then be represented. IGM also needs to put forward enough candidates
from the final assembly line (labour intensive), otherwise workplace representatives
from this area would reject the list. Balance is also important between skilled and un-
skilled production workers. A gender balance is achieved through proportional repre-
sentation in relation to the female workforce; women are represented in the top 10 on
the list. There is also the need to keep a political balance between the social-democrat
and the progressive-group. The progressive-group is composed of works council-
members who favour a more radical and progressive policy (conflict oriented plural-
ism) and the social-democrats who lean towards a more collaborative interest medi-
tation. Even though social-democrats are the strongest group, usually many members
of the progressive-group are in the first 40 on the list and secure seats on the works
council. All groups and unions submit their lists to Opel's election committee and
works council elections and workers vote for one of the lists. Elections are essentially,
then, a competition for leadership Schumpeter (1976); participation in this sense does
not provide many opportunities beyond that of voting (Mason 1982:169). Regular
elections are held every four years, during the period between March 1 and May 31;
voting is held by secret ballot.
Assessments estimate that 80 % of workers participate at works council elections;
Opel's election results are at the following level of participation (76 % in 1994). Elec-
tions for works council-members are on the basis of proportional representation;
there are no constituencies and there is no first-past-the-post system. The results of
the election shows the following breakdown of votes (appendix P1): In 1994, IGM
received 86.2 % (1990: 82.9 %), DAG 5.4 % (1990:7.1 %), CMV: 5.4 % (1990: 6.1
%). In 1990 and 1994 the majority voted in favour of IGM; DAG's and CMV's share
was reduced in the results in 1990. The two independent Turkish lists received about
the same votes in 1994 as in 1990.
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On the basis of these election results, Opel's works council is formed, i.e. an institu-
tionalised representation of interests of all its employees is created. All workers at
Opel vote as workers (one worker has one vote), not as union members, for one of
the lists. The percentage of votes which each list receives is then translated into seats
(if there are 50 seats, a list needs at least 2 % of the votes to get one seat on the
works council). Therefore, all lists which receive enough votes are entitled to have
seats. The distribution of seats according to the 1990 and 1994 elections showed
(appendix P2): IGM 43 (1990: 42), DAG: 1 (1990: 2), CMV: 1 (1990: 2), and the
Turkish list Silzer-Icin: 0 (1990: 1). Silzer-Icin's failure to receive enough votes to
capture one seat at Opel's works council was caused because particular Turkish
workers took part in management's early retirement plan for production workers and
this resulted in a reduction of Turkish workers at Opel.
Opel's workforce was reduced between 1990 and 1994 and therefore the number of
seats on the BV was also reduced (from 47 to 45), despite this IGM managed to re-
ceive more seats than before. The results show the dominance of IGM; IGM is able
effectively to ignore DAG and CMV, however their working relationship tend to be
co-operative.
Since Opel's works council does not have an imperative mandate (sec. 42-46
BetrVG), i.e. the works council is not directly dependent on workers, workers influ-
ence and participative role is reduced to an election every four years. Opel's works
council-members are not only independent during these four years from the direct in-
fluence of workers; they enjoy certain protection from direct management influence
too; they are guaranteed their level of pay and job grading to ensure the smooth con-
tinuation of their working life. They also enjoy special protection against dismissal,
i.e. their protection makes it attractive to workers to participate in the works council.
However, it also separates works council-members from the workforce by privileging
them.
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Unlike workplace representatives and stewards, works council-members do not de-
pend on an area or workgroup; they are elected by the workers of the whole plant.
However, to be effective, company size is crucial for the existence of a works council.
To function properly a works council needs to represent at least 600 workers; below
this number works councils are often too small to operate. Opel's works council-
members are assigned to geographical or production related areas throughout the
plant; these areas vary in size. While there are 1,500 workers with one works council-
member at the very labour intensive final assembly; there are other units which also
have one works council-member with only 160 workers. There is also one works
council-member who is assigned to recycling which allows him little time to represent
workers because his work unit is dispersed (appendix P3). On average, one works
council-member represents about 750 workers at Opel (appendix P3) but the number
of workers varies significantly between different areas inside Opel.
Given the distance between the works council and the workers, a certain inevitable
tendency to bureaucratisation can be detected (Keller 1993:71), because of the works
council-members lack of direct and daily contact to the workforce and their relative
distance this results in the tendency to bureaucratisation rather than representation.
During works-meetings (Betriebsversammlung) works councils are able to communi-
cate with the whole workforce (BetrVG sec. 42) and the topics discussed can include
all matters relating to the plant, for example collective bargaining, IR, economy, etc.
These meeting are held once every four months, are not public, but officials of those
unions that are represented in the plant and representatives of the employers' associa-
tion are permitted to attend. Given Opel's relatively large workforce, such meetings
are organised in a large hall and discussions are transferred by monitors to other halls.
At discussion and presentations during the works-meeting (15. July 1993), works
council-members prefer to raise such issues as the general economy, business and la-
bour politics (Schuring 1992). Workplace representatives often heavily criticise man-
agement during these meeting.
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If Batstone et al.'s (1977:45) concept of a quasi-elite (a core-group) is transferred to
Opel, eight works council-members in their head offices are members of this core-
group, i.e. these members are given strong support by other workers; usually their
negotiating skills are high and they have usually proven their skills in defending work-
ers rights. These members are certainly not all members of the social-democratic
group. At least ten works council-members do not belong to this group, including the
works council-convenor and two to three other works council-members in the head
office. Most younger works council-members do however belong to the social-
democratic group, as this tend to help them to become a works council-member and
get a position in head office. They prefer to be associated with the youth-group. This
group overlaps to some degree with the progressive and with the social-democratic
group. Politically, they are more likely to represent the New German Left rather than
the Old German Left (Markovits 1993). Although the deputy works council-convenor
is the head of the social-democratic group, his successor is from the pro gressive-
group. Since the last election and introduction of a new retirement plan accepted by
many of the older workers and some works council-members, members of the New
Left are moving into important positions as the workforce sees them as strong in rep-
resenting their interests.
Although power is concentrated in the person heading Opel's works council (cf.
Keller 1993:71), the deputy convenor has significant input into personnel affairs
within the works council and he is head of the social-democratic group. According to
works council-member Reitinger (1993), "there is no major split on Opel's works
council". Richard Heller (former works council-convenor) led the victory in 1975 of
the progressive-group within IGM over an older, more conservative works council
majority. He served as chairman until a few years ago when his deputy Rudolf Miller
became convenor. Heller has made it a priority to develop and preserve unity in the
works council. This political strategy has been successful, the Heller/Milner team has
won every election since 1975 by large majorities (Turner 1991:134).
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Opel's works council meets approximately twice per month and its decisions are made
through majority voting (allner 1983:420). IGM's works council-members of the
social-democratic group are in the majority. Although its participation rights are re-
stricted within the company, the works council also has significant external influence
since some members of the social-democratic group are also on the Riisselsheim city
council. Opel-Riisselsheim's works council-members are also members of the Group
Works Council (Konzernbetriebsrat) of other West-German GM plants. Once a year
the group-works council meets with Opel's management for the whole of Germany
(West). Head of the group-works council is the convenor of the Riisselsheim works
council. Such a group-works council is an organ of the BetrVG (sec. 54). It is re-
sponsible for dealing with matters that concern all plants (Bochum, Riisselsheim,
Kaiserslautern) that cannot be regulated by individual works council. Teamwork has
been seen as an issue affecting all plants because GM's management and the works
council wanted the same model for teamwork in all it's operations, even though they
accepted that slight divergences will occur in different plants.
Opel-works council's also has links to the local IGM office at Darmstadt, IGM's head
office in Frankfurt, to GM-Aspem, and to GM-Saab. Given language difficulties and
the national characteristics of IR, etc. Opel's works council has rather loose contacts
with other European GM plants, but meets annually with their representatives under
the auspices of the International Metalworker? Federation. Contact to other German
car manufacturers is regularly organised by IGM (three times per year). According to
the advisor to Opel's works council Herber (1993), "in February 1992, a European
Community support meeting of European GM representatives took place for the first
time". The economic-committee (Wirtschaftsausschufl) is one of the main information
provider for the works council. Management has to inform works councils of business
plans at an early stage (sec. 106 BetrVG). Unlike the works council, which consists
only of workers, the economic-committee is a permanent joint committee. According
to sec. 106 BetrVG, the economic-committee is not a decision-making body because
it does not have co-decision-making powers in any business area (Keller 1993:69).
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In the daily life of companies, workers tend to view works councils as part of their
union representation (Miiller-Jentsch 1986:228) although works councils are not
permitted to use their office for union affairs. In practice, this rule is hardly enforced.
All of Opel's works council-members also have union positions (sec. 74 BetrVG).
However, during any strike, works council-members can support a strike to a signifi-
cant degree, works council-members can participate as union members but not as
works council-members. IGM takes a leading role in strikes, but at times when there
are no strikes, unions are not allowed to endanger the spirit of mutual trust between
works councils and management. The union's advice to works councils can extend
codetermination and participation rights by confirming additional rights in regional
collective bargaining between IGM and the employer federation. Such extensions of
participation rights for works council can be additional forms of representation, i.e.
speakers of workgroups (Hanau and Adomait 1986:113). In other words, while un-
ions and employer's federations could have introduced a speaker of a workgroup
(similar to a teamspeaker) through regional collective bargaining, they did not do so
at the level of regional or national collective bargaining.
Works Councils themselves can be located in different positions in the triadic concept
of unitarism, pluralism, adversarialism. Kotthoff (1982) has described seven types of
works councils: 1) A respected works councils who is acknowledged by management;
the latter however still makes all important decisions, 2) a respected and stable works
council in large companies, 3) a co-operative strong and independent works council
which is in a position to effect decisions by management, 4) a management's works
council--(often in small and medium companies), i.e. management controlled 5) an
isolated BR often found in sizeable companies which has neither good contacts to
management nor to union, 6) an ignored works council, i.e. one that is ignored on a
personal basis and is to be found mostly in small companies with a high level of skilled
workers (Keller 1993:75), 7) a class-war works. council (Muller-Jentsch 1986:226),
which not only recruits new union members, but also demonstrates a large degree of
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working with workplace representatives and one which feels itself to be accountable
to workplace representatives (Schmidt and Trinczek 1991:184). These seven forms of
BR can be incorporated into the triadic frame of reference:
Table 5.5.: The Three Frames of Reference & Kotthoffs Typology 
I	 unitarist I	 pluralist	 I	 adversarial	 I
65	 41	 2	 3	 7 
Most types of works councils however work fall within a the pluralist frame of refer-
ence. Kotthoff s number 7 applies to the adversarial frame of reference; his no. 5 and
no. 6 are closer to the unitarist frame of reference. Consequently, most works council
are part of an institutionalised forms of IR largely because of the legislative frame-
work which requires them to remain within a pluralistic system. However, if a works
council does not participate in management's decision, it can become a vehicle for a
management approach (unitarist frame of reference). However, even Japanese com-
panies operating in Germany have recognised works councils and their demands for
participation. As for Opel's works council, no. 2 (Kotthoff) would apply because it is
a) respected and stable and located in a large company, and b) it is also a co-
operative strong and independent works council; it holds a position in which deci-
sions by management can only be made with works council co-operation. Opel' works
council is a combination of number 2 and 3, which makes it even more powerful, be-
cause it adds stability to power.
b) Opel's workplace representatives
One of the problems for representational structures at Opel is that the distance be-
tween the works council-member and workers can be considerable, i.e. on average
only 750 workers to one works council-member must inevitably mean a reduction of
democratic functions. While the size of the "constituency" of a works council-
member is large, workplace representatives on the other hand are much closer to their
workgroups. According to Opel's VP-convenor Ziegler (1993), the size of a constitu-
ency varies; it can take anything between 15 and 90, but is between 15 and 30 in most
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cases with an average of about 25. This improves the degree of democratic participa-
tion given to each worker. Between 25 and 50 workplace representatives elect one
section- or departmental Blocky (Blockvertrauensperson). On average there are 30
workplace representatives in an area to one works council-member, but the size of a
workplace representatives' constituency can vary between 8 and 55 (appendix P4). In
other words, a typical production area has 750 workers and is represented by one
works council-member, one or two Blockies and 30 workplace representatives. IGM
(1980:6) puts forward 5 to 20 workers for every election of workplace representa-
tives. All workplace representatives in one company constitute a VP Body which
elects a VK-Committee. According to the VICL-convenor Ziegler (1993) Opel's VICL
has 14 members, one of whom is elected as convenor, s/he is usually also a works
council-member. Since Opel's departments are very large, there is a middle level
(Biocides) who function between workplace representatives-committee and work-
place representatives. There are 64 Blockies, i.e. a ratio of 1.5 to one works council-
member. Opel has approximately 1,000 workplace representatives. Schmidt and
Trinczek (1991:181) claim that attendance at workplace representatives' meetings is
sometimes very low and that they are run by works council-members. In most cases,
approximately 20 to 25 workplace representatives attend Opel's VP-meetings, which
are officially run by Blockies, but often governed by the works council-member.
Works council-member Reitinger (1993) notes, that works council-members play an
important role in such meetings because they report to works council-committees, etc.
Blockies also have regular meetings, which, according to Ziegler (1993), take place
every two months. In contrast to most works council-meetings, Blocky-meetings deal
largely with trade union issues.
On the basis of their relative distance to the workplace, works council-members work
often with other workplace representatives on related issues. As far as teamwork is
concerned, Opel's works council was not able to support management's request with-
out consulting and gaining the approval of workplace representatives, i.e. 64 Blockies.
Although the works council took the final decision and negotiated with management,
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VPs' opinions were also a crucial factor. Even though workplace representatives are a
powerful group, employer associations always reject union claims to recognise work-
place representatives (Keller 1993:81). It seems remarkable that German unions have
never reached a collective bargaining agreement with employers regarding the role of
these workplace representatives (Schmidt and Trinczek 1991:172), therefore, work-
place representatives remain go-betweens (Adams & Rummel 1977:19); or arms of
the works councils (Koopmann 1984:411). Certainly the 35-hour-week strike at Opel
in 1984 illustrates the strength of workplace representatives. They organised the strike
which was called by IGM.
The relationship between Opel's works council and workplace representatives could in
general be defined as co-operative; Opel's workplace representatives support the
works council, but the works council depends to a large extent on workplace repre-
sentatives as they are draw up on the election lists for works council elections; this
gives workplace representatives a powerful position over works councils. Given these
factors, workplace representatives are almost as strong as British stewards in their
representative functions.
5.2.5. Conclusions
Most workplace representatives could be described as having a more radical
(adversarial) style compared to works council-members who tend towards a pluralist
frame of reference. Even amongst the Blockies for whom mediation is the key, there is
a small sub-group of Blockies, who strongly tend towards an adversarial approach.
The majority of Blockies, however, as well as the workplace representatives come
from the social-democratic group and see themselves as pluralists:
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majority of BR-members
soda/-democratic group	 progressive group
New Left
majority of VP committee
sodal-democn3tic group	 progressive group
New Left
majority of Biocides
social-democratic group	 progressive group
New Left
majority of VPs
soda/-democratic group	 progressive group
New Left
Table 5.6.: BR VPs Blockies & The Three Frames of Reference
adversarial
Although all levels of representation (works council, VIM; Blockies, workplace rep-
resentatives) can be further set in a political framework as social-democrats or a pro-
gressives or the New Left, none of these groups fight internally. The IR approach of
all these groups is fundamentally oriented towards a pluralist frame of reference.
None of the groups departs from a pluralist frame of reference. Opel's structure of
representation results in unification in the interests of a common policy. Possible
sources of conflict are between the Blockies and the works council because most
Biocides tend to be adversarial to management, while the majority of the works
council is not.
Representation through Opel's works council structure is at the most important level;
although workplace representatives have direct input from the shopfloor, they do not
have enough power to significantly influence the works council, except in the case of
works council elections, when workplace representatives do have real influence over
shaping the list. However at Opel the most significant form of representation is
formed above the level of shopfloor workgroups and even above sections or depart-
ments. Real decision-making power is assigned to the works council far more than the
workgroup unit, and this can act to remove real representation from the shopfloor and
displace it to a more bureaucratic if stable body. However, as the case of small unof-
ficial strikes have shown, Blockies and workplace representatives do have the power
to act outside the works council's influence. Opel's works council is however usually
strong enough to make the Blockies and the workplace representatives operate within
the pluralist frame of reference as the case of some unofficial strikes have shown.
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Consequently, Opel's structure of representation demonstrates an interesting power-
play between different groups and their different levels of representation. The rela-
tionship between Opel's workplace representatives, works council-members and
Blockies can be shown as a matrix using the following frame of reference:
Table 5.7.: Management & Representation and Frame of Reference 
Neither Opel's management nor the works council can afford not to mediate or nego-
tiate with each other. Even during a small scale strike in Opel's paint shop organised
by workplace representative and Blockies, the works council moved both back to a
position of mediation. It seems that neither works council nor management is inter-
ested in moving outside a pluralist frame of reference. However, both sides can op-
erate satisfactorily within the pluralist frame of reference sometimes leaning towards
a more unitarist approach (management) at other times tending towards a more ad-
versarial approach (workplace representatives and Biocides).
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5.3. Comparative Conclusions
It is vital to note that no part of the German dual system operates in isolation. All
parts of the system depend on each other in many ways. The term dual system is used
to describe two clear aspects of the system: a) one based on law, the other b) based
on trade union's organisation and representation. While the union based system of
workplace representatives is legally legitimised, it is important because it provides
works councils with a recruiting ground for new works council-member. Many ex-
amples demonstrate how both systems complement each other and create a direct say
for workplace representatives.
In contrast to British IR, Germany's IR is characterised by relatively centralised col-
lective bargaining at the industrial level. Unlike British stewards, German works
councils and workplace representatives are faced with "organised" collective bargain-
ing, because the mode of participation is highly regulated by the law. This means that
British stewards can move towards an adversarial frame of reference quickly when
faced with a adversarial situation created by management. Legal requirements pre-
vent the development of an adversarial frame of reference for the German works
councils and workplace representatives. British stewards' committees and German
works councils sometimes appear to carry out similar activities. However, such paral-
lels must be drawn carefully as there are some very important differences. While
works councils are strongly pluralist in approach, the other has a wider range of
choices. In Germany strikes are outlawed for works councils, works councils are
regulated, protected and are constrained by a large body of case law and legal statutes
(cf. a pluralism), on the other hand the British shop stewards system is constructed by
voluntarism and customs and practice based on the power of workgroups on the
shopfloor.
Whereas participation as a principle that is legally enshrined combined with a policy of
reconciliation and mutual trust are central to the German system, British IR has no
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legal base to it's system of participation. There is no strong force which drives shop
stewards at Vauxhall towards a pluralist frame of reference, in fact, in terms of sur-
vival they see an adversarial frame of reference as most advantageous for workers.
The main characteristics of IR in both countries, i.e. their dominant and distinctive
features, seem to have been established at a fairly early stage of industrial develop-
ment:
Table 5.8.: The Historical Develo ment of Stewards and BRs/VPs
frames of reference unitarism pluralism adversarlallsm
FRG: VPs before 1919 BR after 1920 until now VPs in 1918/19
VPs after World War ll until now
UK: Stewards since early industrialisation
In contrast to German workplace representatives, German works councils have influ-
ence over social issues but again their influence is limited in relationship to business
affairs. Although works councils' activities are legally regulated, workplace represen-
tatives have a wide range of responsibilities. German workplace representatives (VPs)
can be compared with stewards:
Table 5.9.: Stewards and Workplace Representatives
GB: Stewards Germany: VPs
(Coates & Topham 1988:157; Partridge 1977:32) (Koopmann 1984)
spokesman of the workgroup
disseminator of information between the organl-
sation and the group
Inform union members concerning union policies, inform
union members about resolutions of union committees
minor bargaining over grievances advise BR before signing works-agreements
monitoring of information Inform union members about collective agreements
exercising leadership to strengthen cohesion &
bargaining power
encourage union members to discuss union issues,
organise, participate, and carry out Industrial action
liaison with other groups & managers
decision-making
formal negotiation with senior managers
German workplace representatives and British stewards are similar in some areas,
both act as a link between union organisation and members, and they also both share
the role-of monitoring information and agreements. By contrast while strikes are or-
ganised by unions outside a company in Germany, in Britain such an action is more
likely to come from within and be motivated from the bottom up. While formal nego-
tiations with senior management is not a function of workplace representatives in
Germany but is allocated to the works council, British stewards do have the ability to
negotiate on collective issues directly as spokesperson of their group; this is not men-
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tioned by Koopmann as part of a workplace representatives' function at Opel. In
Germany, although workplace representatives are elected by their group and they do
clearly represent a group of workers, the structure of representation does not actively
depend on this link between workgroup and workplace representatives. Whereas in
Britain, this link is crucial for an understanding of the representative system.
Structures of representation in both countries include unions and, in formal terms,
both have a multi-union system. However at Opel, although DAG and CMV both ex-
ist as well as IGM, they are insignificant. Given the power of IGM, it may not be ap-
propriate to speak of a real multi-union system because representation is dominated
by them. In contrast to this, Vauxhall has a real multi-union system, with a balance of
power between the two dominant unions. While IGM at Opel is the only union with
workplace representatives and holds almost all works council seats, Vauxhall's
TGWU has 2,349 members, AEEU has 1,524, and MSF has 380. While IGM clearly
dominates workplace representative and BR, AEEU has 72 stewards, TGWU has 71,
and MSF has 11; all have a degree of autonomy within this structure and can influence
union policies. While TGWU's stewards are the core-group on the shopfloor, IGM's
workplace representatives and works councils are in a similar position without having
to take any other union into account. However relations between Vauxhall's unions
are problematic; TGWU is not only the strongest union but also forms the core-group
and is often able to convince MSF and AEEU to follow it's policies. Even though in
both Germany and England unions tend to operate separately, they all depend on their
stewards/workplace representatives, who in turn depend on their workgroup for
power. The following graph shows the distance between a workgroup or workers and
their representatives:
Table 5.10: Ratio between Workers and Representation in GB and FRG
Country No. Representative represents no. of workers 	 -
FRG one works council -member 750
FRG one workplace representative 25
GB - one shop stewards 32
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Although the size of a workplace representatives' constituency can vary between 15
to 90 and, usually, has 25 on average, stewards can represent between 50 and 60
members; a typical steward's constituency at Vauxhall is 32 members. Although VPs'
and stewards' constituencies are about the same size, their influence differs signifi-
cantly. The German structure of representation is not based on the workgroup; while
the workgroup is the key element in British representation.
Since typologies are very important in comparative analysis and one typology is the
German seeking harmony (Ordnungsfaktor) and the independent opposition
(Gegenrnacht) model, Vauxhall's stewards can be seen as closer to the Gegenmacht
model operating somewhere between the Ordnungsfaktor and Gegenmacht model,
while the works council tends towards the Ordnungsfaktor. Using Batstone's model
of a quasi-elite; the core-group in Vauxhall is a group of determined and strong
TGWU-stewards who lead the workforce. However, Opel's core-group is difficult to
determine. Firstly, can be found within the IGM; secondly, Blockies can form a core-
group with considerable influence, thirdly Opel's core-group can also be inside the
works council because of its major role in decision-making; fourthly, within Opel's
works council there are two political groups, i.e. the social-democratic and the pro-
gressive- group, who also exert their influence as a core-group. On the basis of Kot-
thoff s typology, Opel's works council combines number 2 and 3, while Vauxhall's
core-group, i.e. TGWU convenor and several stewards is a combination of 3 and 7.
Table 5.11.: Kotthoffs Typology & Frame of Reference
unitarism pluralism adversarialism
65 41 2 3 7
Opel's BR
AEEU TGWU
As Vauxhall's model for teamwork shows, any change in work organisation could
only be made with the TGWU's stewards approval. The stewards see themselves to a
much lesser degree as co-operative, but as in a strong and independent position, i.e.
number 7, (class war). Compared to the wide range of possible IR approaches at
Vauxhall, the range of IR approaches for Opel's works council is much narrower.
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While works councils play an important role in managerial decision making, Vaux-
hall's TGWU's approach is very different, because they generally oppose management
and management itself does not function within a pluralist frame of reference:
Table 5.12.: The Frame of Reference: Vauxhall and Opel
unitarism pluralism I adversatialism
Opel's BR Opel's VPs
AEEU TGWU
Opel's and Vauxhall's structures of representation demonstrates one group operating
within the pluralist approach and another group sometimes with a pluralist and at
other times an adversarial approach. However, the crucial element for both is, that
Batstone's quasi-elite or core-group differs in Germany from Britain. While in Ger-
many, the question of a core-group is distributed through institutionalised forms of
the system, in Britain a voluntary group within the TGWU is the core-group, i.e. the
shop stewards. The German system operates with top-down representation, separat-
ing representatives from the workforce through a strict legal system, while in Britain
workers participate at workgroup level; they are kept down and their powers are of-
ten restricted by management but they also draw their representative power from the
bottom, i.e. the worker's themselves.
Table 5.13.: Mana ement, Re resentation and Frames of Reference
representation
management
unliarIsm pluralism 
	
I
--,z9P-
adversarialism
unitarism
,.• >$-t ,
	 , ,
, pluralism
,
Vauxhall's management
Opel's management
Opers BR
Vauxhall's quasi-elite
adversarIallsm
Opel's works council has a good relationship with management, because it has an in-
dependent legal basis (the works constitution), which provides enough power for it
not to be incorporated into management and which also forces both sides to negotiate
(e.g. the works council forced management to accept the election of teamspeakers).
The legal strength of works councils in Germany protected workers representative
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systems throughout the recession much better than other systems of indirect partici-
pation where "weak labour is integrated into managerial decision making in a decid-
edly subordinate way" (Turner 1991:13). However at Vauxhall this did not happen; in
fact the opposite happened and at Opel workers maintained their traditional strength.
The other basis for workers' representation is the independent union IGM, which al-
though it operates largely outside the plant strengthens the works council (BR).
Workplace representatives do not provide a significant power base for the structure of
representation, although they do play an important part. Crucial to the structure of
representation at Opel is not the workgroup, because at an important level, neither
Blockies nor works councils depend on the workgroup. In contrast to this, the work-
group is the sole unit of worker's power in Vauxhall's union representation.
183
Chapter 6
Teamwork &
Representation
6. Teamwork and
the Structure of Representation
Both, Vauxhall and Opel introduced teamwork into an existing structure of represen-
tation in 1992 and both plants started the planning period for this move in the early
1990s. Once it was decided that teamwork should be introduced on the shopfloor on
a permanent basis, it inevitably meant a reorganisation of traditional shopfloor organi-
sation. Teamwork replaced the old worker-supervisor structure with one in which
workers did not have to answer directly to supervisors, but to teams and teamleaders.
Representatives at Vauxhall and Opel were fully involved by management during the
introduction period. Despite this, the different IR systems in Luton and Rfisselsheim,
the IR system tended to influence the introduction of teamwork in different ways.
To examine the effects of teamwork on the existing structure of representation, two
typical plants have been compared with each other because each of them have charac-
teristics of an adversarial or pluralist nature. The basic IR systems in each plant not
only affected the introduction of teamwork, but also the actual structure of teamwork
itself. The IR system of each plant influenced issues filo the election or appointment
of teamleaders/teamspeakers, leadership styles, competencies, the question of auton-
omy, etc. Even though a pluralist structure of representation is to some degree de-
fined by law in Germany, the traditional representative system at Opel was affected by
the introduction of teamwork. At Vauxhall, the adversarial state of IR was also af-
fected by the introduction of teamwork. Despite the differences of each IR approach,
both Vauxhall and Opel were able to introduce teamwork in very different ways and
with very different approaches from management and unions.
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6.1. Teamwork and the Structure
of Representation at Vauxhall
According to Vauxhall's manager ICnapman (1994), teams at Vauxhall were set up
with on average of about eight members. Teams took responsibility for quality, out-
put, inspection, repair, cleanliness and some maintenance, they tended to share jobs,
and to improve the way work was done. Managers however emphasised a cultural
change in IR associated with the introduction of teamwork. Manual workers would
no longer be just a pair of hands or leave their brains at the gate, they would have
greater responsibilities and more status because of these responsibilities. This cultural
change in terms of the status of the workers is emphasised in union/management
agreements (Carr 1994:203).
6.1.1. Teams, Teamwork & Leadership
Teamwork was introduced into plants that operated with traditional Fordist/Taylorist
production pattern. Often these teams do not work as teams, because they rarely
cornmunitcate with each other during production, therefore such working pattern
could be described as "working in a loose grouping" or Arbeit im Raumverband
(Kirsch 1993:19). A distinction between teams and workgroups (Katzenbach & Smith
1993) needs to be made. Vauxhall's teams are in fact more like workgroups; they have
the strong and clear leadership that characterises workgroups. As teamleaders hold a
special position, the following sort of leadership applies to teamleadership as well as
management styles (Smith et al. 1984:176): 1) The teamleader tells, 2) sells, 3) tests,
4) consults, or 5) joins. Since Vauxhall's tearnleaders do not depend on a vote from
their teams, their loyalty is not directed primarily towards the team, rather to man-
agement (hypothesis: C). Therefore, they generally adapt a tells style. On the basis of
their relationship to management the majority of Vauxhall's teamleaders prefer a sell
or test style; the consult style is used less than the join style; among all teamleaders
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participating in interviews the latter style was the most rare. Most teamleaders can
afford to adapt the first four leadership styles but, given their direct mandate from
management, the teamleader-team relationship is authoritarian and adversarial be-
cause of its non-participative nature. Teams and teamleaders see themselves on oppos-
ing sides. Despite the fragmentary nature of teams, team-members are held to be in-
dividually accountable; teams tend to run meetings effectively but their discussions are
then assessed by others. In summary, Vauxhall' teams are more like workgroups then
teams. However, the Vauxhall management prefers to label them teams hoping this
will create a psychological commitment and coherence within the group, i.e. a culture
that will benefit management. The existence of teamleaders does represent clearly a
new player on the shopfloor. Gulowsen's scale (1979) for measuring autonomy is
useful for measuring the degree of autonomy given to teams:
Table 6.1.: Team Autonomy at Vauxhall
'	 no participation ' participation co-decision-making autonomy
1 teamleader selection
new members in teams
distribution of work
time flexibility
5 acceptance of additional work
8 . representation outside a team,
either via supervisor or direct
i methods of production
8 production goals (output)
9 production goals (quality)
According to this table, management maintains those functions which are seen as
management's role or as the right to manage, on many crucial issues. Only on the
level of 5, 6, and 7 does management allow teams to participate. Since distribution of
work within a team is one of the central issues for teamwork, management gives
teams the level of co-decision-making at a certain level. In none of the nine items on
Gulowsen's scale are teams given full autonomy. Since management reserves most of
the functions measured by Gulowsen's scale firmly in its area of responsibility, man-
agement's right to manage has not shifted from an adversarial frame of reference; i.e.
it is essentially adversarial, i.e. imposed from above and controlled by one side.
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6.1.2. Stewards and
the Introduction of Teamwork
Vauxhall's teamwork at Ellesmere Port began with a new agreement and a wage sup-
plement of 5 %. The agreement urged unions at Luton to make a similar deal to
achieve the additional 5 % (Carr 1994:200). In contrast to the TGWU, the AEEU ac-
cepted management's proposal wholesale, while TGWU-stewards modified and dis-
cussed the agreement with the union membership on five Saturdays in 1992. Member-
ship meetings took place outside the plant and up to 100 people attended. IBC'
TGWU-stewards attended also. Step by step, the new proposals were discussed and
alterations were made. The fmal proposal was approved through a ballot of members
of all the unions in September 1992. The election had a high turnout and the proposal
was accepted by a 2,5:1 majority for AEEU; 51 % of TGWU's members agreed and
according to MSF-convenor Payne (1993), "87 % of MSFs members voted in favour
of Working Together to Win. To the TGWU-Convenor John Jack (1992), the voting
in his union TGWU showed that:
• the membership were aware of the problems that
teamwork could bring to the workers,
• the TGWU membership was reluctant to approve the concept of
teamwork.
Through meetings and discussions, the TGWU, more so than the AEEU and MSF,
made their members aware of the implications of teamwork. As a result, TGWU-
members voted with a narrow margin for the acceptance of the agreement, demon-
strating that the TGWU membership held a critical view on the introduction of team-
work. --
With the introduction of teamwork, management wanted to change parts of the repre-
sentational arrangement to improve lR in it's favour. However, the failure of man-
agement to modify or share it's responsibilities of planning and organising and it's de-
termination not to devolve any significant responsibility or power to the teams is
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wholly characteristic of an adversarial management style, i.e. one that fears the de-
struction of its own powers. On the other hand, management did recognise the unions'
right to represent the interests of, and communicate with it's members on these issue
(Vauxhall 1992:11) and in this sense seemed to move in the direction of a pluralist
approach. Management then proposed that unions should speak with one voice
through the JPC (Carr 1994:202). As Jack (1994) noted: "According to the agree-
ment, management expressed the intention of improving IR in the plant". This com-
mittee was composed of 17 members from management, AEEU, MSF and TGWU; it
was held in a monthly basis and unions agreed to attend. The TGWU more than the
AEEU saw the JPC as an attempt to incorporate unions into management's agenda.
Management's authoritarian style, the way it handled these meetings confirmed this
suspicion as far as the TGWU were concerned. From the union's point of view the
JPC was a management device to impose their own plans (i.e. adversarial) and was
merely a pretence at pluralism. Management, on the other hand, was incapable of go-
ing beyond a us and them attitudes in order to build confidence in a pluralist ap-
proach.
While management agreed to unions and stewards having time off for representation,
in practice the situation at the door-section was rather different, because stewards
who were not team-members were not allowed to attend other team-meetings. They
could do so only if union members requested their attendance; significantly stewards
did not attend any team-meeting during the introducing period between October 1992
and January 1993 and therefore were excluded from participating. Such exclusion fed
into the nature of later (adversarial) reactions. However, in 1994 shop stewards were
able to attend their own team-meetings, a fact which contradicts the agreement made
with management.
Besides stewards' right to represent, unions discussed the emergence of teamleaders.
Long before voting on the agreement, "the unions were concerned that the creation of
a new grade of teamleader, in larger numbers than existing stewards, could result in
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many problems being resolved without reference to the stewards, resulting in a loss of
status for the unions as a whole" (Carr 1994:203). However, all the unions fought to
ensure that tearnleaders did not interfere with the representative powers of the stew-
ards. Some teamleaders however had a tendency to see themselves as engaging in a
new form of supervisory role (hypothesis D). According to AEEU-convenor Longley
(1994), "out of the 543 teamleaders, approximately 100 (mostly AEEU-teamleaders)
identified themselves as part of management and wanted to join the MSF
(supervisor's) union". Eric Payne (MSF-convenor) denies that this was the case. All
teamleaders remained in their former union (AEEU or TGWU), even after changing
their job title and description. Vauxhall did not have mixed teams, which kept the
traditional splits between skilled and unskilled unions open. While seeming to ask for
a common union policy, the way that teamwork was developed, particularly in terms
of each union organising their own teams, meant in practice, little real commonality
developed between the TGWU and the AEEU. This was reflected in the widening of
the gap in their attitudes during the whole process of teamwork introduction.
By the end of 1994, Vauxhall operated with 543 teamleaders and 154 stewards, i.e. a
1:3,5 ratio between teamleaders and stewards. In terms of numbers, workers were
closer to their teamleader than to a steward, because each team was smaller than a
steward's constituency. It seems as if management did reduce the strength of shop
stewards through the introduction of teamleaders by setting stewards against both su-
pervisors and tearnleaders. In the survey, 10 % of the workers saw their teamleader as
representative of their interests (cf. chapter 6.2.3.). Since supervisors are hardly re-
garded as representatives, it could be argued that without teamleaders, not 82 % saw
their stewards as representative, but 92 %. To respond to teamwork, the TGWU
made it's stewards aware of the following principles (Batton & Rcid 1991:28):
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1. Continually to monitor the effects on trade union organisa-
tion. 2. 'Push' the role of stewards. 3. Keep persuading the
company that they cannot succeed without a healthy union
presence. 4. Go for as many 'joint' activities as they can.
There is no such thing as an 'independent' survey. We want to
push for joint control, and joint questions 5. Quality Circles
become boring and run out of ideas, 'nice-guy' teamleaders
revert to being authoritarian foremen, etc. Look out for oppor-
tunities to re-assert the role of the steward. 6. Oppose 'infor-
mality'. It is phoney. Use formality to protect established pro-
cedures and the role of the union. 7. Keep up your information
and education campaign.
These instructions demonstrate the degree of fear that the unions experienced of the
new team structure. They saw them as a strategy to usurp power from the traditional
representational structure built by workers. Before teamwork was introduced,
TGWU-stewards discussed their future role in a teamwork system. They tried to
strengthen the role of their stewards in the area of production; stewards were trained
and educated about teamwork. Any attempts by management to reinforce the role of
teamleaders as a management role were rejected by the unions.
According to the AEEU-convenor Longley (1994), unions and management are
aware that about "20 % of teamleaders think they are managers". Not only in the
AEEU did teamleaders move in the direction of management, TGWU's convenor Jack
(1994) also made the point that tearnleaders are expected to do a supervisory job
without receiving proper remuneration or reward for that job; unions considered the
marginal pay as inadequate. For the unions this meant again that management were
redefining jobs and expecting more from workers without recognising this through the
union and the pay structure. The recruitment of some stewards to tearnleaders was
also seen as a loss by the unions of their own representatives. As AEEU's convenor
Long1ey_(1994) stated: "We lost 8 stewards who became teamleaders" and TGWU's
convenor Jack (1993) estimated that: "The TGWU lost three stewards, who were ap-
pointed by the company for the position of teamleader and the AEEU lost among 12
to 15". Carr (1994:203) noted: "To the major unions' embarrassment, a significant
number of stewards applied to become teamleaders, and most were accepted. Sixteen
AEEU Engineering Section stewards and a smaller number of TGWU-stewards be-
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came teamleaders". For the union those shop stewards who became teamleaders were
falling for a management strategy to weaken the union. Given the small number of
150 stewards, the loss as a result of this remained at approximately 10 %. Unions
sought to keep their structures intact by not losing too many stewards to manage-
ment. The attempt to keep stewards on their side clearly shows the unions' interest in
maintaining a clear boundary between them and management, but also the desire to
maintain an adversarial frame of reference rather then be led into a unitarist frame of
reference disguised as pluralism.
Not only were the AEEU and TGWU able to keep the loss of stewards at a reason-
able level, they also successfully dealt with the introduction of teamwork, teamleaders
and other related initiatives. According to Batton and Reid (1991) "A management
strategy based on issues of teamwork did include an attack on unionism":
Table 6.2.: Techniciues and TGWU
„.
Management Techniques,
,
, ,	 TGWU's response at Vauxhall
,
De-valuing the steward:
1) Changing the role of supervision,
2) involving employees,
3) 'Team organisation.
Management changed the role of supervision and gave
teamieader more power leading to conflicts between them
and stewards. Although direct employee Involvement was
rare, teamwork resulted In problems for stewards In some
areas of the plant.
Changing the climate:
1) Information as a directed weapon.
2) Selection and vetting.
Through supervisors-teamleader meetings, stewards at the
door-section were effectively by-passed.
Individualising workers:
1) Appraisal etc./merit rating.
2) Individual contracts etc.
Neither merit rating, nor individual contracts are introduced at
Vauxhall. A process of individualisation cannot be detected.
Teamwork certainly was seen by the unions as a management threat; Vauxhall's un-
ions however attempted to secure their own position not by rejecting teamwork, but
by shaping the teamwork agreement. They rejected some initiatives but managed to
shaped core elements of teamwork. Although "the major unions were suspicious of
teamwork" (Carr 1994:203), they adapted teamwork. This strategy was one of dam-
age limitation (Carr 1994:202). Unions that were forced to secure their existence and
position by using a policy of damage limitation were not really moving towards plu-
ralism, they saw themselves rather defending their own interests against a hostile plan
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conceived by management. They felt that they were forced to remain adversarial to
secure their very existence. Not surprisingly, Vauxhall's TGWU tried to follow a
strategy developed by the union' head office to respond to teamwork:
Table 6.3.: TGWU Strate gies and Activities at Vauxhall
.,
'TGWU Strategy ,,,
-
•	 ,,.	 ,,,
Activities at Vauxhall
1. A clear role for the steward: Make sure 'teams' do not
remove the stewards role.
With the decision for a mutual exclusion of a stewards
post and teamleader, Vauxhall's trade unions ensured the
sole membership representation through stewards.
2. Keep formality and 'rigid' agreements and proce-
dures: You will be encouraged to be 'Informal' - but you
need to keep agreements and procedures In place. Ask the
company whether its system of financial, legal and owner-
ship, and control system is informal'.
Vauxhalls management and unions reached a formal
agreement to introduce teamwork. Attempts by manage-
ment to informally change the role of teamleaders were
rejected by unions on the basis of the written agreement,
which specifies the role of teamleaders.
3. Break the link between
'teams and company survival'
Although the unions see Vauxhall can survive without
teamwork, the membership clearly sees a link between
both as expressed in the survey.
4. Widen the debate on 'quality': what does it really
mean? What about our interpretation of 'quality'?
(investment, control, information, etc.)
Quality was not an issue for Vauxhalls unions during the
period of the research, because management kept the
issue in their area of responsibility.
5. Membership awareness: Already before the introduction of teamwork, the TGWU
organised meetings with all members to discuss team-
work and the narrow vote In favour for the agreement
clearly states the awareness of the membership.
6. Strengthen union links outside the company: Do
not accept an identification of the union as only in that
company - keep links with trade unionists In other compa-
nies and with your wider union organisation. You may need
them.
During the introduction of teamwork. Vauxhalls unions
strengthen their links to unions outside the company
(IBC, FORD, etc.). Links to the education department of
the TGWU improved due to training programs for team-
work run by the TGWU.
Although Vauxhall's unions were in a difficult position throughout the early 1990s,
they managed to maintain their existence as an independent body of representation
and ensured that most of the TGWU's goals were met. Union policies during the in-
troduction of teamwork could best be described as: (a) damage limitation, (b) main-
taining an independent representation, (c) maintaining the number of stewards, (d)
shaping rather than rejecting the introduction of teamwork. Since the bargaining
power of unions was significantly reduced in the 1990s, neither the AEEU nor the
TGWU was able to wholly reject management's strategies for teamwork so a com-
promise was felt to be inevitable. The unions adapted a defensive approach to team-
work by trying to maintain their independence and not to be incorporated into man-
agement's version of teamwork.
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6.1.3. Teamleader,
Teams and Representation
After the introduction of teamwork, the number of stewards was linked to the number
of supervisors and not to the number of tearilleaders. Unions discussed the manage-
ment claim that the number of stewards should be linked to the number of teamlead-
ers. This however, was strongly rejected by the unions as a central management attack
on their system and the number of stewards was kept at the existing level; there is
now one shop stewards to every 2.5 teams. The TGWU-deputy-convenor Garcia
(1994) stated, that "teamwork is a question of control, either we or the teamleader
controls". This again demonstrates an adversarial frame of reference to the basic IR
issues. Control however, the unions felt might be difficult to maintain; unions feared
exclusion as there were only a few shop stewards within the teamwork system. Ac-
cording to a TGWU-steward Sullivan (1993) teamleaders became more influential
than shop stewards because "attendance was moved from a clock-in system to atten-
dance control by the teamleader thus the teamleader gained more power". Teamlead-
ers undermined the shop stewards system not only by outnumbering stewards, but
also because teamleaders again increased their powers. TGWU-steward Garcia (1994)
views the question of power in the following way: "If you have a strong steward, you
have a weak teamleader and if you have a weak steward, you have a strong team-
leader". However it is important also to remember that a large number of teams have
no shop steward presence to control the teamleaders' power.
In the door-section at Vauxhall, where teamleaders were in a particularly strong posi-
tion, "teams wanted to control the moves of the teamleader" (Sullivan 1993). How-
ever this proved difficult given the backing of the supervisor for the teamleader. Be-
sides their numbers and their increased power, TGWU's convenor Jack (1994) viewed
the teamleaders' attack on stewards in the following way: "In theory, supervisors and
teamleaders can work together against stewards, but in practice this has not happened
yet". In contrast to this statement events at the door-section demonstrated the oppo-
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site; the supervisor, in alliance with the teamleader, was successfully able to by-pass
stewards from the AEEU and the TGWU. Jack (1994) admits, that "we have team-
work, on the whole we can control it, but there are a few sections where teamleaders
have established control over stewards". In other words, there are conflicts between
teamleaders and stewards in some sections and potential for conflict within the new
structure. However, on the whole, TGWU's representatives claim that they are in
control of teamwork. Management, on the other hand, by establishing a more diverse
system of representation feels that they have broken down and dispersed the opposi-
tional structure of the union particularly when some shop stewards (AEEU and
TGWU) begin to shift allegiance from the union to an identification or loyalty to man-
agement. With teamleaders and their assigned tasks, shopfloor management has
changed (hypothesis a):
Whether a teamleader is appointed, or not a teamleader will be a new
player within the participative framework (industrial democracy) on the
shop floor.
Vauxhall's managers see teamworking as a crucial step in changing the culture of the
shopfloor, and "believe that the concept has been willingly accepted by employees,
though acknowledging that it takes time to set up" (Carr 1994:204). According to the
TGWU (Batton and Reid 1991:20), the difference between the old supervisor-worker
system and the new teamleader-system is:
Table 6.4.: Old and New 1R
Traditional IR system. New Style In:
Steward by-passes supervisor Power increased by Team Bliefing and merit rating
Supervisor of little importance Stripping Stewards functions
While under the old system stewards were almost able to run shopfloor management,
the teamleader system bought management control back to the shopfloor. Team
briefings provided another form of control of workers because they gave management
direct communication access through the teamleader to the workers. As the supervi-
sor's function shifted towards a teamleader, their role was viewed by a TGWU-
195
steward on the door-section as "like corporals, because they do the dirty work for
management" (Sullivan 1993). Hypothesis (e):
Whether or not a teamleader is appointed, a new form of control of work-
ers on the shop floor may result.
The power of teamleaders, then, can lead to the exclusion of independent worker's
representation; it can also weaken their ability to defend themselves against manage-
ment's control. One of the important defences against management's control, the
steward's network (Batstone et al. 1977:70) has been increasingly challenged by
teamleaders who have enough time off to set up their own network of communica-
tions. Workers, on the other hand are more separated from each other and this tends
to break down concepts of solidarity in the workforce. The system of teamleaders is
much less democratic, while stewards are directly accountable to members and can be
dismissed or delegated if they do not perform their role well, teamleaders can not be
deselected. On the other hand, the democratic election of shop stewards ensures that
shop stewards are not incorporated into management's ethos (Coates & Topham
1972:82). In contrast to this, teamleaders are part of management and team-members
do not have any method to control or expel them. According to AEEU's convenor
Longley (1994), supervisors are able to restrict the work of stewards; for example,
sometimes they do not give stewards time off when crucial meetings are taking place.
In such a culture, a "steward can easily become an outsider" (Batton and Reid
1991:20). In a survey (appendix C) to assess the relationship between the union and
teamleaders the workforce was asked (question: 27): Is the union a source of argu-
ments or disagreements between the team and teamleader? 25.9 % said yes and 44.4
% said no. For almost half union policy is not a source of argument between them.
This indicates that the new system does not seem to have potential for conflict on this
issue. To the question (28): When there are disagreements with your teamleader over
the union, how often does your team stick together and challenge the teamleader?
their responses were; all the time 19 %, often 28.6 %, sometimes 33.3 %, never 19
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%. Given that almost 60 % said either often or sometimes, it seems that this is a po-
tential minefield of conflict.
A further question was asked about conflicts among team-members themselves
(question: 30): Is the union a source of arguments or disagreements between team-
members? Only 11.1 % said that the union was an area of conflict between team-
members; 63 % said the union was not an issue of conflict. In contrast to the team-
member - teamleader relations, the union was much less an issue of conflicting views
among team-members. Analysing both questions and their responses, the issue of un-
ionism tends to divides teams from teamleaders, but not team-members amongst
themselves. Since the issue of union participation divides teamleaders from teams, the
following question was asked (question: 29): In your opinion if there was a serious
disagreement with your teamleader and the union, how likely would it be for the team
to stick together and challenge the teamleader? 27.8 % indicated very likely, 47.2 %
said likely, 16.7 % mentioned unlikely, and the answer highly unlikely was given only
by 8.3 %. In short, 75 % of the team-members would act together against a team-
leader in order to defend their fundamental rights to trade union representation. In
summary, it seems as if there is a significant gap between teams and teamleaders con-
cerning union participation and this seems to restrict teamleaders' powers in totally
undermining trade union representative structure.
Given management's direct access to workers through teamleaders, their ability to
control teams, and their potential ability to either by-pass stewards or attack their
network, it can be concluded that teamleaders perform an increasingly important pro-
management role. According to TGWU-steward Garcia (1994), increasingly, man-
agement seems to "de-recognise supervisors, because teamleaders take over their
functions". This perception has led to reaction from the union. "If teamleaders take
the functions of supervisors, than we need to increase the number of stewards to the
level of tearnleaders" (John 1994). Vauxhall's TGWU discussed the issue of this
power shift from supervisor to teamleader as the new player who challenges stewards.
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To maintain the power balance between unions and management, unions continuously
sought a numerical match between teamleaders and stewards, however management
has always resisted such a proposal. Again, the conflict over this numerical match is
non-pluralist; both management and union continue to act within a self-defensive and
adversarial frame of reference.
The majority of teamleaders, then, identify with supervisiors because their loyalty is
not with their teams but with management, while only a few remain close to their un-
ion (hypothesis: C). As Garcia (1994) noted: "I had one former steward as teainleader
in the paint shop who had to resign from being a steward, but he then became a union
organiser". Most teamleaders seems to have chosen their side (cf. Parker & Slaughter
1988). In summary then, (a) teamleaders are a new person on the shopfloor appointed
by management with direct influence and (b) they can provide significant control over
workers. The issue of control is integral to the teamleader's loyalty to management.
This is also supported by the team-members' survey answers which describe team-
leaders as on the side of management. This is also confirmed by a high proportion of
workers who state that, in the case of conflict between a team and a teamleader, they
would act together against teamleaders. The appointment of teamleaders has resulted
in a gap between teams and teamleaders. Given such a gap, the question of the repre-
sentation of teams by teamleaders, as demanded in the agreement (Vauxhall 1992:4),
is hardly clear. Such a question regarding representation can be transferred into the
following hypothesis (b):
Whether or not a teamleader is appointed, s/he will be a team and work-
ing area representative. Therefore, an appointed teamleader may get into
conflict with an elected steward on the issue of: who represents?
Management and unions continue to operate in an adversarial frame of reference as
far as the representative functions of teamleaders and stewards are concerned. Despite
the gap between team and teamleaders, management claims that it (Vauxhall 1992:11)
sees "the need to foster and maintain the best possible relationships with its employees
based on a spirit of care, unity, teamwork, mutual trust and co-operation". Manage-
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ment recognises the exclusive right of each union to communicate with its own mem-
bers and did not want or did not feel they could take on the unions over such a fun-
damental issue or by-pass unions. In this sense management views representation as a
dual structure: one form of representation is through unions and the other form of
representation is through teamleaders. While a teamleader represents between five
and fifteen workers, a steward represents on average 32 members. Using 49 TGWU-
steward's constituencies (appendix P5), the size of each constituency varies signifi-
cantly. Teamleaders are closer to team-members in terms of practice compared to
stewards but may be seen as management's representatives by workers. Despite man-
agement's idea of a dual representation, unions view representation in a different way.
It is interesting that TGWU-stewards rejected the notion of an elected teamleader be-
cause elections of teamleaders would not only incorporate a form of elected represen-
tation into management but would confuse members over the question: who repre-
sents?
Not all TGWU-stewards opposed elections; one at the door-section argued that,
"tearnleaders should be elected" (Sullivan 1993). However, the general view of
TGWU- and AEEU-stewards was that tearnleaders should be appointed, i.e. seen to
be clearly management appointments; stewards, on the other hand, should be elected
clearly by the workforce, and stewards who become teamleaders should no longer be
able to stand as stewards. The unions' position is further explained by Batton and Reid
(1991:20), as "stewards can be isolated and reduced in influence as the new type of
supervisotheamleader takes away the steward's role in: 1) caring for employees, 2)
grievance-handling, 3) protection against higher management, 4) passing on informa-
tion, 5)-community leadership". So, despite union attempts to separate the two roles,
the very role of both overlaps and confuses the issue of representation. As a shop
steward noted: "Teamleaders are not for the team, they are for management" (Sullivan
1993).
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Who to ask: 82 %
the personnel department
	 2% 
,supeivisorstothers;,3,A, 24a4:-.....4 6 14i.ei
your union representative:
When team-members were asked (question: 25): What do you think about your
teamleader's position on the union? 40.7 % said their attitude to the union was too
critical, and only 1.9 % said too supportive. However, 40.7 % said about right. Since
almost nobody mentioned too supportive, but many said too critical, teamleaders
were definitely not viewed as pro-union. When asked the question (26): What pro-
portion of members of your team would agree with your assessment? 29.6 % said al-
most all, 18.5 % said most, 11.1 % said about half, 13 % mentioned some, 1.9 % said
none, and 11.1 % said don't know.
More important than a simple team-members' attitude to this is the question of repre-
sentation or who to consult in case of a problem, which relates to number 1, 2, 3, and
possibly number 5 of Batton & Reid's (1991:28) list of TGWU responses. The follow-
ing question therefore assesses if and how far teamleaders are able to take over stew-
ards' functions of representation (question: 23): If you thought that you or someone
on your team was being subjected to some form of on-the-job harassment or unfair
treatment, to whom would you most likely turn to get something done?
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Over 80 % of team-members still turned to their steward as a first choice in the case
of a problem; teamleaders only received 10 %; Vauxhall's union's have successfully
ensured their survival; union members still believe that stewards and not teamleaders
represent them. According to TGWU-steward Sadlier (1994), by the process of elec-
tions "power still rests with stewards, because members give them the power";
"stewards are closely identified with the workgroup they represent" (Terry 1984:71).
According to the AEEU-convenor Longley (1994) "AEEU team-members still go to
their stewards, they do not by-pass stewards".
Although stewards are not by-passed by tearnleaders, management does try to by-pass
stewards. At the door-section stewards were excluded from the so-called Wednesday-
meetings, which were held with teatnleaders including the supervisors. As a TGWU-
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steward describes the situation: "Teamleaders on the door-section stay together and
support the supervisor, they do not work and team-members have to do the job for
them. The team has no chance to change this as teamleaders are not elected. They
also cannot even have team-meetings without the teamleader. Teams cannot suggest
new teamleaders, because of their fear of the teamleader and supervisor" (Sullivan
1993).
Since the introduction of teamleaders at the door-section unit is seen to be highly
problematic, the following question (31) about the "real case"was asked: When there
is a disagreement with Vauxhall policy on union representation, does the teamleader
side with the team (or team-member) or with the supervisor? 11.1 % said they sided
with the team, 29.6 % said they sided with the supervisor: 14.8 % said "the problem
hasn't come up but the they thought the teamleader would side with the team"
(hypothetical case), 22.2 % said "the problem hasn't come up but the teamleader
would side with the supervisor, and 5.6 % did not respond. The real case (29.6 %)
and the hypothetical case (22.2 %) can be combined; the majority thinks that their
teamleader would side with the supervisor. Given this gap between the two sides the
area of potential conflict could shift from stewards-supervisors to stewards-
teamleaders. This could be formulated as a hypothesis (0:
Whether or not a teamleader is appointed, the area of conflict will shift
more towards the shop floor level. 
Ideally with teamwork, more conflict avoidance or conflict resolution should take
place, because most conflicts should be resolved within a team. However, one of the
potential conflicts over the steward's ability to represent workers and resolve conflicts
is that '-'-management does not release stewards from their job" (interview: Longley
1994) in order to participate in problem-solving. Although steward's release for rep-
resentation is a provision of Vauxhall's teamwork agreement, the release for stewards
depends on the relationship between stewards and supervisothearnleader. As the
TGWU-steward Garcia (1994) noted: "If a steward can go off line to represent mem-
bers depends on the relationship between the tearnleader and the steward", which will
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also depend on issues like the shop stewards attitudes and the likeliness of his oppos-
ing management; in other words whether or not they like his attitude. The ability of
stewards to represent has now come to depend on a power relationship between su-
pervisors and teamleaders. Even though TGWU and AEEU senior stewards claim that
their stewards are able to represent union members, teamwork puts increased pressure
on stewards in terms of limiting their role and power.
6.1.4. Conclusions
Teamleaders at Vauxhall are appointed and they use a sell or test style. Teamleaders
have less loyalty to their team and more to management (hypothesis: C) because of
the means of selection. Vauxhall's teamwork is therefore a management led system.
However, unions have also been involved to inform their membership about the impli-
cations of teamwork and to ensure that it's membership voted on the issue of team-
work. Some stewards applied for a teamleaders' position and subsequently lost their
position as stewards. Because of the adversarial frame of reference that prevails at
Vauxhall, teamleaders are generally perceived as on management's side. While both
AEEU and the TGWU lost several stewards, teamwork itself did not lead to an all-out
challenge to union representation because the union secured their position, as far as
possible, by not rejecting teamwork wholesale. They rejected some initiatives and
were able to shape Vauxhall's teamwork to some extent.
While the unions succeeded in maintaining to a large degree their old representational
power, the fact that stewards do not have access to all the teams weakens their overall
position and influence and may in time lead to a weakening of the whole shop stew-
ard's system. In addition, not only are stewards disadvantaged by their smaller num-
ber, but they have to cope with an additional person who virtually replaces the role of
the supervisor under a different guise and in this case claims to represent the views of
the team. There is no doubt that the emergence of teamleaders strengthens manage-
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ment, because stewards have to deal with both supervisors and teamleaders. The rela-
tionship between stewards and teamleaders could be described as: If there is a strong
steward in an area, there will be a weak teamleader and vice-visa; however manage-
ment has succeeded in reducing the conflict to smaller units and to issues of personal
power rather than that of collective will and action.
Structurally, stewards are now in a weaker position at Vauxhall. It is not only struc-
tures that determine the outcome of control but personal relationships also have to be
taken into account. However, even when stewards are personally strong and skilful,
the structure of teamwork acts against them. Vauxhall's unions were successful in
making sure that tearnleaders and teams were seen as different, i.e. representing dif-
ferent interests by arguing for an appointment system. However the gap between
management and unions continues through the teamwork system, although it could be
argued that management's and union's adversarial relationship has now moved closer
to the shopfloor.
While teamleaders can be and still are union members, they are not able to be stew-
ards, because the latter is clearly identified with the union side. This gap between
teams and teamleaders is supported by survey result; 75 % of all team-members be-
lieve that teams will stick together "all the time"/"often"/"sometimes" against team-
leaders (question 28). Most important for the survival of an independent union repre-
sentation is the question of who are the real representatives? Teamleaders can by-pass
stewards, and team-members can go directly to teamleaders in case of problems rather
than shop stewards. However, shop stewards maintain their legitimacy and credibility
with the-workforce itself.
Unions have been successful in persuading union members to question the role of the
teamleaders; team-members are aware that as far as the union is concerned teamlead-
ers are definitely not on their side. They are clear on the issue of choosing sides, be-
cause their true representatives are stewards and not teamleaders who will tend to
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justify management positions. On the other hand, management's power is strengthened
through a combination of supervisors and teamleaders.
To conclude, the introduction of teamwork has not altered the structure of traditional
representation and it has in no way changed the adversarial frame of reference of
previous management-union relationships. Management and unions have remained in
the us vs. them position. While it could be argued that management made some at-
tempt to move unions into the direction of a pluralist frame of reference, management
attempts were seen by the union as half-hearted and authoritarian; they did not inspire
confidence or trust in the other side. Management practice did not go far enough in
order for unions to accept management's statement that it wanted industrial democ-
racy. Given that both sides were unable to move away from the old adversarial frame
of reference, the introduction of teamwork did challenge union's representation on the
shopfloor but failed to entirely dismantle it. Unions were able to ensure that stewards
continued to represent workers and that Vauxhall's teamleaders have no major repre-
sentative functions. However management has also laid a foundation of minor changes
which if taken further could evolve and eventually undermine the role of shop stew-
ards. In order to defend their different positions it seems unlikely that either manage-
ment or unions can move away from an adversarial frame of reference. From a man-
agement view an attempt was made to behave pluralistically and to set up more
democratic institutions however it seems that the style in which they did this only en-
couraged and fed the suspicious of the other side. In other words management had an
opportunity to change the IR system at Vauxhall but failed to do so even though it
failed to achieve it's secondary objective, i.e. pluralism, it gained it's primary objec-
tive, i.e,the introduction of teamwork.
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6.2. Teamwork & the Structure
of Representation at Opel
Given GM's American teamwork experience, the question for Opel's management ac-
cording to Turner (1991:125) was how to transform a traditional plant into something
approximating to the NUMMI-model without closing the plant. Since management
and works councils were legally obliged to behave within a pluralist frame of refer-
ence, GM's demand for change was a challenge to both. By mid-1985 discussions on
teamwork became increasingly important and this resulted in a production groups
concept.
Although GM's operations world-wide are headed by GME, according to Opel's
teamwork-manager Hildmann (1993): "GME did not defme our policy on teamwork
because they felt this would destroy creativity and narrow our options". Again crucial
for Opel's works council and for management was the selection of teamspeakers.
Since GME did not interfere, Opel's management had a choice of electing teamspeak-
ers or appointing teamleaders. Because of their legal position the works council was
in a strong bargaining position to influence this discussion. According to Opel's
teamwork-manager Hildmann (1993), it was the works council which made "the in-
troduction of teamwork conditional on the election of teamspeakers".
Opel's tradition of pluralism, integrative bargaining and industrial democracy in
management-works council relations, GME's non-interference policy, and the works
council's relatively strong bargaining power on work organisation helped to create the
policies--and practices that affected the introduction of teamwork. Eventually after
some negotiating Opel's teamwork-manager Hildrnann (1993) "agreed to the election
of teamspeakers", so that teams could elect their leaders (Shire 1991:11). This created
a workgroup unit with a leader and some degree of coherence. Opel's teamleaders
were not imposed by supervisors or management. Management and the works council
were interested in creating a good relationship between teams and middle manage-
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ment. Opel's teamspeakers were not intended to lead their teams, but to improve links
between supervisors and teams, and general communications down the chain of com-
mand.
6.2.1. Teams,
Teamwork and Leadership
Both Opel's management and the works council saw teams as the core element of
QNPS. Organising workers into teams under QNPS's was designed to be different
from just working on the assembly line. Although teams are called Fertigungsgruppen
(production teams), Katzenbach & Smith, Kirsch (1993) and even IGM's literature
(1991) on teams seriously suggests that, according to their own definition, real teams
do not exist at Opel (cf. chapter 2.1.1.). In contrast to the old supervisor-worker
structure, where the supervisor is set apart as a leader, teamleadership is not so de-
fmed, nevertheless leadership is not shared (ICatzenbach & Smith 1993). For example,
individual workers are given a small ink stamp to sign each card on a car to testify
that only quality products leave a team area. That workers (not a team) are individu-
ally accountable for this, indicates the existence of a workgroup which is working co-
operatively according to some cohesive plan. Since each worker assembles an individ-
ual part, the Taylorist fragmentation of work tasks still prevails under the new team-
work system at Opel. According to Kirsch (1993), Opel's teamwork might better be
called Arbeit im Raumverband or working in a loose group which has a loose internal
structure (chapter 2.1.1). According to IGM's Reform 2000 (1991:57), teamwork is
defined-as a group of workers who not only produce a complete product, but also
check it's function and quality; Opel's teams neither build a complete product, nor do
they run quality checks. In contrast to workgroups, however, teams participate in ac-
tive problem-solving through open discussions during team-meetings. Opel's overall
performance and reward system is not linked to teamwork. Even though auditing (a
review of a complete car for quality problem-solving) is introduced on certain sec-
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tions, team performance is not collectively assessed. According to 1Catzenbach &
Smith's definition of groups and teams, Opel's teamwork concept lies somewhere
between a workgroup and a team.
Opel's teamspeakers are part of the team on whose behalf they speak (for Smith et al.
(1984:176) they consult or join) so they neither make decisions themselves (tell or
sell) nor perform as an authoritarian (cf. White & Lippitt 1960) figure (test). Team-
speakers still tend to defme the situation and possible course of action and then con-
sult their subordinates for comments and opinions. Opel's teamspeakers are not able
to by-pass team-members or to act against their opinions or decisions. Opel's team-
speakers need to consult a team, because s/he depends on the team that elects him, so
teamspeakers tend towards a participative style. The tearnspeaker and team-members
jointly review the situation and reach a decision on appropriate action. Even though in
some rare cases newly appointed teamspeakers tried to take over a supervisor's re-
sponsibilities, the middle-management, the works council and the teams ensured that
their functions remain within BV 179. While the very existence of teamwork at Opel
measured by Katzenbach & Smith's and Kirsch's definitions can seriously be ques-
tioned, a leadership style analysis clearly demonstrates the participative role of team-
speakers.
6.2.2. The Works Council and the
Introduction of Teamwork
With the- introduction of teamwork at a traditional motor-car plant, a new level of su-
pervision or representation emerges, i.e. tearnspeakers. The shape of teamwork is
again largely defined by the existing structure of representation in such a plant. At
Opel then, both management and the works council recognised differences in interests
but an attempt was made to mediate these differences by setting up structures for par-
ticipation within an integrative bargaining approach; unlike the adversarial model
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(cf. Vauxhall) or the unitarist model (cf. Toyota) which dominates and attempt to ex-
clude unions and workers' representatives.
Opel's IGM structure of representation demonstrates this dualist system; it is made up
of workplace representatives (VPs) and the works council (BR). Workplace represen-
tatives and works councils are part of a long tradition of management-BR/VP co-
operation. Some IGM's workplace representatives operate on the edge of the adver-
sarial frame of reference as an unofficial paint-shop strike showed. While this indus-
trial action was in response to a conflict of interests with management, workplace rep-
resentatives reacted by moving towards an adversarial frame of reference. However,
as a result of this industrial action, works council and management re-negotiated the
issue and managed to reach a settlement. Opel's works council was able to use work-
place representatives operating outside the pluralist frame of reference to put pres-
sure on management to negotiate. So while the works council's role is to mediate, it
sometimes draws strength from the workplace representatives who operate on a more
adversarial model.
One additional institution of industrial democracy is Opel's economic committee
(Wirtschaftsausschup, i.e. a management-works council joint committee on Opel's
business affairs; at Riisselsheim works council-members and management discuss is-
sues particularly connected with the business strategy of the company. During a
meeting of the economic committee on GM's business strategy for the 1990s, QNPS
were discussed and Opel's works council was informed about management's plan for
teamwork long before it was implemented.
Opel's works council demanded a general framework agreement covering
Riisselsheim, Bochum and ICaiserslautem. Already in the 1970s as part of a govern-
ment initiated scheme for Humanisation of work, teamwork was promoted by Opel's
works council, but was received with little interest on the part of management. Nego-
tiation for an agreement became a central issue for management and the works council
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in 1989. The BV 179 agreement was reached by April 1991 when Opel's group-works
council and management formally agreed to introduce teamwork. Given the relation-
ship between Opel's works council and the IGM, and IGM's demand that if teamwork
was introduced an agreement between works councils and management had to be
achieved (IGM-Reform 1991:58), Opel's works council secured its position via IGM
by obtaining a democratic teamwork agreement. The demand by IGM, Opel's works
council and management for a teamwork-agreement shows the importance of the plu-
ralist frame of reference for all three players. It also demonstrated the BR's willing-
ness to co-operate with management in that it supported management's demand for
teamwork. Management and works council were almost obliged to agree on the issue
of teamwork; although the main decision came from the works council, management
however still had to face opposition from middle-management (supervisors, etc.). For
management the goal was greater efficiency and productivity for the works council
and workplace representatives the aim was a humanisation of work. The goals were
different for both but both felt that they were able to achieve some of these goals
through agreement.
Section 90 of the German works constitution (BetrVG) demands that Opel's works
council has the right to be informed about the introduction of a new production proc-
ess. Teamwork involved a wide range of legal provisions in the BetrVG; Hunold
(1993:6) has listed a number of regulations regarding the introduction of Opel's
teamwork and lean production (QNPS):
Table 6.5.: Teamwork and BetrVG
rSection:' Area of Requlationr"""
90: change In production and workplaces,
92: personnel planning and personnel development,
106: business affairs,
111: change In production organisation, methods and process technokKly
87, no.1: business organisation,
87, no.10: introduction of new wage structures,
91: humanisation of work,
98: training,
99: personnel related outsourcing, employment in teams,
111: social plan.
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According to sec. 81 BetrVG, information about the introduction of teamwork had to
be given so that works councils could discuss the issues proposed by management.
The general organisation of a company (Ordnung des Betriebes) is an issue for Sec.
87 BetrVG and management's plan for a team design, teamspeaker, team-meetings
and project teams are aspects that apply directly to this section. With the introduction
of teamwork schemes for suggestions (Kaizen) and since Kaizen is part of GMs
QNPS, such suggestion schemes were asked for in sec. 87 BetrVG. Since teams also
were able to create a certain amount of flexibility over work time (Sec. 87 BetrVG),
Opel's works council has to be involved regarding issues such as the commencement
and ending of work time and holiday planning.
Before teamwork was introduced, Opel had changed the wage structure to narrow the
wage grades; it demanded that an allowance for teamspeakers should be introduced.
Since teamspeakers are rewarded differently from ordinary team-members (Sec. 87
BetrVG), Opel's works council again was concerned as it regulates works councils'
participation in issues like wages; wage structures are negotiated between union and
management representatives on a regional and sectional basis (chapter 5.2.). GM's
management offered a very small wage increase = 30 pence per hour to teamspeakers
and since then unions have not demanded a wage increase for teamspeakers on a col-
lective bargaining basis as the union supports the principle of equal pay for all team-
members including the teamspeakers.
Personnel planning again is directly related to a works council's legal right to partici-
pate and some aspects of teamwork relate to Sec. 92 BetrVG (personnel planning); in
the case of team size, staffmg, team design, etc. The staffmg of teams is an important
issue because if new teams are made up of new workers and management wants ex-
ternal applications, then works councils can according to Sec. 93 BetrVG demand
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that, in the first instance, internal applications must be considered. No applicants
however were considered because the agreement regulating that teams were to be or-
ganised along existing sections of production determined that the teamspeaker had to
come from within a team. Whenever management assessed workers for new positions
(cf. teamspeakers), works councils needed to agree on the assessment regulations
(Hunold 1993:30). Whenever these assessments were used at job interviews, works
councils could attend assessment seminars as observers. Opel ultimately did not use
an assessment scheme for teamspeakers and team-members, because teamwork was
introduced at a brown-field site with existing workers. Much use however was made
of Opel's training scheme for tearnspeakers, because the works councils were able to
participate in the design of these courses.
Sec. 111 BetrVG demands that information has to be given to the works councils if
basic production design is reorganised. "According to Womack et al., lean production
is a second revolution in production and can lead to changes in basic production de-
sign" (HunoId 1993:13) therefore, the works council has to be consulted during the
introduction of QNPS. One element of QNPS is SOS. While these are areas in which
Opel's works council can participate, internal work distribution within a team is not an
item that needs agreement between management and workers because team-members
can organise internal work distribution among themselves. Therefore Opel's works
council does not have any legal right to participate (Hunold 1993:20). Works councils
are involved when ICaizen activities of a team result in changes in the workplace. Ac-
cording to sec. 91 BetrVG (human design of workplaces), the law requires that the
newest available standards for the design of a workplace for teamwork has to be used.
Besides the legal requirements, IGM formulated 12 main principles for the introduc-
tion of teamwork, which provided guidelines for works councils and workplace repre-
sentatives. These guidelines were (Roth et al. 1988, 1992):
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Table 6.6.: IGM's Guidelines and Arrnlication
''•''' 1GM's Principles: Application at Opel:
(1) a broad assignment of varying tasks for the group
(including long cycie times);
Opel's BR did not reach an agreement to assign tasks to
a team, nor for an extension of cycle time.
(2) group competence In decision making In: job rotation,
division of the work, quality control, and training needs;
Opel's agreement allows teams to rotate, etc., but teams
at Opel cannot decide their training needs.
(3) decentralisation of the plant decision-making struc-
tura;
With the agreement, decision-maldng was transferred
from supervisor to teams
(4) selection of production organisation and technology
suitable for group work (based on decentralised technoi-
ow and production concepts);
Opel's management reversed this by re-organising
cockpit and door production from box manufacturing
back to line manufacturing.
(5) equal pay for group members; Payment is still according to different wage levels.
(6) equal opportunity for all, Including special training
where necessary for the disabled and the socially disad-
vantaged, to participate in groupwork (as torldadstic"
work organisation);
Although BR's were able to ensure the position of dis-
abled and disadvantaged in its agreement, In practice
however disabled and disadvantages workers were not
only made redundant through the separation program,
but were also made to leave assembly teams.
(7) support for the personal and occupational develop-
ment of Individuals and the group;
Opel's agreement included training schemes for team-
speaker.
(8) regular group meetings, at least one hour per week; BR's successfully negotiated regular team-meetings on a
weeldy basis (1 h).
(9) representation of group Interests within the estab-
lished plant system of representation;
Although IGM's guidelines do not demand as election
system for tearnspeaker, BR's achieved that in the
agreement and in practice.
(10) voluntary participation in the groups; Although the agreement notes IGM's demand, it was not
Implemented.
(11) pilot projects to test the functioning of group work
before broader Implementation;
Opers BR negotiated pilot projects and monitored them.
(12) a joint steering committee at the fimi level, with
equal labour and management representation, to oversee
and co-ordinate the implementation of group work and
the activities of groups"
Such a joint management-BR committee was set up and
meets regularly every two weeks to discuss develop-
manta.
While Opel's works council failed to negotiate a re-organisation of production on a
more human basis with a longer cycle time, the works council managed to give teams
autonomy over their own work assignments Opel's teams can be measured on the
Gulowsen scale (1979) of team-autonomy (chapter: 2.1.11):
Table 6.7.: Team Autonomy at Onel
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Team-members did have an input in their day to day working lives and as a result the
supervisory role was reduced. However, Opel's works council was not able to extend
the team based box-manufacturing in the cockpit and door-section to other areas of
production (cf. Schonberger 1982). In fact, the reverse happened, in both areas box-
manufacturing was abolished and moved back to line-manufacturing. The failure of
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Opel's works council to achieve longer cycle time and box-manufacturing demon-
strates the significant limitations of the bargaining power of Opel's works council once
issues have left the area of social affairs.
A decision on the selection system for teamspeakers was connected with the area of
personnel affairs, and therefore in this area works councils, could exercise it's influ-
ence. Opel's works council convinced management to introduce elections, even
though IGM's guidelines did not demand either training programmes for the work-
force or the election of teamspeakers. Although Opel's works council was less suc-
cessful in negotiating training, it did negotiate considerable time off for team-
meetings. Equally successful was the introduction and monitoring of pilot projects and
the creation of a joint committee to oversee teamwork (Shire 1991:7). On February 5
1993, the works council's committee on teamwork organised a meeting of all area-
works council-members to assess the development of teamwork and to discuss the
affects on union representation. Although this meeting was organised by Opel's works
council many managers of the joint committee were invited. This only one example of
the high-trust relationship between management and works council.
In summary, although Opel's works council was unsuccessful in influencing discus-
sions and decisions on production related matters, it was very successful in personnel
and social matters. Team-members were able to elect their teamspeakers without in-
terference from management, supervisors or middle-management.
6.2.3. Teamspeakers,
Teams and Representation
Opel's management and the works council agreed to give teams the maximum input
on the decision on the selection of tearnspeakers they were willing to create an addi-
tional player on the shopfloor. This could be formulated in the hypothesis (a):
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Whether or not a teamleader is elected or appointed, a teamleader will be
a new player within participation (industrial democracy) on the shopfloor.
Opel's teams do have a clear say on these issues because they elect teamleaders; a new
player is introduced who has a basis of legitimacy through a democratic election. The
question of how teamspeakers represent workers is more connected with their work-
ing situation; if they are a working member of a team, they are team-members with the
function of a speaker. In contrast, if they are likely to be not a working member of a
team, they are more disconnected and become more distant from their teams. As
works council-member Reitinger (1993) at fmal assembly put it: "Teamspeakers
should not be taken off the assembly line, otherwise s/he may become another form of
supervisor, the question also arises who will cover her/his work?"
Works council-members on fmal assembly particularly oppose the notion of a team-
speaker who is disconnected from his/her team; Opel's BV 179 demands that team-
speakers are active players (i.e. working team-members) and works council-members
support this. Given that Opel's final assembly is almost completely unionised, team-
speakers who are also union members, need to be working members of a team so that
there is no distance between team-members and their speaker.
The survey question (appendix D, question: 27): Is the VP/works council a source of
arguments or disagreements between the team and teamleader? was asked. Only 8 %
said yes and 84 % said that the works council/workplace representative was not a
source of conflict between team-members and speakers. Given the specification in BY
179, workers do not see any difference between themselves and the speakers. Given
this, no-gap between team-members and their teamspeakers can be detected. Respon-
dents also replied to the question (28): If yes, when there are disagreements with your
teamspeaker over the VP/works council, how often does your team stick together and
challenge the teamleader? 75 % of them said they either never or only sometimes
stick together to challenge their speaker. Team-members do not feel a need to stick
together against their speakers because solidarity exists with the teamspeaker; team-
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work, then, has created a significant degree of cohesion between teams and speakers.
Team-members accept their teamspealcers are not a new form of supervisor and that
teamspeakers do represent the interest of the team.
Since teamspeakers are elected by teams, workplace representatives are elected by
their workgroup, and works council-members are elected by all Opel-workers, an-
other question arises, which can be formulated in hypothesis (b):
Whether or not a teamleader is appointed or elected, s/he will be a team
and working area representative. Therefore an elected or appointed
teamleader may get into conflict with a workplace representatives and/or
an elected works council-member on the issue of: Who does represent?
As a team-member, a worker, and a union-member, each worker votes for three dif-
ferent people at three different levels, that is her/his team (= teamspeaker), her/his
working area (= workplace representative) and her/his plant (= works council). Opel's
works council has a relatively high degree of bargaining power but is also distant from
workers because of the provisions of the BetrVG that regulate the ratio between
workers and works council-members. All workers at Opel's plant elect the works
council based on the lists drawn up by unions. Works council elections are held plant-
wide and even if a works council-member is assigned to an area, s/he does not have a
constituency. However, it is obviously important in terms of representation for works
council-members to be known, even though workers in their area do not elect them
directly (cf. proportional representation), they often recognise their name on a union
list. On the basis of the election results of Opel's latest works council's election, IGM
currently has 43 out of the 45 works council-members. As one area works council-
member represents about 750 workers, the most powerful person to represent a
worker is at the same time the most distant. Closer to the worker on the shopfloor are
the workplace representatives who are elected as union representatives. As union
membership at final assembly is well above 95 %, almost all workers elect their
workplace representative in their working area. On average one workplace represen-
tative represents 19 union members at final assembly line; throughout Opel the size of
a constituency is 25 (appendix P6). Not only the size of the union constituency varies
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between final assembly and the rest of Opel's operation, the team size also varies be-
tween 13 team-members on average and six to eight at final assembly. This has a
number of advantages for workers; they are able to communicate directly and imme-
diately with their workplace representatives. Given this relative closeness to their
members, workplace representatives are often the contact person between works
councils and workers. However a teamspeaker is closer than a workplace representa-
tive to the workers; Opel's teams final assembly are about 1/2 the size of a workplace
representative's constituency.
Unlike the case of teamspeakers, procedures for the election of works councils and
workplace representatives are clear; they are held by a secret ballot. According to
works council-member Franz (1993b) "some teamspeakers were already re-elected
without have team-meetings", despite the fact that elections should take place during
team-meetings. In some "cases on the line, teamspeakers were elected according to
nationality" (Wink 1993), which has proved a problem given the mixture of nationali-
ties on Opel's assembly line because it fosters conflicts among team-members and
teamspeakers with different nationalities.
On the Omega-production line approximately 30 % of workplace representatives were
elected as teamspeakers (interview: Seib 1993), the plant-wide figure lays between
10% and 15%. The VP-committee saw this result as the failure of the VP-convenor's
work. In the following elections for the VP-convenor he was not re-elected. Accord-
ing to the new VP-convenor Ziegler (1993), the results of teamspeakers' re-elections
in 1992 and 1993 did not change the number of workplace representatives elected; it
stayed the same. According to Ziegler (1993), the current number of workplace rep-
resentatives (1,000) cannot be increased to the level of tcamspcaker (2,500) because
of the unmanageable number of teamspeakers. Given that ratio, one workplace repre-
sentative may have to cover 2.5 teams, which also means that approximately 1.5
teams do not have a direct form of union representation. At one workplace represen-
tative meeting, for example, held on the Omega-line (shift B) on 28. January 1993,
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two out of the 10 workplace representatives were teamspeakers at the same time.
While the current VP-convenor accepts that ratio, his predecessor Wink (1993) ex-
plained:
wOrkplace > representatives do not get elected as teamspeakers, such
rteamspeakers should be made workplace representatives. One Of the
reasons for i workplace representative not getting elected as a team-1
speaker lies probably in the fact that the workplace representative just
passes on information to the workers.: Hence, the workplace representa-
tive worked more from the works council down to the workers instead of
the reverse'. 
However, before the first elections took place, Meisters made it clear that they ex-
pected only workplace representatives would be elected as teamspeakers (interview:
Hildmann 1993). Also, BR-member Franz (1990:5) predicted that ideally, the team-
speaker and the workplace representative should be the same person. The result of
having only 10-15 % workplace representatives elected as teamspeakers raised seri-
ous questions about the quality of a workplace representatives' work.
The number of Opel's workplace representatives is linked to the number of Meisters
and while VP-convener Ziegler argues to keep that at the same level, BR-member
Wink argues for an extension of the number of workplace representatives to the level
of teamspeakers, which would result in approximately 2,500 workplace representa-
tives. In the future, according to the prediction of Opel's teamwork-manager Hild-
mann (1993) a Meister will be a co-ordinator of four to five teams in his area and act
as a link between shopfloor and management. On average about one workplace repre-
sentative is in a Meister-area and with the introduction of teamwork the number of
Meisters remained roughly the same. The ratio between Meisters and workplace rep-
resentatives has not change dramatically between 1991 and 1994. However this may
change as Meisters' areas become larger. A workplace representatives has a particular
role in representing different opinions within a team, whereas the teamspeaker repre-
sents a team view. While a workplace representative not only has to deal with differ-
ent opinions among union members in her/his area, s/he may also face dealing with
differences between teams. Before teamwork arrived differences between union mm-
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bers were largely dealt with on an individual basis, now different opinions can be ex-
pressed by different teams.
As team-meetings are not seen as an appropriate forum for union discussions; man-
agement at Opel's feared that local labour representatives would fill-up team-meeting
times with discussions about union negotiations and other political issues (Shire
1991:11). In reality this did not happen because teamspeakers were in control of the
agenda of team-meetings. Again as most teams do not have a workplace representa-
tive as teamspeaker, or even a workplace representative as a team-member, union
opinion is not present at all. According to works council-member Seib (1993), "this
creates a mode of excluding union representation". It might be argued that a work-
place representative in the role of a teamspeaker could influence and better represent
a team. According to works council-member Witte (1993) workplace representatives
should not be teamspeakers, because team-members would see them as disconnected
from the team. They would no longer work on the assembly line if they incorporated
both roles; this would lead to a gap between workers and their representatives. While
workplace representatives have in some cases become teamspeakers, works council-
members are unlikely to run as a candidate for teamspeakers' election; works council-
members are excluded because they have a full-time position and they are not a mem-
ber of a team.
At the time of the introduction of teamwork, the DGB's education institution (A rbeit
und Leben) organised workshops on New Management Culture in Riisselsheim to
discuss lean production, Opel's QNPS, teamwork and the role of teamspealcers. At
these workshops, workplace representatives and works council-members openly dis-
cussed the question: Would it be appropriate for the workplace representative or the
teamspeaker to represent workers?
Two years after BY 179 was signed, team-members at final assembly were asked
(question: 25): What do you think about your teamspeaker's position in relationship
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to the works council/workplace representative? 42 % saw their teamspeaker's posi-
tion in relationship to the works council/workplace representatives as about right, but
surprisingly 40 % ticked the no response box. When asked (question: 26): What pro-
portion of members of your team would agree with your assessment? they answered
that they thought 80 % of their fellow team-members would agree to the statement
that the relationship between teamspeakers and works council/workplace representa-
tives is about right. It seems that teamspeakers are not seen as an anti-union force at
Opel and management did not attempt to set up structures to by-pass union work-
place representatives. Teamspeakers are not an additional structure of union represen-
tation, even though they seem to act as an additional and supportive channel of com-
munication. One of the crucial points of representation, either through workplace rep-
resentatives or works council-members, is the first contact between a worker, a union
member or a team-member and the person who represents them. To the question (23):
If you thought that you or someone on your team was being subjected to some form
of on-the-job harassment or unfair treatment, whom would you most likely turn to get
something done? almost 50 % said they would go to their teamspeaker, 22 % named
their workplace representative, 24 % said their works council-member, only 6 %
wanted to go to supervisors, 2 % said the personnel department. Teamspeakers are
clearly seen as representative for work related problems, even though, put together,
workplace representatives and the works council obtained 46 % of the votes. Team-
speakers are clearly not seen as part of a management-dominated structure of repre-
sentation designed to by-pass union or works council representation. In the words of
Opel's VP-convenor Ziegler (1993): "Teamspeakers and workplace representatives
work together". Since a teamspeaker is closely linked to a team, s/he not only repre-
sents the view of a team, but also depends directly on their backing through elections;
teamspeakers then, supporv4he overall structure of representation at Opel.
Crucial to the question of representation is which side would a teamspeaker take in
the case of a conflict between management's interest and worker's interest. Hence,
team-members were asked (question: 31): When there is a disagreement with Opel's
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policy on the works council/VP, does the teamspeaker side with the team (or team-
member) or with the supervisor? 21.6 % said that the teamspeaker would side with
the team and 17,6 % saw their teamspeaker siding with the supervisor. However, as
the problem had not occurred so far, 49 % of the team-members said that the problem
had not arisen and if it would arise (question 31), the teamleader would side with the
team; only 11.8 % saw them identifying with their supervisor, if a problem did occur.
These differences too may be because there are differences in the allegiances of indi-
vidual teamspeakers. On the whole team-members see their speakers as very much
part of their team, i.e. one of us and see the supervisor as an outsider.
Given the close co-operation between team-members and teamspeakers, Opel's team-
speakers can be seen within the teamspeaker joins category (Smith et al. 1984:176),
i.e. they seem totally committed to a participative style. Even Opel's production man-
ager views teamspeakers in that way: "The team at Riisselsheim elects a teamspeaker,
who is neither a supervisor nor a superior" (Enderle 1991). Opel's teamspeakers are
not a source of a new form of management control, they are rather a cohesive team-
member with speaker functions.
One of the common expectations is that, with teamwork, conflicts will not only ap-
pear on the shopfloor, but that they may also be addressed in team-meetings before
reaching the stage of workplace representatives, works councils, and personnel de-
partments. Such an expectation can be expressed in the following hypothesis (t):
Whether or not a teamleader/speaker is appointed or elected, the area of
conflict may shift more towards the shop floor level.
Since almost half of the team-members stated that they would go to their workplace
representative or their area-BR-member in the case of problems, conflicts, it seems,
are still solved within the traditional structure of representation. However, the other
half of the team-members mentioned the teamspeaker as the person to consult; work-
place representatives themselves seems to view the introduction of teamspeakers as
helpful because minor problems can be solved at either the team level, through team-
221
meetings or face-to-face as the teamspealcers are elected and accountable. Workplace
representatives feel that this is some assistance to their work of representing union
members. Given the results of the survey and the case study, tearnspeakers seemed to
support works council's and workplace representatives' role.
6.2.4. Conclusions
Traditionally, German car plants have an lR system operating a balanced works
council-management relationship which operates like Walton and McKersie's (1965)
integrative bargaining model for in-plant bargaining. This includes a union based
workplace representative system. As works councils are based on the principles es-
tablished on BetrVG, they have traditionally operated within a pluralist frame of ref-
erence. In addition, Opel's workplace representatives can also be seen as part of this
pluralist frame of reference. Despite this general picture, not all issues are approached
in this way. Management and workplace representatives sometimes operate within
both a pluralistic and an adversarial frame of reference, as the paint-shop strike dem-
onstrates; when management cancelled a BY workplace representatives reacted with a
strike. Opel's works council was able to move management and workplace represen-
tatives back into a pluralist frame of reference so that negotiations took place and a
solution was found. Equally the workplace representatives were able to exert influ-
ence both on Opel's works council and management to address their grievances.
In BV 179 Opel labelled it's teams production teams; the main purpose of introducing
teams was a new organisational form in production areas. Katzenbach & Smith
(1991), Kirsch (1993) and IGM however seriously challenge the use of Opel's label
teams. Opel's teams according to their definition are not teams, they have some char-
acteristics of a team but are more like workgroups. Opel strongly claims to have in-
troduced a team-concept but they are little more than workgroups with elected team-
speakers. On the one hand the BetrVG gives Opel's works council significant influ-
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ence over personnel issues (cf. teamwork); on the other hand it showed significant
limitations on the works council's bargaining power particularly once issues have left
the area of personnel affairs. An example of this limitation is the inability of the works
council to influence Opel's management on production issues; Opel's box-production
was moved back to a line system despite IGM arguments for a humanisation of work.
In contrast to this, Opel's works council was able to ensure that teams have a clear
input in selecting their teamspeaker, this resulted in a close link between teamspeakers
and teams.
As a team-member, a worker and a union-member, each worker votes for three differ-
ent people at three different levels; at team level, at the level of her/his work area, and
at plant level. Teamwork is a phenomena that affects works council much less than
workplace representatives who work on the shopfloor. Although works councils,
workplace representatives, and management expected that workplace representatives
would be elected as teamspeakers, the election results were devastating for Opel's
union representation; only 10 % to 15 % of the workplace representatives were
elected as teamspeakers which reflects the way that workers viewed their workplace
representatives. However, this did not result in a conflict of representation between
teamspeaker and workplace representatives because teamspeakers are clearly seen as
representative for a range of work related problems. Consequently team-members,
because they elect their teamspeaker, see her/him as much as a representative of their
concerns as they see works councils and workplace representatives. Team-members
see their speakers very much as being one of them; they see supervisors, on the other
hand, as outsiders and workers do not identify with them. Opel's works council was
successful in installing an additional level of workers' representation. Since team-
speakers are also union members and part of the team in this system, they do not form
a new supervisory group because their legitimacy is based on an election by team-
members.
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To conclude, Opel's works council and management was successful in introducing a
team-concept which supports representation by adding a third level of representation
via tearnspeakers. Even though IGM failed to get it's workplace representatives
elected for teamspeakers, new teamspeakers did not act as a force against team-
members or union workplace representatives. Several aspects ensure the link between
teamspeaker and team-members; most crucial is the team-based election of team-
speakers. By setting up a democratic team structure as regulated in BV 179. Opel's
team-concept is not seen as a threat to traditional forms of representation, but sup-
plements Opel's dual structure of representation. The pluralist IR system at Opel with
its system of weights and balances has not been affected by the introduction of team-
work. The confidence felt by workers in their teamspeakers has increased rather than
decreased their sense of participation; they feel that the structure of representation is
now closer to the shopfloor. However while the introduction of teamwork has not
undermined a pluralist approach based on legal requirements it has had some implica-
tions for the work based union layer of M.
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6.3. Comparative Conclusions
Opel and Vauxhall, both GM subsidiaries introduced teamwork in 1992 into their re-
spective national IR systems. Both team-concepts have been compared in two differ-
ent plants, in the context of two different countries and in the context of two different
IR systems; there are some similarities between the two teamwork systems but also as
many divergences largely because of their traditional IR systems; one essentially ad-
versarial in approach (Vauxhall) and the other pluralistic (Opel).
By focusing on important points of comparison between the two plants it is possible
to illuminate the central research question: To what extent and in what ways does the
institutional context affect the transition from a traditional system of representation
to teamwork and how does this affect the general structure of representation? To
analyse whether or not there are real teams operating in Vauxhall and Opel it has also
been necessary to apply the same criteria to both and to examine similarities and di-
vergences within different IR contexts. Both systems have very different ways of or-
ganising workers' representation and it has been necessary to see how the introduction
of teamwork has affected these systems to examine whether or not traditional repre-
sentational forms have been changed.
6.3.1. Teams,
Teamwork and Leadership
Teams at Opel and Vauxhall are similar in size. Opel's teams have between five to fif-
teen members and Vauxhal 's teams have eight to fifteen. Since team-members in both
plants do not need to communicate with each other to carry out their production task,
i.e. within a Fordist/Taylorist context, they are working in Arbeit im Raumverband
(Kirsch 1993:19) with a loose internal structure, i.e. they are groups rather than teams
(Katzenbach & Smith 1993). While their membership size is approximately the same
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in both plants, they differ fundamentally in their leadership and leadership style. While
Opel's teams have a teamspeaker whose team identifies with them, Vauxhall's teams
have teamleaders, i.e. team-members do not identify with their teamleader. Opel's
teamspeakers use a participative leadership style, teamspealcer joins; Vauxhall's team-
leaders are much more likely to adapt a teamleader tells style. While Opel's team-
speakers are seen as part of the team, Vauxhall's teamleaders are appointed and this
seems to determine the style of their leadership. Besides the issue of different leader-
ship styles, teams in both plants are given a certain degree of autonomy although this
is marginally greater at Opel particularly in terms of influencing the production proc-
ess on the shopfloor. Applying Gulowsen's scale ( 1979) the difference is clear:
Table 6.8.: Autonomy at Vauxhall VA and Opel (OP
no participation participation co-decision-maldng autonomy
, teamleader selection x, , VA OP
new members In teams VA and OP
distribution of wort VA and OP
lime flexibility VA and OP •
acceptance of additional work OP VA
representation outside a team OP VA
methods of production VA OP
production goals (output) VA and OP
production goals (quality) VA OP
Vauxhall's and Opel's teams are both allowed a significant input on internal work dis-
tribution and on methods of production. However the degree of real autonomy for
both is small with the one exception that of elected teamspeakers at Opel.
6.3.2. Representation
and the Introduction of Teamwork
The introduction of teamwork with a 5 % wage increase at Vauxhall and with no
wage increase at Opel to some degree indicates the essential differences in both sys-
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tems. In the former case management saw the workforce as needing a financial incen-
tive to establish a management led teamwork system; the pay increase helped to
counter union opposition and to persuade the workforce. In Opel's pluralistic system
the process could be handled more democratically and co-operatively using Walton
and McKersie's (1965) integrative bargaining model without financial incentives and
with much less threat to a representative system in which different powers are dis-
tributed between workplace representatives; Blockies and the works council.
Opel's lR has a dual structure; issues such as teamwork were introduced at plant level,
while issues such as wage bargaining are left to regional and sectorial collective bar-
gaining between IGM and the employers federation. While works councils and man-
agement negotiate on plant-level (integrative bargaining), unions and employer rep-
resentatives act on a sectorial & regional level (distributive bargaining). Therefore,
Opel's teamwork could not be linked to a wage increase, unless the IGM had negoti-
ated for this; significantly the union did not link the introduction of teamwork and
wages even though teamspeakers were offered some financial reward for their new
responsibilities.
While IGM is the dominant union at Opel and other unions are marginalised, Vauxhall
has two main unions (AEEU and TGWU). Opel's introduction of teamwork was ne-
gotiated between the works council and management almost without consultation
with the IGM; at Vauxhall, unions were the main players • and direct consultation with
TGWU and AEEU representatives took place. One of the striking differences be-
tween Vauxhall and Opel is that a vote was taken on the agreement by all union mem-
bers at Vauxhall, while Opel's agreement was signed by the works council and man-
agement without any vote by workers, i.e. an adversarial system saw the need to use
a democratic strategy in order to take the workforce with it (having, of course put
forward a fmancial incentive) while the more pluralist system operated through it's
existing more democratic institutions to gain acceptance. Since workers, not IGM-
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members, elect Opel's works council, BV did not need workers' direct approval via
voting, such agreements are then legally binding on and apply directly to all workers.
With the agreements, both plants introduced an institutionalised forms of IR (i.e. in
terms of joint steering committees), Vauxhall's JPC and Opel's Lenkungsausschufl.
Although both committees were designed to support the introduction of teamwork,
Opel's committee survived because of the long established participatory relationship
between management and the works council that already existed as part of the plural-
ist approach. The Lenkungsausschuft was seen as a continuation, that is, part of an
on-going process of workers management relationships; management and works
council met on a regular basis and therefore chose the integrative bargaining-option
of mediation and negotiation.
Because Vauxhall's unions did not have any form of regular meeting with management
before teamwork and as there was no ethos of co-operation, both sides preferred to
negotiate issues on an ad hoc basis without any institutionalised form, i.e. they acted
in a non-institutionalised and adversarial fashion as in the past. Furthermore, Vaux-
hall's unions soon left the JPC over conflicts with management on out-sourcing. Man-
agement's attempt to move unions from an adversarial towards a pluralist frame of
reference failed partly because the union was used to the traditional system and
trusted it. Management also failed to create confidence in a new approach. Manage-
ment's attitude to the JPC was felt by the workforce to be the same as in previous
JCC's, i.e. a means of imposing management decisions. Unions, then, continued to
reject any notion of being incorporated into management's agenda. During the 1990s,
Vauxhall's unions experienced themselves in a disadvantaged position because of the
recession and other external political factors and feared further erosion of their power
through new management strategies. In short, Vauxhall's lR showed an adversarial
pattern before teamwork, because management and unions saw each other as oppos-
ing players, and they continued to act adversarially during and after the introduction
of teamwork. Both sides might also be described as anti-incorporate, because man-
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agement wanted to incorporate unions into their goals and unions feared incorpora-
tion would destroy their own interests.
Incorporation was a more important issue with the type of low-trust IR at Vauxhall
where the survival of workers' representation depended on an independent union
body (institutional stability); at Opel the works council is guaranteed by the BetrVG
law and worker's representation is institutionalised (institutional stability by law).
Consequently, Vauxhall's adversarial frame of reference and Opel's pluralist frame of
reference determined not only the process of introducing teamwork, but also the ef-
fectiveness of the JPC and the Lenkungsausschufl. Opel's works council and Vaux-
hall's unions negotiated directly with management over the issue of teamwork. The
former in a much less suspicious manner because it was more confident of it's influ-
ence; the latter tentatively and negatively because they distrusted management's ex-
pression of pluralism (low-trust).
Both unions, however (IGM and TGWU) did get involved in the process of introduc-
ing teamwork by issuing recommendations to their shopfloor representatives on how
to deal with the new situation. While IGM focused on organisational issues seeing
teamwork as primarily an organisational and production issue, TGWU focused on in-
dustrial relations, i.e. the most important issue for it was the general state of IR and
the survival of worker's representatives. The TGWU emphasised the role of the union
and stewards as important, while IGM saw teamwork as a more neutral issue. Both
unions recommendations can be compared. It is interesting to note how the TGWU
strategy for introducing tearnleaders was implemented in Vauxhall but also how this
compared with activities at Opel:
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Table 6.9.: Strategies and Activities
TGWU Strategy Activities at Vauxhall Activities at Opel:
1. A clear role for the
steward:	 Make	 sure
'teams' do not remove
the stewards' role.
With a decision for a mutual
exclusion of a steward's post
and teamleader,	 Vauxhall's
unions	 ensured	 the	 sole
membership	 representation
through stewards.
Teamwork did not effect the BR,
but Opel's workplace represen-
tatives were requested to be-
come	 teamspeakers;	 team-
speakers assist Vertrauensleute
on the shopfloor
2. Keep formality and
'rigid'	 agreements
	 and
procedures: You will be
encouraged to	 be 'in-
formal' - but you need to
keep agreements and
procedures	 in	 place.
Ask	 the	 company
whether its system of
financial,	 legal	 and
ownership, and control
system is 'informal'.
Vauxhall's management and
unions	 reached	 a	 formal
agreement	 to	 introduce
teamwork. Attempts by man-
agement	 to	 informally
change the role of teamlead-
ers were rejected by unions
on the basis of the written
agreement, which specifies
the role of teamleaders.
The	 BR	 and	 management
reached a formal agreement to
introduce	 teamwork.	 Since
1992, two changes have been
made and both were done in the
form of written agreements, i.e.
amendments	 to	 the	 original
agreement.
3.	 Break the	 link	 be-
tween
'teams	 and	 company
survival'
Although the unions believe
that	 Vauxhall	 can	 survive
without teamwork, the mem-
bership clearly saw a link
between both as expressed
in the survey.
Although the unions believe that
Opel can survive without team-
work, the membership clearly
sees a link between both as ex-
pressed in the survey
4. Widen the debate on
'quality':	 What	 does	 it
really	 mean?	 What
about our interpretation
of 'quality'? (investment,
control,	 information,
etc.)
Quality, investment, control,
information,	 etc.	 were	 not
issues for Vauxhall's unions
during the period of the re-
search.
Opel's BR is concerned with
quality and got involved in is-
sues	 like	 investment,	 control,
and	 information	 handling	 be-
tween management and workers
via teams.
5. Membership aware-
ness:
Before	 the	 introduction	 of
teamwork, the TGWU organ-
ised meetings with members
to discuss teamwork; the nar-
row vote in the agreement's
favour clearly conveys the
awareness of the member-
ship.
Neither	 Opel's	 BR	 nor	 the
workplace	 representatives	 in-
formed workers before the intro-
duction of teamwork. but the BR
participated	 during	 plant-wide
meetings	 organised	 by	 man-
agement.
6.	 Strengthen	 union
links outside the corn-
pany: Do not accept an
identification of the un-
ion as only in that com-
pany - keep links with
unionists in other com-
panies	 and	 with	 your
wider	 union	 organisa-
tion;	 you	 may	 need
them.
During	 the	 introduction	 of
teamwork, Vauxhall's unions
did not strengthen their links
to unions outside the com-
pany. However, links to the
education department of the
TGWU improved because of
training programs for team-
work run by the TGWU.
Opel's BR is part of a network of
BRs in the German car industry
and is therefore well informed
about teamwork in other car
plants	 outside	 of	 GM-
Rasselsheim as well as outside
of GM
This TGWU strategy reflects their suspicion that teamwork will be used by manage-
ment to dismantle traditional worker's representation and furthermore that workers
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will be seduced into a management controlled representative system. The TGWU en-
sured that the stewards' role was not by-passed and taken away by the creation of
teamleaders; the maintenance of an independent union representation was their first
priority. However, this anxiety did not affect the law-based works council system at
Opel. The effects of these respective position were contradictory; Vauxhall's stewards
ensured their independence by arguing the incompatibility of the role of teamleaders
and stewards; Opel's workplace representatives did the opposite; they actively got in-
volved in teamwork initially by trying to take over teamspeakers' roles. When this
failed they incorporated teamspeakers into the structure of representation even though
this made the role of their workplace representatives more complicated in terms of
representing individual workers. It could be argued, however, that workplace repre-
sentatives were to some degree by-passed at Opel but that this was not as vital to
worker's interests as if shop stewards had been by-passed at Vauxhall, because of the
existence of a strong external union, IGM and the works council, i.e. an institutional-
ised system of checks and balance served to maintain worker's representational struc-
tures and meant that teamspeakers were not a threat. Opel's works council and Vaux-
hall's TGWU/AEEU followed the TGWU's recommendation to introduce teamwork
with a written agreement. Institutionalised pluralist in Germany protected the man-
agement-worker agreement, at Vauxhall management attempted to change team-
leader's role without amending the agreement; this was fought by the unions and
management had to cancel this plan (distributive bargaining). While management's
attempt to by-pass unions by implementing a change not agreed with unions was
therefore defeated, it indicated to unions, management's willingness to break agree-
ments when it suited them and their intention of undermining the union (institutional
instability).
For the TGWU it was important to argue that the link between the development of
teamwork and the survival of the company were not the same. They viewed this con-
nection made by management as an echo of the traditional lock-out threat; either co-
operate or lose work. Neither Opel's works council nor Vauxhall's unions however
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were able to win this argument with workers, who in both companies clearly linked
the success and competitive success of the company with teamwork. Quality was an-
other issue that workers accepted was closely connected to company survival at Opel
and therefore they were more willing to accept the management definition of company
survival than their own representatives. Vauxhall, on the other hand, saw the quality
argument as another ploy by management to frighten the workforce. In contrast to
this, Vauxhall's workers saw quality issues as of less importance in connection to
company success. Unlike Opel's works council, Vauxhall's unions had been tradition-
ally less involved in issues like investment, control and information flow.
In terms of union activities to defend workers' interests Vauxhall's unions took a
stronger stance that either the works council or the workplace representatives at Opel.
Not only did the TGWU pressurise management for pre-agreement discussions, but
members also were able to vote on the agreement. In contrast, there were no union
meetings prior to the introduction of teamwork at Opel. Through direct involvement,
participation and preparatory meetings, Vauxhall's workers were at least made aware
of teamwork issues, while Opel's workers were simply informed of management deci-
sions. During this period of introduction, Vauxhall's TGWU used its contacts to
TGWU-stewards at Ellesmere Port and IBC to seek information about teamwork and
communicate their findings to the workforce. The union with a strong adversarial
approach, the TGWU, pointed out the disadvantages of the system to it's members;
despite the financial incentive, (or "bribe") by management to workers, it could be
argued that they were successful in this. Additionally, TGWU members of IBC at-
tended meetings at Vauxhall to inform workers on teamwork. While TGWU-stewards
utilised -their direct contacts with shop stewards from GM's IBC plant in Luton,
Opel's works council's generally sought information from IGM and met with works
councils from other German GM operations. Again it is interesting to contrast IGM's
teamwork recommendations with what actually happened in Vauxhall and Opel:
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Table 6.10.: Principles and Activities
IGM's Principles: Activities at Vauxhall Activities at Opel:
1. A broad assignment of vary-
ing	 tasks	 for	 the	 group
(including long cycle times);
Vauxhall's unions did not reach en
agreement to assign tasks to teams, or
an extension of cycle time.
Opel's BR did not reach an agreement to
assign tasks to a team, or an extension of
cycle time.
2. Group competence in deci-
sion making In such areas as
Job rotation, dhrision of the work,
quality	 control,	 and	 training
needs;
Vauxhall's agreement allows teams to
rotate, etc., but teams cannot dedde
their training needs. Teams rank low
on Gulowsen's scale, because little
autonomy Is given to them.
Opel's agreement allows teams to rotate,
etc., but teams at Opel cannot decide their
training needs. Teams rank higher on
Gulowsen's scale, because more auton-
omy Is given to them.
3. Decentralisation of the plant
dedsion-maldng structure;
With the agreement decision-making
was partly transferred from supervisor
to teamleaders.
With the agreement decision-making was
partly transferred from supervisor to team-
speakers
4. Selection of production or-
ganisation and technology stilt-
able for group work (based co
decentralised technology and
production concepts);
Teamwork did not change production
concepts or technology, assembly line
work remained unaffected,
Opel's management reversed this, by re-
organising cockpit and door production
from previous boxto me-manufacturing.
5. Equal pay for group mom-
bers;
No equal pay for team-members was
Introduced
No equal pay for team-members was in-
troduced
6.	 Equal	 opportunity	 for	 all,
Including spedal training where
necessary for the disabled and
the socially disadvantaged, to
participate In group work (group
work as solidaristic work or-
ganisation);
Vauxhall's unions did not introduce any
clause in their agreement with man-
agement	 regarding	 disadvantaged
workers. Increasingly, such workers
were made to leave teams at the as-
sembly line,
Although BR's were able to ensure the
position of disabled and disadvantaged in
its agreement, In practice disabled and
disadvantaged workers were not only
made redundant through the retirement
program, but were also forced to leave
assembly teams.
7. Support for the personal and
occupational	 development	 of
Individuals and the group;
Vauxhall's management did not intro-
duce additional training at the door-
section, apart from a production related
training on the job,
Opel's	 agreement	 included	 training
schemes for teamspeakers, but no further
training was done, apart from rotation, I.e.
training on the job.
8. Regular group meetings, at
least one hour per week;
Team-members are required to attend
meetings during shift hours. Meetings
are rare and off shift.
BR's	 successfully	 negotiated	 regular
team-meetings on a weekly basis (1 h).
Meetings are rare.
9.	 Representation	 of	 group
interests within the established
plant system of Interest repre-
sentation;
Besides teamleaders, the group is not
represented as a group, but team-
members are represented as workers
by their elected stewards.
Although IGM's guidelines do not demand
an election system for teamspeakers, BR's
could ensure that in the agreement and in
practice. VPs should be teamspeakers.
10.	 Voluntary participation 	 in
the groups;
Although	 membership	 is	 voluntary,
almost everybody joins teams.
Although the agreement states it, It was
not used in practice, all workers took part.
11. Pilot projects to test group-
work before broader implemen-
tation;
Vauxhall's pilot area for teamwork was
the door-section.
Opel's BR negotiated pilot projects and
monitored them.
12. A joint steering committee
at the firm	 level, with equal
labour and management repre-
sentation, to oversee and co-
ordinate the implementation of
group work and the activities of
the groups.
Managements attempt to introduce a
JPC failed IR is handled on a direct,
informal and non-Institutionalised basis
between Individual unions and man-
agement
A joint management-BR committee was
set up and met regularly every fortnight to
discuss developments on final assembly.
The introduction of teamwork involved no major management concessions on
changes to production patterns or extensions of cycle times despite union arguments
for humanisation of work at Opel. Significantly, too, the traditional trade union value
of protecting all members of the workforce, particularly the disadvantaged, were
completely undermined both at Opel and Vauxhall. While this was treated as a secon-
dary issue, its implications in terms of the defence of industrial trade union rights is
significant as was its consequence for traditional trade union concepts of equal repre-
sentation. Neither shop stewards nor workplace representatives seem to have been
able to resist these effects of teamwork. Team autonomy on the other hand was par-
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daily negotiated at Opel; it ranks significantly higher on the Gulowsen-scale compared
to teams at Vauxhall. At both plants a further decentralisation of decision-making
took place, as decisions previously made by supervisors were transferred to teams;
middle management was, in effect, reorganised. Again this was implemented most
successfully at Opel. However, the fundamental decision on the use of box or line-
manufacturing remained with management at both plants, and in both cases the tradi-
tional assembly line was maintained, despite IGM's attempt to influence this issue at
Opel.
Although teamwork affected the structure of wages, i.e. a bonus for teamleaders and
teamspeakers at both plants and a reduction of wage grades at Opel, team-members
did not receive equal pay. Despite IGM's demand for worker's solidarity and unity in
the event of attacks on individual worker's rights, disadvantaged workers at both
plants were adversely affected and forced out of teams for a variety of reasons. Opel's
works council and Vauxhall unions failed to ensure good equal opportunity practice.
While management in both plants, despite the union request, did not introduce special
training for workers to prepare them for teamwork because of rotation and the on-
the-job-training schemes, many workers were able to improve their occupational
skills. Although Opel's works council ensured that teams could meet weekly for an
agreed time during work hours, in practice this was rarely done. This is best described
by a works council-member Franz (1994): "Teamwork and team-meetings are as if
one were two years married without having sex". The situation at Vauxhall was simi-
lar where the agreement also mentions team-meetings during work time, but such
meetings took place on a voluntary basis and after work hours. In both cases, meet-
ings could be cancelled by supervisors to avoid the interruption of production. Opel's
agreement was better than Vauxhall's where meetings took place on shift and were
poorly attended. There is ultimately however little difference between both sites be-
cause in both cases meetings were rare in practice.
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Opel's works council ensured the incorporation of teamspeakers as part of a demo-
cratic structure of representation by suggesting that a) existing workplace representa-
tives be elected and b) that teamspeakers be trained as workplace representatives.
Vauxhall's unions did the opposite. Vauxhall's teamleaders are not part of any union
organisation, they are seen clearly as management tearnleaders appointed by manage-
ment; the position of stewards, for example, is incompatible with the position of
teamleader. Opel's works council opted for an incorporation of teamspeakers
(democratic = pluralist) and Vauxhall's unions opted for the exclusion of teamleaders
(non-democratic = adversarial). IGM's request for a joint steering committee was
successful at Opel; at Vauxhall the JPC did not survive very long and never func-
tioned as a participatory body. In short, institutionalised IR (i.e. the setting up of
committees) survived in a pluralist system and so did its integrative bargaining ap-
proach while in contrast, institutionalised forms of IR did not survive in an adversar-
ial relationship with its distributive bargaining approach.
To conclude, Vauxhall's unions and Opel's works council were only partially success-
ful in influencing some aspects of teamwork and this was generally at a low level.
However the pluralist frame of reference which provided a stable IR system was able
to adapt teamwork with advantages to both sides because the works council and
IGM's union representatives did not need to focus on securing their existence. In
contrast, Vauxhall's unions felt threatened by management's initiatives and felt the
need to fight constantly to maintain their position to limit the affects of teamwork on
their own representational structure.
6.3.3. Teamleader/Teamspeakers,
Teams and Representation
The hypothesis (a) whether a teamleader is appointed or a teamspeaker is elected,
s/he will be a new player within participation (industrial democracy) on the shop-
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floor can be examined in the light of both interviews and surveys conducted at Opel
and Vauxhall. Management at both operations introduced a teamleader/teamspeaker
as a new representative layer between team-members and supervisors. Teamlead-
ers/speakers have representative functions on the shopfloor because part of their task
is to represent team-members. As a hierarchical function, teamleaders and teamspeak-
ers can be positioned in the following ways when compared to the former supervisor-
worker structure:
Table 6.11.: Old and New Structures
Old Structure Team Structure
Production Manager / Betriebsieiter Production Manager / Betriebsieiter
Supervisors / Meister Supervisor / Meister
Teamleader /Teamspeaker
Workers Workers (team-members)
Although GME requested a flattening of organisational hierarchies to improve com-
munication between the shopfloor and management, both managements actually in-
troduced on additional level of hierarchy with teamleaders/teamspeakers. Manage-
ment was not interested in addressing hierarchical issues or examining how they affect
production line efficiency. They were more interested in introducing a self-regulating,
more flexible system of job rotation and quality control on the shopfloor which could
be run by workers themselves rather than through a middle management structure.
While communication from management to workers was done under the old system
through the supervisor, it is now done through teamleaders/teamspeakers. Teamlead-
ers and teamspeakers are different in terms of their leadership role (spealdng vs. lead-
ing), but also their position; they are positioned between team-members and supervi-
sors (hypothesis d):
Table 6.12.: Supervisors and Team-Members 
I supervisor	 (-	 teamleaders	 teamspeakers	 4	 team-members I
However teamleaders still tend to take their cues from supervisors and their informa-
tion from management, teamspeakers, on the other hand, are seen as identifying with
the team at Opel. Representation is a crucial question for teamleaders and teamspeak-
ers. This can be expressed in the hypothesis (b): Whether or not a teamleader is ap-
pointed or elected, s/he will be a team and working area representative. Therefore
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whether appointed or not teamleader/teamspeaker may get into conflict with an
elected steward on the issue of: who represents? Opel's workers elect a three tier
system of works councils, workplace representatives, and teamspeakers; i.e. they elect
BRs as workers, workplace representatives as union members, and teamspeakers as
team-members at Vauxhall workers only have one level of workers representation at
the shopfloor level, i.e. their elected stewards. At Opel, elected teamspeakers (13:1)
are the closest person to the shopfloor with representative functions, followed closely
by workplace representatives (25:1). Crucial for these representation issues is that
Vauxhall's teamleaders are generally not stewards and they are unlikely to move over
to this position as they are appointed by management through a selection process that
would exclude many traditional shop stewards. The survey (question: 25) reveals this
identification:
What do you think
about your teamleader's
position on the union?
Answers: Vauxhall Opel
12%Too critical 40.7%
Too supportive 1.9% 40%
About right 40.7% 42%
More significant is the following question because it determines how team-members
see the question (23) of who represents them: If you thought that you or someone on
your team was being subjected to some form of on-the-job harassment or unfair
treatment, whom would you most likely turn to get something done?
Whom to ask: Vauxhall: Opel
46%Your Teamleader/Teamspeaker: 10%
Your Union Representative: 82 % 22 %
Your BR: N/A. 24%
Your Supervisor: 6% 6 %
The Personnel Department 2% 2 %
Responses at Opel's final assembly support the hypothesis that the teamspeakers at
Opel are much more trusted than at Vauxhall whereas in Vauxhall the fundamental
alliance is that of shop stewards/workers. Team-members at Opel tend to see elected
teamspeakers as representatives (46 %). By contrast, if a teamleader is appointed by
management as at Vauxhall, only 10 % would regard him as a true representative.
Team-members in both plants see their elected stewards and their workplace represen-
tatives/works council as a good source of representation. Neither Opel's or Vauxhall's
team-members see supervisors or the personnel department as representing their in-
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Table 6.13: :	 Managementn n_
Representation	 Management 
BR 4
Opel	 Workplace Representatives 4 Meister
Teamspeaker
Vauxhall Shop Steward
Teamleader
SupenAsor
terests. But whereas Opel's team-members see both their workplace representatives
(VPs) and their teamspeakers as agents of representation, Vauxhall workers see their
shop stewards as their true representatives.
The teamwork introduced at Opel then supported an existing pluralist representative
system; whereas teamwork at Vauxhall is seen as an adversarial development by the
workforce. A team-concept introduced into an IR system based on a pluralist frame
of reference led not only to the election of a teamspeaker, but also developed good
representative models. A team-concept introduced in an adversarial frame of refer-
ence resulted in a teamleader that is felt by the workforce to be non-representative
and this has created a potential for conflict between stewards, on the one side, and
tearnleaders/supervisors on the other.
The last hypothesis (f) examines the question of conflict: Whether or not a teamleader
is appointed or elected, the area of conflict may shift more towards the shopfloor
level. While Vauxhall's agreement explicitly mentions conflict and its resolution,
Opel's agreement does not even need to mention this, because provision to resolve
conflicts are provided by BetrVG and workplace representatives. As a result conflict
has not worsened on the shopfloor after the introduction of teamwork. Workplace
representatives in fact see the existence of teamspeakers as helpful in resolving par-
ticular issues. At Vauxhall however the possibility for conflict between shop stewards
and teamleaders is much greater. The relationship between traditional representation
and teamleaders/teamspeakers can be shown in a graph:
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6.3.4. Conclusions
Although both plants have introduced so-called teamwork, the sort of teamwork in-
troduced should actually be defmed as groupwork. Neither teams function as
autonomous teams because individuals still carry out Tayloristic production tasks and
the level of autonomy remains very limited in both cases. The question of appointment
or election of teamleaders was determined by different systems of IR (pluralist or ad-
versarial). Under Opel's pluralism and integrative bargaining approach, teams at
least reach full autonomy on the election of teamspeakers. In Vauxhall's adversarial
and distributive bargaining approach teams have no autonomy because their team-
leaders are appointed by management.
Institutionalised IR systems also differed in both plants. While Vauxhall's management
attempted to introduce a JPC and failed (low-trust), Opel's Lenkungsausschufl played
a vital role during the introduction of teamwork (high-trust led to trust building). Un-
like Opel, Vauxhall's management tried to use the JPC to incorporate unions into
their agenda and to threaten them with institutional instability. Out of fear of being
incorporated into management's agenda, losing their independence or being weakend,
unions decided to leave Vauxhall's JPC. Opel's management did not attempt to use the
Lenkungsausschufl for control purposes because they were more inclined to accept
pluralism, given the legal basis for democratic representation embodied in the agree-
ments and the law.
During the introduction of teamwork, plant based representation received guidelines
from their unions, and when Vauxhall and Opel's team-concepts are measured against
these guidelines they have only partially succeeded in implementing the unions' con-
cept of teamwork, which is essentially democratic and devolves more power to work-
ers. Neither union achieved their goals of greater humanisation in the production
process. Opel's democratic team-concept gave workers the option to elect an addi-
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tional form of representation, while Vauxhall's workers had to face additional super-
vision via management's non-democratic teamleaders.
To conclude, neither pluralism nor the adversarial approach led to a team-concept in
the sense defined by organisational sociology, i.e. accomplishing work related tasks as
a coherent group and not as individuals. It also did not lead to a high degree of
autonomous decision-making. Both IR systems failed to meet most of the require-
ments issued by IGM and TGWU. However, the advantage of an IR system within a
pluralist frame of reference lay in the strengthening of representation and in some de-
gree to more worker participation in the day to day running of the plant, while an IR
system based on an adversarial understanding not only led to the failure of institu-
tionalised IR, it also made teamleaders appear to be a new management tool, to
strengthen management's control, thereby leading to greater possibilities of conflict.
240
Chapter 7
Conclusions,
Summary &
Assessments
7. Summary,
Conclusions & Assessments
In order to examine the research hypothesis a range of important issues have been ex-
amined that have affected industrial democracy and the structure of representation in
the motor-car industry. Primarily the study has been a comparative one, with a re-
search design that has allowed for a two-plant, cross-national but one-corporation
comparison. The specific issue of the effect of teamwork on shopfloor representation
has been particularly analysed. The final summary and conclusion has seven objec-
tives: 1) summarising the original research problem, 2) assessing the models used in
the study, 3) linking the research problem to theories of teamwork and representation,
4) summarising the two case studies, 5) evaluating the outcomes of the case studies
by using the hypotheses, 6) drawing some final comparative conclusions, 7) assessing
the thesis to test their wider validity for IR.
7.1. The Research Question
The aim of the study was to assess the research question: To what extent and in what
ways does the institutional context affect the transition from a traditional system of
representation to teamwork and how does this affect the general structure of repre-
sentation? With the transfer of elements from the Toyota Production System of lean
production into the European and American car industry, teamwork experienced a
renaissance. Its introduction had important implications: the most important being the
formation of a new layer of teamleaders/teamspeakers whose representative functions
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could interfere with the traditional system of representation (workplace representative
and works councils in Germany, shop stewards in Britain).
Two key questions have been addressed: a) How does the relationship between man-
agement and traditional workers' representation in a unitarist, pluralist or adversarial
frame of reference affect the transition to and implementation of teamwork? What are
the outcomes of the transition from a supervisor-workers system to a team-tearnleader
system? b) How does the emergence of team-members, teamleaders/teamspeakers
interact with the traditional system of shop stewards, workplace representatives and
works councils and what effect has this had on the structure of representation?
7.2. Assessment of the Models
The theoretical model used in this thesis to examine teamwork and the structure of
representation at Vauxhall's Luton plant and at Opel's Riisselsheim plant has been the
triadic model; this links a pattern of IR systems or approaches and the behaviour of
actors (frame of reference). It also establishes a set of characteristics which inform the
three different approaches. These approaches and frames of reference have been de-
scribed as: unitarism (collusion), pluralism (integrative bargaining), and adversarial-
ism (distributive bargaining). The triadic approach has been used as a model not
only to describe certain patterns in an 112 situation but primarily to enable a compari-
son. In thepresent study, the triadic approach has successfully been linked to Walton
and McKersie's negotiation theory and to the theory of transition in order to examine
the change from a workers-supervisor system to a teamwork system.
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These models have proved useful as a device to analyse the possible outcomes of a
transition, i.e. to demonstrate how the structure of representation and the type of
strategic negotiations (integrative or distributive bargaining), establishes the nature
of the structure of representation after the introduction of teamwork. In other words,
the model provided a useful tool to predict whether a teamwork system would be
non-democratic (distributive bargaining) or democratic (integrative bargaining).
Given the study of the pre-teamwork conditions of IR at Vauxhall and at Opel, the
triadic model has proven to have a predicting value. A study of the pre-teamwork lR
system provided enough evidence to assign the structure of representation to one of
the triadic description. After the transition and the introduction of teamwork, the tri-
adic model also provided an analytical background to examine the consequences of
teamwork for the structure of representation. As well as examining the way that this
determined a non-democratic or a democratic outcome, the model also provided a
framework for an analysis of the sort of changes which occurred on the shopfloor
with the introduction of democratic teamspeakers and non-democratic teamleaders.
Apart from the success of applying this model, there are significant shortcomings in-
herent in its use. The non-democratic and democratic model in many ways is not
flexible enough to capture the complex reality of IR on the shopfloor. Concepts of
unitarism linked to collusion, pluralism linked to integrative bargaining and adversar-
ialism linked to distributive bargaining are often too simplistic to entirely encompass
the range of approaches and the contradictions that exist in diferent IR systems. In
addition, the triadic approach also sets boundaries which limit the analysis of an IR
pattern. IR actors do not constantly behave within the particular triadic model they
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are supposed to be using, they often seek a pragmatic accommodation (chapter
2.2.5.), equally patterns of general lR do not fit neatly into one or the other model.
a) The Pluralist approach and Opel's industrial relations
The existence of Opel's works council and workplace representatives within the
structure of representation as an institutionalised form of IR is clearly pluralist oper-
ates within a pluralist frame of reference and utilising integrative bargaining meth-
ods. Most of the integrative bargaining negotiations apply not only to strictly eco-
nomic issues, but also to obligations and rights (1965:129). Teamwork, according to
their definition, is an issue for negotiations about obligations and rights. While issues
related to economic values (distributive bargaining) are negotiated outside of work-
places (chapter 5.1.2.) in the German case. The pluralist model which leads to inte-
grative bargaining, then, has proved to be helpful in explaining both the transitional
events and the final more democratic outcome. However, it has also had limitations.
An IR system which is based on pluralism assumes that institutionalised forms of in-
dustrial democracy are successful and that trust can be established, i.e. joint meetings,
works councils, etc. and that a goal of a balance of power is achieved. The degree of
representation given to workers in this pluralist approach, however is still extremely
limited e.g. Opel's groups are not teams, i.e. their power is limited and they have little
co-decision making powers. While a pluralist model allows institutions (works
council, etc.) to prevent strikes and solve issues with an integrative bargaining am
--:proach, it was not effective in stopping, for example, the strike at Opel's paint shop.
Before the strike, Opel's management demonstrated how quickly it could move back
into an adversarial approach from a pluralist IR approach towards an adversarial IR
position, by attacking the works councils directly, i.e. the cancellation of works
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agreements. In the words of Walton and McKersie, Opel's management ceased to ne-
gotiate according to the integrative bargaining model and move into a distributive
bargaining model. Given the pluralist approach to IR at Opel, works councils and
workplace representatives should have sought to negotiate with management using an
integrative bargaining mechanism, but when workplace representatives felt strongly
that pluralism was not working for them (low-trust) and decided on industrial action,
they broke with the pluralist form of problem-soving and moved towards an adver-
sarial one.
Walton and McKersie's model of distributive bargaining is an example of one of the
options most utilised in an adversarial relationship. In the case of the strike it might
be justified to argue that the action of Opel's management and the reaction of Opel's
workplace representatives used a distributive bargaining model. While being on
strike, Opel's works council changed their approach to negotiations with management
moving to a situation which can be described as integrative bargaining. At the same
time workplace representatives fell back on on the distributive bargaining model
("one person's gain is a loss to the other" 1965:4) when they felt that pluralist model
was not working. Walton and McKersie (1965) have predicted that such a situation
can be categoriesed as a mixed distributive and integrative bargaining position. The
mix of both bargaining system in fact provides checks and balances so that, if one as-
pect breaks down, another come into play. Opel's IR system in fact provided a more
complex system than can simply be described as pluralist.
In short, Fox' and Moore's models have advantages but also have shortcomings when
applied to IR situations in both Opel and Vauxhall. In the event of a strike, for exam-
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pie, Opel's ER system proved to be both pluralist and adversarial patterns at the same
time. While a triadic approach is useful as a general scheme or framework it needs
continuous refinements when applied to the changing and complex situations of IR.
1:0 The adversarial approach and Vauxhall's industrial relations
The study of Vauxhall's IR system provided strong analogies with Fox' adversarial
model. The use of an adversarial frame of reference by Vauxhall's union representa-
tives and management demonstrated that the overall IR system can be described as
adversarial. The adversarial frame of reference is based on a set of assumptions that
reject the idea of participation and the possibility of using institutions to establish of
industrial democracy; it is a low-trust relationship. Vauxhall's shop stewards showed
a willingness to participate on the Joint Plant Committee (JPC) before and during the
introduction of teamwork (integrative bargaining). Typical for the adversarial ap-
proach of Vauxhall's management towards the union in the JPC was their "attempt to
destroy or weaken the other side" (Purcell 1981:55) by trying to reduce the number of
stewards. This led to institutional insecurity for the union which provided the sub-
stance of further problems (Walton and McKersie 1965:136).
Given the adversarial or anti-incorporatist frame of reference of management and a
core-group of trade unionists with a strong influence on strategy, it was difficult to
move towards a pluralist or high-trust approach. The rejection of teamwork by stew-
ards on the shopfloor was based on their perception that teamwork was a manage-
ment manoeuvre to undermine their representative power (one person's gain is a loss
to the other). Certainly management's attempt to move towards a pluralist frame of
reference, i.e. of an integrative bargaining position failed. Despite the subsequent
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failure of the JPC for a considerable time Vauxhall's workers representatives and
management continued to operate with both an adversarial and a pluralist model in a
mixed negotiation system (integrative and distributive bargaining).
In summary, both case studies show the limitations of the triadic model. Not only do
actors within a model use patterns of behaviour from different models at different
times, but they also use patterns and frames of reference from different models at the
same time. As a consequence the IR model of the triadic approach can provide a
useful framework for research into two different IR systems (Opel and Vauxhall), but
its limitations have to be taken into account. The reality of IR systems can be seen as
being much more complex than a simple unitarist, pluralist, and adversarial frame of
reference suggests.
7.3. The Theory of Teamwork
and Industrial Democracy
In this thesis, teams, teamwork, team leadership, participation and representation are
seen in the context of a theoretical debate developed to analyse and understand the
social aspects of a transition from one social system to another. Moore's (1966) the-
ory of transitions and Walton and McKersie (1965) collective bargaining models are
useful in that both contain predicative features. A change in the social organisation of
production (towards a team-teamleader system) can be seen as a transition. The theo-
retical system of Fox, Walton and McKersie and Moore have been used in the area of
IR to analyse the transition from a supervisor-worker system to a team-teamleader
system:
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Supervisor - Worker System
4.
Team - Teamleader
adversarial	 unitarist	 pluralist
	
Non-Democratic Outcome.	 Democratic Outcome	 Non-Democratic Outcome
	
Appointed TeEunleader ,	 Elected Teamspeaker
	 Appointed Teamleader
Table 7.1.: Transition and Outcome
Once an IR system can be identified showing a unitarist, pluralist or adversarial
frame of reference seems it is possible to predict a democratic or non-democratic out-
come. However none of the boxes should be seen as closed, because there are varia-
tions within each IR system and there are variations within the selection methods for
teamleaders/teamspeakers. None of the ideal boxes were found in their pure form in
reality, e.g. while in the triadic model, theoretical categories are useful in practice they
cannot be simply applied.
a) Unitarism and teamleaders
A transition from a supervisor-worker to a team-teamleader system can occur in an
IR system which is unitarist and uses a system of negotiations that can be described as
collusive (Walton and McKersie 1965:188). Such an IR system is based on the as-
sumption that management has the right to manage and workers should be loyal to
management; this results in a selection of teamleaders that can be called authoritarian;
teamleaders are not elected, but appointed by management and are selected according
to management criteria. As a consequence, the leadership style tends to be autocratic
and teamleaders operate in a teamleader tells, sells, or tests style. In the tells version,
a teamleader simply tells team-members and in the sells version s/he sells ideas, etc. to
team-members, but has no final decision making power. In the unitarist system, works
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councils end up isolated from the workforce and ignored by management; workplace
representatives tend to adapt a populist role rather than a political representative one.
Negotiations in the sense of collective bargaining either do not take place at all or in a
collusive mode. In summary, a unitarist approach does not lead to a democratic ver-
sion of teamwork and cannot move IR closer to pluralism.
b) Pluralism and teamspeakers
An IR system can also show indicators that can be described as pluralist, i.e. pluralist
forms of institutionalised lR which negotiates in an integrative bargaining mode. This
is a high-trust system. In this case, the selection of teamleaders is democratic and
elected teamspeakers tend to adapt a leadership style associated with a teamspeaker
consults and joins style. Within this system of pluralism, works councils are re-
spected, stable and co-operative (Kotthoff 1982). In short, once an IR system on the
shopfloor features pluralism, the 11Z system is likely to continue its pluralist approach
with the election of teamspeakers and will attempt to avoid adversarial confronta-
tions. Management equally works through a system in which workers' views are col-
lected and mediated.
c) Adversarialism and teamleaders
One indicator for the existence of an adversarial relationship is the use of the dis-
tributive bargaining mode because both sides reject the notion of participation and
institutionalised forms of IR. It is likely that the question of teamleaders' selection is
left to management. In such an adversarial relationship between management and
workers' representatives, there is a low-trust attitude between the two sides. Since
teamleaders in an adversarial frame of reference are likely to be appointed by man-
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agement they tend to adapt the same leadership style as in a unitarist frame of refer-
ence.
7.4. The Case Studies of Teamwork
Participation by workers' representatives during the introduction of teamwork
showed, that in an adversarial case, representatives either did not participate at all or
only minimally (low-trust). While in the pluralist system full participation occurred
during the period of introduction. At Opel, the Lenkungsausschufi was a success story
with intense participation by the works council and workplace representatives, be-
cause it was a institution with a degree of high-trust between both sides and strongly
favoured an integrative bargaining approach to teamwork. While Vauxhall's Joint
Plant Committee (JPC) was used by management in an attempt to incorporate unions
into their agenda, this subsequently failed, because it failed to create trust between the
two sides. Management's attempt to reduce the number of shop stewards created
what Walton and McKersie have described as institutional instability. Eventually, the
issue of out-sourcing of production divided management and unions; management felt
that this was exclusively a management decision while unions felt they should be in-
volved in a co-decision-making way. Further co-operation was rejected by the unions
which ended the attempt at a pluralist approach at Vauxhall. On the basis of the nor-
mative or state supported pluralism (Betev'G) at Opel and management's attempt to
reduce the number of stewards at Vauxhall, the issue of insitutional security (Walton
and McKersie 1965:136) was a problem for the TGWU and AEEU, but not for
Opel's works council.
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7.5. Outcomes and Hypotheses
Out of the two key research questions, the following hypotheses were developed as a
guideline to study teamwork and it's affects on the structure of representation:
a) Whether or not a teamleader is elected or appointed, a teamleader will be a new player within participation (industrial
democracy) on the shopfloor.
b) Whether or not a teamleader is appointed or elected, s/he will be a team and working area representative. Therefore
an elected or appointed teamleader may get into conflict with an elected steward and/or an elected BR on the issue
of: who represents?
c) A teamspeaker who is elected, Is more likely to solely represent a team, because a teamleader can be voted out A
teamleader who Is appointed by the company, represents the team's interest and the company's interest at the same
time.
d) Whether an elected teamspeaker represents a team, a teEunleader may be a representative against the company In
the case of conflict On the other hand, If a teamleader is appointed by the company, s/he may be used against the
workers In the case of conflict
e) Whether or not a teamleader is appointed or elected, a new form of workers control on the shopfloor may result.
f) Whether or not a teamleader Is appointed or elected, the area of conflict may shift more towards the shopfloor level. 
Out of the research question To what extent and in what ways does the institutional
context affect the transition from a traditional system of representation to teamwork
and how does this affect the general structure of representation? Several hypotheses
(see box) were developed (a-f).
Hypothesis a) 
The case studies at Vauxhall and Opel have shown that with the introduction of
teamwork, teamleaders and teamspeakers were introduced as new players on the
shopfloor. As the table on (question: 16): Teamleaders and Team-Members demon-
strates, there is a recognition by team-members of the teamleaders' role. For example,
41.7 % of the German team-members said that their teamspeakers respected them all
the time, while only 16.7 % of British team-members said their teamleaders respected
them all the time. In addition, 38 % of German team-members said the teamspeaker
co-operated with them all the time while only 9.3 % of British team-members agreed
with this. Analysing both teamwork agreements on the issue of continuous improve-
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ment of work standards (KVP), teamleaders/teamspeakers in both plants became the
channel for information between management and workers. Teamleader/teamspeakers
also organised team-meetings and participated in the organisation of work patterns.
They were also seen as part of a legitimate lR system; team-members felt they could
turn to them in cases of unfair treatment. In summary, teamleaders and teamspeakers
are a new player on the shopfloor who not only actively participate on work related
issues, but are also seen as having some sort of limited steward/workplace represen-
tative function; they are perceived by team-members as having a role to play in indus-
trial democracy.
Hypothesis b) 
According to the analysis of the case studies, representation changed with the intro-
duction of teamleaders/teamspeakers. At Vauxhall, teamleaders are perceived as less
representative of the workforce than at Opel. In other words, elected teamspeakers
are felt to be true representatives, while appointed teamleaders are not seen in the
same light. At Opel almost 50 % of team-members see teamspeakers as someone to
turn to for representation, while this is the case for only 10 % of Vauxhall's team-
members. While Vauxhall's team-members do not get confused about who represents
them (for them it is still clearly the traditional structures), i.e. shop stewards, Opel's
team-members see their teamspeakers as representatives equal to their workplace rep-
resentatives (46 %). This has not led to a confusion at Opel over the issue of repre-
sentation, because teamspeakers seem to assist workplace representatives (VPs) in
their representative function. Opel's workplace representatives are confident that the
sort of job-sharing of workplace representatives and teamspealcers which has
emerged after teamwork is effective. A different level of issues are still dealt with by
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workplace representatives or works councils, however, but minor issues are solved
directly at team level by elected teamspeakers. In the case of workplace representa-
tives their role has merged to some degree with that of teamspeakers; in the case of
shop stewards it is clearly separate from teamleaders.
The questionnaire results seem to confirm Smith et al.'s theory of leadership styles.
Opel's elected teamspeakers are bound to use a pluralist leadership style, i.e. a team-
speaker consults or joins, while an appointed teamleader is able to adapt a non-
democratic leadership, i.e. a teamleader tells, sells, or tests.
In summary, the issue of representation is clear for Vauxhall's workers, because, as
actors in an IR system, they see their interest clearly represented by their stewards. At
Opel, team-members seek representation from their teamspeakers in the first place and
if a problem remains unsolved, seek additional help from workplace representatives
and works councils. In short, neither in an adversarial nor a pluralist framework has
the issue of teamwork led to confusion over the question: who represents?
Hypothesis c) 
Since Opel's teamspeakers are elected, their legitimacy depends on team approval and
accountability therefore they have to represent the interest of their team; Vauxhall's
appointed teamleaders do not rely on team support but depend on management ap-
proval. In one case, for example, at Vauxhall's door section, team-members almost
refused to acknowledge an appointed tearnleader because he was seen as too closely
associated with management. The representative legitimacy of teamleaders or team-
speakers emerges from the results of the questionnaire. According to 42.6 % of
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Vauxhall's team-members, management-appointed teamleaders think more like man-
agement, while only 8.7 % of Opel's team-members believe that their team-speakers
think like management. 52.2 % of team-members at Opel think that teamspeakers
never think like management, compared to 11.1 % at Vauxhall. The results support
the hypothesis that an elected teamspeaker is more likely to identify with the team and
have the team identify with them than those who are appointed by management.
Hypothesis d) 
Given that elected teamspeakers differ in their loyalties to appointed teamleaders, the
question of loyalty also influences the issue of representation in the case of conflict.
Teamspeakers who have teams as their basis of legitimacy are likely to support their
team or their team-members in the case of conflict; teamleaders who have manage-
ment as their basis of legitimacy are likely be loyal to management in a similar situa-
tion. Responses to the survey question concerning management's policy on union rep-
resentation show that 70 % of Opel's team-members thought that in the case of con-
flict, teamspeakers would side with the team. Only 26 % of Vauxhall's team-members
felt that teamleaders would side with them in the case of conflict. Consequently, an IR
system based on an adversarial frame of reference tends to lead to an adversarial re-
lationship between team-members and teamleaders. Teamleaders then tend to pursue
an adversarial leadership style (tells, sells, and tests) leading to an alignment of team-
leaders with management in the case of conflict. Elected tearnspeakers in an IR system
based on a pluralist frame of reference, can pursue a democratic leadership style
(consults, joins) leading to the alignment of teamspeakers with team-members in the
case of conflict. Consequently, the outcome of leadership styles and teamleaders' or
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teamspeakers' alignment with management or team-members is based on the existing
IR system and the nature of this system will shape the type of teamwork that results.
Hypothesis e) 
Teamspeakers who are part of a team and adapt a democratic leadership style see the
question of control as minor because they themselves are team-members with speaker
functions and they believe team-members to be in control. In an IR system which is
based on pluralism, control is not as important an issue as in a system based on ad-
versarialism. However, control in pluralistic teamwork can be seen as a more subtle
control of the sort Barker (1993:412) described; that is, control inside and by the
team itself, called concertive control (i.e. workers policing each others). Control in an
adversarial system is clearly external control through management, supervisors and
technical systems (R. Edwards' 1981, chapter 2.2.3.). Teamleaders who are manage-
ment appointed tend to adapt an autocratic leadership style, hence the question of hi-
erarchical control is more important. In addition, the control function of supervisors
are weakened and transferred to teamleaders. In short, control is not as vital an issue
for the teamspeaker in a pluralist system as it seems to be for a management that op-
erates in an adversarial mode. In Opel's pluralist system, external control is reduced
as the task and number of supervisors and their role is reduced, while concertive con-
trol increases. In adversarialism, control also seems to be reduced by the reduction of
supervisors, but this is compensated for by the establishment of a teamleader with
control -functions, whose basis for legitimacy is management. In the IR systems based
on a pluralist frame of reference (Opel) control is further reduced, while in an IR
system based on an adversarial frame of reference control moves closer to the shop-
floor, i.e. by the establishment of teamleaders with control functions.
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Hypothesis 0 
Management at Vauxhall and Opel initially saw that one of the advantages of team-
work was its ability to. solve conflicts directly on the shopfloor. Therefore, both
teamwork systems are designed to enable teams to solve problems without the inter-
vention of outsiders, i.e. either supervisors or trade unions. Team-meetings are seen
as a forum to solve not only production problems, but also IR problems. However,
because in both cases team-meetings are not operated according to the agreements,
i.e. are either rarely held (Opel) or held in work time (Vauxhall) there is no forum in
which the team can really address various issues or conflicts that arise. As a result,
team-meetings do not function as a problem-solving forum.
IR at Vauxhall, compared to lR at Opel, has always focused on actors on the shop-
floor because of the importance of shop stewards. With the introduction of teamwork,
this did not change significantly. However, because of the legal requirements of Opel's
IR, many issues had to remain at management-works council level. While teamwork
did not change either IR system in terms of the place of conflict resolution, Opel's
structure of representation seems more capable, at a certain level, of problem-solving
on the shopfloor than Vauxhall's. At Opel, 46 % of the team-members see team-
speakers as someone to turn to in the case of problems, while this is only the case for
10 % of Vauxhall's team-members. Given teamspeakers' close relationship to the team
at Opel and their leadership style, their ability to solve problems within the team is
structurally given. On the other hand, conflicts between teamleaders and team-
members are to a much lesser degree resolved by teamleaders at Vauxhall. In other
words, Vauxhall's adversarial system is set up to in such a way that conflicts continue
to be resolved outside of teams through traditional representatives mode, i.e. trade
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unionism. However, conflict-solving cannot be seen as purely team-based at Opel and
union-based at Vauxhall, because some levels of conflict at Vauxhall may still be re-
solved within teams and some levels of conflict at Opel can only be resolved by
workplace representatives or at works council level. The introduction of teamwork
did not replace Opel's structure of representation, because only minor problems are
solved inside teams.
Having analysed and compared all six (a-f) hypotheses, it seems as if the outcome of a
pluralist approach to IR leads to a pluralist concept of teamwork which in turn leads
to a democratic version of team leadership with an increased potential for conflict
resolution. An IR system which indicates the presence of an adversarial frame of ref-
erence tends to introduce an adversarial version of teamwork leading to an authori-
tarian leadership style with a reduced capacity for problem-solving.
7.6. Comparative Conclusions
This thesis has been concerned with the question of representation when teamwork is
introduced. It seems there are two different outcomes of a transition from a worker-
supervisor system to teamwork: a) the non-democratic outcome (cf. adversarial ap-
praoch with distributive bargaining model of negotiations; or the unitarist approach
with collusion model of negotiations) or b) democratic (pluralist using an integrative
bargaining approach). While a unitarist or an adversarial frame of reference leads to
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an appointed teamleader, only an ER system based on a pluralist frame of reference
leads to an outcome where a democratically elected teamspeakers is chosen.
Several theories have provided tools to transfer the results of both cases studies to a
wider arena of IR. However, teamwork and representation and the transition from a
worker-supervisor system to a teamwork system cannot be adequately explained by
using a single theory. Theories of IR (Fox, Cressey, Purcell, etc.) enabled the transfer
of case study results beyond a study of organisational issues. Equally important, how-
ever, has been Walton and McKersie's theory of bargaining behaviour which gave a
framework for the prediction of outcomes. In addition, Kotthoffs theory of the role of
works councils and Batstone et al.'s theory of the role of shop stewards provided fur-
ther theoretical ground to understand the two case studies and the IR actors. While
Opel's IR system became even more democratised with the election of teamspeakers,
Vauxhall's IR system remained within the limitations of adversarialism. In other
words, teamwork in both cases had a reinforcing function, it reinforces and stabilises
both IR system.
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7.7. General Assessments
Fox's triadic model of lR linked with a theory of collective bargaining and transition
provides a tool to analyse teamwork and the structure of representation. To assess the
model (a), its power for predictions (b) and its limitations (c) have to be considered.
Therefore the following section will:
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The general assessment will provide a discussion about the models used to analyse
Vauxhall and Opel beyond both cases.
a) Case Studies
The thesis provides two depth case studies. In addition to the Vauxhall and Opel
plants, teamwork was introduced in all of GM's European motor-car plants and in
other motor-car companies. In order to examine the strength and weaknesses of the
triadic model, GM's Eisenach plant (chapter 2.2.4.; 4; 4.2.; 4.2.2.) is used as a com-
parative example, because this plant operates within GME and within the German IR
system, but still provides a somewhat unusual case to other German plants. Like
Rover (chapter 2.1.1.2.; 2.2.4.) however, as a non-GM plant, has a different approach
towards teamwork, because Rover's team-concept was influenced by its link to
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Honda. Like Rover, Opel-Eisenach's team-concept was influenced by GM's Canadian
management team (Suzuki-GM joint-venture). In short, both Rover and Opel-
Eisenach provide somewhat unusual cases in the European motor-car industry and
therefore provide almost ideal examples for an assessment of the model used in the
thesis.
Opel-Eisenach:
I. The West-German Labour Law comes to Eastern-Germany
As mentioned in chapter 2.2.4. and 4.2, Opel's Eisenach plant is a green-field opera-
tion. Until November 1989 East-German IR was organised very differently from
Western concepts, but with political transformation and anticipation of unification
with West German institutions were introduced. "In the first weeks following 1989,
the GDR's [former Easter-Germany] trade unions continued working on the basis of
the old collective bargaining system. However, it soon became apparent that a shift to
the West-German system was inevitable. The first State Treaty (Staatsvertrag) on 18
May, 1990, applied the basic principles of West German labour law to the GDR.
These principles have been in force since 1 July, 1990" (Bispinck 1995:63). The
West-German labour law includes the works constitution act (BetrVG). Unlike West-
ern works councils with their long tradition of a pluralist understanding of industrial
relations, East-German works councils were new in every respect. In East-Germany
many works councils were created in many establishments before the works constitu-
tion act-was formally introduced to East-Germany. On the basis of Germany's nor-
mative or state supported pluralism (BetrVG), those Eastern works councils which
were elected before the BetrVG had to accomodate to the legal margins of pluralism.
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II. General Motors Opens a New Plant
In September 1992, GM began producing cars near East-Germany's former Wartburg
production site with a completely new plant. GM did not employ many of the old
Wartburg workforce and started instead with 1,200 new workers as a green-field op-
eration. Workers for the new plant were assessed and employed by Opel-Eisenach and
received "lean production"-preparation in a state funded training centre in Eisenach.
To secure state funding for the creation of a new business in Eastern Germany, GM
decided to keep Opel-Eisenach as an independent business unit of GME. Eisenach
started not only with a complete new production concept which was different from
West-German production, but also with a new IR concept. GM was able to introduce
a new IR concept, because a) the West-German labour law had just arrived in Eastern
Germany and b) the works council was active with setting up their own structure.
The Works Council and Unionism
While Opel's Western employees have established traditional forms of unionism
(IGM) and in-plant representation via workplace representatives and Blockies, Opel-
Eisenach's workers and the members of the works council barely knew each other.
Therefore, a system of representation via unions (distributive bargaining) could not
have been established (Skocpol 1987) in the early 1990s, because none of the former
East-German unions survived the transformation of 1989/90. The West-German
works councils could not influence the setting up of the plant, because Opel-Eisenach
was legally a separate business not connected to GM-West Germany. Opel-Eisenach's
first works council was elected in March 1991 by the newly employed workforce
working partly in the training centre and partly setting up the new production. The
second election took place in March 1992, because of the doubling of the number of
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employees (interview: BOckel 1993). During a strike in February 1993 (Bispinck
1995:67), workplace representatives were set up at Eisenach. The creation of work-
place representatives facilitated the move of the relationship between management and
workers towards the West-German pluralist model.
IV. Industrial Relations in Practice
Given the lack of any tradition of pluralism and the newly composed works council
faced with an experienced management from the West (including CAMI/Canada),
Eisenach's works council operated in a manner akin to Walton and McKersie's term
"collusion". Within the German system of normative pluralism, there is room for
manoeuvring towards adversarialism or unitarism. Members of Eisenach's works
council were not able to participate on joint-works council meetings of all Western
GM plants (Riisselsheim, Kaiserslautern, Bochum).
In the early 1990s, East-German works councils were forced into a position which
comes close to the unitarist approach: a) Through re-structuring plants towards a
modern and capitalist production, works councils were forced to support the exis-
tence and survival of plants as their prime objective. b) Unions and works council
were faced with up to 50 % unemployment in the Eisenach area. c) Although works
council and IGM wanted to reach the wage level of West-German workers, this could
only be done over a time period, which had to be negotiated with management. d)
The re-kructuring of production at Opel-Eisenach was done in a lean production
fashion to which works council largely agreed. KreiBig (1992:618) use the term Not-
gemeinschaft (Partnership in adversity or for mutual survival) and Mickler et al.
(1994:274) use the term Existenzsicherungspartnerschaft (co-management) to de-
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scribe the relationship between East-German works councils and management. The
term Existenzsicherungspartnerschaft describes a relationship of merging interests,
i.e. to secure the survival of the plant, in a rather unitarist way; a works council be-
comes an assistant to management (co-management). The relationship between Eisen-
ach's works council and management did not seem to depart from this (Buteweg
1995:27).
Rover:
As mentioned in chapter 2.1.1.2. and 2.2.4. Rover is somewhat different from Vaux-
hall's Luton plant. In 1992 Rover's IR changed fundamentally with the introduction
of the agreement "Rover Tomorrow". With the arrival of Japanese cars in the small
and medium size market and especially since the opening of production by Nissan in
Sunderland and Toyota in Derby, Rover faced increased competition in a segment of
the market traditionally associated with Rover's product range. Therefore, Rover was
in a need for a change of product quality and production. This was linked to a change
in the social organisation on the shopfloor. The agreement, then, introduced many of
the lean production features as well as Japanese management techniques on the basis
of Rover's link to Honda.
While Rover's industrial relations system was traditionally seen as leaning towards
adversarialism, Honda's IR system in Japan and in the USA can be adequately de-
--
scribed as being unitarist in its character. While collective bargaining at Rover tradi-
tionally took place within a distributive bargaining approach, Rover's collective bar-
gaining pattern in the 1990s tended toward collusion. Traditionally and like many
other motor-car plants in Britain, Rover's shopfloor workers are organised by:
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TGWU (production workers) and AEEU (skilled workers). While the TGWU could
be seen as an representative of a more adversarial tendency towards IR with a dis-
tributive bargaining approach, the AEEU represents a more pluralist approach and
has a tendency to favour a collective bargaining approach within the margins of inte-
grative bargaining. Already before the introduction of the "Rover Tomorrow"
agreement, both unions met to discuss management's proposal for the change towards
lean production, which moved the TGWU towards pluralism. Most of management
proposals were made with the assistance of Honda. Together with Rover's white-
collar union (MSF), all unions accepted the "Rover Tomorrow" agreement.
While AEEU and MSF saw the agreement as a departure from the adversarial "us and
them", TGWU members were more reluctant to move towards pluralist IR. Rover's
management with the assistance of Honda moved the IR system towards pluralism by
an active and successful attempt to include the unions in decision-making. In short,
when faced with a) an increased competition through the arrival of Japanese cars, b)
Japanese production in Britain, c) Honda as partner of Rover, d) the acceptance of
"Rover Tomorrow" by AEEU and MSF, the TGWU moved towards pluralism when
offered by Rover's management in the early 1990s.
al) Teamleaders and Teamspeakers
Teamwork at Opel-Riisselsheim (elected teamspeakers) differs substantially from the
approach taken at Opel-Eisenach (appointed tearnleaders). Both companies operate
within the German IR system, while GM-West has established institutionalised forms
of industrial democracy (cf. works councils, etc.), Opel's Eisenach plant was a trans-
plant and set up before the workforce was employed and a works council was elected.
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In other words, Eisenach's teamwork was introduced at a time when the relationship
between management and the works council can be described as unitarist with a col-
lusive approach towards collective bargaining, therefore the appropriate way in which
teamleaders were selected was the appointment model. However, with the merger of
Opel-Eisenach with the West-German Opel plants (by the mid-1990s), demands from
the works council at GM Western plants are made to move towards an elections sys-
tem for team-speakers. This coincides with an increased self-confidence of Opel-
Eisenach's works council and the move towards pluralism.
Rover, on the other hand, operated an IR system showing patterns of pluralism in the
early 1990s. Rover's negotiations for the introduction of teamwork took place in a
collective bargaining mode which could be described as integrative bargaining. This
allowed Rover's management and unions to create a more trustful relationship. The
outcome of this newly created trust-relationship between management and unions
gave both sides the option of a partly democratic system of the selection of tearnlead-
ers. With the introduction of teamwork, workers were able to apply for the position
of teamleaders. Candidates had to pass assessments and tests by management. The
candidates who remained (usually two to three per team) could stand for election for
the position of teamleaders by the teams. Although the relationship between manage-
ment and unions can be seen as pluralist, it was not stable enough to allow the pure
election model. Coming from an unitarist position, Honda favoured the classical Japa-
._
nese appointment model for teamleaders, while the TGWU from their adversarial
standpoint also favoured an appointment model for tearnleaders as a TGWU policy
towards teamleaders in the motor-car industry. It could be argued that the bloc be-
tween Honda (unitarist) and TGWU (adversarial) was overcome by Rover's manage-
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—unitarist	 I	 pluralist	 I	 adversarial
Eisenach' management (1992) 4
Eisenach's works council (1992) 4
Eisenach's management and works council (1995)
Honda's management (1990) 4	 4 Rover's management (1990)
MSF
	 AEEU	 4- TGWU
Rover's management & unions (1995)
unitarist	 pluralist	 I	 adversarial
Table 7.2.: Pragmatic Accommodation: Rover & el-Eisenachop
ment and the AEEU's move towards pluralism. As demonstrate in several table on the
triadic approach (5.6; 5.7.; 5.11.; 5.12; and 5.13. etc.), within the triadic approach,
Honda's, Rover's (chapter 2.1.1.2. and 2.2.4.), Opel-Eisenach's (chapter 4 and 4.2),
the works council's, the AEEU, the MSF, and the TGWU's move towards a prag-
matic accommodation (chapter 2.2.5.) can be seen in the following way:
a2) non-democratic Outcomes
In the case of ER, a system that operates in an adversarial frame of reference with a
distributive bargaining style of regulation before the change towards teamwork is
unlikely to lead to a democratic 112 system with integrative bargaining pattern.
Whether or not an IR system shows patterns of a unitarist or an adversarial frame of
reference, both actors operate in a non-democratic way. Industrial democracy is an
alien concept to an adversarial or an unitarist relationship. Within such a system,
neither side attempts to find democratic solutions for micro or temporary problems. A
transitional period would seem to give an opportunity to change to a different 112
model. However, within an adverserial model neither management nor workers' rep-
resentatives are strong enough to force the other side into institutionalised mode of
problem-solving (cf. integrative bargaining). The prospects for a mutually agreed,
planned form of industrial relations are minimal (Purcell 1981:229). Within the adver-
sarial distributive bargaining approach, both sides block each other and "neither side
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is prepared to risk the first move" (Purcell 1981:229). Within a unitarist and collusive
relationship management and workers' representatives' power relation is asymmetric
resulting in unilateral decision-making by management.
IR systems that are based on an adversarial or a unitarist frame of reference do not
tend to set up institutionalised forms of representation, and consequently when team-
work is introduced it is non-democratic; none of the IR actors behave in a participa-
tive approach. Within a unitarist frame of reference, management has the power to
determine the selection method for teamleaders without the interference of workers'
representatives, because they are either excluded or collude. This is done through the
appointment of teamleaders. As far as the question of elected or appointed teamlead-
ers is concerned, within an adversarial arrangement, neither management nor work-
ers' representatives have the power to determine the selection method for teamlead-
ers. In contrast to a pluralist frame of reference, neither side seeks a democratic ar-
rangement; both sides remain within a low-trust us vs. them pattern.
a3) democratic Outcomes
An election of team-speakers is likely in a system with a high degree of trust and an
integrative bargaining pattern. Within an integrative bargaining system, unions and
management have the option to reach their goals, i.e. the introduction of teamwork in
such a way so that "they can be accommodated by the same means" (Walton and
McKersie 1965:136). The democratic selection of team-speakers is seen by manage-
ment as transferring democracy to workers leading to a high-trust relationship on the
shopfloor, a high degree of legitimacy and acceptance of the team-concept. While
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unions/works councils see the election as an option to increase industrial democracy
on the workplace and the introduction of an additional level of representation.
Any IR system based on pluralism must have industrial democracy and institutional-
ised forms of participation. In such a system, IR issues such as teamwork are dis-
cussed within integrative bargaining with institutions like works councils and some-
times with newly created institutions like Opel's Lenkungsausschufi. Pluralism in
conjunction with an integrative bargaining system does not determine an outcome,
but does set up institutionalised forms of IR to discuss issues. A pluralist frame of
reference in most cases enhances workers' participation on the introduction of team-
work and influences decisions on the selection methods for teamspeakers.
b) Possibilities for Predictions
Only in a few cases, has an IR system with a pluralist frame of reference introduced a
non-democratic selection method for teamleaders (cf. GM-Eisenach). However, GM-
Eisenach also have institutionalised forms of industrial democracy for the introduction
of teamwork. These forms of industrial democracy are committees similar to Opel's
Lenkungsausschufl (joint committees). In other words, it is reasonable to predict a
democratic version of teamwork with a participative approach during the introduction
of teamwork (cf. LenkungsausschuB) resulting in the election of teamspeakers.
Consequently, it can be predicted, with some confidence, that if an IR system is plu-
ralist, the introduction of teamwork and the selection method for teamleaders will
most likely be democratic and includes: a) the introduction or use of institutionalised
forms of industrial democracy through the process of integrative bargaining and b)
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the election of teamspeakers as a form of industrial democracy on the shopfloor. It is
even more probable that an lR system displaying an unitarist or adversarial patterns
is not likely to have institutions that create industrial democracy that operate with an
integrative bargaining approach. The predicted outcome is non-democratic: a) the
introduction of teamwork on management terms without participation by workers'
representatives and b) the appointment of teamleaders.
bl) Theoretical Assessments
The combination of a theory of transitions and Fox' triadic approach (cf. chapter 3,
Hyman 1994a:167) with Walton and McKersie's collective bargaining model can
move the triadic approach closer to the development of an lR theory to explain cer-
tain phenomena and predict future outcomes.
These models are particularly useful in a comparative study. While the theory of
transition is developed by analysing societies, Fox's IR model is based on the study of
different IR systems and Walton and McKersie's theory is based on the study of 10
cases of collective bargaining behaviour. All not only assist the analysis of IR phe-
nomena, but also the comparability of different IR systems. A theoretical analytical
framework for a comparative IR study provides a sufficient device because not only
does it structure each case study in a similar way, but it also narrows the focus of the
researcher on the same issue in both cases.
c) The Limitations of Predictions
One of the important questions is the level on which this IR theory can be applied.
The theory of transition is based on the existance of two classes; Fox (1974:248) uses
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the triadic approach to analyse the relations between workers' representatives and
management and Walton and McKersie between unions and management as well. One
of the critical limitations for the theory of transition is the fact that IR systems are not
necessarily nation based, but nations with their legal system, traditions and institutions
seem to have a significant influence on the way IR operates at company level.
cl) Variations within a National IR System
In the case of Japanese producers, there seems to be a national model with a strong
tendency towards unitarism and collusion, i.e. the appointment of tearnleaders and an
authoritarian management control of teams. This nation-based model is predominant
at Nissan, Toyota, Honda, Suzuki, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, Mazda, etc. (interview: Mithu-
naga 1992, appendix 0). The Japanese appointment model is also transferred to
Western transplants (Berggren 1991). Ford also provides indicators for the existence
of a company-based model where teamleaders are appointed. It is extremely unlikely
that elected teamspeakers can be found in European Ford operations given Ford's
tradition of being anti-union (Beynon 1973) and the way teamleaders are introduced
in German and British motor-car plants. At GM's CAMI plant (Robertson 1992) in
Canada, teamleaders again are appointed, but CAMTs appointment-model changed to
an election-model, because CAMI's workers fought for democracy (strike). On one
of the rare occasions of a strike at a partly Japanese owned transplant, workers de-
manded elected teamleaders (Berggren 1993:182).
-
Except for Rover (IRS/534 1993) in the UK and GM in Spain (interview: Garcia
1994, appendix 0), which operate a mixture of election and appointment, all GM
plants either elect teamspeakers or appoint teamleaders. A mixed system is a selection
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system that combines the election of team-members with a strong management influ-
ence.
To conclude, a distinct national model cannot be detected in terms of the selection of
teamleaders/teamspeakers; despite the common perception about the influence of na-
tional IR systems on the outcome of the transition towards teamwork (Turner 1991).
A national model is the exception rather then the rule. However it is possible to make
some generalisations, i.e. in Germany an election model dominates, while in England
an appointment model prevails. Japan alone provides a homogeneous national model,
because all teamleaders in Japanese car manufacturers are appointed.
c2) Variations within a Company IR System
After examining the pattern of national models it is important to investigate company
models. There are companies that either only elect teamspeakers or only appoint
them. Volvo universally supports elections (Berggren 1992). Often single plants
within the same multi-national company operate different selection processes within a
single country. GM's German plants have both systems: GM-Eisenach appoints, while
GM-West elects. Within General Motors Europe (GME), there are also different sys-
tems. GME consists of plants in Germany, Britain, Spain, Belgium, etc. While Ger-
man GM plants usually have elected teamspeakers, British GM plants have appointed
teamleaders. GM is the most interesting research area for a study of teamleaders not
because GM is the world's biggest car producer, but because of its diversity.
272
c3) National and Company Systems of IR
German industrial relations have a tendency towards regulation at a national level,
which is expressed in a high degree of national jurification. One could call this norma-
tive or state supported pluralism. This focus on consensus resolution (integrative
bargaining) creates the legitimacy and the high-trust of the German IR system. A di-
versity of interests is recognised and acknowledged by an institutionalised forms of
industrial democracy and IR shows pluralist patterns. Typically, large corporations
lean towards a democratic version of teamwork with the election of teamspeakers in
all German owned motor-car manufacturers. The main exceptions, however, are for-
eign-owned companies that seem to have a wider choice on the issue of teamleader
selection. Only foreign-owned GM-Eisenach and Ford has an appointment system.
In the USA, traditionally the industrial relations system can be seen as showing pat-
tern of an adversarial relationship, but with an element of legal regulation of rights
disputes. Typically in an industry with large corporations such as motor-car manufac-
turing Galbraith's (1980: 115) concept of countervailing power applies. The strength
of organised labour in the car industry forces management to accept demands for
regulation. In the US motor-car industry, however, the arrival of Japanese producers,
the recession of the 1970s and 1980s, the transfer of financial capital to locations like
Mexico and the exclusion of unions in Japanese-owned transplants forced unions to
concession bargaining to achieve mutual survival. Throughout this period unions re-.
mained highly organised in the motor-car industry (Kochan et al. 1984, Katz 1985).
As a result and in contrast to Germany's normative pluralism (legal regulation by the
state), the frame of reference of industrial relations in American-owned motor-car
manufacturers could be labelled pragmatic pluralism (voluntarily regulated between
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monopolised capital and industrial unions). This has led to a democratic version of
teamwork with the election of teamleaders.
British industrial relations show a more diverse picture. Despite the rhetoric of plural-
ism in the 1990s, there is still a strong underlying adversarial tradition in many motor-
car plants. Industrial relations in Britain in the motor-car industry of the 1990s could
be described as sophisticated modern (cf. Fox 1974:302). Purcell & Sisson (1984)
explain this as support for unions and stewards where appropriate (cf. Purcell & Ahl-
strand 1994:197). With a move towards a policy of New Realism (i.e. a strong move
away from adversarialism), management's approach may gain control. As a result an
examination of British motor-car manufacturers reveals a diverse picture, of demo-
cratic and non-democratic types of teamwork with elections and appointments of
teamleaders.
In summary, there is only one clear cut national system of industrial relations, which
has a clearly defmed teamwork strategy and that is in Japan. Other nations and com-
panies are very diverse. However, there is a clear link between a national industrial
relations system and the industrial relations system of motor-car companies that are
home-owned. In other words, a company which is home-owned and is located in an
IR system that shows a pluralist frame of reference is likely to produce a democratic
version of teamwork. If a company is foreign-owned and is located in an IR system
-
with a pluralist frame of reference, it is less likely to have a democratic version of
teamwork. Management in such a company has a wider choice compared with a
home-owned company. In order to achieve a pluralist frame of reference, an industrial
relations system needs either nonnative pluralism or countervailing power. If an IR
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system lacks normative pluralism or lacks countervailing power the outcome for the
teamwork system is unlikely to be democratic.
c4) A unitarist, pluralist or adversarial System of IR
Since Fox (1966, 1974) formulated his triadic approach, there have been several
modifications to his system. The most recent and most sophisticated amendment of
Fox's model was suggested by Purcell & Ahlstrand (1994). In other words, IR has
proven to be far more complex then the simple triadic model originally suggested. It
can never be said that actors in one approach always behave within the frame of refer-
ence in which they are supposed to behave.
In the two case studies of this thesis, IR actors did not behave consistently within one
frame of reference. Neither have the two case studies been pure and uncomplicated
examples which fit Fox's frame of reference. The reality is that one predominates on
one occasion and another frame of reference predominates on another occasion.
Vauxhall's IR system did not demonstrate a purely adversarial approach and Opel's
IR system did not demonstrate a purely pluralist approach. In the case of Vauxhall,
IR showed the dominance of an adversarial and distributive bargaining approach.
However, the early participation of workers' representatives on the JPC was not a
sign of an adversarial approach. Management's initiative for a JPC seemed to repre-
sent an attempt to establish institutionalised industrial democracy with integrative
bargaining to mediate between both sides. As they participated on the JPC for some
months, Vauxhall's stewards also showed a willingness to move from an adversarial
and low-trust frame of reference to the high-trust pluralist frame of reference. Both
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management and unions however failed ultimately to abandon the adversarial and
distributive bargaining approach.
As at Vauxhall, Opel's works council and workplace representatives also moved be-
tween different ER approaches. While the overall pattern of behaviour of IR actors can
be broadly described as pluralist, Opel's management, at times, moved towards an
adversarial frame of reference and into distributive bargaining by cancelling several
company agreements. Workplace representatives reacted in a similar way by moving
away from a pluralist towards an adversarial frame of reference and organising a
strike at the paint-shop. To conclude, neither in the Opel nor in the Vauxhall case are
there pure example of the triadic categories. Unless an IR system can be clearly
shown to have predominant characters of one of the three frames of reference, a pre-
diction on future developments is limited.
c5) Space for Contingency
As is the case in certain IR systems, not all teamwork systems are either completely
democratic or completely non-democratic. Despite the fact that most cases of the se-
lection of tearnleaders/teamspeakers showed one distinct system, some cases showed
the existence of a mixed system. The prime example of this is Rover (UK) because it
has a system whereby teamleaders are selected by management but workers are al-
lowed to vote for one of the selected candidates. This system is a mixture of appoint-
--
ment and elections.
Limitations of the theory are not only to be found in the lack of conformity in terms of
teams structures but also in the behaviour of IR actors within a certain frame of refer-
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ence. They are also be found in the predicted outcomes, because not all systems show
a clear outcome. While no behaviour of an IR actors can exist within a pure frame of
reference, there are systems that do not lead to a pure outcome either democratic or
non-democratic. This limits the use of this theoretical framework to predict outcomes,
according to this theory this can only be done when an IR system shows strong pat-
terns of one or another frame of reference. Unless a clear frame of reference can be
detected, predictions about an outcome for teamwork are limited.
c6) Probabilities
All attempts to apply the triadic categories of IR to a broader context in order to test
their wider validity encounters the same problems as in the two comparative case
studies. There is certainly no clear national or company model which universally ap-
plies to the introduction of new forms of work organisation such as teamwork. In fact
companies show a flexibility of approach in introducing teamwork (cf. GME) which is
dependent on their awareness of the existence of different IR models; some elements
of which suit them but which on the whole they do little to change. While there is then
no absolutely pure or static IR system which is unitarist, pluralist or adversarial, ei-
ther in terms of nation, company or, indeed, within one plant, there is still a high de-
gree of probability that where an IR system is weighted towards one approach then
the introduction of any new form of representation in IR will be heavily influenced by
the traditional system. New representational forms will tend to exist alongside the old
ones either in an adversarial relationship (Vauxhall) or in a more comfortable pluralist
manner (Opel) but they do not radically alter the old system. In the exceptional case,
where it could be argued that the introduction of teamwork changed an IR system
(CAMI), it was solely because one of the adversarial actors (workers) gained the up-
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per hand over the other adversarial actor (management) through an act of adversar-
ialism (strike) and moved the IR system into a more participative or pluralist model; a
change, it is interesting to note that was short-lived. It seems, then, that despite a
certain degree of fluidity within IR systems the probability of predicting outcomes
from a knowledge of an existing IR system is extremely high not only in specific in-
dustries like the motor-car industry but also in many other industrial situations.
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Appendix
(A) Interview Questions for Company visits (Vauxhall Luton)
Question for Luton
1. The Company
1.1.	 Starting year and history of the plant?
1.2.	 Position inside GM-Europe?
1.3.	 Position inside GM world wide?
1.4.	 Number of shops inside the plant?
1.5.	 Tasks or name of the shops?
1.6.	 Operating task or which car and output?
1.7.	 Mode of operation (cell, dock, line etc.)?
1.8.	 Which work time and shift working pattern can be found at the plant?
2. The social structure of the plant?
2.1.	 How many workers?
2.2.	 White collar and blue collar proportion?
2.3.	 Production worker and skilled worker?
2.4.	 How many workers are inside each shop?
3. Trade Union Representation? 
3.1.	 Which unions are in the plant?
3.2.	 Which areas are covered by which unions?
3.3.	 How many shop stewards has each union?
3.4.
	 How do they get elected?
3.5.	 How often do they meet?
3.6.	 How many Betiebsrá te and Vertrauensleute are there?
3.7.	 How do they get elected?
3.8.	 How often do they meet?
3.9.	 Is there a committee of joint shop stewards?
3.10. How often does it meet?
3.11. How is the outside contact to the various unions officials?
3.12. Is there any union connection to other GM-plants in GB?
3.13. Is there any contact to GM-plants within Europe and in the USA?
3.14. Is there any contact to other Car plants?
4. Team Concept
4.1.	 Is teamwork introduced?
4.2.	 In which areas of the plant teamwork is introduced?
4.3.	 How long does teamwork exist?
4.4.	 How teamwork was introduced?
4.5.	 What was the reaction of the workers, the foreman/Meisters and managers towards
teamwork?
4.6.	 Are there agreements between trade unions and the company concerning the issue
of teamwork?
4.7.	 On which level (plant, regional, national) are this agreements?
4.8.	 How many members has each team in which area of production and who decided
that?
4.9.	 Are the teams composed of unskilled and skilled workers?
4.10. Is there job rotation within groups?
4.11. Is there job rotation among other groups?
4.12. How defines rotation and how is it organised?
4.13. What are the regulative powers of the team?
4.14. Who defines the boarders of the team's regulative powers?
4.15. In which areas (production, holiday, overtime, shift pattern, absenteeism, work time
etc.) can teams regulate there own affairs?
5. Teams and Representation
5.1.	 How do teams represent themselves?
5.2.	 Do teams have mixed union membership?
5.3.	 If yes, did this cause problems?
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	5.4.	 If yes, which problems did arise and how were there solved?
	
5.5.	 Are there team leaders, or team speakers?
	
5.6.
	 What is the role or task of the team speakers?
	
5.7.	 Who defines the team speakers role or task?
	
5.8.	 Are the team speakers elected or appointed?
	
5.9.	 Who is appointing this team speakers?
5.10. If the team speakers are elected, how did they get elected and who regulates the
election process?
5.11. If the team speakers are elected, how often take election place and who defines the
elected period of the team speakers?
5.12. Who got elected for team speakers?
5.13. In how many cases did shop stewardsNertrauensleute got elected for the position of
team speakers?
5.14. How is the relationship between "non-shop steward team speakers/non-
Vertrauensleute team speakers" and "shop steward team speakersNertrauenslaute
team speakers"?
5.15. Did the team speakers deal with issues which concerns shop stew-
ardsNertrauensleute (or Betriebsrâte) representation?
5.16. Did the existents of "non-shop steward team speakers/non-Vertrauensleute team
speakers" cause problems for the trade unions/Betriebsräte?
5.17. How do the trade unions/Betriebsrdte deal with that?
5.18. Will "non-shop steward team speakers/non-Vertrauensleute team speakers" under-
mine trade union representation?
Thomas Murakami M.A., Univ.of Warwick/SIBS-Phd), December 1992
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(B) Interview Questions for Company visits (Opel FlOsselsheim)
Fracien fOr Opel
1. Das Unternehmen:
1.1.	 Beginn und Geschichte des Untemehmens?
1.2.	 Position des Untemehmens innerhalb General Motors Europa
(Produktionszusammenhãnge)?
1.3.	 Position des Untemehmens innerhalb GM-weltweit
(Produktionszusammenhänge)?
1.4.	 Anzahl der Produktionsabteilungen im Werk?
1.5.	 Produktionsaufgabe und Bezeichnung der jeweiligen Abteilung?
1.6.	 Produziertes Autos und Produktionszahlen?
1.7	 Produktionsverfahren (Zell - Fertigungen, Flie(3band usw.)?
1.8.	 Arbeitszeit und Schichtablaufe im Werk?
2. Sozialstruktur des Werkes
2.1.	 Wieviele Arbeiter/Angestellte sind beschäftigt?
2.2.	 Verháltnis zwischen Arbeitem und Angestellten?
2.3.	 Verháltnis zwischen ungelemten Arbeitem und Facharbeitem?
2.4.	 Wieviele Beschaftigte arbeiten in jeder Produktionsabteilung?
3. Vertretungsstrukturen 
3.1.	 Organ isationsgrad im Werk?
3.2.	 Gibt es unterschiedliche Organisationsstdrken innerhalb des Werkes?
3.3.	 bis 3.5. = Great Britain
3.6.	 Wieviele Betriebsräte und wieviele Vertrauensleute gibt es?
3.7.	 Wie werden diese gewählt?
3.8.	 Wie oft finden Versammlungen der BetriebsrateNertrauensleute stall?
3.9.	 und 3.10. = Great Britain
3.11.	 Wie ist die Zusammenarbeit mit den zustandigen Gewerkschaftsvertretem?
3.12.	 Gibt es Verbindungen zu BetriebsrâteNertrauensleute in anderen General
Motors Werken innerhalb der BRD?
3.13.	 Gibt es Verbindungen zu BetriebsrdteNertrauensleute in General Motors
Werken in Europa oder den USA?
3.14.	 Gibt es Verbindungen zu BetriebsrdteNertrauensleute anderer Automobi-
lunternehmen?
4. Gruppenarbeit
4.1.	 1st Gruppenarbeit eingefahrt?
4.2.	 In welchen Bereichen des Untemehmens wurde Gruppenarbeit eingefahrt?
4.3.	 Wie lange existiert Gruppenarbeit schon?
4.4.	 Wie wurde Gruppenarbeit eingefahrt?
4.5.	 Wie war die Reaktion der Arbeiter, der Meister und der Geschdftsleitung
gegenÜber Gruppenarbeit?
4.6.	 Gibt es eine Betriebsvereinbarung Ober Gruppenarbeit zwischen dem Be-
triebsrat und dem Untemehmen?
4.7.	 Auf welcher Ebene wurde der Vertrag abgeschlossen (Untemehmen, Werk,
usw.)?
4.8.	 Wieviele Mitglieder hat eine Gruppe in welchem Produktionsbereich und
wer entscheidet dart:ter?
4.9.	 Gibt es Gruppen bestehend aus ungelemten Arbeitern und Facharbeitern?
4.10.	 Gibt es Rotation innerhalb der Gruppen?
4.11.	 Gibt es gruppenObergreifende Rotation ?
4.12.	 Wer legt diese Rotation fest?
4.13.	 Welche regulativen Möglichkeiten hat eine Gruppe?
4.14.	 Wer legt die Grenzen der Mäglichkeiten einer Gruppen fest?
4.15. In welchen Bereichen (Produktion, Urlaub, Uberstunden, Schichtarbeit, Ab-
wesenheit, Arbeitszeit usw.) kann die Gruppe ihre eigenen Angelegenheiten
selbst regeln?
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5.	 Gruppenarbeit und Vertretungsstrukturen 
5.1.	 Wie vertreten sich die Gruppen nach auBen?
5.2.	 bis 5.4. = Great Britain
5.5.	 Gibt es Team Leader oder Gruppensprecher?
5.6.	 Was sind Rolle und Aufgaben der Gruppensprecher?
5.7.	 Wer legt diese Rollen und Aufgaben test?
5.8.	 Werden die Gruppensprecher emannt oder gewahlt?
5.9.	 nur in Great Britain
5.10.	 Wie werden die Gruppensprecher gewählt und wer legt diesen Wahlmodus
fest?
5.11.	 Wie oft werden die Gruppensprecher gewahlt und wer legt die Amtszeit
eines Gruppensprechers test?
5.12.	 Wer wurde als Gruppensprecher gewahlt?
5.13.	 In wieviel Fallen wurden Vertrauensleute/Betriebsrate zu Gruppensprechem
gewahlt?
5.14.	 Wie 1st das Verhaltnis zwischen Ex-Vertrauensleuten-Gruppensprechem
und Gruppensprechern, die vorher keine Vertrauensleute waren?
5.15.	 Ubernehmen Gruppensprecher Aufgaben von Vertrauensleu-
ten/Betriebsraten (Kompetenzüberschneidungen)?
5.16.	 Bereiten die "nicht-Vertrauensleute-Gruppensprecher Probleme far die
Vertrauensleute/Betriebsrate?
5.17.	 Wie gehen die Vertrauensleute/Betriebsräte damit urn?
5.18.	 KOnnen die "nicht-Vertrauensleute-Gruppensprecher die Vertretungsstruk-
turen unterlaufen und/oder aushOhlen?
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El Male El Woman0 No Response
0 Yes': No 0 No Response
El Yes El No 0 No Response
0 Yes0 No 0 No Response
El Yes0 No 0 No Response
very much/somewhat/not much/not at all
very much/somewhat/not much/not at all
0	 El	 El	 0
all the time/ often/ once in a while/ never
El
agree	 disagree
El
	
El
El
	
El
(C) Survey Questionnare for the Vauxhall Motors Luton plant
To Team Members
Dear Team Member,
With the following questionnaire, I would like you to answer these questions concerning the concept
of teamwork. This questionnaire is completely anonymous and therefore non of the questions relate
to you personally. We are going to ask questions about team concepts, team-meetings, team leaders
and so on. We are interested in questions of fact and more importantly, we want your opinions on a
range of issues.
Your answers will not be forwarded to Vauxhall Motors Ltd. Your participation in this questionnaire
is completely voluntarily. So, please answer the questions to the best of your ability.
1. Including the team leader how
many people are in your team?
2. How many are woman?
(including the team leader)
3. Is your team leader a woman or a
man?
4. Has the number of people on your
team changed since your last meet-
ing?
5. Details?
6. What do you like about the team
concept at Vauxhall Motors Ltd.?
7. Is there anything you don't like
about the team concept at Vauxhall
Motors Ltd.?
8. Are you required to attend team-
meetings?
9. Do you always attend?
10. Is there a pressing issue that you
team is dealing with now?
11. How much do you like the idea
of working as part of a team?
12. How much do you like being a
member of your team
13. How often have there been seri-
ous disagreements between members
of your team
14. If the answer to 13 is other than
"never", probe what the disagree-
ments were about, how many mem
bers involved, if team leader in-
volved, how the issue was resolved,
etc.?	 --
15. Please read the following list of
statements ad mark wherever you
agree or disagree. All things consid-
ered, working in a team...
a) Helps me do my job better.
b) Gives me a chance to get to know
people.
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all the time / often / once in a while / never
0 0
0 0 0
0 0
-D 0
0
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0
0
0 Yes0 No 0 No Response
0 Yes0 No El No Response
Yes0 No 0 No Response
Yes0 No 0 No Response
c) Is a waste of time.
d) Gives me a chance to raise my
concerns.
e) Helps me feel I'm part of Vaux-
hall.
f) Is a way to get us to work harder.
g) Helps me see how my job fits in
the overall scheme.
h) Gets us all pressuring one an-
other.
i) Gives me a say over how my job is
done.
j) Helps Vauxhall but not me.
k) Allows team members to act to-
gether to express complaints.
16. The next section focuses on the
team leader: For the following series
of questions you are asked to make a
judgement about how often some-
thing happens. There are four
choices.
a) How often do you get along with
your team leader?
b) How often does your team leader
help you with your job?
c) How often does your team leader
co-operate with you?
d) How often do you get the sense
your team leader respects you?
e) How often does your team- leader
pressures you to submit suggestions?
f) How often does your team leader
listen to your ideas about making the
job easier and safer?
g) How often does your team leader
put pressure on you to do your job?
h) How often does your team leader
think more like management than
one of you?
17. Do you think there should be
team leader?
18. Would you like to become team
leader?
19. Do you think team leaders
should be elected?
20. Do you think that team leaders
should be rotated? Do you think that
everyone should get a chance at be-
ing the team leader ?
21. Do you think that the current
system for selecting team leaders is a
fair one?
22. In no, what system would be a
fair one? (Probe seniority)
Yes0 No El No Response
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23. If you thought that you or some-
one on your team was being sub-
jected to some form of on-the-job
harassment or unfair treatment, who
would you most likely turn to in or-
der to get something done?
24. Some people say that when the
team concept has been tried at other
plants the teams work more for the
good of the company than for the
good of the workers. Based on your
experience at Vauxhall would you:
1. your team leader
2. your union representative
3. the personnel department
5. others	
1. agree
2. agree somewhat
3. disagree somewhat
4. disagree
5. no response
25. What do you think about your
team leader's position on the union?
26. What proportion of members of
your team would agree with your
assessment?
27. Is the union a source of argu-
ments or disagreements between the
team and team leader?
28. If yes, when there are disagree-
ments with your team leader over
the union, how often does your team
stick together and challenge the
team leader?
29. If no, in your opinion if there
was a serious disagreement with
your team leader over the union,
how likely would it be for the team
to stick together and challenge the
team leader?
30. Is the union a source of argu-
ments or disagreements between
team members?
The final question:
31. When there is a disagreement
with Vauxhall policy on the union,
does the team leader side with the
team (or team member) or with the
supervisor?
too critical / too supportive / about right
0	 0	 0
almost all/most/about half/some/none/don't know
ED I:00 0
0 Yes0 No 0 No Response
all the times / often / sometimes / never
0	 0	 0	 0
very likely/ likely/ unlikely/ highly unlikely
0 0 0	 0
0 Yes0 No 0 No Response
O 1. sides with the team (or team member)
0 2. sides with the supervisor
O 3. the problem hasn't come up but the team
leader would side with the team.
O 4. the problem hasn't come up but the team
leader would side with the supervisor.
O 5. no response
,764,v,aul,m, ff,liiinzaffbct
Thomas Murakami
University of Warwick, SIBS-PHD, Coventry CV4 7AL
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(D) Survey Questionnare for the Adam Ooel Rüsselsheim plant
An Gruppenmitglieder
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
ich mOchte Sie bitten, die folgenden Fragen kurz zu beantworten. Wie Sie sehen ist der Fragebogen
anonym gehalten. Es gibt keine Fragen zu Ihrer Person. Eine Weitergabe an die Adam Opel AG fin-
det nicht statt. Es werden Ihnen durch die Beantwortung des Fragebogens - die auf Freiwilligkeit
basiert - keine Vor- oder Na.chteile entstehen. Sie kOnnen also ohne Bedenken jede Frage so be-
antworten, wie Sie es fiir zutreffend erachten.
Datum:	 Arbeitsbereich: 	
Name des zustandigen Betriebsrats:. 	
1.Wieviel Mitglieder hat Ihre Gruppe
einschlieBlich des Gruppensprechers?. 	
2.Wieviel*Mitglieder der Gruppe sind Frauen? 	
3.Geschlecht des Gruppensprechers?Mann .Frau
4.Hat sich die Anzahl Threr Grupperunitg1iederJa0Nein.
seit dem letzten Gruppengesprach geandert?.keine Angabe0
5. Warum hat sich die Zahl verandert?. 	
6. Was gefallt Lhnen an Gruppenarbeit?..
	
7. Was gefällt Ihnen an Gruppenarbeit nicht ? 	
8.Wird von Ihnen verlangt an .JaO.Nein0
Gruppengesprachen teilzunehmen?...keine Angabe0
9.Haben Sie bisher an alien ...JaO.NeinO
Gruppengesprachen teilgenorrunen?...keine Angabe
10.Gibt es derzeit emn wichtiges ..JaO.NeinO
Thema in der Gruppe? 	 keine Angabe0
11.Sagt Ihnen die Idee etwas als Tell einer Gruppe zu arbeiten?
ja, sehr Oeigentlich schon Onicht so sehr 0. absolut nicht 0
12.Gefällt es Ihnen als Teil einer Gruppe zu arbeiten?
ja, sehr Oeigentlich schon 0.nicht so sehr 0. absolut nicht 0
13. Wie Oft gab es ernste Meinungsverschiedenheiten innerhalb der GrupPe?
immer 0 oft 0. manchmal 0 nie
14.Wenn eine andere Antwort als "ME" gewahlt wurde, was waren die Griinde
und half der Gruppensprecher die Probleme zu Risen?	
15. Arbeiten in der Gruppe?
Wie beurteilen Sie die folgenden Aussagen:..Zutreffend	 Unzutreffend
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a) Hilft mir meine Arbeit besser zu verrichten...0-0
b) Ich habe die Chance andere Leute kennenzulernen..
1st eine Verschwendung von Zeit 	 0..0
d) Ich kann meine Gedanken auBem 	 0..0
e) HiIft rnir mich als Mercedes-Mitarbeiter zu fahlen.. 0..0
f) Macht die Arbeit schwerer 	 0 CI
g) Dadurch verstehe ich wie meine Arbeit in der
gesamten ArbeitsprozeB einzuordnen ist...0.. CI
h) Erzeugt Arbeitsdruck in der Gruppe.... 0.. CI
i) Ich kann iiber die Art meiner Tatigkeit mitbestirnmen.. CI.. CI
j) Hi1ft der Mercedes-Benz AG, aber nicht mir...CI..0
k) Ermliglicht den Grupperunitgliedem das gemeinsame
Vorbringen von Problemen 	 CI CI
16. Gruppens_precher: 
(bitte nur emn Feld ankreuzen)....immeroftmanchmalnie
a) Wie oft sprechen Sie mit Ihrem Gruppensprecher. Cl CI Cl Cl
b) Wie oft hilft er der Gruppe bei der Arbeit. C100 CI
c) Wie oft arbeitet er mit der Gruppe gemeinsam. CI CI CI Cl
d) Wie oft denke Sie, Ihr Gr-Sprecher respektiert Sie CI CIO Cl
e) Wie oft verlangt er KVP-Vorschlage von Ihnen. 11 CI CI Cl
t) Wie oft hOrt Ihr Gruppensprecher zu, wenn
Sie Vorschlage zur Arbeitserleichterung machen.0 CIO CI
g) Wie oft fordert Ihr Gr-Sprecher mehr Arbeit von Ihnen0 0 0 0
h) wie oft denkt Ihr Gruppensprecher mehr wie
die Geschaftsleitung als wie die Arbeiter..0 0 0 0
17. Glauben Sic, es sollte Gruppensprecher geben?Ja0 Nein CI
keine Angabe CI
18. MOchte Sie Gruppensprecher werden?. JaCINein
keine Angabe
19.Glauben Sic, Gruppensprecher sollten..JaCINein0
gewahlt werden keine Angabe0
20.Sollte die Tatigkeit des Gruppensprechers.JaCINein
rotieren keine Angabe0
21.Denken Sic, daB die gegenwartige Regelung derJa0Nein0
Wahl der Gruppensprecher fair ist? keine Angabe 0
22. Wenn nicht, welche Regelung ware dann besser?
23.Wenn emn Gruppenmitglied unfair 1. Meinen Gruppensprecher.0
behandelt wfirde, an wen warden Sie2. Meinen Vertrauensmann.CI
sich wenden um dies abzustellen?3. Meinen Betriebsrat..CI
4. Meinen Meister.. CI
5. Personalabteilung.. CI
6. andere	
24. Es wurde in anderen Firmen gesagt,l. stinunt..
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daB Gruppenarbeit mehr dem 2. ja, vielleicht..0
Unternehmen dient als den Arbeitern?3. eher nicht..0
4. stimmt nicht..0
5. keine Angaben.. 0
25.Welche Position vertritt Hirer Meinungl. zu kritisch..0
na.ch Ihr Gruppensprecher gegentiber2. zu unterstiitzend.0
dem Betriebsrat/Vertrauensmann?3. gerade richtig..0
4. keine Angaben.. 0
26.Wieviel Ihrer Gruppenmitglieder wiirdenl. etwa alle..0
Ihrer Ansicht zustinunen 2. etwa die Halfte. 0
3. niemand. 0
4. keine Angaben.. 0
27.Ist der Betriebsrat/Vertrauensmann emn 1. ja...0
Grund von Unstinunigkeiten zwischen der 2. nein...0
Gruppe und dem Gruppensprecher3. keine Angaben.. 0
28.Wenn J A, wie oft steht Ihre 1. inuner...0
Gruppe zusammen gegen den2. oft...0
Gruppensprecher? 3. manclunal ... 0
4. nie ... 0
29.Wenn NEIN, ware es 1. sehr wahrscheinlich. 0
wahrscheinlich, das die Gruppe ihre2. wahrscheinlich..0
Meinung gegen den Gruppensprecher 3. unwahrscheinlich.0
vertritt? 4. sehr unwahrscheinlich. 0
30.Ist der BetriebsratNertrauensleute1. ja...0
emn Grund von Konflikten zwischen2. nein... 0
den Gruppenmitgliedern? 3. keine Angaben.. 0
Zur letzten Frage:
31.Wenn es zwischen der Mercedes-Benz auf der einen Seite und dem
Betriebsrat/der Gewerkschaft auf der anderen Seite zu Konflikten kornmt,
wem schlieSt sich dann Ihr Gruppensprecher am ehesten an?
1.der Gruppe und den anderen Gruppemnitgliedern....0
2. dem Meister 	 0
3.Bis jetzt trat dieses Problem noch nicht auf,
aber der Gruppensprecher wiirde sich
wahrscheinlich der Gruppe anschlieBen 	 0
4.Bis jetzt trat dieses Problem noch nicht auf,
aber der Gruppensprecher wiirde sich
wahrscheinlich dem Meister anschlieBen
	 0
-
Danke fOr Ihre Mitarbeit
Thomas Murakami, University of Warwick, IRRU, GB-Coventry CV4 7AL
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(E) The Teamwork Agreement of the Vauxhall Luton plant
Working together to win
Vauxhall's team work agreement is defined in a small book issued by Vauxhall's Luton gen-
eral head office. The document, wich is signed by all unions and the management regulated
the team concept in the following statements:
a. Concept:
The Trade Unions, as the representatives of employees, have an integral part to play in this
agreement. The team concept is a critical part of the Quality Network Production System
that will allow the Company to be a producer of World Class Quality products at a competi-
tive cost thereby securing customer satisfaction and contributing to the long term viability of
the Company and long term job security for its employees. The key ingredient in the con-
cept is that employees have an opportunity to impact the success of the business through
decision making, pride in their work and co-operative efforts among each other to continue
to improve the value provided to our customers. This process requires joint participations
mutual trust, respect and recognises employees as the most important investment and re-
source and a critical part of the operational process. The functional catalyst of the team
concept, therefore. are the team members and team leaders who share responsibilities.
All team members (5-15) share the responsibility for:
• Work performed by the team, subject to any work measurement system in operation
at the time
• Rotating jobs within the team and, where necessary, between teams within job
classification
• Ensuring quality of team output
• Maintaining a safe clean and tidy work area
Continually striving for improvement in operations, cost, quality and productivity, e.g. scrap
and waste reduction, keeping quality and maintenance records, etc.
• Establishing and achieving team goals as set out in the objectives.
• Acquiring job knowledge to fulfil all jobs within the team with adequate training.
Being a self-sufficient team by performing duties previously performed by other
disciplines, e.g. self-inspection, repair, minor maintenance subject to time allow-
ance.
• Developing efficient work methods in conjunction with support activities and display-
ing those methods n the workplace.
• Attending and participating in team-meetings as required within working hours.
• Team-meetings outside of shift hours will be determined and agreed within the
Team. Attendance at such meetings will be on a voluntary basis and without any
form of prejudice towards any non-participating team member.
The team involves employees working together as a natural work
group. An assembly line team could be composed solely of employees working together
with full flexibility to achieve schedules and improve efficiency and quality. Similarly as-
sembly teams also work together as part of a larger team unit to achieve maximum positive
affect from all groups of the operation. e.g.:
• Assembly team
• Material handling team
• Maintenance team
• Quality Assurance
Linking team together (team support or work together):
Even recognising full individual flexibility teams can also be composed of employees from
one or more occupational classifications as required to accomplish a task. These teams, for
the purpose of problem-solving, will be constructed on a temporary basis, from the various
classifications in order to overcome these problems, e.g. recurring equipment breakdowns,
e.g.
A = Manufacturing Staff - Assembly Team
B = Manufacturing Staff-MPC.
C = Manufacturing Support - Maintenance/Technical Support Staff
D = Manufacturing Staff - Quality Assurance
with each employee carrying out any task up to their skill level and within safety statutes.
b) Team Leaders:
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This responsible position provides further growth opportunities for team employees to assist
them in developing their full potential. The Team leader is an integral part of the team and
has a full and active role within that Team. In addition to the responsibilities of a team
member the team leader will also have responsibilities for
Knowledge and ability to perform all operations in the team.
Dedication and ability to support the team with overall guidance from the Supervi-
sor.
Active liaison with other team leaders, Supervisors and such other employees, e.g.
Shop Steward as the position requires.
Encouraging individuals and the team to meet their responsibilities in:
Quality, Cost, Productivity, Scrap reduction, Training, Job rotation, Performance to sched-
le, afety. .
All aspects of how teams and team leader concepts work are of interest to the Trade Unions
and all representational procedures will apply where appropriate:
Problem-solving in the areas of employee job related problems.
Obtaining and co-originating necessary supplies, required maintenance and techni-
cal support to ensure continuous efficient operations,
-	 Accepting responsibility for the working operation of the team.
-Accommodating employee absences where appropriate.
-Communicating job related information to team members.
The Unions accept that the Company will establish through agreement a selection
criteria for team leaders. The selection of team leaders will be on the basis of this
agreed criteria. Applications will be sought and all applicants will be interviewed.
Note:
Employees who are group teaders at the time of signing this Agreement, and are not se-
lected as team leaders will retain their rate of pay until, and subject to, further discussion on
Salary/pay rates and progression.
c) Supervisors:
The manufacturing supervisor will be responsible for providing the leadership of a small
number of teams. The supervisor will maintain responsibility for such matters as develop-
mental/ disciplinary/corrective action, engineering changes, revamps and administration of
salary/wage changes, etc.
The supervisor will have responsibility for selecting new team members, establishing per-
formance standards in conjunction with other supervisors/managers within the units and for
reviewing employee's performance for the purpose of personal development and, where
necessary, wage progression.
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(F) Questionnaire for Team-Autonomy (England)
The Team Concept with the Factory
Please tick the following fields where appropriate ot define the role of
your team within the factory organisation:
Priority should be given to teams in fmal assembly.
TASK	 Participation:
No Participation
by the team
Team Participation
in Decision
Co-Decision
Making
Autonomous
Team
Decisions
1) Selection of 0 0 0 0
Teamleaders
2) New Members in
the Team 0 0 0 0
3) Distribution of
Work within the
Team 0 0 0 0
4) Time Flexibility 0 0 0 0
5) Acceptance of
additional work 0 0 0 0
6) Representation
outside of the Team 0 0 0 0
7) Methods of Pro-
duction
0 0 0 0
8) Goal of Produc-
tion (Output) 0 0 0 0
9) Goals of Produc-
tion (Quality) 0 0 0 0
Thank you very much for taking time to answer the question above.
Thomas Murakami
SIBS-PHD
University of Warwick
GB-Coventry CV4 7AL
FAX: + 44 203 - 52 4148 oder 52 4628
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Bitte schicken Sie
den ausgefiillten
Fragebogen an
mich zurtick:
-
(G) Questionnaire for Team Autonomy (Germany)
Fragen zur Gruppenarbeit
Mit diesem kleinen Fragebogen mtichte ich Sie herzlich bitten, die nachstehenden Fragen gemaB der
gegenwdrtigen Praxis der Gruppenarbeit in Ihrem Werk zu beantworten VI. Im Mittelpunkt meines
Interesses steht dabei die Produlaions-Gruppe in der Vor- oder Endmontage. Sollten Gruppen
(mtiglicherweise Projektgruppen) mit unterschiedlichen Ausformungen existieren, so sollte die
Gruppe ausgewahlt werden, die am langsten existiert und die greiBte Erfahrung sanuneln konnte.
Ihr Name: Firma: Datum:
Aufgabenbereich: Die Gruppe hat:
kein EinfluB MitSprache Mitentscheidung Cauppenentscheiclung
Fragen der
Gruppenleitung	 0 0 0 0
Fragen von
Neueinstellungen 0 0 0 0
Fragen der
Aufgabenverteilung 0 0 0 0
Fragen der
Produktionsmethoden.. 0 0 0 0
Fragen der
Arbeitszeitgestaltung... 0 0 0 0
Annahme von zusatz-
lichen Arbeiten/überschuB 0 0 0 0
Fragen der Vertretung
nach auBen... 0 0 0 0
Quantitative
Produktionsziele.... 0 0 0 0
Qualitative
Produktionsziele 	 0 0 0 0
Haben Sie allerbesten Dank fiir Ihre Zeit und Bemilhungen und besonders dafiir, daB Sie mir beim
meiner Forschung behilflich waren.
Thomas Murakami
SIBS-PHD
University of Warwick
GB-Coventry CV4 7AL
FAX: + 44 203 -524148  oder 52 4628
292
(II) The Teamwork Agreement of Opel-ROsselsheim (German Originall
Betriebsvereinbarung Nr. 179
Gruppenarbeit
Zwischen der Geschaftsleitung und dem von den Betriebsräten der Werke ROsselsheim,
Bochum, Kaiserslautem und des PrOffeldes Dudenhofen bevollmachtigten Gesamtbe-
triebsrat der Adam Opel AG wird folgende Betriebsvereinbarung zur Anwendung der Grup-
penarbeit geschlossen.
PrAambel
In der Adam Opel AG wird Gruppenarbeit eingeffihrt, um die Wellbewerbsfahigkeit des Un-
ternehmens zu erhalten und zu steigern sowie den Mitarbeitem/innen verbesserte individu-
elle Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten im Rahmen ihrer betrieblichen Thtigkeiten anzubieten.
Die Kenntnisse und Erfahrungen der Arbeitnehmer/innen sollen zur Verbesserung der Arbe-
itsabldufe, der Arbeitsplatze, der Arbeitsumgebung sowie der Arbeitsbedingungen genutzt
werden, indem die Arbeitnehmer/innen an der betrieblichen Gestaltung von Arbeitsabläufen
beteiligt werden.
Personelle Veranderungen durch Produktivitätsverbesserung sollen unter anderem zur Ver-
besserung der Produktqualitat und zur Mitarbeiterqualifizierung genutzt werden.
Wesentliche Ziele der Gruppenarbeit sind der kontinuierliche VerbesserungsprozeB (KVP),
Steigerung von Flexibilitdt und Einsatzbereitschaft der Mitarbeiter/innen sowie ErhOhung der
Arbeitszufriedenheit und der Motivation.
Wird durch Produktivitätssteigerung die GruppengrOBe reduziert, werden freiwerdende Mi-
tarbeiterlinnen an Arbeitsplâtzen eingesetzt, die nach MOglichkeit hOherwertiger sind bzw.
Entwicklungspotential bieten, mindestens jedoch der gegenwärtigen Wertigkeit entsprechen.
Durch MaBnahmen aus dieser BV dart kein Gruppenmitglied weniger Lohn oder Gehalt er-
halten oder entlassen werden.
1. Geltungsbereich
Diese Betriebsvereinbarung gilt Mr alle Beschäftigten der Werke ROsselsheim, Bochum,
Kaiserslautern und des Pniffeldes Dudenhofen.
2. Grundprinzipien der Gruppenarbeit
GruppengrOBe:
Gruppen bestehen in der Regel aus 8 bis 15 Mitarbeiternfinnen.
Gruppenberelch:
Jede Gruppe arbeitet in einem sinnvoll abgrenzbaren Tätigkeitsbereich.
GruppenzuaehörIgkeit:
Die Gruppen sollen in ihrer angetroffenen Zusammensetzung gebildet werden. Urn die Kon-
tinuitdt der Gruppe zu gewahrleisten, sind die Gruppen personell so zu besetzen, daB
Kurzverleihungen aufgrund unterschiedlicher Anwesenheiten und Programmschwankungen
mOglichst vermieden werden.
Aufgabenalele der Gruppe:
Die Gruppe hat gemeinsame Aufgaben und Ziele, die in Absprache mit dem betrieblichen
Vorgesetzten festgelegt werden. Es sind dies u.a.:
- Selbstarganisation bei
der intemen Aufgabenverteilung
der Pausenregelung
der SchichtObergabe
der Durchfahrung von Gruppengesprdchen
der Verbesserung des Arbeitsschutzes
der Uberwindung hoher Arbeitsteilung
der DurchfUhrung der Urlaubsplanung
der Freiplanung von Maschinen im Rahmen eines vorgegebenen
Programmes
- ErhOhung der Arbeitszufriedenheit und Motivation
- Erfilillung des Produktionsprogrammes und der Qualitatsanforderungen
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- Ausgleich von Leistungsschwankungen
- Kostenganstige Produktion
- Optimale Maschinen- und Anlagennutzung einschlieBlich der abertragenen Instandhal-
tungsund Wartungsarbeiten (kleinere Reparaturen) und kleineren EinrichttAtigkeiten
- Kontinuierlicher VerbesserungsprozeB (KVP) zur Vereinfachung und Erleichterung der
Arbeit und Optimierung der Fertigung. Daraus resultierende Veränderungen finden Ein-
gang in die Arbeitsvorschrift
- Anschauliche Darstellung von Arbeitsplatz und Arbeitsablauf nach einem einheitlichen
Verfahren
- Durchfahrung von Verbesserungen im Arbeitsbereich der Gruppe
- Sicherstellung des Informationsflusses (untereinander, zu vor- bzw. nachgeschalteten
Bereichen und zum Meister/in)
- Einarbeitung neuer Mitarbeiter/innen durch gegenseitiges Training
und entsprechendem Zeitausgleich
- Integration von Behinderten, Gleichgestellten und nicht voll einsatzfähigen Werksange-
hOrigen
- Ordnung und Sauberkeit am Arbeitsplatz
- FOrderung des kreativen, innovativen und selbstAndigen Denkens
und Handelns bei den Mitarbeiter/Innen
- Mitgestaltung der Arbeitsinhalte, Arbeitsbedingungen, Arbeitsorganisation und Arbeitsum-
gebung
Personelle MaBnahmen, die aufgrund der Ergebnisse von Gruppenarbeit/Gesprächen realis-
iert werden sollen, setzen die Zustimmung des Betriebsrates nach BetrVG voraus.
Personenbezogene Tests, Prafungen, Leistungskontrolle und Beurteilungen dutch die
Gruppe finden nicht stall.
Grumenoesorâche:
Gruppengesprâche sind Arbeitsbesprechungen von bis zu einer Stunde und sollen einmal
wOchentlich stattfinden.
Die Gruppe bestimmt den Zeitpunkt des Gruppengespräches unter Beracksichtigung der
Fertigungssituation und in Abstimmung mit dem Vorgesetzten. Dies gilt besonders far
schicht- und bereichsabergreifende Gesprdche.
Das Gespräch findet mOglichst in der normalen Arbeitszeit staff. Massen die Grup-
pengesprdche fertigungs- oder programmbedingt auBerhalb der Schichtzeit stattfinden,
werden sie als Mehrarbeit vergatet.
Die Gruppe 1st frei sowohl in der Wahl der Themen im Hinblick auf die oben definierten
Aufgaben als auch in der Frage, wen sie zu den Gruppengesprdchen einladt. Fach- und
Fahrungskräfte sowie der Betriebsrat werden zur Klärung spezifischer Fragen hinzuge-
zogen.
Vorgesetzte, Betriebsrat sowie Fachabteilungen kiinnen in Absprache mit der Gruppe
spezielle Themen in die Gruppengesprâche einbringen und bei deren Behandlung tell-
nehmen.
Zielerreichunq
Die Weiterentwicklung der Gruppe im Hinblick auf ihre Zielerreichung wird dutch Eigenkon-
trolle anhand vorgegebener Parameter durchgefahrt und anschaulich dargestellt.
Parameter kOnnen 'z.B. sein:
- Abbau der Monotonie
- Anlagen- und produktbezogene Oualifizierung
- Arbeitsbedingungen
- Arbeitssicherheit
- Ausbringung
- Belastungsausgleich innerhalb der Gruppe
- Kosterv,-z.B. Nacharbeit, AusschuB Hilfsstoffe usw.
- Maschinenverfagbarkeit
- Menschengerechte ArbeitsplAtze (Arbeitsplatzgestaltung)
- Qualitat
Entlohnunq:
Die Entlohnung far Gruppenarbeit erfolgt im Opel-Prâmienlohn auf der Basis der BV-Nr. 180
und richtet sich innerhalb der Gruppen nach den Anforderungen der jeweiligen Atte-
itsplatze.
Personalzubilligung bel Grumenarbelt:
Die Arbeitszutellung erfolgt auf Gruppenbasis.
Die Ubergangszeit bis zur Einfahrung des neuen Systems und Details zur Personalzubil-
ligung bei Gruppenarbeit sind zu regeln.
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Flexibilitat innerhalb der Grupe:
Die Gruppe sorgt Mr die Erreichung und Aufrechterhaltung der festgelegten Flexibilitât zur
Erf()Hung der Arbeitsaufgabe. Im Rahmen der vorgegebenen Flexibilitãt soil deshalb
zwischen den Arbeitsplatzen gewechselt werden.
Jedem Gruppenmitglied muB die Mäglichkeit der individuellen Entwicklung im Rahmen der
betrieblichen Tätigkeit und Notwendigkeit gegeben werden. Die Gruppe dart niemanden in
dieser Entwicklung hindern.
Neben der internen Flexibilität muB in den Gruppen eine Obergreifende Flexibilitat aufge-
baut werden, so daB Gruppenmitglieder auch in den 'Mich vor- bzw. nachgeschalteten
Nachbargruppen arbeiten kOnnen. Dadurch sollen Verleihungen vermieden werden. Der/die
zustãndige Meister/in regt dies an und stimmt dies zwischen den Gruppen ab.
3. Gruppensarecher/in
Der/die Gruppensprecher/in vertritt die Gruppe nach innen und auBen. Er/sie handelt im
Auftrag der Gruppe und hat keine Weisungs- und Disziplinarbefugnis.
Der/die Gruppensprecher/in wird in freier geheimer Wahl mit einfacher Mehrheit zundchst
auf 6 Monate und später bei Wiederwahl auf emn Jahr aus der Mitte der Gruppe gewdhlt.
Vor der Wahl muB die Gruppe ausfahrlich Ober die Aufgaben, Rechte und Pflichten des
Gruppensprechers/der Gruppensprecherin informiert werden. Eine Abwahl des Gruppen-
sprechers/der Gruppensprecherin durch die Gruppe ist in geheimer Wahl mit einfacher
Mehrheit jederzeit meglich.
Ein Stellvertreter/in wird auch in geheimer Wahl gewAhlt. Er/sie vertritt den/die Gruppen-
sprecherfin bei Abwesenheit, insbesondere bei Krankheit, Urlaub etc.
FOr die Dauer der Funktion des Gruppensprechers/der Gruppensprecherin wird ihm/ihr eine
Zulage von DM 0,50 pro Stunde gezahlt, die auch der/die Vertreter/in ab der ersten Stunde
Mr den eingesetzten Zeitraum erhdlt. Eine Anpassung der Zulage erfolgt bei TariferhOhun-
gen.
Neben der völligen Einbindung in die Arbeit der Gruppe Obernimmt der/die Gruppenspre-
cher/in u. a. die folgenden Aufgaben:
- Motivieren der Gruppe
- Ausgleich von Meinungsverschiedenheiten
- Sicherstellung des Informationsaustausche5
- VerfoIgen der Gruppenziele
- UnterstOtzen des Meisters/der Meisterin
- Leitung der Gruppengesprdche
Der/die Gruppensprecher/in erhält die erforderliche Zeit zur Erf011ung seiner/ihrer Aufgaben.
4. Funktion des der Meisters/in 
Die Gruppenarbeit erfordert eine Verânderung der FOhrungsaufgabe des/der Meisters/in.
Schwerpunkte seiner/ihrer Fahrungsfunktion verlagern sich zur sozialen, pädagogischen
Seite. Weitere Schwerpunkte sind:
- Betreuung seinerfihrer Gruppen
- Vorgabe und Vereinbarung von Zielen
- UnterstOtzung der Gruppe zur Erreichung der Ziele
- UnterstOtzung der Gruppe bei der Festlegung von MaBnahmen,wenn
erkennbar wird, daB die Zielerreichung in Frage gestellt ist
- Gruppen- und bereichsObergreifende Koordination und Kommunikation
- Informationsaustausch Ober die Gruppe hinaus
- UnterstOtzung bei ProblemlOsungen insbesondere im Rahmen des
kontinuierlichen Verbesserungsprozesses (KVP)
- UnterstOtzung im QualifizierungsprozeB
- Mitarbeiterbeurteilung
- Personaleinsatz
Der Personaleinsatz Ober die Gruppe hinaus obliegt der Verantwortung des Meisters/der
Meisterin. Die Besetzung der einzelnen Arbeitspldtze innerhalb der Gruppe wird weitestge-
hend auf Verschlag der Gruppe selbst geregelt und bestimmt. Der Meister/die Meisterin
berdt gegebenenfalls die Gruppe dabei.
5. Training
Vor Beginn der Gruppenarbeit werden alle Beteiligten auf ihre zuldinftigen Aufgaben
vorbereitet.
Gruppensprecher/innen, Stellvertreter/innen und Meisterfinnen werden zusatzlich in Techni-
ken zur Moderation, Konfliktbewdltigung, Fahrungswissen u.ã. ausgebildet. Quali-
fizierungsplane werden in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Betriebsrat erstellt und bedOrfen des-
sen Zustimmung.
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Die Bereichsleitung stellt unter Beteiligung der Meister/innen im Rahmen der gegebenen
KapazitAt die Einhaltung und Durchfahrung dieser Qualifizierung sicher.
6. Verbesserungsvorschldge
Ein Verbesserungsvorschlag, der aus der Gruppe gemacht wird, gilt als Gruppenvorschlag
und wird in der BV zum VV-Wesen geregelt.
7. Mitwirkung und MItbestImmunasrechte des Betrlebsrates
Urn die Mitbestimmungsrechte wahmehmen zu können, wird der Betriebsrat Ober alle
MaBnahmen rechtzeitig informiert.
Die Rechte des Betriebsrates nach Gesetz, TarifvertrAgen und Betriebsvereinbarungen
bleiben unbenihrt.
8. Einfahrung
Geschaftsleitung und Gesamtbetriebsrat haben das Ziel, die Gruppenarbeit
schnellstmOglichst in alien Bereichen der Adam Opel AG einzufÜhren. Dies erfolgt im Rah-
men der vorstehenden Regelungen auf Ortlicher Ebene in Abstimmung mit den Be-
triebsrâten.
Die flachendeckende Einfahrung wird sich Ober einen Iângeren Zeitraum erstrecken.
Geschdftsleitung und Gesamtbetriebsrat sind sich deshalb einig, daB Aufgaben und Ziele
der Gruppenarbeit, so wie sie in Ziffer 2 beschrieben werden, sinngemdB in Bereichen
angewendet werden, wo Gruppenarbeit noch nicht eingefahrt ist.
9. Verfahren bel Meinungsverschledenheiten
Die L6sung von Meinungsverschiedenheiten im Zusammenhang mit dieser Betriebsverein-
barung soil durch eine paritätisch besetzte Kommission geregelt werden.
10. Inkrafttreten
Die Betriebsvereinbarung tritt am Tage der Unterzeichnung in Kraft.
Die bisher geschlossenen Betriebsvereinbarungen zur Gruppenarbeit, Bochum BV-Nr. 18
vom 22.12.1988 und Kaiserslautern BV vom 18.09.1989, werden ab diesem Zeitpunkt durch
diese BV auBer Kraft gesetzt.
11. laindigung
Die Betriebsvereinbarung kann mit 6.monatiger Frist zum Jahresende, erstmals zum
31.12.1993 gekOndigt werden. ROsselsheim, den 04. April 1991
_
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(11) The Teamwork Agreement of Opel-FlOsselsheim(English Translation)
The company agreement No. 179
On 4. April 1991, Adam Opel AG and the works council reached an agreement regarding
the introduction of team work. The agreement (Betriebsvereinbarung No. 179) applies to all
General Motors operations in West Germany (excluding the Eisenach operation).
Introduction:
To meet the challenge of competition and increase workers individual self-development
within the frame of production, the company introduces team work. The essential aim of the
team concept is continuous improvement, increase in flexibility and motivation.
If productivity increases and team sizes can be reduced, the leaving team member will be
employed at a better or similar position within the company
1. Definitions:
The introduction of team work applies to all workers at the ROsselsheim, the Bochum, and
the Kaiserslautern plant, as well as the experimental site at Dudenhofen.
2. Basic Principles of Team Work:
The team size should range between 8 and 15 workers. Each team should accomplish its
production tasks without a short time incorporation of external workers. Teams have follow-
ing responsibilities:
-distribution of work among its members,
-	 regulation of rest time, team-meetings, health and safety improvements, job rota-
tion, holiday planning,
-increase of motivation and satisfaction,
-production tasks and quality demands have to be met,
-compensation of production vacillation,
-costs of production,
-	 production and tool efficiency compensated by minor maintenance and machine
fitting,
-continuous improvement for production,
-developing standardised work charts,
-	 installation of improved tools or production methods within the working area of the
team
-ensure the information flows within the team and to the supervisor,
-training of new team members,
-integration of disabled workers,
-maintaining a clean and tidy work area,
-support creativity, innovations and independence of team members,
-	 participation on work tasks, conditions, production organisation, and working envi-
ronment.
If team-meetings result in suggestions concerning personal changes, the works council need
to approve this suggested changes.
Teams can neither test or examine team members, nor are job evaluation and efficiency
measures responsibilities of the team.
Team-meetings are work related discussions up to one hour and should be on a weekly ba-
sis. Teams define the date of the meetings with regard to production, especially in the case
of shift or area extenting meetings. Team-meetings are held at normal working hours. Off
work time meetings are paid as overtime. Teams are free to determine the subjects of team-
meetings. Further, teams can, for specific questions, invite the necessary specialists, su-
pervisors, and works councillors. Specialists, supervisors, and works councillors can on
team approval introduce special issues in team-meetings.
Wages of team members are based on the company agreement No. 180 and apply to each
member according to the working task.
To reach the goal of flexibility, team members should rotated among different jobs. The
team has to ensure that each team member has the option of developing the necessary
skills. The team cannot hinder any member from self improvement.
3. Team Speaker:
The team speaker represents the team insides and outside of the team. s/he acts on behalf
of the team and has no disciplinary or supervisor right. Secret elections (majority voting) for
the team speaker are held among the team members on a six months (first election) and
later on a one year basis. Previous to the election, the team is to inform about the duties,
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rights and tasks of the team speaker. The term team speaker may end at any time trough a
majority of the team members in a secret election. A deputy team speaker has to be
elected, who deputises for the team speaker during his/her absentees. Team speakers re-
ceive an additional 20 p.c./hour. Deputies receive this payment during their acting time.
The team speakers have the following responsibilities: Team motivation, moderator at
team-meetings, information flow, reaching team tasks, support supervisors, s/he is provided
with the necessary time for his/her duties. "Team speakers have no authority to discipline
people.
4. The Functions of Supervisors
Team work changes the work of supervisors as well, hence his/her task shifts more towards
social functions, as there are: Working together with teams, supporting teams to ensure the
accomplishment of their tasks, supporting communication and co-ordination among teams
and sections, supporting problem-solving processes, supporting qualification of team mem-
bers, Personaleinsatz. Supervisors are responsible for changes of team members among
teams, whereas the teams regulate internal team rotations and supervisors only may advise
teams.
5. Training:
Previous to the introduction all workers will be prepared for team work. Team speakers,
deputy team speaker, supervisors receive an additional communication training. Together
with the works council training methods for qualifications will be developed. The works
council need to approve this training schemes.
6. Suggestions:
Suggestions made by the team will be team suggestions and apply to the agreement con-
cerning "Company Suggestions".
7. Participation and Co-determination of the Works Council:
To ensure the works council's ability of co-determination, it has to be informed about planed
measures within a reasonable period of time previous. The rights of the works council based
on collective and company agreements, laws, and other regulations remains untouched.
8. Introduction:
For Adam Opel AG and works council the target is the introduction of team work as soon as
possible. Local adjustments with works councils need to be arranged. The company wide
introduction of team work will be time consuming. .
9. Negotiations and Procedures:
A committee of equal numbers (company and works council) will be installed to deal with all
necessary negotiations concerning this agreement.
10. Duration:
This agreement will be in force on the 4. of April 1991 and my re-negotiated not before the
31. December 1993. With this agreement the Bochum team work agreement (22. December
1988) and the Kaiserslautern team work agreement (18.09.1989) will be discontinued.
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(J) Supplement to Teamwork Acireement (German Oriainall
Absprache zur BV Nr. 179 'Gruppenarbeit'
Personalzuteilung bei Gruppenarbeit
GeschAftsleitung und Gesamtbetriebsrat der Adam Opel AG treffen folgende Absprache zur
Betriebsvereinbarung Nr. 179 (Gruppenarbeit):
Die Personalzuteilung bei Gruppenarbeit soil einfach und eindeutig sein. Sie soli sich an den
realen Gegebenheiten orientieren. Die Zuteilung erfolgt auf Gruppenbasis.
Rahmenbedlngungen 
- Die rein rechnerische Umstellung zum neuen DV.System/Ermittlungsverfahren erfolgt
personalneutral.
- Im neuen System erfolgt die Zuteilung des notwendigen Personals grundsatzlich nach 4
Hauptgruppen:
a. Produktbezooene Tatigkeiten 
Produktbezogene TAtigkeiten sind Tätigkeiten mit tatsâchlichen Arbeitswerten und der tat-
sächlichen Häufigkeit pro Schicht.
b. Schichtzvklische Servicetatigkeiten 
Schichtzyklische ServicetAtigkeiten sind z. B. Werkzeugwechsel Umbau, AblOsetatigkeiten
und Reinigungsarbeiten.
Sie werden nicht mehr anteilig, sondem mit ihren tatsAchlichen Werten und HAufigkeiten
pro Schicht vorgegeben.
c. Monatszvklische ServIcetatigkelten 
Monatszyklische ServicetAtigkeiten sind z. B. Umbau, vorbeugende Instandhaltung und
vorbereitende TAtigkeiten.
Sie werden pro Ereignis und HAufigkeit beschrieben und in ihrem Zeitbedarf aufgezeigt.
d. Zusfitzliche Titiakeiten und Bedingungen
sind z. B. Abwesenheit, StOrungen, anteilige HelfertAtigkeiten, Werkzeugumtausch, An-
lernen, Training, Ausbildung, KVP und GruppensprechertAtigkeit.
Als Basis Mr die Tätigkeiten a. - c. wird eine Durchschnittsleistung von 103 % pro Gruppe
festgelegt.
Far Linienoperationen (FlieBfertigung) mit eiberwiegendem MTM-Anteil erfolgt die Person-
alzuteilung auf Gruppen mit einer durchschnittlichen Leistung von 100 %. Diese Gruppen-
zuteilung kann bereits vor Einfahrung der Gruppenarbeit durchgefahrt werden.
Nach gemeinsamem Verstandnis kann die Auslastung auf die Gruppenleistung nach den
notwendigen Flexibilisierungen / Qualifizierungen und gegebenenfalls technischen Urn-
gestaltungen der ArbeitsplAtze erzielt werden.
Bis dahin erfolgt eine Korrektur. Solite sich das Personal pro Gruppe rechnerisch nicht auf
voile Personen aufaddieren, wird auf Meisterebene ausgeglichen.
Ubergangszelt  (Altes System und Gruppenarbeit)
Komponenten-, Reparatur-, Nacharbelts-Berelche auBerhalb der Linie.
Die Zuteilung erfolgt auf heute bestehende Abteilungen bzw. Kostenkontrollstellen unter
dem heute jeweils galtigen Uberleistungsprozentsatz.
Unienbereiche (FlieBfertigung)
Die Zuteilung erfolgt pro Gruppe mit durchschnittlich 103 % überleistung (REFA) bzw. 100
% Leistung (MTM).
Neues System 
Die zu regelnden Details des neuen Systems werden von der ParitAtischen Kommission
erarbeitet.
ROsselsheim, den 04. April 1991
Die GeschAftsleitung 	 Der Gesamtbetriebsrat
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(K) Supplement to Teamwork Agreement (English Translation)
Labour Distribution and Team Work
-
The Adam Opel AG management and the works council reached the following agreement
on 4 April 1991.
Rank and file distribution into teams should be simple and clear and should be adjusted to
necessities. The detailed distribution is based on teams.
In the new system, the distribution of personal is based on four main groups:
a) Production:
Production oriented work is an activity, which has real production value and is based on its
frequency per shift.
b) Maintenance (cycle per shift):
Shift cycled maintenance work is for example tool handling, fitting, and cleaning work in re-
lation to its necessity per shift.
C) Maintenance (cycle per month):
Monthly maintenance service work is for example preventive maintenance and preparative
activities should be indicated in its frequency and time.
d) Additional Activities:
This are absentees, interruptions of production, tool changing, assistance work, training,
education, suggestions, and team-meetings.
The basic activity for a team (a to c) is defined with 103 percent per team. According to
common understanding, the full productivity of a team can be accomplished after the nec-
essary training and flexibilisation. Until this level of operation is reached, supervisors will
compensated in the meantime. A committee of equal numbers (company and works council)
will be installed to deal with all necessary negotiations concerning this agreement.
_
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(L) Consolidation-Agreement of the Rüsselsheim Plant (German Original)
Betriebsvereinbarung Nr. 210
Standortsicherung
Anlage 3: MaBnahmen zur Kostenstrukturverbesserunq
Gruppenarbeit:
• Freistellung des Gruppensprechers (kostenneutral)
• Die Gruppensprecher stehen neben den bisherigen Aufgaben far folgende Arbeiten zur
yerfagung:
• Ubemahme der Helfertigkeit und Hilfe bei Taktaberschreitung
• Ablösung der persOnlichen Verteilzeiten der Gruppenmitglieder
• Ubernahme von Reparaturen und SOK
• Wahrnehmung weiterer Aufgaben im Rahmen des QNPS
Die Wahl der Gruppensprecher erfolgt aus einem Personenkreis, dessen fachliche und per-
sOnliche Eignung durch noch festzulegende Auswahlkriterien belegt wurde.
(M) Consolidation-Agreement of the Rasselsheim Plant (English Translation)
Company/Works Council Agreement No. 210
Consolidation
Appendix 3 (i.e. Team work):Measures for Cost Reduction 
Team Work:
• The Team Speaker will be exempt form direct assembly work (at no extra cost for the
company).
• In addition to the general duties of Team Speaker, s/he will have the following respon-
sibilities:
• The Team Speaker will assist the Team in cases where the cycle time is exceeded.
• The Team Speaker will cover for absent Team Members.
• The Team Speaker takes responsibility for minor repairs
• The Team Speaker will carry out additional tasks in accordance with to the QNPS
The Team Speaker will be elected from the Team and must meet the personnel and skill
requirements, to be defined by subsequent arrangement.
-
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(0) List of Semi-structured Interviews
BOckel, Ulrich: 'Works council member at GM's Eisenach plant', personal interview at 13. July 1993
Casu, Guido 1993: "Section workplace representatives (Blocky' at General Motors ROsselsheim
plant', personal interview on 10. August 1993
Eglington, Michael D. 1992: "Manager Employee Relations and Personal Planning", Vauxhall Motors
Luton Plant, personal interview on 3. December 1992
Eglington, Michael D. 1993: "Manager Employee Relations and Personal Planning", Vauxhall Motors
Luton Plant, personal interview on 4. March 1993
Franz, Klaus 1993: "Full time works council member' (freigestellter Betriebsrat) for teamwork intro-
duction at General Motors ROsselsheim plant", personal interview on 26. January 1993
Franz, Klaus 1993a: 'Statements at LenkurgsausschuB meeting (steering committee) on teamwork",
General Motors ROsselsheim plant, LenkungsausschuB Meeting on 12. July 1993
Franz, Klaus 1993b: "Presentation at Works Meeting"-General Motors ROsselsheim plant, Meeting on
15. July 1993
Franz, Klaus 1994: "Full time works council member' (freigestellter Betriebsrat) for team work intro-
duction at General Motors ROsselsheim plant', personal interview on 13. September 1994
Garcia, Jose Luis 1994: "Deputy Convenor of the TGWU at the Vauxhall Motors Luton Plant', Per-
sonal Interviews between 1. and 4. November 1994
Hart, Mark E 1993: "Quality Network Representative - Vauxhall Luton Plant', personal interview at
Vauxhall Motors Ltd. on 2. March 1993
Hasenauer, Karl-Heinz 1993: "Personal Interview with works council member (Paint Shoo) at Adam
Opel AG", Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim 30. June 1993
Herber, Armin 1994: "Personal Interview with secretary (Referent) to the works council at Adam Opel
AG", Adam Opel AG, FlOsselsheim 30. August 1994
Hildmann, Manfred 1993: "Management project leader for introducing the team-concept at the Gen-
eral Motors ROsselsheim dant (Manufacturing)", personal interview on 29. January 1993
Jack, John 1992: "Convenor of the TGWU at the Vauxhall Motors Luton Plant", Personal Interviews
between 1. and 6. December 1992
Jack, John 1993: "Convenor of the TGWU at the Vauxhall Motors Luton Plant", Personal Interviews
between 1. and 6. March 1993
Jack, John 1994: 'Convenor of the TGWU at the Vauxhall Motors Luton Plant", Personal Interviews
between 1. and 4. November 1994
Knapman, Dave 1994: "Employee Service Manager' at the Vauxhall Motors Luton plant, personal
interview on 4. November 1994
Kohlbacher, Uwe 1993: "Section workplace representatives (Blocky)", at General Motors ROsselsheim
plant", personal interview on 19. July 1993
Lalji, Jack 1992: "Supervisor at the Door Module Section", at the Vauxhall Motors Luton plant, per-
sonal interview on 4. December 1992
LaIli, Jack 1993: "Supervisor at the Door Module Section', at the Vauxhall Motors Luton plant, per-
sonal interview on 3. March 1993
Longley, Michael 1994: 'Convenor of the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union at the
Vauxhall Motors Luton Plant', Personal Interview on the 3. November 1994
Mithunaga, Nobuo 1992: "Administrative Department. Nissan-Kyushu olanr, Personal Interview on 5.
September 1992
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Mailer, Rudolf 1993 "Head of the works councils at Opel-ROsselsheim (freigestellter Betriebsrat), per-
sonal interview, Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim 28. July 1993
Payne, Eric 1992: "Senior shoo steward of the MSF union" at the Vauxhall Motors Luton plant, per-
sonal interview on 3. December 1992
Payne, Eric 1993: "Senior shoo steward of the MSF union' at the Vauxhall Motors Luton plant, per-
sonal interview on 4. March 1993
Reitinger, Hans 1993: "Full time works councils member (OMEGA-line) at hall K 40" (freigestellter
Betriebsrat), personal interview, Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim 28. January 1993
Russell, Eric 1993: "Team member and operator" on the Door Module Section at the Vauxhall Motors
Luton plant, personal interview on 4. March 1993
Sadlier, George 1994: "Trade Union Chairman of the Transport and General Workers Union at the
Vauxhall Motors Luton Plant', Personal Interviews between 1. and 4. November 1994
Schischke, Roland 1993: "Statements during LenkungsausschuB (steering committee) for the intro-
duction of teamwork", General Motors ROsselsheim plant (Department of Organisational De-
velopment), LenkungsausschuB Meeting on 12. July 1993
Seib, Karl-Heinz 1993: "Full time works councils member (OMEGA-line) at hall K 40° (freigestellter
Betriebsrat), personal interview, Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim 26. January 1993
Sigges, Dieter 1993: "Full time works councils member at the parts shop" (freigestellter Betriebsrat),
personal interview, Adam Opel AG, Rasselsheim 19. July 1993
Sullivan, John 1993: "TGWU Shoo Steward' on the Door Module Section at the Vauxhall Motors Lu-
ton plant, personal interview on 4. March 1993
Vogel, Hans 1993: "Manager for the Introduction of the Team Conceot at the Door Module Section at
Adam Opel AG", Personal Interview at the General Motors Rasselsheim plant, 27. January
1993
Warman, Bruce 1993: 'Director of Personnel' Vauxhall Motors Ltd. Luton, personal interview on 4.
March 1993
Wink, Gerhard 1993: "Full time works council member" (freigestellter Betriebsrat), personal interview,
Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim, January 1993
Wink, Gerhard 1993a: "Full time works council member" (freigestellter Betriebsrat), personal inter-
view, Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim, August 1993
Witte, Hans-Joachim 1993: "Full time Works councils member at the Door-Module Section"
(freigestellter Betriebsrat), personal interview, Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim 24. June 1993
Ziegler Gotthard 1993: 'Works council member and convenor of workplace representative body" per-
sonal interview at Adam Opel AG, ROsselsheim, January 1993
304
(P) Tables and Graphs for Vauxhall and Opel
P1: Opel's BR Elections
Election Results for the Works Council in •=X,
• Aolown Opel AO, OArnsAny, AAA A1A: 'ALA (111104)
fAultl-L/nlon ElsotIona In 1990 A 1994
PAO 7.1
Slalor M.1
AA.1•ur.
Ism n.•
'GAB Mots"! Woricera 'Union313..dkG ==. "white collar ir-Tailoia" (like MS1r)CNICY	 clairiatisan Union (Dol. Union)
1990
Sizler n• Turkish List
Alternative Turkish
List 110•01n110 60.1.101•••n• ISOM
Works Council Elections Opel Rasselsheim
Number of VVorlas 'Council Santa In 1990 mina 1994
'Mamma. 111•nn•n11.1•04.1eli•
ea Metall
MN ow.
Mlomv
IEZOI albar-loln
Elections In 1990
43
Elections In 1984
P3: BR and Workers at Opel
Works Council - Worker Relation (1993)
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P6: Workplace Representatives & Consituencies
Vertrauensleute & Constituency at Opel/Germany
Flaw many union members are represented by one VL ?
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P5: TGWU-Stewards and Workgroups
P7: Works Council-Members & Workers
Representation & BetrVe
Average amount ol Workers represented by one WC and lull4Ime WC
Workers WCa	 lull-time WC
1000 91 500
2000 134 667
3000 156 750
4000 174 800
5000 165 634
7000 241 675
9000 290 900
12000 364 858
15000 429 833
16000 466 1000
21000 538 1000
24000 585 1091
27000 628 1125
30000 667 1200
arms-awin
The graph shows, that if a company has 1000 workers one part-time
works council-member has to represent 91 and a full-time works council-
member 500. If the number of workers increases to 30,000 one part-time
works council-member represents 667 workers and a full-time works
council-member 1,200. In other words, when the size of a company in
terms of workers increases, the ration between works council-members
and workers is increasingly to their disadvantage. 
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